with threescore officers, and 17 pieces of artillery, were taken.

This expedition was planned and executed with equal ability; but the success, complete as it was, was dearly purchased, for O'Donnell was disabled by his wound. A reinforcement of 10,000 French enDec. 13. tered Catalonia. The boats of the English squadron attacked a convoy of 11 vessels, laden with provisions for Barcelona, in Palamos Bay, which the enemy had reoccupied the batteries which protected them were destroyed, the magazines blown up, two of the vessels brought out, and the rest burnt; but our men, having completely effected their object, retired in some disorder; the French were joined by a party from St Felio, and the English, instead of retreating to the beach, where the ships would have covered their embarkation, made for the mole, thoughtlessly taking their way through the town, which the enemy had now occupied. The boats made instantly to their assistance, and suffered severely in bringing them off. Our total loss amounted to 33 killed, 89 wounded, and 86 taken prisoners. Captain Fane, of the Cambrian, was among the latter. Campoverde, Eroles, and Sarsfield continued to make head against Macdonald, notwithstanding the reinforcement which he had received; but O'Donnell was compelled to quit the command, and retire to Majorca, to be healed of his wound. His activity and successful enterprizes had gained him the entire confidence of the Spaniards, and made him the terror of the enemy, and his loss therefore was severely felt. Suchet, who had been impeded five months in his operations against Tortosa by the incessant vigilance of the Catalans, was

at length enabled to break ground before it. The Valencians, under Ge. neral Bassecourt, made an attempt to relieve it, and were defeated at Ulde. cona, on the 26th of November. Af. ter this victory Suchet pursued the siege without interruption, for the Catalan generals were sufficiently oc cupied by Macdonald. The place was not defended as might have been expected from Lili's former conduct, nor as it ought to have been: after thirteen days of open trenches, and four days of bombardment, the French had established themselves at the bottom of the ditch; they had carried on mining operations for two days, and there were three practicable breaches in the body of the place. There were 7800 troops within the town; but Lili, instead of withstanding an assault, surrendered at discretion. The French, to excuse this surrender, asserted that the garrison could not have defended themselves an hour longer without being put to the sword. The Spaniards thought otherwise; they remembered what Mariano Alvarez had done at Gerona, where a French army, equal in number to that of Suchet, lay for ten weeks in sight of an open breach, which they did not dare assault a second time. They pronounced sentence of death against the Count de Alacha, for having thus delivered up a city which he had so much better means of defending, and beheaded him in effigy in the marketplace of Tarragona. This surrender took place on the 2d of January, and a few days afterwards Coll de Balaguer was lost also, either by the treachery or cowardice of those who should have defended it. But the spirit of the province remained unbroken, though the loss of Tortosa cut off its communication with Va

lencia, the great object of the French being, as they said, to insulate Catalonia from the rest of Spain; and preparations were immediately made for the investment of Tarragona, the last of its strongholds, and the most

important, because of its port. It is painful to reflect, that at any time during the war ten thousand British troops would have turned the scale in this part of Spain.

VOL. III. PART I.

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AFTER the battle of Ocana, Lord Wellington clearly perceived what would be the business of the ensuing year. There was no longer a Spanish army in the field capable of occupying the attention of the enemy, and the continental peace left Buonaparte at liberty to employ his whole force in the nefarious project of subjugating the peninsula. It could not therefore be doubted that he would make the utmost efforts to destroy the English army, and obtain possession of Portugal; the former of which objects, could he effect it, would be as gratifying to his pride, and his rancorous hatred of the British name, as the latter was essential to the fulfil ment of his ambitious projects. Well aware of this, Lord Wellington, from the time that he found it impossible to co-operate with the Spanish armies, began to prepare for the defence of Portugal.

The Portugueze army had taken the field almost as soon as Marshal Beresford was appointed to the command, so that little or nothing had been done towards improving it. The army, indeed, like the government of that country at the commencement of this new era, was in the worst possible condition; both were in the lowest

state of degradation to which inveterate ignorance and imbecility could reduce them. Portugal had excellent laws, and a constitution, the restoration of which might satisfy the most enlightened of her patriots; but her laws and her constitution had long been suspended by a stupid despotism, and the noble character of the people seemed to be suspended with them. In every department, from the highest to the lowest, the rankest abuses prevailed; and had it not been for the activity which was kept alive by their commercial relations, the institutions of the realm were in such a state, that the Portugueze would soon have ceased to be ranked among civilized nations. Yet such are the effects of commerce, that it was an improving country, in spite of its government, its idolatry, its inquisition, the degeneracy of the higher ranks, the decay of learning, and all the other evils attendant upon the total loss of liberty. Had it not been for the French revolution, Spain and Portu gal might have fermented and purified themselves of their civil abuses.

The government of Portugal ought at this time to have been completely under our controúl. The events in Spain had enabled us twice to expel

the French, and we were now preparing to protect their country against a third invasion. Notwithstanding the spirit of the people, they could not have defended themselves without our assistance, because of the general disorganization; and it was necessary that we should carry on the war as principals, rather than allies. The Prince of Brazil had given us full powers for this, and as soon as the troops went into winter quarters, Marshal Beresford began the task of reforming and disciplining the Portugueze army: how capable the men were of being made good soldiers, had been sufficiently proved by Sir Robert Wilson, if it could be supposed to require proof. Early in the session, parliament was informed that the king had authorized pecuniary_advances to be made to PorFeb. 22. tugal, in support of its military exertions, and had made an arrangement for the maintenance of a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. 20,000 we al ready had in our pay, the sum for whom was estimated at 600,0001.; for the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000l., to which was to be added a farther sum of 130,000l. for the maintenance of the officers to be employed in training these levies, and preparing them to act in conjunction with the British troops. This led to a very interesting debate in the House of Lords. Marquis Wellesley affirmed, "that Portugal was the most material military position that could be occupied for the purpose of assisting Spain he was ready to admit that great disasters had lately befallen the Spanish cause, he admitted it with pain and regret, and no person could view them with deeper concern than he did; but still they were far from sinking his mind into despair. Still

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he would contend, it was neither litic nor just to manifest any intention of abandoning Portugal. And here he would call upon their lordships distinctly to say, whether they were prepared to withdraw the British troops from Portugal, and thus dispirit that country, and induce her to relax her efforts for her own defence? What advantage could be derived from thus casting over our own councils, and the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and complexion of despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived; that all attempts to assist them, or even to inspirit their exertions in their own defence, were now of no avail; that they must bow the neck and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader? This indeed would be to strew the conqueror's path with flowers, to prepare the way for his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms. Was it then for this that so much treasure had been expended, that so much of the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever calamities and disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to hope that it would prove unconquerable, All their defeats and disasters were solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. It was his decided opinion, and he would not hesi tate again to repeat it, that it was the imbecility, or treachery, of that vile and wretched government which first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart of Spain; that delivered into hostile hands all the fortresses of that country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have

so inauspiciously begun. Let not their lordships come to any resolution that can justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain in considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what other consequence would result from prematurely withdrawing the British troops from Portugal, or retracting the grounds upon which we have hitherto assisted her ?"

Lord Grenville replied. "He felt it," he said, "an ungrateful task, a painful duty, to recal the attention of their lordships to his former predictions, which they had despised and rejected, but which were now, all of them, too fatally fulfilled. His object, however, was not a mere barren censure of past errors, but rather, from a consideration of those errors, to conjure them to rescue the country from a continuance of the same disasters, and to pay some regard to the lives of their fellow citizens. Were they disposed to sit in that house day after day, and year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure, and the use

less effusion of so much of the best blood of the country, in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts? It was a sacred duty imposed upon them to see that not one more life was wasted, not one more drop of blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man could say that, by any human possibility, such dreadful sacrifices could be made with any prospect of advantage. Was there any man that heard him, who in his conscience believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of that brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal? If," said he, " I receive from any person an answer in affirmative, I shall be able to judge by that answer of the capacity of such a person for the go. vernment of this country, or even for the transaction of public business in

a deliberative assembly. By whatever circumstances, by whatever kind of fate it was, I must say, in point of fact, that, in my opinion, I always thought the object of the enterprize impossible; but now I believe it is known to all the people of this country, that it has become certainly impossible. Was it then too much to ask of their lordships that another million should not be wasted, when nothing short of a divine miracle could render it effectual to its proposed object?" In these strong and explicit terms did Lord Grenville declare his opinion, that it was impossible for a British army to secure Portugal; and thus distinctly did he affirm, that the opinion of a statesman upon this single point was a sufficient test of his capacity for government.

After touching upon the convention of Cintra and Sir John Moore's retreat, he spoke of the impolicy of our conduct in Portugal. And here it is to be wished that the feelings of government had anticipated, or followed him. "If those," he said, "who had the management of public affairs had possessed any wisdom, any capacity for enlightened policy in the regulation of a nation's interests and constitution, any right or sound feelings with regard to the happiness of their fellow creatures, here most fortunately had been a wide field opened to them. They had got the possession of the kingdom of our ally, with its government dissolved, and no means existing within it for the establishment of any regular authority or civil administration, but such as the British government alone should suggest.

Here had been a glorious opportunity for raising the Portugueze nation from that wretched and degraded condition to which a lengthened succession of mental ignorance