are cut off that caused the Legislature to reduce the time of limitation from fifteen to five years.

GENERAL NOTES.

Although it was held in Piner v. Clary, 17 B. Mon. 645, that a certificate of deposit by reason of its indorsement became a bill of exchange, yet under this Act, we think, it would be a promissory note. See Krebs v. Blatz, 134 Ky. 505, 121 S. W. 436, and authorities cited.

While a surety, on a promissory note, is liable only as surety as against a payee with knowledge of the fact that he is a surety, Weller v. Ralston, 89 S. W. 698, 28 K. L. R. 572, yet under this Act he is only a maker and therefore not entitled to presentment, demand or notice, Fritts v. Kirchdorfer, 136 Ky. 643, 124 S. W. 882. Nor can an indorser for accommodation be treated as a surety. First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 790; Grayson County Bank v. Elbert, 143 Ky. 750, 137 S. W. 792.

The note sued on in Mechanics & Farmers' Savings Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071, possessed all the requirements of negotiability required by this Act. See on this point Wettlaufer v. Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W.

1071, where it was held that a note not payable to order or to bearer was not negotiable.

On the question of limitation see Arnett v. Howard, 156 Ky. 458, 161 S. W. 531, where it was held that the assignor of a non-negotiable promissory note was released unless the action was brought in five years. But a note which is payable to order and made negotiable by the statute of the State, in which it was executed and payable, is barred in five years (see Kentucky Statutes, Section 2515), German Nat. Bank v. Zimmer, 141 Ky. 401, 132 S. W. 1023. Notwithstanding all these decisions it was held in Southern Nat. Bank v. Schimpler, 159 Ky. 372, 167 S. W. 148, that Section 2515 of Kentucky Statutes was repealed by this Act and that a surety was not released until seven years after the cause of action accrued (Section 2551, Kentucky Statutes).

For annotations involving void notes and peddler's notes not properly indorsed, see note to Section 57.

As to notes made payable to the order of the maker, see Section 480 of the Kentucky Statutes and the cases of Pace v. Welmending, 12 Bush 142, and Bramlett v. Caldwell, 105 Ky. 202, 48 S. W. 982, 20 K. L. R. 1123.

As to what is a complete note under this sec

tion, see Robertson v. Commercial Security Co., 152 Ky. 336, 153 S. W. 450.

As to protest of negotiable promissory notes, see notes to Sections 118, 154 and 155.

§ 185. What Is a Check?-"A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank (Sec. 190) payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check."

In Shrieve v. Duckham, 1 Litt. 195 and Humphries v. Bicknell, 2 Litt. 297, the Court of Appeals gave the same definition of a check as that given in the above section. Afterwards, as will be shown in notes to the succeeding sections of this article, the Court drew certain distinctions between bills of exchange and checks, which no longer exist under this Act.

Since a check is now a bill of exchange and governed by the same rules, except as modified by Sections 186, 187, 188 and 189, it follows that a drawer of a check is released where the check was presented, dishonored, and due notice not given to him. See Section 89. This has changed the law of this State to this extent. See Lester v. Given, 8 Bush 357, where it was held that the drawer of a check was "in some sort the prin

cipal debtor and he was not discharged by any laches of the holder ** * in not giving him notice of dishonor, unless he suffered some loss or injury thereby and then only pro tanto."

Where a forged draft was paid by a bank by placing the proceeds to the credit of the holder (who was a party to the forgery) and he in turn paid a debt by a check on this deposit, and the bank paid this by giving the creditor credit by placing it to his credit and giving him a pass book evidencing his deposit, it was held that his and his assignee's rights were not affected by the original forgery, of which they knew nothing. J. M. Robinson & Co. v. Bank of Pineville, 146 Ky. 538, 142 S. W. 1065. To this extent this would be good law under this Act. But the holding in that case that the check to a third party gave the holder a right of action against the bank, is not now the rule. See Section 189 and note.

While it is a general rule that a bank must know the signatures of its depositors, and having paid a forged check to a holder in due course cannot recover back the money (Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 10, 13 S. W. 339, 11 K. L. R. 803), yet where the paying bank failed to have the holder identified and paid the forged check upon a forged indorsement, and thereafter the check was paid by the bank upon

which it was drawn, it was held that the money could be recovered by it from the paying bank, because first, of the negligence of the paying bank in not requiring identification and, second, because the paying bank warranted the forged indorsement. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986.

For cases on protest see notes to Sections 118, 153 and 154.

§ 186. When a Check Must Be Presented. "A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time (Sec. 192) after its issue, or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay."

The facts being admitted the question of when a check should be presented is one of law to be determined by the Court, and where the parties and the bank on which the check is drawn are all residents of the same town, the check need not be presented for payment until the next secular day in order to hold the drawer. Cawein v. Browinski, 6 Bush 457.

But it will be noticed that this section refers exclusively to the drawer. If the check is not presented within a reasonable time the drawer is discharged only to the extent of loss caused by the delay. Lester v. Givens, 8 Bush 357; Smith v.