before they signed it, and had ample opportunity to read it." No authorities are cited, but the Court seems to draw the distinction between the signature of a person to a negotiable instrument which he believes and has a right to believe is something else, and where he knows or ought to know what he is signing and is deceived as to the purpose for which it is to be used. The authorities in other states are divided on this question. And see note to Section 52 on notes detached from contracts; for in those cases it might be contended that makers were deceived into signing the notes by the implied representation that they were inseparable parts of the contract.

"We think that the rule is now well-established that as between himself and the party accommodated, the accommodation party is in effect a surety, and his right to recourse against the party accommodated is that of a surety aganist a principal debtor. As to other holders of the paper, his liability is in general that of a similar party (maker, acceptor, or indorser) who receives value, but he is so far a surety as to holders with notice of his accommodation character that he will be discharged by arrangements made to his prejudice with the principal debtor without his knowledge." Morehead v. Citizens' Deposit Bank, 130 Ky. 414, 113 S. W. 501.

The fact that the holder sued the maker of a check and did not sue the indorser, is not proof that it was no longer the real holder and was suing for the benefit of the indorser. Holder had right to sue any or all parties. Choteau Trust & Bankink Co. v. Smith, 130 Ky. 418, 118 S. W. 279.

The cancellation of a contract which was the consideration of a note did not affect the rights of a holder in due course, a bank, but maker was entitled to certificates of deposit issued to payee as purchase price for the notes, all three being parties to the action. Southern Ins. Co. v. Milligan, 154 Ky. 216, 157 S. W. 37.

This section is cited in Bothwell v. Corum, 135 Ky. 766, 123 S. W. 291; Jett v. Standafer, 143 Ky. 787, 137 S. W. 513.

Notice that under this section a holder in due course can "enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon." This changes the rule as between the holder and his immediate indorsee laid down in Pilcher v. The Banks supra.

§ 58. When Subject to Defenses.-"In the hands of any holder other than in due course (Sec. 52), a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course, and

who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter."

See Lester v. Given, 8 Bush 357; Greenwell v. Haydon, 78 Ky. 332; Greer v. Bently, 43 S. W. 219, 19 K. L. R. 1251; Childers v. Billiter, 144 Ky. 53, 137 S. W. 795; Austin v. First Nat. Bank, 150 Ky. 113, 150 S. W. 8.

In Cline v. Templeton, 78 Ky. 550, A executed his note to B, who indorsed to C, who discounted it in a bank. It was not paid at maturity and was taken up by C, who at the time he purchased it from B, knew of its infirmity, held that C could not recover. It will be noticed that in this case C knew of the infirmity at the time he purchased the note, and hence he could not then recover on it. He could not strengthen his title by further negotiation. But if he had not been a party to the note before it had come into the hands of a holder in due course, and if he had not been a party to the fraud or illegality, and he had bought it for value from such holder, his knowledge would be no defense.

Where A executed his note to B, who indorsed it to C, who indorsed it to D, who sued A upon it and A pleaded a good defense and that D had notice of it at the time of his purchase, held that

D could not rely on the fact that C was a holder in due course unless he alleged that fact. Childers v. Billiter supra.

§ 59. Holder Deemed a Holder in Due Course.-"Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course (Sec.52); but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course. But the last mentioned rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such defective title."

Every holder is deemed a holder in due course. See Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana 133; Hargis v. Louisville Trust Co., 30 S. W. 875, 17 K. L. R. 218; McCarty v. Louisville Banking Co., 100 Ky. 4, 37 S. W. 144, 18 K. L. R. 569; Wilkins v. Usher, 123 Ky. 696, 97 S. W. 37, 29 K. L. R. 1232.

Every holder is deemed to be the owner. Crosthwait v. Misner, 13 Bush 543; Callahan v. Louisville Dry Goods Co., 140 Ky. 712, 131 S W. 995. Not every holder in due course is absolute owner; he may only have a lien on the paper under Section 26; and it is obvious that one may be the owner and yet not a holder in due course.

Burden of proof. The old rule was that, since "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course," this presumption "cannot be overcome by mere allegation, in defense of an action on the note, of anything short of facts, which if true, would render the note absolutely void from the beginning, so as to shift the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. And in all cases, except where the allegations in defense are of facts which would render the instrument sued on void from the beginning, allegation and proof must be made by the defendant, who is bound on the negotiable instrument, of facts that would remove the presumption, such fraud in its inception, or circumstances raising a strong suspicion of fraud, before the plaintiff can be required to show by testimony when, by what means, and the circumstances under which he acquired the right to and the possession of the note, in order to show his right to recover thereon." McCarty v. Louisville Banking Co. supra, and see David v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 103 Ky. 586, 45 S. W. 878, 20 K. L. R. 263.

But this rule as an entirety is not now the law. The burden of proof shifts only when it is "shown" (by the face of the paper, or by allegations undenied, or by proof) that the holder's title is defective as defined in Section 55. See Arnett v.