to accept the bill, already accepted by the proper drawee, "was not a party to the bill by reason of his name being placed upon it." Here the bill was signed by both drawer and drawee, who then became acceptor; and the signature of B was held to be a nullity. In such a state of case and without words indicating his intention to be bound in some other capacity, would he not under this section be deemed an indorser? It seems to be the purpose of this section, Subsection 6 of Section 17 and Section 64, to attach the liability of indorser to everyone signing a negotiable paper, except those who sign as maker, drawer, or acceptor, or by appropriate words indicate their intention to be bound otherwise.

While the Court of Appeals in Owensboro Savings Bank & Trust Company's Rec. v. Haynes, 143 Ky. 534, 136 S. W. 1004, seemed uncertain as to whether one, who had written his name on the back of a negotiable note, could prove by parol that he was a surety, they had only one year before in Mechanics' & Farmers' Savings Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071, decided that very question in the negative; and fifteen days after passed upon it again, deciding it in the same way. First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 790. These cases were followed by Grayson County Bank v. Elbert, 143 Ky. 750, 137

S. W. 792; First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 154 Ky. 11, 156 S. W. 856; Lyons Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 147 Ky. 653, 145 S. W. 376. In these cases it was held that one who placed his name on the back of a negotiable instrument without words in the indorsement showing a different intention, was liable to the holder as indorser only and that parol evidence could not be introduced to show that he was a surety or a guarantor or bound in any capacity other than as indorser. In the first Bickel case it was said: "The purpose of the statute is to exclude parol evidence and to make the written instrument control the rights of the parties." But in the same case it was held, dicta, that, as between the parties, parol evidence could be introduced "to show whose debt it is, that the real debtor may be required as between the debtors themselves to discharge his own debt rather than one who is secondarily liable for it."

In Young v. Exchange Bank, 152 Ky. 293, 153 S. W. 444, this section was held to be declarative of the common law and applied to the liability of an accommodation indorser on a draft drawn and indorsed before this Act was passed.

This section was cited and applied in Hoyland v. National Bank, of Middlesborough, 137 Ky. 682, 126 S. W. 356; Williams v. Paintsville Nat. Bank, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S. W. 534; Ken

tucky Title Savings Bank, etc. v. Langan, 144 Ky. 46, 137 S. W. 846.

§ 64. Liability of Signer in Blank, Not Otherwise a Party.-"Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following rules:

(1) "If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties.

(2) "If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.

(3) "If he signs for the accommodation (Secs. 29, 68) of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee."

See note to Sections 63 and 68.

Where a married woman, not a party to the draft, indorsed it in blank, she was held an accommodation indorser thereby undertaking to answer for the default of another, and therefore not liable. Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Langan, 144 Ky. 46, 137 S. W. 846.

Notice that in order to hold one under this section he must sign in blank and before delivery.

§ 65. Warranty-Where Negotiated by

Delivery or Qualified Indorsement.-"Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery (Secs. 30, 190) or by a qualified indorsement (Sec. 38) warrants:

(1) "That the instrument is genuine and in all respect what it purports to be.

(2) "That he has a good title to it. (3) "That all prior parties had capacity to contract.

(4) "That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.

"But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.

"The provisions of subdivision three of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or corporate securities, other than bills and notes."

See note to Section 66 and note to Section 57 on void instruments.

The first three subsections seem to be but a codification of the common law. Maupin v. Compton, 3 Bibb 214; Cope v. Asberry, 2 J. J. Mar. 296; Ware v. McCormack, 96 Ky. 139, 28 S. W. 157, 959, 16 K. L. R. 385; Wilcoxen v. Morse, 44 S. W. 142, 19 K. L. R. 1830; Monarch v. Farmers' & Drover's Bank, 105 Ky. 430, 49 S. W. 317, 20 K. L. R. 1351.

In Markley v. Withers, 4 T. B. Mon. 14, it was held that one who transferred a note by delivery did not warrant the solvency of the maker; and in Johnson v. Welby, 2 B. Mon. 122, such a transferor of a bill could not be held except for a failure of consideration, the court intimating that the fraud should amount to knowledge that the bill would not be paid and could not be enforced. All these cases are founded on the collateral warranties which would accompany the sale of a chattel. But under this Act the warranties are a part of the contract of negotiation. So if one indorses without recourse he is liable, if the instrument is not genuine, or if he has not a good title to it, or if he knew of any fact which would impair its validity (such, for instance, as a gambling debt), or would render it valueless.

§ 66. Liability of General Indorser."Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course (Sec. 52):

(1) "The matters and things mentioned in Subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of the next preceding section; and

(2) "That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.

"And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or