[Certain Officers and Deputies Paid by Are Not Officers of City

of New Orleans.]

Art. 158. The fact that the officers and deputies herein provided for are paid by the City of New Orleans shall not make them officers or employes thereof.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

[Who Ineligible for Jury Service.]

Art. 159. No person shall be permitted to act as a juror, who, in due course of law, shall have been convicted of treason, perjury, forgery, bribery or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or who shall be under interdiction. Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 99; Const., 1879, Art. 148.

[Oath of Members of General Assembly and Other Officers.] Art. 160. Members of the General Assembly and all officers, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I (A. B.) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Constitution and laws of this State; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent according to the best of my ability and under

on me as..

standing. So help me God."

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 1; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 89; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 90; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 90; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 100; Const., 1879, Art. 149.

[Seat of Government.]

Art. 161. The seat of government shall be and remain at the City of Baton Rouge.

Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 107 (Baton Rouge); Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 130 (New Orleans); Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 131 (New Orleans); Const., 1879, Art. 130 (Baton Rouge).

[Treason, Its Definition and How It is Shown.]

Art. 162. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, or adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or his confession in open court.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 2; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 90; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 91; Const., 1864, Title VII, Arts. 91, 92; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 101; Const., 1879, Art. 151.

[Removal of Officers by General Assembly.]

Art. 163. All civil officers shall be removable by an address of two-thirds of the members elected to each House of the General Assembly, except those whose removal is otherwise provided for by this Constitution.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 8; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 98; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 97; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 99; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 106; Const., 1879, Art. 152.

[Members of Congress, Officers of United States or Foreign

States, Not Eligible as Members of General Assembly.] Art. 164. No member of Congress, nor person holding or exercising any office of trust or profit under the United States, or any State, or under any foreign power, shall be eligible as a member of the General Assembly, or hold or exercise any office of trust or profit under the State.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 14; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 102; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 99; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 101; Const., 1879, Art. 150.

[Laws, Public Records, etc., to Be in English-Judicial Advertisements in Certain Cities, etc., May Be in French When Directed by Law.]

Art. 165. The laws, public records, and the judicial and legislative written proceedings of the State, shall be promulgated, preserved and conducted in the English language; but the General Assembly may provide for the publication of the laws in the French language, and provide that judicial advertisements, in certain designated cities and parishes, shall also be made in that language.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 15; Const., 1845, Title VI, Arts. 103, 132; Const., 1852, Title VI, Arts. 100, 129; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 103; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 109; Const., 1879, Art. 154.

[Ex Post Facto Laws, Laws Impairing Obligations, etc., etc., Prohibited.]

Art. 166. No ex-post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be passed, nor vested rights be divested, unless for purposes of public utility, and for adequate compensation previously made.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 20; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 109; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 105; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 109; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 110; Const., 1879, Art. 155.

Ex Post Facto and Retroactive Laws.-An ordinance to prevent keeping saloons open after 10 p. m., passed after the issuance of a license to a retailer of spirituous liquors and imposing a penalty for its violation, is not an ex post facto or retroactive law, unless the act sought to be punished was committed before its passage. State vs. Isabel, 40 An. 340.

Act 105, 1874, Sec. 5, relative to prescription of actions to invalidate titles of property purchased at tax sales, is legitimately retrospective, and operates on tax sales made prior to its passage. Barrow vs. Wilson, 39 An. 403.

Aet 89, 1886, establishing the rank and order of privileges on crops, cannot be given a retroactive operation so as to give a pledge of crops under Act 66 of 1874 preference over an antecedent privilege, existing at the date of the pledge. Flower vs. Skipwith, 45 An. 895.

Act 107, 1884, does not vest the holder of a warrant against the general fund, with a right protected against impairment by subsequent legislation which diverts from the general fund certain taxes which would under the act have gone to that fund. The collection of these taxes was doubtful in 1884, and as a fact they were not collected until a subsequent year. Fisher vs. Steele, 39 An. 447.

Act 225 of 1855, granting exemption from taxes to a Masonic corporation, so long as its property was or should be occupied as a lodge room, did not constitute a contract between the State and the organization, which could not be repealed by subsequent legislation or constitutional provisions. Grand Lodge of F. & A. Masons vs. City of New Orleans, 44 An. 659.

No one has a vested right in any legal capacity which may be conferred by law, so one who is under existing law a forced heir, may, before the death of his ancestor, etc., have his capacity so changed by law, as to be liable to disinheritance by will or declared incapable of even inheriting ab intestato. Hughes vs. Murdock, 45 An. 935,

The Legislature may make a tax deed conclusive evidence of compliance with every requirement which it might in the orginal exercise of its discretion have dispensed with, and may validate retrospectively the proceedings which it might originally have authorized in advance thereof. Breaux vs. Negrotto, 43 An. 426. A prohibition in the Constitution against the passage of ex post facto laws applies exclusively to penal or criminal cases. Locke vs. City of New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; Le Briton vs. Morgan, 4 Mart. N. S. 138. An act which does not relate to crimes and offenses, and does not impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts, is not unconstitutional. City of New Orleans vs. Poutz, 14 An. 853; Same vs. Cordeviolle, 13 An. 268.

Impairing the Obligation of Contracts.-Only the person whose rights are invaded can plead the nullity of a law as impairing the obligation of a contract. State vs. City, 32 An. 726.

The right of a judgment creditor of a parish to have a tax levied for the payment of his judgment is a vested right, which cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislation. Favrot vs. Parish, 34 An. 491. Repeal of law levying tax to pay judgments does not affect judgments ordered paid before repeal. Shields vs. Chase, 32 An. 409; id. 884. But a judgment itself is not a contract. State vs. City, 38 An. 119. See Rousseau vs. City, 35 An. 557.

The State of Louisiana cannot be coerced to execute a contract which it has made with one of its citizens and which contract has been abrogated by a subsequent act of the Legislature. State ex rel. McEnery vs. Lanier, 47 An. 110. (It is difficult to summarize the reasoning by which the court reaches the conclusion despite the Art. 155, Const., 1879, and the Const., U. S., about obligation of contracts. The court cites Louisiana vs. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, to support the doctrins.) See Mower vs. Kemp, 42 An. 1007; Consolidated Ass'n of Planters vs. Lord, 35 An. 425; Forstal vs. Consolidated, etc., 34 An. 770.

Powers granted to public corporations-i. e., parishes, municipalities, etc.—are not within the principle that invalidates laws impairing the obligations of contracts when they amend or destroy the power conferred. The Legislature may modify or abolish the power granted, as the public good may require. Layton vs. City, 12 An. 515; Moore vs. Same, 32 An. 726; State vs. People's, etc., Co., 46 An. 1031; Reynolds vs. Baldwin, 1 An. 162; Douglas vs. Craig, 2 An. 919; Police Jury vs. Shreveport, 5 An. 661; State vs. Pilsbury, 31 An. 1.

The charter of a municipal corporation is not a contract. Layton vs. New Orleans, 12 An. 516; Moore vs. Same, 32 An. 726; Police Jury vs. Shreveport, 5 An. 661; State vs. Pilsbury, 31 An. 1. But a right vested in a municipal corporation by the terms of its charter to collect wharfage rates cannot be abrogated by a subsequent act of the Legislature. Ellerman vs. McManus, 30 An. 190.

The Legislature may annul a privilege which it has granted a municipality, to purchase a gas works established therein under legislative charter. Crescent, etc., Co., vs. N. O. Gaslight Co., 27 An. 138.

An act of the Legislature which seeks to confer contract rights on creditors of a municipality is a violation of the existing contract rights of other creditors, is unconstitutional as violating the obligation of contract. State vs. Board of Liquidation, 40 An. 398.

A franchise granted by a municipality to a street railway company is a contract. East, etc., R. R. Co. vs. City, 46 An. 526. So is an ordinance authorizing a telephone company to maintain its lines. City vs. Great Southern T. & T. Co.,

40 An. 41.

An act diverting the income of a municipality from a certain source, and devoted by previous legislation to the payment of certain obligations, is uncon stitutional as impairing the obligation of the contract rights of the holders of the obligations originally designated (State vs. Board of Liquidation, 40 An. 398); but where the original act permitted the disposal of any surplus, any act disposing of it, does not impair the contract rights of the creditors entitled to the fund out of which the surplus arose. U. S. vs. Thoman, 156 U. S. 353.

The Legislature cannot shorten the term of an officer as fixed by the Consti tution, nor abolish the office. The officer has a vested right in the emoluments of the office for the term. State vs. Jumel, 30 An. 861. The adoption of a new Constitution destroys the right of an incumbent of an office created by the Legis lature, though the term had not expired. State vs. Crenshaw, 8 An. 401.

A legislative grant of an exclusive right to supply gas to a municipality after performance by the grantee is a contract protected by the Const. of the U. S. N. 0. Gas Co. vs. La. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; See N. O. Waterworks Co. vs. Rivers, id. 674; S. F. Tamany Co. vs. N. O. Co., 120 U. S. 64. Effect of police power on such grants. Butchers, etc., Co. vs. Crescent, etc., Co., 111 U. S. 746; 33 An. 934. Municipal regulation of franchise when void as impairing obligation of contracts. N. O. Waterworks Co. vs. Louisiana Sug. Ref. Co., 125 U. S. 18.

Levy of taxes in excess of constitutional limit to pay contract obligations. See Art. 232 and annotation.

Exemption From Taxation.—Where the legislative charter of a corporation does not reserve the right to repeal or amend it, an exemption from taxation contained therein, constitutes a contract, which the State cannot impair by subsequent legislation. St. Anna's Asylum vs. City, 105 U. S. 362, reversing 31 An. 292. What does not constitute a contract. Grand Lodge, etc., vs. City, 44 An. 659; seo N. O. vs. Lafayette Ins. Co., 28 An. 756.

Vested Rights in Remedies.- The legal remedy for the enforcement of contracts, in existence when a contract is made, is not a vested right, and the Legislature may change the remedy, but it cannot destroy the contract by denying all means of enforcing it. State vs. City, 34 An. 1149; Robert vs. Coco, 25 An.

199; N. O. C. & L. R. R. Co. vs. State, 157 U. S. 219. Exemption from attachment or executions is unconstitutional as related to previously contracted debts (N. O. Canal & B. Co. vs. City, 30 An. 1371); so with homestead acts, they cannot affect mortgages existing on the property at the time of enactment. Cole vs. La Chambre, 31 An. 41.

Police Power.-Slaughter House Cases.-16 Wall. 36; 1 Woods, 1321; see Fed. Cas. No. 8408. Privileges and rights of citizens, ibid. Invalidity of licenses imposed on traveling agents from other States. McGuire vs. Parker, 32 An. 832.

So a judgment enforcing the payment of an officer's salary is not protected by the constitutional provision, as the obligation to pay a salary fixed by law is not a contract. State vs. Police Jury, 35 An. 544; see 34 An. 41, 365.

[Private Property Taken, etc., for Public Purposes, Must Be Paid For.]

Art. 167. Private property shall not be taken nor damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.

Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 109; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 105; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 109; Const., 1868, Title VI, Art. 110; Const., 1879, Art. 156. See Art. 2 and annotation.

Where an emergency exists, private property may be taken by public agency without a judicial expropriation. Koerber vs. Orleans Levee Board, 51 An. 523.

Where, because of its location, property is not subject to servitude for levee purposes, any damage to it must be paid for, though there was no taking of property, and though the damage was caused by the construction of a levee. Pontchartrain R. R. Co. vs. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee Dist., 49 An. 570.

The provision of Art. 156 (Const., 1879), and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, do not apply to assessments for local improvements, but only to exactions made under the right of eminent domain. Excelsior Plant. & Mfg. Co. vs. Green, 39 An. 455.

The land of a riparian proprietor may be taken by the City of New Orleans without compensation to the owner, for the purpose of enlarging a roadway which has been encroached on by the Mississippi river. It is an exercise of the police power, and not of the right of eminent domain. Ruch vs. City of New Orleans, 43 An. 275.

For a comprehensive consideration of the issue when the taking of private property is within the police power of a state and when it is not, see Eldredge vs. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452. (This case arose under Const., 1879, Art. 156 of which is like Art. 167 of present Constitution, and the Federal and State jurisprudence is reviewed.)

Morgan's La. & Tex., etc., Co. vs. R. R. Commission, 109 La. 247.

[Laws Shall Not Be Suspended Unless by General Assembly.] Art. 168. No power of suspending the laws of this State shall be exercised unless by the General Assembly, or by its authority.

Const., 1812, Art. VI, Sec. 17; Const., 1845, Title VI, Art. 106; Const., 1852, Title VI, Art. 102; Const., 1864, Title VII, Art. 104; Const., 1879, Art. 157.