For form of plea of no consideration, see Evans v. Stone, 80 Ky. 78; Mullikin v. Mullikin, 23, S. W. 352, 25 S. W. 598, 15 K. L. R. 612; Allnutt v. Allnutt's Exr., 127 S. W. 986; Bronston's Adm'r. v. Lakes, supra.

The burden of proof is on the person alleging no consideration. Radford's Adm'r. v. Harris, 144 Ky. 809, 139 S. W. 963.

But if the pleader unnecessarily sets out the consideration he must prove it. Bronston's Adm'r. v. Lake, supra, and cases cited therein.

§ 25. What Constitutes a Consideration. "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes a value, and is deemed such, whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time."

Sections 25, 26 and 27 are so intimately connected that they are annotated together.

Decisions Prior to Passage of Negotiable Instrument Act.

Prior to the enactment of this law it was held in this State that where one received a negotiable instrument in payment of an antecedent debt, or in consideration of the suspension of a previous right of action, or the relinquishment

of any security, he was a purchaser for value; Alexander v. Springfield Bank, 2 Met. 534. This was also the law as to a simple contract; May v. Quimby & Co., 3 Bush 96. But one, who merely took negotiable paper as security for a pre-existing debt, was not a holder for value; Lee's Adm'r. v. Smead, etc., 1 Met. 628; Thompson v. Poston, 1 Duv. 389. The same was true of a pledge of shares of stock; Shuster v. Jones, 58 S. W. 595, 22 K. L. R. 568. In the case of Walker v. Harris, 114 S. W. 775, it was decided that the pledge of shares of stock to secure a note payable one day after date and given for a pre-existing debt was not supported by a valuable consideration, that one day after date was not a real suspension of a right of action and that the Negotiable Instrument Act did not apply because the note was executed before its enactment. But the question arises does this Act change the law of consideration except where negotiable paper is concerned; and would it not have been well to have placed the decision on that ground? It was not negotiable instruments but shares of stock that were pledged.

Decisions Involving Negotiable Instrument Act.

Value. Extension of time given the principal, is a sufficient consideration to bind sureties sign

ing the new note, although they had been released, without their knowledge, on the old note; Steger v. Jackson, 102 S. W. 329; Davis v. Bank of Clarkson, 144 Ky. 417 138 S. W. 246. Taking a note in payment of a previous note constitutes one a holder for value. Campbell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 137 Ky. 555, 126 S. W. 114. But where one deposits his own check on another bank, and is permitted to check against the same, but under an agreement to reimbuse the collecting bank if check is not paid, the collecting bank is not a holder for value, Boswell v. Citizens' Savings Bank, 123 Ky. 485, 96 S. W. 797.

Value paid at any time. In each of the following cases the holder was held to be a holder for value. Where after the delivery of the note the payee paid debts of the maker of equal amount, Hermann's Exr. v. Gregory, 131 Ky. 819, 115 S. W. 809. Where one deposited a check and at the time drew out part of the money and drew balance before bank received notice of dishonor, Choteau Trust & Banking Co. v. Smith, 133 Ky. 418, 118 S. W. 279.

Where A deposited in R Bank two checks for $1,000.00, each on F Bank, one certified and the other not; and both checks were dishonored, but R. Bank was not notified of dishonor of uncertified check and permitted A to withdraw the

amount of both checks, held that R. Bank paid value for both checks; that its action in doing so was proper, for it had the right to assume that the certified check would be paid, First Nat. Bank v. Bank of Ravenswood, 141 Ky. 671, 133 S. W. 581. Also see American Nat. Bank v. J. S. Minor & Sons, 142 Ky. 792, 135 S. W. 278, where it was held that an extension given a debtor was a sufficient consideration to support a pledge of a note to secure the debt extended and for the payment "of any other liability of mine to said bank due or to become due, or that may hereafter be contracted."

Where C delivered a negotiable note to J, in consideration of his becoming surety for C, under agreement that the note was to be the property of J if he had to pay the note on which he was surety, and J did pay that note, held that he was the holder for value and owner of the note pledged, Jett v. Standafer, 143 Ky. 787, 137 S. W. 513.

The renewal by a bank of certain obligations of a corporation is a sufficient consideration to support an agreement by certain directors "in consideration of loans already made and to be made," by the bank to the corporation, to become jointly liable on all obligations of the corporation indorsed by either of them. First Nat. Bank v. Doherty, 156 Ky. 386, 161, S. W. 210.

Lien to secure a pre-existing debt. Where one holds a note as security for a pre-existing debt, he is a holder for value, Wilkins v. Usher, 123 Ky. 696, 97 S. W. 37, 29 K. L. R. 1232; Citizens' Bank v. Bank of Waddy's Rec., 126 Ky. 169, 103 S. W. 248, 31 K. L. R. 365; Campbell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 137 Ky. 555, 126 S. W. 114; Diamond Distilleries Co. v. Gott, 137 Ky. 585, 126 S. W. 131; American Nat. Bank v. Minor, supra.

Where there is a good defense as between the parties, the pledgee in due course can recover only the amount of the debt for which note was pledged, Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 157 Ky. 617, 163 S. W. 766. But in this case it was held that plaintiff could not be required to look to its other collaterals first; while in the Bank of Waddy case it was held that it could be so compelled.

"Without receiving value therefor" evidently means receiving no value for the instrument. It does not mean that an individual or a surety company, receiving a premium to become a surety or accommodation party, has received value within the meaning of this section. "No portion of the proceeds was paid by the bank to him. It was not executed for his accommodation," Mechanic's & Farmers' Savings Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1070; and in First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 890, it is empha