"Investment," as commonly employed, has been judicially defined to mean the putting out of money on interest in some form more or less permanent so as to yield an income. -Dean v. Hawes, 29 Cal. App. 689, 157 Pac. 558.

"Last clear chance."-Tucker v. Pacific R. Co., 174 Cal. 42, 161 Pac. 1147.

"Lawful issue."-Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346.

"Levied."-People's Water Co. v. Boromeo, 31 Cal. App. 270, 160 Pac. 574.

"Lowest responsible bidder." West V. Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 556, 159 Pac. 202. "Matter."-Bruschi v. Cooper, 30 Cal. App. 682, 159 Pac. 728.

"Maintain" an action, as used in § 2468 of Civil Code, means to commence, institute, begin or bring.-Creditors' Adjustment Co. v. Rossi, 26 Cal. App. 725, 148 Pac. 528.

"May."-Ex parte Cencinino, 31 Cal. App. 238, 160 Pac. 167.

"May" means "must" in by-law fixing date for holding annual meeting of corporation. Strappler v. El Dora Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 516, 150 Pac. 643.

"Merchantable" is synonymous with “marketable," when used in connection with the title in real estate.-Agnew v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 39, 148 Pac. 819.

"Municipal affairs."-Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 159 Pac. 600; Scheafer v. Herman, 172 Cal. 338, 155 Pac. 1084.

"Negotiate" has been construed to mean "conversation in arranging the terms of a contract."-Salter v. Ives, 171 Cal. 790, 155 Pac. 84.

"Net profits."-Fee v. McPhee, 31 Cal. App. 295, 160 Pac. 397.

"Occupancy," as used in section 1006 of the Civil Code, means possession, actual possession as contradistinguished from constructive possession.-Hart v. All Persons, 26 Cal. App. 664, 148 Pac. 236.

"Occupation" is synonymous with the expression "subjection to the will and control" and with "possessio pendis," and signifies "actual possession."-Hart v. All Persons, 26 Cal. App. 664, 148 Pac. 236.

"Option," by common as well as legal understanding, is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another that he shall have a right to buy at a fixed price within a certain time.-McKey v. Clark, 233 Fed. 928.

"Other transportation companies."-United Railroads v. Railroad Commission, 173 Cal. 801, 162 Pac. 391.

"Points."-Bruschi v. Cooper, 30 Cal. App. 682, 159 Pac. 728.

"Process," as used in Political Code, sections 17, 4171 and 4319, defined.-In re Baker, 32 Cal. App. 320, 162 Pac. 922.

"Ratification," as used in §§ 2310 and 2312 of Civil Code, refers to the act of another. -Snook v. Page, 29 Cal. App. 246, 155 Pac. 107.

"Ratification," sale by owner is not a.Snook v. Page, 29 Cal. App. 246, 155 Pac. 107. "Ratify" is a term properly applicable only to contracts by a person acting or

-

Snook V.

assuming to act for another. Page, 29 Cal. App. 246, 155 Pac. 107. "Ratify" refers to the act of another.Snook v. Page, 29 Cal. App. 246, 155 Pac. 107. "Resign."-People v. Marsh, 30 Cal. App. 424, 159 Pac. 191.

"Road," as used in section 468, was intended to include the main line and all branches, both of original and consolidated companies. Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lambert, 166 Cal. 749, 137 Pac. 1116.

"Secured."-J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Copren Bros., 32 Cal. App. 194, 161 Pac. 647.

"Selling."-People v. Winkler, 174 Cal. 133, 162 Pac. 109.

"Stock" and "shares" are not interchangeable.-Film Producers v. Jordan, 171 Cal. 664, 154 Pac. 604.

"Stockholder," in section 3, article XII of the constitution, is synonymous with "owner of shares" in section 298 of Civil Code.Western Pac. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 166 Cal. 346, Ann. Cas. 1915B 825, 136 Pac. 284. "Such declaration." In Fed. 405.

re Valhoff, 238

"Swamp, overflowed, or other public lands of the state," includes tide lands and submerged lands.-People v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 692, 158 Pac. 177.

"To negotiate a lease" does not confer power to execute a lease.-Salter v. Ives, 171 Cal. 790, 155 Pac. 84.

"To ratify" is to give sanction and validity to something done without authority by one individual in behalf of another.Snook v. Page, 29 Cal. App. 246, 155 Pac. 107.

v. Finnell, 173 Cal.

of

"Transfer."-Scholle 372, 159 Pac. 1179. "Unlawfully," sufficient in charge of wrongful act.-Matter of Application Ahart, 172 Cal. 762, 159 Pac. 160. "Vehicle."-Harris v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 161 Pac. 1155.

"Warrant," need not be used to create an express warranty.-Costs v. Hord, 29 Cal. App. 115, 154 Pac. 491.

"Wilfully," imports a design to do a specific act.-Matter of Application of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762, 159 Pac. 160.

§ 19.

1. In general.-One to whom an architect gives an estimate of cost may not recklessly proceed to make contracts which may and probably would make the cost of construction far above that estimated, and then hold the architect responsible for the surplus expenditure.-Benenato v. McDougall, 166 Cal. 405, Ann. Cas. 1915C 871, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1202, 137 Pac. 8.

2. Inference of notice absolute, when.—If it appears that the party has knowledge or information of such facts as are sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry and that he wholly neglects to make any inquiry, or, having begun it, fails to prosecute it in a reasonable manner, the inference of actual notice is necessary and absolute.-Hawke v.

California Realty & Const. Co., 28 Cal. App. 377, 152 Pac. 959.

Presumption rebuttable.-If a party obtains knowledge or information of facts tending to show the existence of a prior right in conflict with the interest which he is seeking to obtain, and which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, then it may be a legitimate, and perhaps even a necessary, inference that he acquired the further information which constitutes actual notice; but this inference may be defeated by proper evidence. Hawke v. California Realty & Const. Co., 28 Cal. App. 377, 152 Pac. 959.

§ 33.

1. Purpose of statute.-Inasmuch as our supreme court in Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 208, in 1864, had decided that an infant could execute a promissory note by agent, it is obvious that the intention of the legislature intended to change that rule of law. It is to be presumed that in adopting the rule herein all its incidents as then established were adopted with it, so that such contracts could be absolutely disregarded, and no disaffirmance was required.-Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 166 Cal. 557, 137 Pac. 911.

§ 34.

1. Contracts of minors.-It is the policy of the law to discourage adults from contracting with infants, and the former can not complain if, as a consequence of their violation of this rule of conduct, they are injured by the exercise of the right with which the law has purposely invested the latter, nor charge that the infant in exercising the right is guilty of fraud.-Flittner v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 Pac. 630.

§ 35.

1. Construction. — The provisions herein concerning disaffirmance by a minor under 18 years are to be understood as referring solely to contracts other than those described in section 33; it is not, therefore, necessary to disaffirm in order to avoid the contract of a minor under that age relating to real property, or to personal property not in his immediate control, or delegating a power.-Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 166 Cal. 557, 137 Pac. 911.

2.

Disaffirmance of contract of life insurance. A contract of life insurance entered into in this state by a minor under the age of eighteen years is subject to the laws of this state in the matter of his right to disaffirm the contract and recover the premiums paid thereunder, and not subject to the laws of the state under which the insurance company was organized and exists, notwithstanding the policy provides that the payment of the benefit should be at the home office of the company and that the premiums should also be paid at such place. -Flittner v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 Pac. 630.

3. A minor under the age of eighteen years may disaffirm a contract without restoring or offering to restore the consideration. Flittner v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 Pac. 630.

House v. Fry, 30 Cal. App. 157, 12 N. C. C. A. 648n, 157 Pac. 500.

$42.

1. Infant bound by decree of court.-An infant can be bound without having his day in court, and is as much bound as a person of full age by a decree in equity, the same grounds being available to both for disputing it.-Estate of Lamb, 6 Cof. Prob. Dec. 432.

§ 43.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

1. Arrest based on advice of magistrate. 2. Magistrate without jurisdiction to issue warrant.

3, 4. Malicious prosecution.

1. Arrest based on advice of magistrate. -The defendant is not exonerated from liability for the false imprisonment by the fact that, before filing his affidavit for the arrest, the magistrate who issued the warrant, being informed of the facts, advised him that there was sufficient cause for the arrest.-Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal. 621, 123 Pac. 1115.

2. Magistrate without jurisdiction to issue warrant. The principle, that where the affidavit for arrest contains direct statement of facts which constitute some evidence of every fact which the statute requires to be shown therein, the magistrate to whom it is presented has jurisdiction to pass upon its sufficiency, and if he determines upon such evidence that it is sufficient and thereupon issues the warrant, the party who invokes his decision is not answerable to the defendant in damages if the magistrate errs in his judgment, is not applicable to the arrest on civil process of a person shown to be a female, since such arrest is not allowed on any state of facts and the magistrate can under no circumstances acquire jurisdiction to issue the warrant.Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal. 621, 123 Pac. 1115. 3. Malicious prosecution. In an action for damages for malicious prosecution it is

1. As to what constitutes. It is libelous per se to falsely charge that a person is a hypocrite.-Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 173 Cal. 387, 160 Pac. 233.

2. Evidence.-In an action for libel, a plaintiff comes into court with his general good character established by the statute, and evidence is not admissible in that issue until the character of the plaintiff has been impeached or put in issue by the waiver.Examiner Printing Co. v. Aston, 238 Fed. 459, 463.

3. Where in an action for libel there is a distinct issue raised by the pleadings as to

the plaintiff's professional character and as to the truth and veracity of his reports as an engineer, the plaintiff may, in his case in chief, introduce evidence that his reputation as an engineer was first-class.Examiner Printing Co. v. Aston, 238 Fed. 459.

4. Where in an action for libeling the plaintiff's reputation as an engineer the plaintiff claims he has been damaged by the publication, and the question of damages has been placed in issue by the answer, the plaintiff may introduce evidence that his reputation was first class.-Examiner Printing Co. v. Aston, 238 Fed. 459.

5. In an action for libel, the plaintiff may, by way of inducement as an explanatory introduction to the main allegations of the complaint, offer in evidence copies of other papers containing articles of the same general character.-Examiner Printing Co. v. Aston, 238 Fed. 459.

6. Where the words published are fairly capable of two meanings, one harmless and the other defamatory, it is a question for the jury to determine from the evidence in what sense the person who may have read the same may have understood them.-Bonestell v. Shaw, 28 Cal. App. 226, 151 Pac. 1149.

7. -Burden of proof.-The burden is on the defendant to prove the truth of the charges and no burden rests on the plaintiff to prove their falsity.-Adams v. Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625, 150 Pac. 1005.

1. Marriage-Solemnization necessary to valid. Inasmuch as solemnization has been made an essential to a valid marriage, a presumption of marriage from continued cohabitation can no longer be indulged in the face of a showing that there was no solemnization.-Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

2. -Former spouse living, effect on validity. A common-law marriage, as well as one entered into under regular forms and ceremonies, does not create the relation of husband and wife between a man and a woman already having a wife and a husband living and not divorced.-Estate of Delaporte, 6 Cof. Prob. Dec. 513.

§ 56.

1. Marriage of minors-Consent of guardian or parent necessary, when.-A female over the age of fifteen years is capable of consenting to and consummating a valid

marriage and consent of guardian or parents is not necessary. In re Ambrose, 170 Cal. 160, 149 Pac. 43.

2. It is only when marriage is contracted by a minor incapable of giving consent by reason of being under age that the consent of the parents or guardian is essential to the validity of the marriage.-Guardianship of Ambrose, 170 Cal. 160, 149 Pac. 43.

divorce. This change was made to bring the law into conformity with the legislation adopted at the same session providing for interlocutory decrees of divorce.-Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

2. To the extent that this section made a marriage within a year after the entry of an interlocutory decree void it did something more than to fix a penalty. It was an effectual bar to attempt of parties to create the marital status. This status could only be created in the mode prescribed in section 55. The amendment to section 61 did not purport to operate as a curative act. -Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

as not complying with the requirement that the subject of every act shall be embraced in its title.-Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439.

4. Construction -To what cases applicable (subd. 2).-A case involving the question whether a second marriage is valid notwithstanding the former husband or wife is alive, and the former marriage has not been dissolved or annulled, the element of good faith and belief of the party that the former spouse is dead is an essential element. This section does not apply if the former spouse is not shown to have been living at the time of the subsequent marriage.-Wilcox v. Wilcox, 171 Cal. 770, 155 Pac. 95.

§ 82.

1. Annulment-Marriage valid until annulled (subd. 3). While subdivision 3 of section 82 of the Civil Code, declaring that a marriage may be annulled if either party to it was of unsound mind at the time of entering into it, the marriage is binding upon the parties and upon all the world until such annulment is declared.-Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346.

2. False representation as to previous chastity. A marriage is not subject to annulment, nor is a conveyance of real property made by the husband to the wife after such marriage subject to cancellation upon the ground that the wife falsely represented prior to the marriage that she had always been of chaste and moral character.-Wilcox V. Wilcox, 171 Cal. 769, 155 Pac. 95.

1. Extreme cruelty-What constitutes.In order to constitute extreme cruelty of the character of grievous mental suffering, it is not essential that a perceptible effect thereof be produced upon the body or health of the complaining party, but it is a question of fact to be deduced from all the circumstances of each particular case, keeping always in view the intelligence, apparent refinement and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party.-Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. App. 68, 154 Pac. 483.

2. Evidence as to.-In such an action physicians of the plaintiff should be permitted to testify generally as to the subject to which plaintiff ascribed her disturbance

of mind and health when she consulted them.-Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. App. 68, 154 Pac. 483.

3. It is prejudicial error in such an action to refuse to permit the plaintiff to describe exactly the acts of the defendant, at the time he would intrude himself upon her privacy, on the ground that the proof would be of no value and would be disregarded by the court.-Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. App. 68, 154 Pac. 483.

ing a reconciliation with the defendant.— Silva v. Silva, 32 Cal. App. 115, 162 Pac. 142.

§ 102.

1. Curing desertion — Determination by trial court.-It is for the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses, to determine from the evidence whether or not the party has brought himself within this section, and the appellate court will not disturb a finding made upon conflicting evidence.-Baker v. Baker, 168 Cal. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916A 854, 143 Pac. 607.

§ 128.

1. Residence of plaintiff-Construction.— Section 128 of the Civil Code, relative to residence of the plaintiff, does not impose any limitation on the jurisdiction of the superior court in the matter of divorces, but simply prescribes certain facts essential to the making out of a case warranting a divorce, and allegations in regard to residence stand on the same footing as any other allegation of facts showing the right to a divorce.-Dahne v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 664, 161 Pac. 280.

2. -Averment as to in complaint. It must be taken as settled by the decisions that the residence prescribed by section 128 of the Civil Code is essential to the jurisdiction of a court to grant a divorce, and also that the complaint must allege such residence; and it is for the trial court to determine whether such essential residence exists, but in making such determination, it is controlled by section 130 of the Civil Code, and can not act upon the uncorroborated statement, admission or testimony of the parties.-Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Cal. 746, 154 Pac. 837.

3. An allegation of residence in a complaint in an action for divorce that "said plaintiff resides in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California; and has resided in said city and county for more than four years next immediately preceding the commencement of this action," measures up to the requirements of the statute, and is not defective for the reason that it is not in so many words alleged that such residence was "bona fide," as the allegation necessarily implies residence in good faith.— Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Cal. 746, 154 Pac. 837.

2. The main purpose of this section was to prevent collusion.-Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. App. 68, 154 Pac. 483.

3. -Sufficiency of corroboration.—Where the cruelty consists of successive acts of ill treatment there need not be direct testimony of other witnesses to every act sworn to by the plaintiff; it is sufficient corroboration if a considerable number of important and material facts are so testified to by other witnesses, or there is other evidence, circumstantial or direct, which strongly

tends to strengthen and confirm the statements of the plaintiff.-Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. App. 68, 154 Pac. 483.

§ 131.

FILING DECISION-INTERLOCUTORY

DECREE.

1-4. Construction-Purpose and effect of

statute.

5-7. Findings must be made.

8, 9. Interlocutory decree-Function of. 10, 11. Notice of entry of-Appeal. 12. Vacating.

1.

Construction-Purpose and effect of statute.The provision for interlocutory decrees with the subsequent delay of one year before the entry of a final decree was intended to operate as a method of prolonging the action, so as to prevent the divorce from being hastily accomplished, and the interlocutory decree, so far as the termination of the marriage relation is concerned at least, is a mere step in the proceedings.Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1, 147 Pac. 1168. 2. With respect to the rights of a husband and wife, respectively, in the property of the other, an interlocutory decree of divorce, given under the provisions of sections 131 and 132 of the Civil Code, does not sever the marriage relation, but they remain in that relation until the final decree of divorce is pronounced.-Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1, 147 Pac. 1168.

a

3.

The language herein contemplates that final decree shall not be entered until after expiration of the time in which an appeal may be taken. The entry of an interlocutory decree nunc pro tunc as of an earlier date does not affect the time prescribed within which an appeal may be taken. The entry of a final decree within a week after the actual entry of the interlocutory decree nunc pro tunc as of a date one year previous is void, and may be vacated on motion of either party or of the court's own motion.-Nolte v. Nolte, 29 Cal. App. 126, 154 Pac. 873.

4. In construing that portion of this section which declares that in divorce actions the decision and conclusions of law shall be filed "as in other cases" these latter words