purposes was to exempt from the possible operation of section 16 of article XX the matters of the tenure of office, appointment and dismissal of municipal employees.Spader v. Rolph, Jr., 29 Cal. App. 774, 156 Pac. 977.

13. Where the board of fire commissioners of San Francisco, after being advised by the city attorney that they had no power to do so, and after they had been notified by the mayor that they must desist, proceeded to and did remove the chief engineer of the department from office without preferring charges and without a trial, they thereby deliberately violated the charter, and their action afforded a sufficient ground for the exercise by the mayor of his power to remove them from office after trial.-Spader v. Rolph, Jr., 29 Cal. App. 774, 156 Pac. 977. 14. Under the provisions of the freeholders' charter of the city of Oakland, which took effect July 1, 1911, and which introduced into the government of the city for the first time a civil service system, the city council can not, under the guise of an ordinance giving to the positions of deputy plumbing inspectors and assistant sanitary inspectors the name of deputy sanitary and plumbing inspectors without making any change in the duties of such positions, remove the incumbents under civil service regulation and appoint other persons in their places, and mandamus will lie to compel the commissioner of public health and safety to reinstate such discharged employees. Cordan v. Jackson, 22 Cal. App. 623, 157 Pac. 828.

15. The provision of the charter of the city of San Jose that a police officer can be removed only for cause and after trial is not in conflict with section 16 of article XX of the constitution, notwithstanding that they hold office at the pleasure of the appointing power.-People v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 963, 158 Pac. 1036.

16. A captain of police is a member of the police force of the city of San Jose under its charter, and where at the time of appointment to the force he takes the requisite oath, it is not necessary he should again take an oath on promotion.-People v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 963, 158 Pac. 1036.

17. A police captain can be removed, under the charter of San Jose, only for cause and after notice and trial.-People v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 963, 158 Pac. 1036.

18. A police officer can not be lawfully removed by an order of the police board reorganizing the police force.-People Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 963, 158 Pac. 1036.

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the fire department, but such board is vested with the discretion of determining whether or not the examination shall include those tests. Maxwell v. Civil Service Commission, 169 Cal. 336, 146 Pac. 869.

21. Where vacancies occur in both the offices of first assistant chief engineer and second assistant chief engineer of the fire department of such city and county, an examination for promotion from the rank of battalion chief to the rank of assistant chief engineer is proper, and a separate examination for each of such positions is not required.-Maxwell v. Civil Service Commission, 169 Cal. 336, 146 Pac. 869.

22. Contracts with-Letting of printing contract.-Where a municipal corporation is required to let its contracts to the lowest bidder after advertisement made, plans and specifications are essential, because it is only through their agency that there is a reasonable assurance of equal competition.Arthur v. Petaluma, 27 Cal. App. 782, 151 Pac. 183.

23. Sufficient compliance by a municipal corporation in the award of a contract for city printing with the requirement of the law that the board of trustees "prepare a schedule of the amount and character of the work" before advertising for bids, is shown, where the specifications are on file with the city clerk, notwithstanding that the minute-book of the board failed to disclose any formal resolution of adoption of the same.Arthur v. Petaluma, 27 Cal. App. 782, 151 Pac. 183.

24. —Printing or publishing charter.— The printing of a freeholders' charter comes within the definition of "advertising" as used in a statute and ordinance providing for the letting of contracts for "city printing and advertising."-Arthur v. Petaluma, 27 Cal. App. 782, 151 Pac. 183.

25. The concluding phrase "all other printing" used in section 777 of the general municipal corporation act as amended in 1891, declaring that "the board of trustees shall annually, at a stated time, contract for doing all city printing and advertising, which contract shall be let to the lowest bidder after notice, as provided in this section, and the contract therefor shall be awarded separately from all other printing," has reference to all city printing not included in the term "advertising."-Arthur v. Petaluma, 27 Cal. App. 782, 151 Pac. 183. 26. Liability for acts of officers.-For an honest, though mistaken, exercise of his discretionary powers, a municipal officer is personally liable.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

27. In the absence of a statutory provision permitting it, an action will not lie against a municipal corporation for damages caused by the negligence of its officers, agents and servants in the performance of the public or governmental duties of the municipality.-Brunson v. Santa Monica, 27 Cal. App. 89, 148 Pac. 950.

28. The act of April 26, 1911, entitled "An act relating to the liability of public officers for damages resulting from defects

can

and dangers in streets, highways, public buildings, public work or property," not be made to include the subject of liability of public corporations in whose service such officers may be, and is void as to any purported legislation therein contained attempting to create a new rule of liability as against such corporations.-Brunson v. Santa Monica, 27 Cal. App. 89, 148 Pac. 950. 29. -Maintenance of "dump.”—A municipal corporation, in the absence of a statutory provision declaring otherwise, is not liable in damages for the neglect of its agents, officers, servants and employees in the maintenance and operation of a "public dump" which the plaintiff was compelled and permitted to use.-Brunson v. Monica, 27 Cal. App. 89, 148 Pac. 950.

Santa

30. The rule that ultra vires contracts purporting to be made by a city, or contracts made in its name by officers without authority to execute them, will not be enforced against the municipality, and that a city is not liable in damages for the tortious acts of its officers done in excess of the corporate powers of the municipality, applies to contracts which are executory. does not apply to the right of a city to hold property in its possession, or to the right to question its use thereof, independent of the assertion of a claim against it for money or damages, or to contracts fully executed by both parties.-Beckett v. Petaluma, 171 Cal. 309, 153 Pac. 20.

It

31. Organization of municipality-Petition for. The publication of the petition for an order incorporating a city as required by section 2 of the Municipal Corporation Act, which states that the petition would be presented to the board of supervisors on Tuesday, April 5th, is sufficient, notwithstanding the day of the week corresponding with April 5th was Wednesday.-Cole v. Orange County, 27 Cal. App. 528, 150 Pac. 784.

32. Where a notice specifies the day of the month for the doing of an act as to which the notice is given, no purpose is served by naming therein the day of the week corresponding to such day of the month.-Cole v. Orange County, 27 Cal. App. 528, 150 Pac. 784.

33. The presentation of such a petition on April 6th is sufficient, when the board met in regular session on April 4th and adjourned its meeting to April 6th, such adjournment being but a continuance of the session and the interruption in the nature of a recess.-Cole v. Orange County, 27 Cal. App. 528, 150 Pac. 784.

34. The failure of the board of supervisors to order a certified copy of its order incorporating the city to be filed in the office of the secretary of state, and the failure to ascertain the number of inhabitants within the boundaries of the proposed city before the ordering of the publication of notice of the election of officers therein, are questions which at most are in the nature of errors and irregularities which, since the board had jurisdiction to act, can not be reviewed in a proceeding in certiorari to

annul the order of the board.-Cole v. Orange County, 27 Cal. App. 528, 150 Pac. 784.

a

35. Ordinances, validity of-Brick-making, regulation of.-An ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of brick within described district of the municipality will not be declared invalid because of the ignorance of a member of the city council, who voted for the enactment, of the actual conditions existing and of the operation of the ordinance upon those to be affected thereby, since the motive of the legislator may not be inquired into, but his conduct is to be judged by the expression which it takes in the enactment adopted.-Hadacheck v. Alexander, 169 Cal. 616, 147 Pac. 259.

36. An ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of brick within a prescribed district of the municipality is a valid exercise of the police power, even as against the owner of land containing valuable deposits of clay which can not be profitably removed and made into brick elsewhere, the land having been acquired by him prior to its annexation to the municipality and having been long used by him as a brickyard.-Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. Ed. 348, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143, affirming 165 Cal. 416, L. R. A. 1916B 1248, 132 Pac. 584. 37. Jitney busses, regulation of.—An ordinance of San Francisco regulating the use upon its public streets of self-propelled vehicles, other than street-cars, traversing such streets between certain definite points or termini and conveying passengers for a fixed charge of not more than ten cents between such and intermediate points, and so held out, advertised or announced, is not discriminatory, by reason of its failure to include all other motor vehicles used on the streets, and especially those used for the carriage of passengers.-Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, L. R. A. 1915F 850, P. U. R. 1915E 282, 150 Pac. 348.

38. The provision of such ordinance that it shall be unlawful for any person to operate such a vehicle on the streets "unless said person shall have had at least thirty days' experience in the operation of an automobile in the city and county of San Francisco," is not invalid.-Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, L. R. A. 1915F 850, P. U. R. 1915E 282, 150 Pac. 348.

39. An ordinance regulating jitney busses and requiring a bond and permit and license fee is not unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of the police power, nor as providing a classification based upon the amount charged for transportation.- Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, L. R. A. 1915F 850, P. U. R. 1915E 282, 150 Pac. 348.

40. The provision of such ordinance that it shall be unlawful for any person to operate such a vehicle, unless there is given and in force either a bond of the owner or lessee of the vehicle with a responsible surety company or association authorized to do business under the laws of this state, in the sum of $10,000, conditioned that the owner or lessee of said vehicle "will pay all loss or damage that may result to any person or property from the negligent opera

tion of or defective construction of said vehicle, or which may arise or result from any violation of any of the provisions of the ordinance or the laws of the state," or a policy of insurance in a company authorized to do business in this state with a total liability of $10,000, insuring said owner or lessee against loss by reason of damage that may result to any person or persons or property from the operation of said vehicle, which policy shall guarantee payment, within the limits prescribed, namely, an aggregate liability of $10,000, and a limitation of $5,000 for any one person killed or injured, and one of $1,000 for the injury or destruction of any property, of any final judgment rendered against said owner or lessee, is a reasonable requirement.-Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, L. R. A. 1915F 850, P. U. R. 1915E 282, 150 Pac. 348.

41. Such provision is not invalid by reason of the requirement that the bond be given by a responsible surety company or association to the exclusion of personal sureties. Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, L. R. A. 1915F 850, P. U. R. 1915E 282, 150 Pac. 348.

42. A municipal corporation has power to regulate the use of its streets by self-propelled motor vehicles for the carriage of passengers, and to provide for the licensing thereof. In re Lee, 28 Cal. App. 719, 153 Pac. 992.

43. A provision of a municipal ordinance which requires a licensed auto bus to be operated eighteen hours per day is a regulation made in the lawful exercise of the police power, and especially of the power to make reasonable regulations governing the use of the streets.-In re Lee, 28 Cal. App. 719, 153 Pac. 992.

44. Planing-mills, regulation of. — A municipal ordinance providing that no one shall construct or occupy a building for use as a planing-mill, furniture factory, or other woodworking enterprise, in which planers, stickers or jointers are used and run by power, without first obtaining a permit from the board of supervisors, is unconstitutional, in that it discriminates between those already operating such mills and those desiring to operate them in the future.-Ex parte Cordoulis, 27 Cal. App. 4, 148 Pac. 800.

45. -Ordinance passed on day of introduction. An ordinance of the board of trustees of a city of the sixth class (Long Beach), purporting to grant to a railroad corporation authority to construct sidings and turnouts in certain streets of the city, passed on the day of its introduction, is void, by virtue of the requirements of section 861 of the Municipal Corporation Act that no such ordinance shall be passed by the board of trustees on the day of its introduction, nor within five days thereafter.San Pedro R. R. Co. v. Long Beach, 172 Cal. 631, 158 Pac. 204.

46. -Soliciting alms.-A municipal ordinance, providing that it should be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to solicit alms, food, clothing or contributions within the municipality "without

first securing a permit so to do from the municipal charities commission of the city," or to make sale of any goods donated to charity, without first obtaining a similar permit, is invalid as conferring upon such commission absolute and arbitrary power to forbid any person from so soliciting or so selling, regardless of his personal character, worth or fitness.-Ex parte Dart, 172 Cal. 47, L. R. A. 1916D 905, 155 Pac. 63.

47. —Sprinkling streets.—An ordinance of the city of Sacramento requiring every person, firm or corporation owning, controlling or operating any street railroad along any of the streets to sprinkle the surface of the street occupied by the railroad between the rails and the tracks and for a sufficient distance beyond the outermost rails thereof so as to effectually lay the dust and prevent the same from arising when the cars are in operation, without cost to the city during the months of June, July, August, September and October of each year, is a valid exercise of the police power.-Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Police Court of Sacramento, 28 Cal. App. 412, 152 Pac. 928.

48. Powers of-Over public utilities.— The amendment of 1910 to section 19 of article XI of the constitution did not vest in the city of Stockton any power which would be impaired by section 50 of the Public Utilities Act, since the provision in such amendment conferring on cities a power to control certain public utilities "under their organic law" does not constitute a grant of unlimited or specific power over such utilities (except in the matter of rates) to any city whose organic law contains no provision for the exercise of such power.-Oro Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 169 Cal. 466, 147 Pac. 118.

49. Language purporting to define the powers of a municipal corporation is to be strictly construed, and any "fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is to be resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power denied."—Oro Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 169 Cal. 466, 147 Pac. 118.

50.

-To contract.-Contracts made by a local governmental body, having both legislative and executive powers, for the purchase of supplies for use in the current administration of governmental affairs, such as current printing expenses, gas, water or electricity for current lighting of city offices or streets and furniture and fittings for such offices, are to be deemed as acts of administration and classed among those governmental powers properly assigned to the executive department.-Hopping v. City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 Pac. 977.

complete and efficient administration of the municipal government, although such powers may not be herein expressly enumerated," the right to expend money for street lighting purposes.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

53. Where the charter of the municipality makes the general street lighting law a part of the organic law of the city, it is necessary that in the exercise of the power of lighting the municipality that the municipal authorities follow the mode prescribed by the general lighting law, which requires, among other things, a resolution of intention and the imposition of the cost of the work upon private property precisely as does the street law.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

54. Street assessments for local improvements. The return to the property owner by way of benefit is, under our system of government, the basic foundation upon which rests the right to impose special assessments.-Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

55. A special assessment is not, in the constitutional sense, a tax at all. It is "a compulsory charge placed by the state upon real property within a predetermined district, made under express legislative authority for defraying in whole or in part the expense of a permanent public improvement therein, enhancing the present value of such real estate, and laid by some reasonable rule of uniformity based upon, in the ratio of, and limited by, such enhanced value."-Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

56. The compensating benefit to the property owner is the warrant, and the sole warrant, for the legislature itself to impose the burdens of these special assessments. It has been a matter of profound regret to this court and indeed to every court which has been called upon to consider the question, that in the application of this principle, theoretically equitable, practical operations have shown grave wrong and injustice to be done. With ceaseless reiteration the courts have deplored these unjust exactions and extortions. With tiresome repetition have they advised the lawmakers of methods for the exercise of the power more in consonance with equity and fair dealing.Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

57. A local assessment may so transcend the limits of equality and reason that its exaction would cease to be a tax or contribution to a common burden, and become extortion and confiscation. In that case it would be the duty of the court to protect the citizen from robbery under color of a better name.-Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

58. An assessment for street widening purposes which assesses lots fronting on the street, in the same amount as allowed for the land taken plus the property owner's proportionate share of the expense of the city in the condemnation proceeding is so grossly unjust as to work a confiscation

of the property, and therefore void.-Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

59. The action of the city council upon an appeal taken in the matter of such an assessment is not conclusive.-Spring Street Co. v. Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 148 Pac. 217.

60. An assessment made wholly against the lots on one side of an improved street is void upon its face, and belongs to that class where the property owner may, without first appealing to the city council, resist its enforcement.-Schaffer v. Smith, 169 Cal. 764, 147 Pac. 976.

61. -Exemption of railroads from assessment.-Land covered by a railroad right of way can not be assessed, but the land itself covered by such right of way fronting upon an improved street is subject to assessment. -Schaffer v. Smith, 169 Cal. 764, 147 Pac. 976. 62. Street improvement proceedings — In general. — Street improvement proceedings are acts legislative in their character, as distinguished from ministerial or administrative acts; and since all of such acts are authorized by the general street law to be evidenced in the form of a resolution, it is not necessary, nor required, to put them in the form of an ordinance, and they are none the less acts of a legislative character because expressed or evidenced in the form of a resolution.-Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal. App. 561, 153 Pac. 397.

63. The provisions of section 13 et seq. of the act entitled, "An Act to Reincorporate the town of Santa Clara" (Stats. 1872, p. 251), relating to street improvements therein, and which authorized contracts to be entered into in advance of the levy and collection of the assessment, were repealed upon the adoption of section 19 of article XI of the constitution, notwithstanding such section terms only specifies cities as coming within its provisions, and not towns.-Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Woodhams, 29 Cal. App. 356, 156 Pac. 62.

in

64. Proceedings for street improvements are not subject to the initiative and referendum provisions of the constitution, for the reason that such provisions and the system established by the legislature for the improvement of public streets can not coexist, if such provisions are applicable to such system.-Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal. App. 561, 153 Pac. 397.

65. Proceedings for letting contracts for street improvements are in invitum, and must be strictly pursued in strict compliance with the law under which they are taken. They are purely statutory, and can be conducted only in the cases and after the manner provided by the statutes.-Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Costa, 171 Cal. 138, 152 Pac. 296.

66. The making of a valid bid is as essential as any other act leading up to the award of a contract for the improvement of streets. Every requirement of the law relating to the bid and "calculated to prevent bogus and dishonest bids" must be observed or the contract will be invalid.-Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Costa, 171 Cal. 138, 152 Pac. 296.

67. The provision of the Vrooman Act, requiring each bidder to place in his bid his affidavit that it is not sham and that he intends no fraud or collusion, must be complied with as a condition precedent to the power to enter into a contract for street improvements. The provision is not merely directory. Its object is to prevent fraud upon the property owner and to avoid the necessity of proving frauds by eliminating, at the outset and before the work is begun, all dishonest and fraudulent bidders and collusive agreements between bidders.-Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Costa, 171 Cal. 138, 152 Pac. 296.

68. The failure of the clerk of the city council, in giving the notice inviting bids for the doing of street work under the Improvement Act of 1911, to state that proposals may be accompanied by a bond as well as by a certified check for an amount which shall not be less than ten per cent of the aggregate of the proposal, is not fatal to the proceedings leading up to the award of the contract.-Federal Construction Co. v. Wold, 23 Cal. App. 751, 158 Pac. 340.

69. A property owner is not entitled to a perpetual injunction restraining the issuance of bonds for the amount due on a street-work assessment against his property, because of the omission of the resolution of intention, upon which the proceedings were based, to state definitely the time for which the bonds are to run, for there is no provision in the bond act which requires such a specification; but he is entitled to an injunction restraining the issuance of such bonds, until the city council shall have issued a warrant which states the term of the bonds, since the provision of the act which requires the warrant to include a notice "describing the bonds" contemplates a statement of the term that the bonds are to run.-Cohn v. Federal Construction Co., 171 Cal. 547, 153 Pac. 916.

70. Under section 2 of the "Vrooman law" it is within the power of the municipal authorities to order several different streets improved in one proceeding and as one improvement, to be performed under one contract.-Remillard v. Blake & Bilger Co., 169 Cal. 277, Ann. Cas. 1916D 451, 146 Pac. 634.

71. Under the provisions of the charter of the city of Santa Cruz the general street law is controlling in the matters of street work therein.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

72. -Under one scheme of improvement. -The right of municipal authorities to include work upon more than one street in a single scheme of improvement is not affected by the fact that some of the streets are wider than others, for the assessment is to be supported upon the ground that each owner is charged with an amount equal or proportionate to the benefit conferred upon his property by the entire improvement.Remillard v. Blake & Bilger Co., 169 Cal. 277, Ann. Cas. 1916D 451, 146 Pac. 634.

73. Such a construction of the statute does not impair the right of the majority of

owners of any single street to bar the work, by protest, for six months, since the Vrooman Act does not give this right to the owners of the majority of the frontage on a street, but to "the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property fronting on said proposed work or improvement" and if the "work or improvement" may cover more than one street, a majority of the frontage on all the streets covered by the proposed work must join to make the protest effectual.-Remillard v. Blake & Bilger Co., 169 Cal. 277, Ann. Cas. 1916D 451, 146 Pac. 634.

74. A resolution of intention providing that "wooden bridges" be constructed at each end of cross-walks at certain points is not deficient for failure to describe the kind of wood to be used in such bridges.-Remillard v. Blake & Bilger Co., 169 Cal. 277, Ann. Cas. 1916D 451, 146 Pac. 634.

75. -Resolution of intention.-A defense to an action to enforce a lien for street work, based upon any illegality in the proceedings under the resolution of intention, may be waived.-Remillard v. Blake & Bilger Co., 169 Cal. 277, Ann. Cas. 1916D 451, 146 Pac. 634.

76. The posting and publishing of the resolution of intention in a street work proceeding, without having thereon the city clerk's certificate to its passage, is not the omission of a legal requirement.-Schaffer v. Smith, 169 Cal. 764, 147 Pac. 976.

77. A resolution of intention in the matter of street work is jurisdictional and absolutely necessary whenever it is proposed to bind, in whole or in part, private property for the payment of the work to be done; otherwise, if it is work of a character which the city proposes to do itself at its own proper charge and expense, no resolution of intention is necessary.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

78. It is only where private property is to be bound for the payment of a street improvement that a resolution of intention is a necessary prerequisite.-Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367.

79. In the doing of street work, the law does not require that the resolution of intention shall in terms describe in detail the work to be done thereunder but provides that the resolution may give that description by reference to plans and specifications contemporaneously created and adopted.Richmond Construction Co. v. Doe, 29 Cal. App. 427, 155 Pac. 1008.

80. The resolution of intention to do the proposed work is an essential prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the governing body of the municipality to inaugurate such work, and if deficient in its description of a material part of the work to be done thereunder, it will not support a cause of action for the foreclosure of the assessment lien. Richmond Construction Co. v. Doe, 29 Cal. App. 427, 155 Pac. 1008.

81. Under the amendments of 1911 of sections 2 and 4 of the street bond act (Stats. 1911, p. 1201), the amendment of 1899 of section 3 of said act (Stats. 1899,