an iteration in different form. Here again, of course, exposure is refutation; and here again the counsel recurs, never to let a term pass without scrutinizing its implication.

3. THE BURDEN OF PROOF

123. The sufficiency of any argument as a whole depends somewhat on "the burden of proof." Burden of proof is a legal phrase to express the degree of proof necessary for one side as compared with that necessary for the other. It is expressed in the legal maxim, “He who affirms must prove."

A is District Attorney. B charges him with using his office for private gain. The burden of proof is on B; i.e. at law or in ordinary discussion, A is not obliged on hearing his charge to prove his innocence - else a man must be publishing himself daily; but B is obliged to prove A's guilt. Actually A may content himself with showing the insufficiency of B's arguments against him, or he may bring forward direct arguments for his own innocence; but since the burden of proof is on B, A will be right, and probably wise, in simply meeting what B brings forward.

So he who affirms that Christian missions in China should be suspended has the burden of proof. The supporters of the negative have done enough if they show his reasons to be insufficient. They do not have to establish, from the foundation up, that Christian missions in China should be pursued. So in general the attacking party, supposing the proposition to express, as it always should, a real issue, has the harder task; for the defence has the advantage of position. So, in another aspect, the burden of proof is on whoever attacks an old or recognized institution or practice; or, conversely, the presumption is in favour of what is accepted by custom or tradition.

In the course of argument the burden may be shifted from one side to the other. Thus if A wishes the public (or a court of law) to believe that B's attack upon him is malicious, or that B received money for making the attack, he must prove. The burden of proof then falls on him. For he that makes a particular affirmation, as of fact, not less than he that makes a general affirmation, as of principle, practice, or policy, has the burden of proof.

4. METHODS OF REFUTATION

124. Though refutation is not a separate kind of argument, it uses, more commonly than direct argument does, certain distinct methods. These are the logical exclusion, the dilemma, and the reductio ad absurdum. Logical exclusion consists in proving the proposition to be the only satisfactory solution by proving in succession every other solution to be unsatisfactory. Ideally this kind of destructive analysis must first make a complete division (§ 57); that is, it must not overlook any essential consideration. Then it must show sufficient grounds for rejecting successively each rival proposition until only the one remains. In this ideal form it is like Mill's canon of residues (§ 99, iv.); it is absolute demonstration; and, like other sorts of absolute demonstration, it is not applicable in ordinary arguments. But in ordinary arguments it has great cogency even though it cannot be pushed to completeness.

As far as I am capable of discerning, there are but three ways of proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your colonies and disturbs your government. These are: to change that spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or to comply with it as

necessary.

BURKE:

Conciliation with America (Select

Works, ed. Payne, vol. I., page 187).

Burke then proceeds to show that neither of the first two ways is feasible. But he does not rest there; for his proof cannot be final, since his division may not be exhaustive. He goes on, therefore, to show directly that the third way would be adequate, feasible, and advantageous, and that it is practically necessary.

In like manner Huxley's argument1 for the theory of the development of all forms of life from protoplasm is conducted by successive rejections of all other theories. The conclusion is that the protoplasm theory is true so far as we know. Since it is not inconceivable that another hypothesis may arise from subsequent discoveries, a hypothesis it remains; but the hypothesis embodies what we now know of the truth, and the method of reaching it is largely useful in refutation.

125. In detail, logical exclusion may be used to overthrow an opponent's argument by showing that his proposition, general or particular, involves untenable premises or inferences. "My opponent's position as to this can be based on (or can lead to) only X, Y, or Z. But X is untenable, and Y, and Z. Therefore the position is untenable." Where the analysis reduces the position to alternatives, it is called a dilemma, and the holder of the position is said to be on the horns of the dilemma. Either way involves him in difficulty.

The next fault is that the inflicting of that punishment is not on the opinion of an equal and public judge, but is referred to the arbitrary discretion of a private, nay, interested and irritated individual. He who formally is, and substantially ought to be, the judge, is in reality no more than minis

1 On the Physical Basis of Life.

terial, a mere executive instrument of a private man, who is at once judge and party. Every idea of judicial order is subverted by this procedure. If the insolvency be no crime, why is it punished with arbitrary imprisonment? If it be a crime, why is it delivered into private hands to pardon without discretion, or to punish without mercy and without measure? BURKE: To the Electors of Bristol (quoted in Genung's Rhetoric).

This is highly effective; but, as generally in logical exclusion, care must be taken to provide against any other possible way out, against what formal logic calls the tertium quid. The dilemma must present absolute alternatives.

126. Reductio ad absurdum is showing that an opponent's position involves an absurd conclusion. Formally, it assumes the opponent's position, and then deduces from it a conclusion manifestly untenable. Informally, as in the Platonic dialogues of Socrates, or in actual discussion by question and answer, it leads an opponent on, step by step, to admit the absurd conclusion himself.

Like this is showing that an opponent's argument "proves too much"; i.e. that if it were applicable at all, it would be applicable also to some other case in which it is manifestly inadmissible.

127. This and all other applications of the method of exclusion demand great care. They are edged tools; if they fail to cut one's adversary, they are pretty sure to cut oneself. Moreover, they should be used only when the exclusion will be seen by the audience to be complete, to be real. And, in general, refutation must always be within the grasp of the audience, it must never

go into subtleties that may seem like quibbles, and it must not try to answer every point singly. In fact, the best general counsel as to refutation is to meet the issue plainly oneself, and to insist that it be met plainly by one's opponent. If he shift his ground, leaving his line of attack to pursue another, this must be pointed out as a damaging admission; but, on the other hand, it is neither fair nor wise to allege admissions that are not necessarily implied; and it is both dangerous and puerile to impute unworthy motives or inferior intelligence. It must never be forgotten that refutation is not trick, and that its proper object is a proposition, not a man.

128. Finally, it must not be forgotten that refutation has to meet, not only the separate forces of the opponent's arguments, but also the combined force of his argument as a whole. The opponent's case must appear, not merely weak here and weak there, but weaker as a whole than one's own case (§ 121). Refutation, then, is not merely analysis in the sense of detaching separate points for answer. This is a necessary part of it, but not the whole. It is destructive, but it is also constructive; it meets the other side as a whole by proving one's own side as a whole the stronger.

e. The Preparation of Proof

I. ANALYSIS A PRIORI

129. In most argumentation the proposition is fixed beforehand by formal or informal agreement. When this is not done, when the speaker has to fix his own proposition, he must spend his first pains in stating it definitely, so that it shall be beyond mistake, and then