v. Owensboro Banking Company, 106 Ky. 706, 51 S. W. 453, 21 K. L. R. 320. In neither of these cases is it disclosed in the opinion whether the bills were inland or foreign. This silence of the Court indicates that this was an immaterial question and that these statutes applied to both character of bills.

Next, does Section 184 of this Act, which makes notes payable to order or bearer negotiable, place them upon the footing of a bill of exchange? We would not discuss this but for the doubt thrown upon it by dicta in Southern National Bank v. Schimpler, 159 Ky. 372, 167 S. W. 148. (See note to Section 184). The very origin of the negotiability of promissory notes is the Statute of Third and Fourth Anne which declares that promissory notes "shall have the same effect and be negotiable in like manner as inland bills of exchange according to the custom of merchants." In addition, the Court of Appeals in two cases (German Nat. Bank v. Zimmer, 141 Ky. 401, 132 S. W. 1023 and Stevens v. Gregg, 89 Ky. 461, 12 S. W. 775, 11 K. L. R. 686) held that an Ohio statute, almost identical to Section 184 of this Act, placed an Ohio note "on the footing of a bill of exchange."

The case of Young v. Bennett supra involved an inland bill of exchange which was drawn and

"And

completed between the time of the passage of Section 479 and Sections 3723, etc. The Court does not refer to any statute, but held: while it may have been wholly immaterial whether the bill was protested or not, yet inasmuch as it was done, and the notice of such protest gave to appellee information of its dishonor, he cannot avoid the legal effect of the same, by reason of the fact that the protest itself and a notice of the same were superfluous and unnecessary."

It thus appears that these statutes were applied to inland bills of exchange in every case that has come before the Court of Appeals except possibly in the Young case. And in that case the statute was not referred to nor was the Court's attention called to it, and the Court having held that the appellee had received sufficient notice, anything said beyond that was superfluous. In addition, the above section (118) of this Act expressly gives the holder the right to have protested an inland bill or a negotiable note. To give this right and then to say that the protest would prove nothing is to render it a nullity.

Section 3726 applied in Harmon v. Wilson, 1 Duv. 323.

The protest having been duly made, is prima facie evidence of such facts stated herein as are

specified and required by Sections 479, 3723, 3725 and 3726.

For note on how and by whom the protest should be made, see notes to Sections 153 and 154. And as to sufficiency and manner of giving notice, see notes to other sections of this article.

ARTICLE VIII.

DISCHARGE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

Section 119. How instrument discharged.

120. What discharges a person secondarily liable.

121. Rights of party secondarily liable who pays instrument.

122.

123.

124.

125.

Renunciation by holder.

Unintentional cancellation; burden of proof.

Material alteration; effect of.

What is a material alteration.

§ 119. How Instrument Discharged."A negotiable instrument is discharged:

(1) "By payment in due course (Sec. 88) by or on behalf of the principal debtor.

(2) "By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation.

(3) "By the intentional cancellation (Sec. 123) thereof by the holder.

(4) "By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money.

(5) "When the principal debtor be

comes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right.”

A note in the hands of the maker and indorsed by the payee is presumed to have been paid. Long v. Bank of Cynthiana, 1 Litt. 290; Ellis v. Blackerby, 78 S. W. 181, 25 K. L. R. 1557. But this presumption can be overthrown by plea and proof that the paper was indorsed for the accommodation of the principal debtor. Callahan v. First Nat. Bank, 78 Ky. 604; Callahan v. Bank of Kentucky, 82 Ky. 231.

The payment must be made by or on behalf of the principal debtor. Thus where two indorsers purchased from the holder a release from all liability on the bill, it was held in a suit by the holder that the sums so paid did not inure to the benefit of the parties antecedent to said indorsers, even though the aggregate of the two payments exceeded the amount due on the bill. Bank of Kentucky v. Floyd, 4 Met. 159.

Of course a payment by an indorser does not discharge the bill as between him and antecedent parties. Bowman v. Wright, 7 Bush 375.

Subsection 4 must refer to the acceptance of a chattel in satisfaction of the paper, or a cancellation of the contract which was its consideration, a settlement or a new binding contract or any