"The officers," said Lord Melville, "who superintended that midnight embarkation endured far more anxiety than they had experienced in the hour of battle, owing to the want of order and discipline among the transports, which was such as to produce the utmost confusion and embarrassment, and to excite, in the minds of those present, the greatest alarm for the fate of the army. Indeed, the serious consequences so much apprehended were only prevented by the exertions of the navy officers and seamen, and of the superintending commissioners of the Transport Board. These distressing circumstances would not have occurred, if, instead of common transports, there had been regular troopships, under naval discipline, whose officers would have been attentive and obedient to the signals made to point out to them the positions which the respective ships were to take and maintain.

"I cannot," said Lord Melville, "entertain a doubt, that if, at the beginning of last year, there had existed in this country an establishment of armed troop-ships, adequate to the conveyance of even eight or ten thousand men, a very considerable portion, if not the whole, of the enemy's ships at Flushing might have been captured or destroyed; and, if it had been thought expedient, the basin might, without much difficulty, have been destroyed also. I have said, if it had been thought expedient, because I am strongly impressed with an opi. nion, that, if there had been such an establishment of floating barracks as I am now recommending, neither the evacuation of Walcheren, nor the destruction of the basin at Flushing would have been necessary. Few men will, I think, conceive it probable, that because the enemy's ships

were not in a condition to quit the basin of Flushing in the months of February and March of last year, we were therefore equally sure of finding them still there in the months of July and August, when our great armament sailed for the Scheldt; consequently the prospect of capturing or destroying them was reduced to the single chance of a successful attack upon Antwerp. If, however, there had been, in the beginning of last year, such an establishment as that for which I now contend, eight or ten thousand men might have been easily embarked, without ostentation or parade, and might have proceeded to the point of attack in perfect se crecy, when, in conjunction with our blockading fleet, a successful result would, I confidently believe, have crowned their operations.

"The plan, then, which I submit to the house is simply this; I propose to fit out, from the ordinary of the navy, a number of armed troopships, adequate to the accommodation of 24,000 men. The troops to be divided into detachments, each properly commanded; and to be accompanied and escorted by a few twodecked ships, and a certain number of frigates and light-armed vessels. These flying armaments to be distributed along the enemy's coasts, and to act either separately or conjointly, according to circumstances; and, if their operations were judiciously conducted, they might, (besides annihilating the coasting, and such other trade as may still be carried on by our enemies,) by keeping up a constant alarm on their coasts, oblige them to draw a very great part of their armies down to their coasts, for the purpose of protecting them against our attacks and predatory incursions; and such a system of warfare would thus act in

the most beneficial manner, both as a means of co-operating with our allies, and of effectually annoying our enemies. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that if, at any time, an object should present itself, upon which we could, with effect and benefit, employ together the whole 24,000 men, a single letter from the War Office and the Admiralty could speedily assemble them at any rendezvous most expedient for the execution of the projected service.

Such ships of war as may be ap propriated to the reception and conveyance of troops, should be fitted, armed, manned, and equipped, on the following reduced scale :-The crew not to exceed, at the utmost, onethird of the proper complement of men;-no ship to carry more than 20, nor less than 12 guns, (according to her class,) and these to be principally carronades ;-the ships also to have reduced masts and yards, the original lower masts only being kept in; the wear and tear of a ship so fitted and employed would not exceed one-fourth of an active cruizer, and the expences and charges would, in the aggregate, be less than one half of the expences and charges in curred for ships when fitted, armed, and equipped, for the purposes of war. And here it is very material to state, that these opinions have the full and entire concurrence of several naval officers, whose experience and judgement entitle them to perfect confidence in this respect; and that one of these officers commanded, nearly the whole of the late war, either an armed transport or a troop-ship, and was present at all the most important conjunct operations."

Lord Melville then entered into a detail of estimates, shewing that it would be more economical to employ

troop-ships than hired transports, even in mere direct expence. "Be sides," said he, "a very great additi onal security would be derived against the capture and loss of great num bers of our seamen and soldiers in hi red transports. I should be most un. willing to estimate the lives of either on data of pecuniary compensation: but if any cold calculator should think it adviseable to follow out such an investigation, he might find, upon inquiry, that the expence of the recruiting service amounts to an enormous sum. Upwards of 130 trans ports have been captured or lost since the commencement of the present war. About 1700 persons have been taken in them; about 1900 have perished. The cold calculator may take this into his account, but Í reject all such calculations,-I hold the life of a British sailor or soldier to be inestimable; and if I had the means of bringing forward the evidence of our enemies upon that sub ject, I should willingly rest upon their testimony.

"It has been objected," he continued, "that the equipment and keeping up the requisite number of armed troop-ships would be such a drain upon the navy, and would re-. quire so many seamen, as to cause se rious inconvenience to the naval service. Now, the establishment which I have proposed would require 48,000 tons of shipping: the tonnage of the British navy is about 800,000; and let me ask, whether any man, competent to form a judgement on the subject, can doubt that, if ships to the extent of 48,000 tons were to be appropriated for the conveyance of troops, the remainder would not be more than amply sufficient for every naval service for which our fleet can possibly be required? In 1800

and 1801, the number of troop-ships and armed transports that were employed amounted to 50 sail, and their tonnage to about 50,000 tons, which we had no hesitation in thus employing at that time, notwithstanding the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, amounted to about 100 sail of the line. At present, the Russian, Swedish, Danish, Dutch or French force, amounts collectively to only 71 sail of the line, while there are 105 sail of the British line now in commission. In truth, I am strongly impressed with a conviction that the naval establishment of the country is now upon a scale considerably exceeding what, in wisdom, in sound policy, and on every principle of sound economy, it ought to be. In my judgement, 81 sail of the line are sufficient for European service, being thus distributed; 20 to the Baltic, 18 to watch the motions of the Dutch fleet, the French fleet in the Scheldt and at Cherbourg, 12 for the ports in the Bay of Biscay, 21 for the Mediterranean and Black Sea, 10 for the service of Lisbon and Cadiz; 10 ships of the line would suffice for foreign service the whole force requisite being 91, which I consider amply sufficient for every probable demand.

"I trust your lordships will believe, that I should be one of the last men to recommend that our naval establishment should be put upon a footing of doubt or nice balance with the force of the enemy. Our superiority ought at all times to be decisive and commanding; but I contend, that, considering the scarcity of naval timber, and the high price of naval stores of every description, this is not a moment when the country ought to give way to a wasteful, ostentatious, and prodigal expenditure; and such I consider an unnecessary num

ber of ships in commission, if they be either detained in our own ports, or sent where they are not likely to meet with an enemy. I do maintain that, circumstanced as the country now is, we ought to husband our navy, particularly our ships of the line, in order that we may keep as many as possible sound and entire to meet future exigencies, when the increased strength of our enemies may render the equipment and employment of a larger force essential to the preservation and safety of the empire.

"These are sentiments which I have long entertained, and they are not declared at the present moment for the purpose of supporting a favourite proposition; still less with any intention of either idly or fac. tiously censuring the administration of the country. It will always give me pain, when I cannot concur in the measures of those to whom his majesty may think proper to intrust the administration of public affairs; and it is peculiarly painful to me to criticise the administration of a department over which I once presided. I am aware of the imputations to which such a line of conduct is liable, and nothing would induce me to under. take such a task, but the conviction I entertain, that, in some very important particulars, his majesty is not well advised on the naval and military interests of the country.

"The termination of the war in which we are now engaged, no human being can foresee; and I have no hesitation in declaring, that so long as France shall retain the sovereignty of the continent of Europe, it is, in my judgement, impossible to make a desirable peace with her; impressed as I am with a belief, that any peace which she might propose would but too probably lead to the subjugation of this country, by presenting

to the ruler of France an opportunity of creating a naval force, which, in conjunction with the fleets of the other maritime powers of Europe, (all of whom, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, are now completely under his controul) might dispute with us the sovereignty of the ocean. This is the event to which we must look forward, as then, though perhaps not till then, we should have to contend, not merely for our independence, but for our very existence. While we, however, retain the dominion of the sea, and preserve the fabric of our constitution, which is the true and genuine source of our manufactures, of our commerce, of our agriculture, and of our revenue, we have nothing to apprehend from the boasted threats, or from the power of France. These may be consider ed as mere bugbears; let the war be conducted on a rational and practicable system, and we shall find our resources perfectly adequate to the contest, so long as circumstances and the safety of the country may render a continuation of it necessary.

"I am aware that any very great diminution of our naval establishment would have the effect of throwing a considerable number of our meritorious officers out of employment; but I cannot suppose that any serious opposition can be fairly grounded on this circumstance, when it is recollected that the same effect would be produced in a much greater degree by the return of peace. I do not overlook, nor am I disposed to underrate, this inconvenience; but I have long foreseen, and am strongly of opinion, that a remedy might be found to compensate the service for the hardship to individuals, arising out of the unprecedented extent of our naval establishment, and the im

possibility at all times of giving employment to a large proportion of its best officers. But every uch act of benevolence ought to flow spontaneously from the sovereign, and a particular suggestion coming from any other quarter would be an impertinent intrusion."

Lord Mulgrave replied, that it was far more expensive to employ ships of war in conveying troops than hired transports, and that he thought it impossible to get over the difficulties which arose from the clashing of the two services, when troops were embarked on board king's ships. He deprecated any idea of reducing the navy in these times, and arguing that the motion ought to be resisted as an unnecessary interference with the executive government, he moved the previous question.-With regard to the necessity of keeping up our naval force at its present extent, Lord Mulgrave argued rightly; his reply, in all its other parts, was not such as Lord Melville's experience and the importance of the subject deserved. One misconception Lord Melville pointed out, he had not recommended that ships of war should be employed on their present establishment for conveying troops, but that the troop-ships should form a separate establishment, under special regulations. The ministry were not disposed to listen to his advice. The Earl of Liverpool, without expressing any opinion upon the subject, said, it was one of great difficulty, and which required very serious consideration; so that it could not now be decided upon. The previous question was therefore agreed on without a division.

If Lord Melville was prevented by his removal from office from forming such an establishment as he now pro

posed, the country suffered a far more serious loss in his removal than in the death of both the great party leaders, who have been so loudly lamented. The advantages of such a measure are even more considerable than they were here stated; for when, in 1801, we had such ships fitted for troops, twice the number of sailors really wanted were allotted to them. An Indiaman of equal tonnage is reckoned well manned with 120 men, whereas these had 250; at once narrowing the accommodation for troops and weakening the navy. The least class of two deckers (now almost banished from the line) will commodiously carry 800 men each, field-pieces, and horses for the officers. We ought to have at least 20 battalions always afloat, and distributed in the several ports, from Leith southward round to Milford Haven, and at Cork. The ships should be stored with provisions, and with field necessaries, according to a list, as easily made out by an officer who had seen service, as the contents of a medicine chest by an army surgeon. And will any person say, that 20 battalions, or 16,000 men, thus stationed upon the alert, some of them able to sail with every wind that could blow, would not present to the enemy an object of alarm, which could not be guarded against by three times their number? Would they, with such a danger before their eyes, invade our colonies? or would they not rather find it necessary to place double garrisons in all the ports of the continent? Let them possess ports if they must pay for them so dearly, and then calculate their gains in the war against British commerce! Another not less important benefit would arise from such an establishThe real security of the enemy at present is in the intelligence

ment.

which they gain during the equipment of an expedition, and which it is not possible to prevent them from gaining ;-upon this hinge turns half their power, that is half their dispo sable force. No deficiency in our military arrangements is at once so obvious, and so easily reformed as this. Double the number of these troop-ships, and no unfortified port in Europe could be occupied by the enemy with impunity.

One measure of essential utility to the service was brought forward by Mr Rose. He obtained leave to bring in a bill for June 7. the increase of seamen, by establishing naval seminaries on the coasts, where boys might be properly educated for four or five years. They were to be supplied from those who were parish paupers, of whom the number amounts to 90,000; they would not cost government more than five pounds each, and this supply would keep up a succession of seamen, to the amount of 7000 every year. This measure will diminish that great evil, the impress service, which might be rendered altogether unnecessary by a few measures more in the same spi rit. Liberty to retire on full pay at the end of one-and-twenty years service after the age of twenty, would probably of itself effect this most desirable reform.

We have the princely establishment of Greenwich, which is deservedly the boast of England,-but Greenwich is not sufficient; and it may safely be asserted, that no man was ever induced to enter the navy by looking on to that asylum as his reward. To the old seaman, indeed, it becomes a point of hope; but, under the present system, his hope is of

that nature which maketh the heart sick. The old seaman, after many