Such notes are now not payable on a contingency

within the meaning of this act.

This section is cited in Wettlaufer v. Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W. 741.

§ 9. When Payable to Bearer.-"The instrument is payable to bearer:

(1) "When it is expressed to be so payable; or

(2) "When it is payable to a person named therein or bearer; or

(3) "When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable; or

(4) "When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person; or (5) "When the only or last endorsement is an endorsement in blank (Sec. 34)."

Notice the words in Subsection 5 only or last.

One who indorses a note payable neither to order nor bearer, does not incur any liability as indorser, arising under this Act. (Wettlaufer v. Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W. 741).

Where the last indorsement on a lost note was in blank, it is necessary that the plaintiff execute bond required by Section 7 of the Civil Code. Hoyland v. National Bank of Middlesborough, 137 Ky. 682, 126 S. W. 356; but where

it is payable to order and not indorsed in blank, no such bond is required. Foster's Adm'r. v. Metcalfe, 144 Ky. 385; 138 S. W. 314.

§ 10. Sufficient Terms.-"The negotiable instrument need not follow the language of this Act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements thereof (Sec. 17).”

§ 11. Date, Presumption.-"When the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be (Sec. 45)."

§ 12. Antedated or Post-Dated-Effect Of. "The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated or postdated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered, acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery."

§ 13. When Holder May Insert True Date. "When an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert there

in the true date of issue or acceptance and the instrument shall be payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date (Sec. 14)."

§ 14. When Blanks May Be Filled."Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered (Secs. 15 and 16) by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiable* to a holder in due course it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time."

*In the original draft the word "negotiated" was used.

It should be noted that this section gives only the right to complete the instrument. Where any words are added to a complete note, it is an alteration. See Section 125 and Blakey v. Johnson, 13 Bush 197. Also that the instrument must be delivered. See Section 15. Such a paper is negotiable only when completed.

In the cases of Bank of Limestone v. Penick, 5 T. B. Mon. 25; Taylor v. Craig, 2 J. J. Mon. 449; Bank of Com. v. Curry, 2 Dana 142; Bank of Kentucky v. Garey, 6 B. Mon. 626; Patton v. Shanklin, 14 B. Mon. 13; Jones v. Shelbyville Fire & L. Ins. Co., 1 Met. 58; Rogers v. Poston, 1 Met. 643; Smith v. Lockridge, 8 Bush 423; Woolfolk v. Bank of America, 10 Bush 504; Cason v. Grant County Deposit Bank, 97 Ky. 487; 31 S. W. 40, 17 K. L. R. 344; and Stanley v. Davis, 107 S. W. 773, 33 K. L. R. 1135; involving notes executed before the passage of this Act, it was held that where one signed and delivered a blank note, he was liable for any amount or any stipulation inserted in the proper blank, irrespective of any limitation of authority, of which limitation the payee or holder had no notice. This is undoubtedly yet the law as to a holder in due course as defined in this act, as is shown by the words of this section and the case of Diamond Distilleries Co. v. Gott, 137 Ky. 585, 126 S. W. 131; but the ques

tion seems to be open as to the rights of a payee, under this section, where the note is filled out in violation of the directions of the signer. In the case of Hermann's Exor. v. Gregory, 131 Ky. 819, 115 S. W. 809, it was contended that, where H. signed a blank note for a certain purpose, and where it was filled out and payees' names inserted by the attorney of the payees and in their presence and then signed by principal debtor and delivered for another purpose, but payees were ignorant of the limitation, H. was not liable. It was argued that payees were parties to the note before its completion; that the note had not been negotiated to them (Section 30), because not being payable to bearer was therefore not negotiable by delivery, but being payable to order of payees was of course not negotiated to them by indorsement; that payees were not holders in due course (Sec. 52, Subsec. 4) and that they were immediate parties (Section 16). The Court said: "Without wholly giving our consent to the contention of appellant, let us see whether his testator's estate can escape liability under the rule laid down by himself," and the Court proceeded to hold that the directions of appellant had not been violated. But we suggest that such signer might yet be held estopped by reason of his negligence in delivering the paper in blank. See note to Section 124.