cargo to obtain the release of his vessel, he has no right to give it away. Under such circumstances the donee takes no title to the property, but is liable therefor as bailee and is bound to surrender it to the owner upon demand.1

Sec. 795. (§ 439.) His right to know the character of the goods and the contents of packages. It is also a general rule that the carrier has no right to demand of the shipper to be inbeen contended by the claimants be an ample compensation for the that it would be a great hardship possible chance of greater profits, to treat this sale as a nullity, by refusing their assistance in and thus compel them to assume saving their neighbor's property. the character of salvors, because they were not bound to save this property, especially at so great a distance from any port of safety and in a place where they could have completed their cargo in a short time from their own catchings, and where salvage would be no compensation for the loss of this opportunity. The force of these arguments is fully appreciated, but we think they are not fully sustained by the facts of the case. Whales may have been plenty around their vessels on the 6th and 7th day of August, but, judging of the future from the past, the anticipation of filling up their cargo in the few days of the season in which it would be safe to remain was very uncertain and barely probable. The whales were retreating towards the north pole, where they could not be pursued, and, though seen in numbers on one day, they would disappear on the next; and even when seen in greatest numbers, their capture was uncertain. By this transaction the vessels were enabled to proceed at once on their home voyage, and the certainty of a liberal salvage allowance for the property rescued will

"It has been contended, also, that the sale was justifiable and valid because it was better for the interests of all concerned to accept what was offered than to suffer a total loss. But this argument proves too much, as it would justify every sale to a salvor. Courts of admiralty will enforce contracts made for salvage service and salvage compensation where the salvor has not taken advantage of his power to make an unreasonable bargain; but they will not tolerate the doctrine that a salvor can take advantage of his situation and avail himself of the calamities of others to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit (see 1 Sumner, 210). The general interests of commerce will be much better promoted by requiring the salvor to trust for compensation to the liberal recompense usually awarded by courts for such services. We are of opinion, therefore, that the claimants have not obtained a valid title to the property in dispute, but must be treated as salvors."

1. The Albany, 44 Fed. Rep. 431.

formed of the quality of the goods or the nature of the contents of packages which are offered to him for carriage, as a condition of his acceptance of them. In Riley v. Horne2 it is said by Best, C. J., that "a carrier has a right to know the value and quality of what he is required to carry. If the owner of the goods will not tell him what his goods are and what they are worth, the carrier may refuse to take charge of them; but if he does take charge of them, he waives his right to know their contents and value." But in Crouch v. The Railway Company, it was said by Maule, J., that this was the only authority which could be found or relied upon for the contention that the carrier had the right to require the shipper to inform him of the nature of the contents of packages offered for carriage; and that the law, as thus stated, would not bear the test of reason. In this opinion the rest of the judges concurred in separate opinions, and it was held that a plea, alleging as an excuse for not accepting the goods the refusal of the owner of the package to disclose the nature of the contents of his package when a disclosure was demanded by the carrier, offered no valid defense to the action for refusal to carry, and was therefore bad upon demurrer; and this may be now stated as the universally recognized general rule upon the subject. If the goods or packages are of the character which he usually carries, or which he proposes to carry, the only inquiry which he has a right to make is in regard to their value, and this the law allows him to do for the purpose of fixing the amount of his charge for the carriage, and of ascertaining the amount of his responsibility which he is to assume, and the degree of care and attention which he will be required to exercise in respect to them.5

Sec. 796. (§ 440.)

Eame subject-Shipper must make known dangerous character of goods.-But while, as is said,

?. 5 Bing. 217.

3. 14 Com. B. 255.

4. Crouch v. The Railway, 7 Exch. 705; The Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524.

74 N. Y. 125; Gorham, etc., Co. v. Fargo, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 434; Shelden v. Robinson, 7 N. H. 157; Merchants' Trans. Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473; Brown v. Railroad

5. See Baldwin v. Steam Co., Co-, 83 Pa. St. 316.

the law is not so unreasonable as to make it the duty of the carrier to make inquiries as to the nature of the contents of packages offered to him for transportation, or to make it obligatory upon the shipper to give the information when required, there is a well-established exception in regard to what are known as goods, the nature of which makes them dangerous in transportation to the persons and property of others engaged in their carriage, or to other goods. When goods of that character are offered to the carrier, it has been held to be the duty of the shipper to make known their dangerous quality, and it would be an imposition upon the carrier not to do so. Unless it be the customary or professed business of the carrier to receive and transport such goods, he may, of course, exercise his option, when he knows that they are offered, to accept them or not. To impose upon him, therefore, goods of such dangerous qualities, the true nature of which is concealed from him, would be as much a fraud upon him as to deceive him by concealing articles of the greatest value by fraudulent devices, and might be attended with even more serious consequences; and to enable the carrier, as far as public convenience will permit, to guard against imposition of this kind, it has been held that the carrier may refuse to receive packages offered to him unless the shipper will inform him of their contents whenever there is good ground for believing that they contain anything of a dangerous character. But it is only when such ground. exists, arising from the appearance of the package or other circumstances tending to excite his suspicions, that the carrier is authorized, in the absence of any special legislation on the subject, to require a knowledge of the contents of the packages offered as a condition of receiving them for carriage.7

Sec. 797. ($441.) His liability for damages occasioned by dangerous goods.-It would be equally unreasonable to pre

6. Brass v. Maitland, 6 Ellis & B. 470; Farrant v. Barnes, 11 Com. B. (N. S.) 553; Alston v. Herring, 11 Exch. 822; George v. Skivington, 5 L. R. Exch. 1; The Boston, etc., R. R. v. Shanly, 107 Mass.

568; The Nitro Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524; Williams v. East India Co., 3 East, 192.

7. The Nitro-Glycerine Case, su

pra.

sume that the carrier had knowledge of the nature of the contents of packages carried by him when there are no attendant circumstances to awaken his suspicions as to their true character. It would be unjust to impute to him such knowledge without giving him the right, not only to inquire of the shipper, but to examine all packages delivered to him, in case he did not choose to rely upon the information thus obtained. Unless, therefore, it be shown that he knew of the dangerous qualities of the goods, such knowledge will not be imputed to him as an inference of law. But losses occasioned to the shippers of other goods by such causes do not come within the legal exceptions to the carrier's liability, and whether he was informed or knew of the danger or not, he will be liable for such losses unless protected by his contract. But he will have his remedy against the shipper of the goods by which the losses were caused.8

Sec. 798. (§ 442.) The liability of the shipper for injury caused by dangerous goods.-The shipper of the goods, when an injury has resulted from their explosive or other dangerous qualities, is conclusively presumed to have been aware of their dangerous character; and if he has concealed it from the carrier, he will be liable to him for all damages which he may have sustained from its effects; and whether he has given the information to the carrier or not, he will be liable to others whose goods or property have suffered injury therefrom. It will be no defense that he did not in fact know or suspect that the goods were likely to occasion the damage. In Pierce v. Winsor, the article shipped on the vessel with other goods was known as mastic, and was so affected by the voyage that it injured other portions of the cargo with which it came in contact, and caused increased expenditure in discharging the vessel. It was proven that the article was new in commerce, and that its dangerous character was unknown to the shipper; but he was held liable for the damage to the owner of the vessel, who had paid to other shippers the losses sustained by 8. Brass v. Maitland, 6 E. & B. 9. 2 Sprague, 35.

470.

them. It was said that in every shipment there is an implied contract on the part of the shipper that his goods are not of such a character as to cause injury to other goods, and that, no matter how innocent or how ignorant he may have been of their real character, the law will impute to him knowledge of the fact, inasmuch as he has had a better opportunity of acquiring it than any other person. And the knowledge of the agent of the shipper of the dangerous nature of the goods is the knowledge of the principal, even if it is admitted that such knowledge must be shown in order to fix liability for the loss upon the latter.10 Nor will the liability of the shipper cease, no matter through how many hands the goods may have passed.11

II. THE CARRIER'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.

Sec. 799. (§ 443.) The compensation of the carrier.-The carrier has, of course, the right to make reasonable charges as compensation for the carriage of the goods, and for the responsibility and risk which he takes upon himself. This he may demand in advance, and make its payment, if he so chooses, a condition of the acceptance of the goods.12 If, however, he

10. Barney v. Burnstenbinder, 64 Barb. 212, 7 Lans. 210; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518.

11. Farrant v. Barnes, supra; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397.

12. Randall v. Railroad Co., 108 N. C. 612, 13 S. E. Rep. 137.

Both at common law and under the interstate commerce act a common carrier may demand payment of his freight charges in advance for goods delivered to him by a connecting carrier; nor does his act in forwarding and receiving traffic from one connect ing carrier without prepayment, while refusing to do the same

thing for another connecting carrier unless prepayment is made, amount to an unjust discrimination. The right to exact payment for a service before it is rendered, or to extend credit, exists both at common law and under the interstate commerce act. Railway Co. v. Miami, Steamship Co., 86 Fed. 407, 30 C. C. A. 142; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 63 Fed. 775, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U. S. App. 380, 26 L. R. A. 192, affirming 59 Fed. 400; Oregon Short Line, etc., Ry. Co. v. Railroad Co., 61 Fed. 158, 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, affirming 51 Fed. 465.