where a conductor ejected a passenger on the ground that his ticket was not genuine. His ticket was in fact a genuine ticket, and so showed upon its face in all respects except the original color, which was blue, but had faded on account of being wet so that it was white or of a light color, and the general appearance of the ticket showed the effect of the water upon it.51 Sec. 1041. (§ 575.) In absence of contract, ticket presumed to be for continuous trip-Stop-over. The performance of the contract for carriage evidenced by the ticket, it has been held, must be demanded by its holder as an entirety, when there is no express agreement upon the subject on the ticket or with the agent of the company with competent authority to make it. If, therefore, by its terms the ticket is for a passage from one point to another, when the journey has been once commenced it must be continued without intermission until the destination named in the ticket has been reached; and the pas torn off by conductors in detach ing coupons, instead of placing such check numbers upon a part of the ticket where it could not be removed without destroying the contract expressed in the ticket, the railroad company should not be heard to say that the removal of the check number by the first conductor in tearing off a coupon destroyed the validity of the ticket. Railway Co. v. Cope, 36 Ill. App. 97. To "mutilate" a railroad ticket within the reasonable meaning of a stipulation on its face that it shall not be good for passage if mutilated in any way, it must be deprived of some essential or material part; and such a ticket is valid, although torn in two pieces, when both pieces are presented to the conductor at the same time, and it is apparent that they are parts of the same ticket, that to gether they form the entire ticket, and that no fraud has been perpetrated upon the railroad company. Young v. Railway Co., 120 Ga. 25, 47 S. E. Rep. 556, 63 L. R. A. 436, 102 Am. St. Rep. 68. He In Henly v. Railroad Co., 59 N. Y. Supp. 857, 28 Misc. 499, affirming 57 N. Y. Supp. 396, 27 Misc. 811, the holder of a commutation ticket so mutilated it for his Own convenience that the places for fares were all cancelled before they had been used. did not apply to the proper officers of the company for relief, but attempted to take passage on it, and persisted in his attempt to such an extent that he obstructed the passageways. He was removed by a policeman, and it was held that the company was not liable as for an assault. 51. Railroad Co. v. Conley, 6 Ind. App. 9, 32 N. E. Rep. 96. senger cannot claim the right to stop at any intermediate place and continue his trip upon a subsequent train of the same company with the same ticket,52 unless the carrier has failed to carry him with that reasonable dispatch which, on account of his reciprocal rights against the carrier, he had a right to 52. Wilsey v. Railroad Co., 83 Ky. 511; Wyman v. Railroad Co., 34 Minn. 210; Stone v. Railway Co., 47 Iowa, 82; Drew v. Railroad Co., 51 Cal. 425; Oil Creek Ry. v. Clark, 72 Penn. St. 231; Cleveland, etc., R. R. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Hatten v. Railroad Co., 39 Ohio St. 375; Churchill v. The Railroad, 67 Ill. 390; McClure v. The Railroad, 34 Md. 552; Cheney v. The Railroad, 11 Met. 121; State v. Overton, 4 Zab. (24 N. J. Law), 435; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. Law, 551, 27 Atl. Rep. 914, 39 Am. St. Rep. 654, 22 L. R. A. 251; Ashton v. Railway Co., (1904) 2 K. B. 313, 73 L. J. K. B 701; Coombs v. The Queen (Can.), 26 S. C. R. 13, affirming 4 Ex. C. R. 321. In California, the rule in the text is changed by statute. Rail way Co. v. Robinson, 132 Cal. 408, 64 Pac. Rep. 572; Robinson v. Railroad Co., 105 Cal. 526, 541, 38 Pac. Rep. 94, 108, 722, 28 L. R. A. 773. In McClure v. Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532, the passenger had a through ticket, which he surrendered and received from the conductor a conductor's check, dated that day and stating that it was good for that day and train only. Wishing to stop over at a certain station, he went into the office and asked a person whom he saw standing in the ticket office whether he could stop over on that check, and was told that he could; that the check was good until taken up. He stopped, and afterwards attempted to resume his journey on the check, which was refused. Held, that he was not entitled to do so, and that, even if the person in the ticket office (whose identity was not shown) were the ticket agent, he would have no implied authority to waive the rule of a continuous passage. To the same effect is Cheney v. Railroad Co., supra. The conductor of one train cannot confer authority which must be recognized by the conductor of another train and which will entitle a passenger to stop over whose ticket does not entitle him to that right. Petrie v. Railroad Co., 42 N. J. L. 449. To the same effect see, Railroad Co. v. Best, 93 Tex. 344, 55 S. W. Rep. 315. As to the meaning of a clause in a ticket that it shall be good only for continuous trips "between" designated stations, see Railroad Co. v. Clarke, 97 Ga. 706, 25 S. E. Rep. 368. 53. In Railroad Co. v. Klyman, 108 Tenn. 304, 67 S. W. Rep. 472, 91 Am. St. Rep. 755, 56 L. R. A. 769, citing Hutch. on Carr., the court said: "The contract operated on both alike. It gave the passenger no more power to break his journey into parts against the company's will than it gave the company to do the same thing against his will. It gave neither the right demand. A fortiori is this true where the ticket expressly of severance and piecemeal per- ond conductor refused to recognize formance without the consent of this check or appellant's right to the other, and no consent is ride and ejected him, and this acshown or claimed. The purchase tion was for the ejection. The of a full rate, through ticket from court, while recognizing the rule Russelville to Nashville, if made in regard to a continuous trip, by plaintiff, entitled him, under held that, the company having the authority of Railroad Co. v. failed to carry him with reasonTurner, 100 Tenn. 214, 77 S. W. able dispatch, he had the right to 223, to elect when he would begin leave the train and continue his his journey, but it did not entitle journey on another. him under that or any other authority, of which we are aware, to subdivide his journey at will, or, when started, to go otherwise than continuously from initial point to ultimate destination. The law implies the right of an election between times for embarkation from the very sale of such a ticket, and it likewise, for a similar reason, implies the duty of a continuous passage from the very fact of its commencement." 54. Wilsey v. Railroad Co., 83 Ky. 511; Miller v. Railroad Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 883, 89 App. Div. 457. After stating the general rule, the court proceeds to say: “But, on the other hand, the company owes duties to the passenger. By the contract, it undertakes to make the transit covered by the ticket within a reasonable time; and it is only when it is doing so in a reasonable manner that the passenger has no right to leave the train, and take passage upon another under the original contract. To hold that he cannot under any circumstances whatever make a re election of trains would give to the carrier an unfair advantage in the performance of the contract, and would be an unjust discrimination against the public. In Wilsey v. Railroad Co., supra, appellant, having purchased a ticket, was a passenger upon defendant's train. About dark the train was stopped by a wreck ahead of it. Being told by the train officials that the train would be detained several hours, perhaps all night, and that they could not say when it would continue, appellant, who was sick, informed the conductor of the fact and asked for a stop-over check, which was refused. Appellant then went to a hotel, remained all night, and next morning boarded another train to continue his journey, having with him the check given him by the other conductor. The sec- contract as it has undertaken to "Reason dictates that for good cause a passenger may leave a train and have his baggage delivered and embark upon another. The peculiar circumstances of this case say so. Here is a sick passenger upon a train, which about dark is stopped upon the road by a wreck ahead of it and upon its own road. It matters not whether the wreck resulted from the company's neglect or not. It exists and impedes the further passage of the train, and prevents the company from complying with the stipulates that the journey shall be continuous.55 Nor can such a ticket be tendered for fare where the passenger has voluntarily taken a train which he knows does not go as far as his destination.56 Nor, under such a ticket, can a passenger who knows that the train will not stop at the point of his destination insist on stopping at an earlier point and having a "stop-over" check provided him upon which to afterward complete his journey.57 do within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. The passenger is informed by the train officials that the delay will last several hours; perhaps all night; that they cannot tell when it will go on, and they fix no time when he must be present and ready to proceed. Is he in such a case required to remain upon the train all night or for an unknown time? We think not. Suppose the particular train upon which he has embarked was by some accident disabled from proceeding at all; would he not be entitled to take a later one and proceed to his destination without the payment of additional fare? The delay in question could not be considered an ordinary one, and that hence the passengers must submit to it. The appellee was not bound to wait all night in the train, or from 7 o'clock in the evening until 4 o'clock the next morning for the train to proceed. The company itself having first failed in the performance of the contract within a reasonable time, reason, a fair interpretation of the contract, as well as public policy, require a different rule in such cases from the general one. It is perhaps impossible to lay down one which will apply to all cases, as each one must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar circumstances; but if, from accident or misfortune or other cause, and without the passenger's fault, his transit be interrupted, and it be more than an ordinary delay, then he may resume his journey afterwards upon a different train, and without the repayment of fare." 55. Petrie v. Railroad Co., 42 N. J. L. 449; Walker v. Railway Co., 15 Mo. App. 333. 56. Johnson v. Railroad Co., 63 Md. 106. Where a person's ticket entitles him only to a continuous passage, he cannot, under his ticket, voluntarily take a train which runs only to an intermediate station and there take passage on a subsequent train running to his destination and claim the right to be carried on such train under his original ticket. And this follows even though such subsequent train is the one he should have taken in the first instance. By voluntarily breaking his journey, he thereby forfeits his right to enter the subsequent train. Railway Co. v. Henry, 84 Tex. 678, 19 S. W. Rep. 870, 16 L. R. A. 318. 57. Trotlinger v. Railroad Co., 11 Lea, 533. Sec. 1042. Same subject-Through passenger cannot claim the advantage of local excursion or competitive rates between intermediate points. When the through fare from the place of departure to the passenger's destination is greater than the sum of the local fare between the place of departure and an intermediate point plus the local fare between that intermediate point and the passenger's destination, owing to the existence of a competitive rate between the place of departure or destination and the intermediate point, a passenger cannot stay on the train and tender the competitive local fare plus the remaining local fare for his through carriage, instead of the existing through rate. By remaining on the train, the passenger shows an intention to make the contract one of through carriage, and he must pay the through rate.58 And it would seem that the same rule is applicable to the use of excursion tickets.59 Sec. 1043. Same subject-Limitations as to time within which ticket is good for use.-A ticket issued without limitation is good for use at any time within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations for similar contracts.1 But the carrier may lawfully limit the time within which the ticket shall be used,2 although such a limitation will be construed 58. Railway Co. v. Hinchcliffe, (1903) 2 K. B. 32, 88 Law T. 800, 72 L. J. K. B. 530, 51 Wkly. Rep. 556, 19 Times L. R. 430. 59. Great Northern Railway v. Palmer, (1895) 1 Q. B. 862, 64 L. J. Q. B. 316. See also, Great Northern Railway v. Windes, (1892) 2 Q. B. 595, 61 L. J. Q. B. 608. 1. Boyd v. Spencer, 103 Ga. 828, 30 S. E. Rep. 841, 68 Am. St. Rep. 146, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Cassiano . Railway Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 82 S. W. Rep. 806. The state legislature may enact that limitations to the contrary shall not be valid. Dryden v. Railroad Co., 60 Me. 512. 2. Boice v. The Railroad, 61 Barb. 611; Shedd v. The Railroad, 40 Vt. 88; Cheney v. The Railroad, 11 Met. 121; Hill v. Railroad Co., 63 N. Y. 101; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Rawitzky v. Railroad Co., 40 La. Ann. 47; Barker v. Coffin, 31 Barb. 556; Wentz v. Railway Co., 3 Hun, 241; Railroad Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen, 267; Hanlon v. Railroad Co., 109 Iowa, 136, 80 N. W. Rep. 223; Trezona r. Railway Co., 107 Iowa, 22, 77 N. W. Rep. 486, 43 L. R. A. 136; Railroad Co. v. Marlett, 75 Miss. |