from facts, a generalization. Whether the truth be that the Chinese are averse to Christianity or averse to certain methods of Christianizing; whether it be the government that is averse, or the people, — is an inquiry to be conducted only by determining many facts of detail. Even the so-called facts of one's own observation need to be disentangled from inference. A declares that the United States War Department in 1898 mismanaged the camps, supplies, hospital arrangements, and transportation. A himself saw the mismanagement in the camp at Montauk. Now what did A see? He saw landings from the transports delayed, the railway tracks crowded at the terminus, emaciated soldiers, hardly able to walk along the platforms, crowded into cars of any sort, dust, confusion, hideous details of disease. If A saw these things, these are the facts. He did not see mismanagement; he inferred it, and the inference must be tested as an inference. Mismanagement is not the only possible cause. The cause may have been partly the unavoidable climate of Cuba, partly the impossible demands of a condition not to be foreseen. Moreover, A saw only a part. Was that part typical or exceptional? Subsequent governmental inquiry failed to prove mismanagement. A's inference, whether valid or invalid, he must not set down as fact. Again, the alleged right of the Chinese to restrict missionary effort is not a fact either. Right is abstract; facts are concrete. The strike of the coal-miners of Pennsylvania in September, 1900, was a thing seen, heard, felt; it was concrete; it is a fact, composed of many separate facts; their right to strike is an idea in their minds and in the minds of many others; it cannot be seen, heard, reported to witnesses; it is abstract; it is not a fact, nor composed of facts. 132. A statement of fact, then, being a statement of past happening or present condition, not an inference, being concrete, not abstract, when is such a statement to be accepted? In general, every alleged fact must be proved to be a fact by sufficient testimony; in general also, the only testimony sufficient in a given case is the best testimony obtainable in that case. This latter is a maxim of law. Thus the law demands, whenever it is possible, oral testimony by witnesses subject to crossexamination. Though cross-examination is beyond the possibilities of everyday investigation, the maxim is a binding principle. Not only law, but also the common sense of educated people, demands the verification of facts by the best tests in any given case available. No statements not thus supported need be accepted; no witness need be credited that does not appear reasonably careful in his observations, responsible, and free from bias and self-interest. Without such checks most argument remains in the air. The first challenge of one's opponent is, How do you know? 1. In general, since it is notorious that few people are habitually accurate observers beyond the rather narrow range of their interests or preoccupations, anybody's report of his observations should be analyzed, so far as possible, into its particulars for scrutiny. That is, testimony should be considered, never in bulk, but always in detail, point by point. 2. Then is the witness intelligent, of established character, responsible for his statements, clear from suspicion of bias or self-interest, and consistent? 3. Further, is the testimony corroborated or does it stand alone? Is there any testimony of fairly equal moral weight to contravene it? 4. Testimony given unwittingly (ie. without consciousness of its import), or against the bias or interest of the witness, may have thereby an added significance. 5. Particular value attaches also to the testimony of a witness1 expert in the observation of the class of facts involved. Practically this means seek evidence that cannot easily be challenged. Most argument outside of law courts being based on evidence in print, sufficient testimony to fact is practically (1) the primary publications, the original documents (subject to the tests of credibility above), or as far back toward them as research can reasonably extend; (2) authority, i.e. accepted sources of information, as standard gazetteers, publications of government bureaus, etc. It is futile to argue about forestry or the adulteration of food products from an article in a popular magazine when every large library contains the reports of the Department of Agriculture; to take statistics about the Philippines from a campaign speech when one's opponent may counter with the Congressional Record or the reports of the Philippine Commission; to be content with information about the Siberian Railway from an article written to entertain, when the latest gazetteers and the publications of geographical societies furnish statistics far less liable to dispute. Unless you must, do not rest on information at second hand. And again, be familiar with the standard sources; with the particular advantages of the various cyclopædias, 1 1 By this is not meant "expert testimony," which may be the opinion of some one recognized as an authority in the matter involved; e.g. the report of a physician to the effect that a certain death was caused by chloroform, or of a bank teller to the effect that a certain signature was made by a certain man. atlases, gazetteers, compends of history and of the arts and sciences; and also with other recognized publications of statistical information in particular fields. Know what guide-books will tell you where to look for authority in a given matter; turn from a book that cites a better witness to that witness himself; always keep note of the source of your every statement of fact; and never cite somebody else's citation without first verifying it yourself. This habit of care will give some skill in weighing more doubtful evidence. Many arguments involve mere current report; and in some cases nothing better can be had. In such cases it should be remembered that conclusions are only tentative and temporary, that proof is of the lowest degree. For the rest, the student must compare different accounts, keep himself on the alert against bias and interest, and accustom himself to separate, in newspaper reports and credulous histories, probable fact from probable garnish of art or inference. Remembering that unsupported testimony, except from witnesses whose observation and character are so well known as to compel belief, is weak, he must try to fortify, or conversely, to offset one testimony by another. In a word, he must learn to read critically. 134. Thus fortified against an opponent's How do you know? one must also make ready against another question, What of it? (§114). How do you know? challenges the facts; What of it? challenges the inferences. In this case, and that, and that, the attacks of the Chinese "Boxers" were directed against mission stations. What of it? Does that prove the missions causes of the outbreak? In this case, and that, and that, — in all known cases, the grazing of sheep in our western forests has been followed by the decline of the forests. What of it? Does that prove the grazing the cause of the decline? These two different cases are alike typical in presenting the ultimate inquiry as to all inferences. At the long last we come down to this question, Do the facts establish this as cause of that? The answer is in Mill's Canons (§ 99). One's deductions, too, as well as his inductions, should be tested (§ 118). Neither, of course, will bear a test for demonstration (§ 108-109); but since to a certain degree we always use both, since the enthymeme supports the partial induction, and vice versa, the use of both must be brought to habitual accuracy. In all this analysis, a priori and a posteriori, what prevails, of course, is penetration. All that logic and rhetoric can supply is the tests formulated by experience. Everybody must acquire for himself the skill to see habitually and promptly what is in a case and what is to be done with it. 3. COMPOSITION (a) Working Plan 135. When the evidence has been explored, the field gone over, the next step is to group the argument under as few main heads as possible, and these in an order at once easy to remember and forcible by its sequence. This counsel applies to writing, but much more forcibly to speaking. A complete plan (§ 91, fine print) is not for use in one's hand; its value is quite different. The notes for speaking, in one's hand or in his head, should be few and simple. An elaborate scheme, since it afflicts the memory and hinders quick adaptation, is unwieldy. An unexpected turn of an adversary, an unexpected disposition in an audience, may throw it out |