great bodily harm from Charles Muccio, together with the purpose and motive under which the defendant claimed to have been acting. All of this was fully considered in determining whether the killing was justifiable or as to whether it was done with deliberation and premeditation.

At the conclusion of the case the defendant's counsel in a request to the court to charge enumerated all of the claims. which the defendant had made with reference to the facts. established by the evidence, as testified to by the defendant with reference to the justification of the defendant in acting under the belief that he was in great bodily danger, and conciuded by asking the court to charge that, if the jury found these facts they must acquit. The court replied: "I will not charge that as you have read it, because it is an attempt to define what would be self-defense and it is lacking in this particular, that you have not inserted the elements of reasonable grounds for belief that he was in danger. You say fearing and believing that if he turned or attempted to go out of the door that the said form was so near to him that he would stab or seriously injure him before he could get out of the door.' He must have reasonable grounds for so believing. That is not in your proposition and so I refuse to charge it." The judge was mistaken. The words which he thought were lacking from the request were in the request, but they had not attracted the attention of the judge during its reading; but we think no harm was done. The only objection that the court made to the request was that it did not have inserted the element of reasonable grounds for believing that he was in danger. This was made clear by what the judge stated after the reading of the request had concluded. The defendant's counsel did not, as he should have done, call the attention of the judge to the fact that the request did incorporate these words, but allowed him to act upon the impression that they were not incorporated. The jury, however, by what was said and took place, were advised as to the true rule of law and as to what constituted a justification, and, consequently, no reversible

error was committed. There is still another answer to this contention, and that is that the judge had fully and correctly charged upon this subject before. There is no other question in the case calling for consideration here.

The judgment and conviction should be affirmed.

PARKER, Ch. J., O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, VANN, LANDON and CULLEN, JJ., concur.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

INDEX.

ABDUCTION.

PENAL CODE, §§ 19, 283—EVIDence of age.

The only thing presented to the jury to support the
testimony of the woman abducted, as to her being under
the age of consent, was her appearance upon the stand,
and the certificate of birth, which she testified was in the
possession of the woman who had taken the stand in
corroboration of her testimony, and which was not pro-
duced. Held that it was error for the court to refuse
to charge that the jury had the right not only to consider
her appearance on the stand and the manner in which
she was dressed, but also the absence of the certificate
of birth. People v. Ragone, 192.

ABORTION.

PENAL CODE, § 294-COMPLAINT.

A complaint alleged that defendant became criminally
intimate with complainant and on a subsequent date, she
informed him that she was pregnant, when he gave her
a pill and made her swallow it, telling her that the pill
would bring a miscarriage, and further alleged that de-
fendant did with intent to procure the miscarriage of
complainant, supply, administer and cause her to take a
certain medicine, drug or substance in violation of sub. I
of sec. 294 of the Penal Code. Held that the complaint
complied substantially with all legal requirements. People
v. O'Neill, 391.

ADULTERATION.

I. OLEOMARGARINE-AGRICULTURAL LAW, § 26.

Section 26 of the Agricultural law forbids the selling
of an article which has been manufactured or produced
in imitation or semblance of butter. In order to prove
that the article in question had been manufactured to imi-
tate in color natural butter, plaintiff's counsel attempted
to prove the color of natural butter, but his witness testi-
fied that most of the butter on the market was colored.
Held that there was no evidence that defendant manu-
factured or kept the article for sale as an imitation of
butter. People v. Hillman, 394.

2. SAME.

The court will not take judicial notice of the color of
butter on the trial of a charge of selling oleomargarine. Id.
3. ADULTERATION OF MILK-COMPLAINT EVIDENCE.

It is not necessary, where the State relies upon a chem-
ical analysis to prove the adulteration of milk, to allege
in the complaint the manner in which the inspection has
been conducted. People v. Woodbeck, 250.
4. SAME.

It is not necessary to allege in the complaint the ex-
istence of the facts and circumstances providing for ob-
taining a second sample, in compliance with Laws 1893,
ch. 330, p. 12, as amended by Laws 1898, ch. 557.

ORDER OF ARREST.

AFFIDAVIT.

An affidavit by the German consul in New York, stating
on information and belief, that defendant stole a sum
named from a certain bank in Roumania, and that the
source of affiant's information and the grounds of his belief
is a cable telegram received by affiant in his official ca-
pacity signed "Acting German Consul Strare," is insuffi-
cient to justify the granting of an order of arrest. Banque
Agricole of Roumania v. Ungureanu, 139.

1. EVIDENCE.

ARSON.

On a trial for arson the theory of the People was that
four members of a family entered into a conspiracy to
burn a house and store and defraud the insurance com-
panies afterward. Held, that there was some evidence
to support the finding that the fire was of incendiary
origin, and tending to show that the defendant, though
absent at the origin of the fire aided and abetted, coun-
selled and induced, his father to commit the act. People
v. Smith, 1.

2. SAME.

Where a witness testifies to the removal of personal
property before the fire by the persons charged with the
arson, and subsequently included by them in their proofs
of loss, it is not competent for the officer to whom the
witness pointed them out, to testify that she identified
the articles or pointed them out to him, as the same
mentioned in the proofs of loss. Id.

3. SAME.

It is improper for the court in overruling defendant's
objection to testimony, to refer to the existence of a con-
spiracy based upon the evidence alleged by the court to
have been received by the court in another case, when
defendant's father had been convicted. Id.

4. SAME.

Another witness was allowed, over an objection, to
testify among other things that the persons charged had
promised to pay him but never had done so. Held, error.
Id.

5. SAME-CHARGE TO JURY.

The defendant requested the court to charge "That
before the jury can convict this defendant the evidence.
must be so strong as to remove every other hypothesis.
than that of the defendant's guilt," which the court de-