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1. Declarations and acts of prior owner. -Acts and declarations of a grantor, made after he has parted with the title to the property and in disparagement of it, are inadmissible when made in the absence of the grantee, but where the very question at issue is as to whether the grantor had ever parted with title, the conduct and declarations of the grantor subsequent to the making of the deed are admissible as bearing on the issue as to whether there had been a delivery of the deed.-Williams v. Kidd,.170 Cal. 631, Ann. Cas. 1916E 703, 151 Pac. 1.

2. The declarations of a prior owner, made while he held title, against his interest as such owner, are admissible against his successor in interest, with regard to personal property as well as real estate.-Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 171 Cal. 158, 153 Pac. 937.

§ 1854.

1. Part of transaction proved-Balance admissible. It is proper to interrogate a witness on cross-examination as to those parts of the conversation on the same subject which he had not detailed in his direct examination, but where no such cross-examination is attempted, it is not the duty of the court either of its own motion, or upon request of counsel to order the witness to narrate the entire conversation.-People v. Coutcure, 171 Cal. 43, 151 Pac. 659.

2. When the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the letter which was refused admission the court on appeal has no means of determining whether the letter was relevant or had any reference to the pending negotiations between the parties, and therefore can not say whether the trial court, having the letter before it, was in error in refusing its admission in evidence. -McIntosh v. Hunt, 29 Cal. App. 779, 157 Pac. 839.

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the first permanent entries of the transactions, that they were made at a time, or within reasonable proximity to the time of the respective transactions, and that the person making them had personal knowledge of the transactions or obtained such knowledge from a report regularly made to him by some other person employed in the business whose duty it was to make the same in the regular course of business.Montgomery & Mullen Lumber Co. v. Ocean Park Scenic Ry. Co., 32 Cal. App. 32, 161 Pac. 1171.

2. In an action to recover the balance due for lumber sold, it is not error to permit the manager of the lumber company to testify as to the correctness of the accounts, where the books were kept under his direction and he had personal knowledge that the charges were correct, and the entries made at the time of the transactions to which they related.-Montgomery & Mullen Lumber Co. v. Ocean Park Scenic Ry. Co., 32 Cal. App. 32, 161 Pac. 1171.

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1. Parol evidence respecting writings.— Where a written agreement purports to be complete, parol evidence is no more admissible for the purpose of adding to its terms than would such evidence be proper in an effort to vary the terms of the instrument itself. Empire Investment Co. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732, 147 Pac. 960.

2. In an action under the provision of the contract that "if at any time prior to the completion of the equipment, the work thereon be discontinued by fire or any cause other than the fault of the (contractor), there shall be immediately due and payable from the (owner) a sum equal to the value of all goods destroyed, materials furnished, labor and services rendered at the time of discontinuance," parol evidence is not admissible to prove an oral agreement that the installation was to be completed within three weeks from the date of the contract. -Roughton v. Brookings Lumber & Box Co., 26 Cal. App. 752, 148 Pac. 539.

3. In an action on a certified check, given in payment of corporate stock, oral evidence is not admissible to show that the word "bearer" was left in the instrument by mistake and that the check was not meant for the seller. Bank of Bakersfield v. Conner, 29 Cal. App. 153, 154 Pac. 869.

4. Where in an action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a written contract for the delivery of hops during the year 1911, the answer sets up the contemporaneous execution of two other instruments calling for similar deliveries in the years 1909 and 1910, and further alleges that the two instruments with the one in suit, by the terms of a collateral contemporaneous oral agreement, constituted but one single and indivisible contract conveying a single

transaction, but which for the convenience of the parties was expressed in three separate instruments, which were executed by the parties thereto at the same time upon the consideration and with the understanding and agreement that the three instruments would constitute but a single contract for the purchase and sale of forty thousand pounds of hops per year for three successive years from the crops produced upon the hop ranch of defendants, it is permissible to permit parol evidence to establish such allegations without doing violence to the rule prohibiting the admission of oral evidence to alter, vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument.-Torrey v. Shea, 29 Cal. App. 313, 155 Pac. 820.

5. In order to let in evidence of a collateral agreement between the parties, such agreement must be consistent with the terms of the writing, and the evidence must not tend to vary or contradict the terms of the written instrument or to defeat its operation.-Piper v. Kellerman, 32 Cal. App. 128, 162 Pac. 423.

6. Evidence of an oral contemporaneous agreement conflicting with the plain terms of a written contract is inadmissible.-Locomobile Co. of America v. Belasco, 32 Cal. App. 329, 162 Pac. 920.

§ 1858.

1. Construction of statutes.-Statutes imposing penalties are, for humane reasons, subjected to strict construction.-Symmes v. Sierra Nevada Min. Co., 171 Cal. 427, 153 Pac. 710.

2. In construing statutes the object to be accomplished by the act is to be ascertained and its provisions considered and so construed, if possible, that all its parts may have effect and operate harmoniously to effectuate that object.-People v. Cole, 28 Cal. App. 448, 152 Pac. 945.

§ 1859.

1. Intent of legislative bodies.-Specific provisions relating to a particular branch of a subject must govern that branch, as against general provisions in other parts of the statute, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provisions relate.-Turner v. Wilson, 171 Cal. 600, 154 Pac. 2.

2. A change in the law extending the time in which a proceeding may be commenced will not be considered as operating to create a new right as to one where the time under the old law had already expired, unless the intent to accomplish this is very clearly expressed.-Schmitt v. White, 172 Cal. 554, 158 Pac. 216.

3. In construing the intention of the board of supervisors in enacting an ordinance creating supervisorial districts, it must be assumed that the board intended to include within the boundaries of the several districts all the territory of the county, and not to leave strips of territory, without local government, lying between any two of the districts, whether consisting of land, or

water, or both, and before such an intention can be imputed to the board or deduced from its action or nonaction it should be made very clearly so to appear.-People v. Williams, 29 Cal. App. 552, 156 Pac. 882.

§ 1860.

1. Circumstances to be considered-Construction of section.-This section, with section 1647 of the Civil Code, simply enacts the common law rule. It is never within their contemplation that a contract reduced to writing and executed by the parties shall have anything added to or taken away from it by evidence of "surrounding circumstances." This rule of evidence is invoked and employed only in cases where upon the face of the contract itself there is doubt and the evidence is used to dispel that doubt, not by showing that the parties meant something other than what they said, but what was meant by what they said.United Iron Works v. Outer Harbor D. & W. Co., 168 Cal. 81, 141 Pac. 917.

2. In an action to recover the purchase price due under a contract to purchase at a fixed price specified blocks of capital stock the admission of evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract which merely confirmed its proper legal construction was not injurious where the same result would necessarily have been reached without that evidence.-Provident Gold Min. Co. v. Manhattan Securities Co., 168 Cal. 304, 142 Pac. 884.

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1.

Construction of section (subd. 9).— The operation of railroads, and especially of interurban railroads, may be termed a "trade" within the meaning of this subdivision.-Vallejo & Northern R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 147 Pac. 238.

2. Under subdivision 3-Admissions and conduct.-In a prosecution under Penal Code, section 269b, the admission of the defendant that he was the father of a child born to his companion in crime while they were living together as husband and wife,

and evidence that the wife's husband had no opportunity for sexual relations with her during the requisite period, is admissible.People v. Woodson, 29 Cal. App. 531, 156 Pac. 378.

3. In a prosecution under section 269b of the Penal Code evidence is admissible showing the defendant's attitude and conduct when he heard his companion introduced as his purported wife.-People v. Woodson, 29 Cal. App. 531, 156 Pac. 378.

4. Under subdivision 4-Dying declarations. It is held in this case that a proper foundation was made for the admission of dying declarations and that evidence of such declarations was properly admitted.-People v. Level, 27 Cal. App. 257, 149 Pac. 772.

5. Where it is made to appear that the declarant was wholly obtuse to religious convictions, entertaining a complete disbelief in a future spiritual existence, or had no regard whatever for the theory of rewards and punishments in the hereafter, his statement in extremis would not be supported by those considerations which may naturally be supposed to exercise an overruling influence upon the minds of men in such circumstances. In such a though the competency might not be destroyed its credibility would be greatly impaired, and when given under such circumstances it should never be submitted to a jury unaccompanied by an explicit admonition by the court that it should be viewed with great caution.-People v. Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 Pac. 477.

case even

6. A dying declaration is admissible when it is made to appear that it was made by a dying person under a sense of impending death, and that such declaration related to the cause of his death.-People v. Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 Pac. 477.

7. An instruction in which it was declared that dying declarations should be received with caution, and that unless it appeared that the declaration made by the deceased just prior to his death accusing the defendant of having fired the fatal shots was made "under a clear opinion of impending death, you can not consider such declaration as evidence in this case, and the court cautions you

not to give as much

weight to such evidence as if the same statement had been testified to in health and subject to cross-examination," is properly refused, where the jury was instructed to receive with caution the evidence of the dying declaration "for the reason that the declarant had not been administered an oath, and an opportunity for cross-examination has not been afforded the defendant and that the declarant might be influenced against the defendant," and for the further reason that the physical condition of the deceased when making the statement might have been such as to render questionable the reliability of his declaration.-People v. Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 Pac. 477.

8. While to be admissible in evidence a dying declaration must generally not be a mere matter of opinion, yet a declaration by the decedent that he was not to blame in the

altercation in which he received the fatal wound may properly be admitted.-People v. Level, 27 Cal. App. 257, 149 Pac. 772.

9. Under subdivision 5-Act or declaration of agent or partner.-In an action to recover the contract price of certain grapes alleged to have been sold and delivered under the terms of a contract which designated the place of delivery and acceptance as other than the place of shipment, there is no error in admitting proof that prior to and at the time of such shipment, the authorized agent of the buyer approved the quality of the grapes and accepted them as sufficient under the contract at the point of their shipment. -Reese v. G. B. Amigo Co., 31 Cal. App. 450, 160 Pac. 837.

10. Under subdivision 12—Usage, when. -A usage can not be given in evidence to relieve a party from his express stipulation, or to vary a contract certain in its terms; but it has a legitimate office in aiding to interpret the intentions of parties to a contract, the real character of which is to be ascertained, not from express stipulations, but from general implications and presumptions. Standard American Dredging Co. V. Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 237, 157 Pac. 833.

§ 1875.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

1. Under subdivision 1-Of abbreviations commonly used.

2. Under subdivision 2—Of operation of local option law.

3-5. Under subdivision 3-Of acts of legislature, of own acts, etc.

6-10. Under subdivision 8-Of laws of na

11.

12.

13, 14.

1.

ture.

Of time, measure of.

Of science and invention, when. Of expectancy and mortality tables. Under subdivision 1-Of abbreviations commonly used.-Courts take judicial notice of the meaning of abbreviations of words commonly used; and it is held in this case that there is no merit in the contention that abbreviations used to designate the official capacity in which the president and secretary of a corporation signed a promissory note were insufficient to show such official capacity.-Union Trust Co. v. Ensign-Baker Refining Co., 29 Cal. App. 641, 157 Pac. 613.

2. Under subdivision, 2—0f operation of local option law. The operation of the Wyllie Local Option Law, in that a given city, town, or district is "no license" territory, is not a fact "established by law" of which judicial notice will be taken.-People v. Mueller, 168 Cal. 521, L. R. A. 1915B 788, 143 Pac. 748.

3. Under subdivision 3-Of nets of legislature, own acts, etc.-The rule that courts will take judicial notice of their own records is limited to proceedings in the same case; hence the supreme court will not judicially know that since the appeal of the case before it the judgment on which the case was founded has been reversed, where such fact is not shown by the record. It is well settled that courts can not in one

case take judicial notice of their records in a different case.-Sewell v. Price, 164 Cal. 265, 128 Pac. 407, 410.

4. In a controversy over tide-lands situated within the bay of San Pedro, in which the city of Los Angeles was substituted as a defendant in place of the city of Wilmington, the court will take judicial notice of the act of legislature of May 1, 1911, passed pending the suit, granting to the city of Los Angeles all the right, title, and interest of the state in all the tide and submerged lands within the city's boundaries, as then constituted, in trust for certain enumerated uses and purposes of public navigation and commerce, the lands subject to the controversy being among those so granted, and will consider such city as successor to the state for all the purposes of the suit.-Patton v. Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521, 147 Pac. 141.

5. Courts will take judicial notice of their records and officers. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency and its application is not confined to courts of record. Anderson v. Board of Dental Examiners, 27 Cal. App. 336, 149 Pac. 1006.

6. Under subdivision 8-Of laws of nature. It is a fact, of which the court may well take judicial notice, that there is no county in this state in which it is practical to serve all of its inhabitants with water by means of one system of works. The topography will not permit it.-San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irr. Co. v. Stevinson, 164 Cal. 221, 128 Pac. 924.

7. Judicial notice will be taken of the operation of the natural law of gravity in the matter of the flow of water.-Miller & Lux v. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 169 Cal. 415, 147 Pac. 567.

8. Judicial notice will be taken of such explosives as gas, kerosene, gunpowder and dynamite.-Schmidt v. Union Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 366, 149 Pac. 1014.

9. Courts can not judicially say that an electric welding machine in operation in a public street will or will not frighten ordinarily gentle horses.-Fallon V. United Railroads, 28 Cal. App. 60, 151 Pac. 290.

10. Judicial notice can not be taken that the flow of water in one well is evidence of a like flow in another well of different depth, a mile or so distant.-Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Zimmerman, 30 Cal. App. 81, 157 Pac. 509.

11. -Of time, measure of. The court may take judicial notice that a particular date of a month fell on a named day.-People v. Rudolph, 28 Cal. App. 683, 153 Pac. 721. 12. -Of science and invention, when.— The courts take notice of discoveries and inventions that have become of common and general use, such as the telephone.-Union Const. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 163 Cal. 298, 125 Pac. 242.

13. -Of expectancy and mortality tables. -Courts take judicial notice of the standard tables of life expectancy, and so of course take judicial notice of the tables that are standard tables, and any such table satisfactory to the court may be introduced with

out foundation proof.-Froeming v. Stockton Elec. R. Co., 171 Cal. 401, 153 Pac. 712. 14. Courts may take judicial notice of the mortality tables in common use.-Dickinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 727, 158 Pac. 183.

§ 1880.

PERSONS WHO CAN NOT TESTIFY. 1-4. Children of tender age (subd. 2). 5-7.

Under subdivision 3-Other party being dead.

8, 9. Purpose of rule in subdivision 3. 1. Children of tender age (subd. 2).-The law does not declare that children under ten shall not be competent to testify, but provides that their incompetency as such shall only be declared when to the trial court it is made to appear that they are incapable by reason of the immature judgment necessarily found in children under ten years to receive accurate impressions of the facts concerning which they may be called upon to testify and to state them truly.-People v. Dunlop, 27 Cal. App. 460, 150 Pac. 389.

2. The burden of showing the incompetency of a child under this section is upon the person who questions the competency, and in the absence of an affirmative showing of an abuse of discretion, the determination of the trial court as to the competency is conclusive upon the appellate court.People v. Holloway, 28 Cal. App. 214, 151 Pac. 975.

3. The competency of a girl of the age of eight years as prosecuting witness, upon a charge of assault with intent to commit rape, is for the trial court to determine by the degree or extent of her understanding and knowledge and not by her age, and such determination must depend upon the manner in which she gives her testimony, a test of which is never available to a court of review. People v. Dunlop, 27 Cal. App. 460, 150 Pac. 389.

4. The determination of the court as to the competency of a child under ten is a question so much in the discretion of the trial court as to be hardly reviewable.People v. Dunlop, 27 Cal. App. 460, 150 Pac. 389.

5. Under subdivision 3-Other party being dead.-Where a wife sues the administrator on a note of the deceased maker the husband is a competent witness on her behalf where the note was her separate property. He is not therefore within the prohibition of "parties or assignors of parties." -Cullen v. Bisbee, 168 Cal. 695, 144 Pac. 968.

6. It is prejudicial error to permit the plaintiff in an action for injuries to his automobile to testify as to the matters of fact occurring before the death of the defendant's testator upon which he based his claim and demand.-George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 Pac. 73.

7. The plaintiff in an action to recover upon a rejected claim for professional services rendered to a deceased person is not permitted, by reason of subdivision 3 of

section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to testify as to the truth and correctness of entries against the deceased made by him in his book of account, but he may testify that he kept such book of account at the time stated and that the book produced was the one kept by him, and if such testimony is supplemented by evidence other than the testimony of plaintiff establishing the trustworthiness of the book, it is then admissible in evidence.-Colburn v. Parrett, 27 Cal. App. 541, 150 Pac. 786.

8. -Purpose of rule in subdivision 3.— The purpose of the rule is that where the

voice of one party to the transaction is
closed by death, the other will not be per-
mitted to testify as to the facts of the trans-
action in enforcing a money demand against
the estate of such deceased person.-George
v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 Pac. 73.
9. The purpose of the rule stated in sec-
tion 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
to prevent a plaintiff, in an action to recover
upon a claim against the estate of a de-
ceased person, from giving testimony which
would in itself tend to establish plaintiff's
claim or demand.-Colburn v. Parrett, 27
Cal. App. 541, 150 Pac. 786.

§ 1881. PERSONS CANNOT BE EXAMINED IN CERTAIN RELATIONS. There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person can not be examined as a witness in the following cases:

1. [Husband and wife.] A husband can not be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband, without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterward, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other; or in an action brought by husband or wife against another person for the alienation of the affections of either husband or wife or in an action for damages against another person for adultery committed by either husband or wife.

2. [Attorney and client.] An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

3. [Confessor and confessant.] A clergyman or priest can not, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs.

4. [Physician and patient.] A licensed physician or surgeon can not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient; provided, however, that after the death of the patient, the executor of his will, or the administrator of his estate, or the surviving spouse of the deceased, or, if there be no surviving spouse, the children of the deceased personally, or, if minors, by their guardian, may give such consent, in any action or proceeding brought to recover damages on account of the death of the patient; provided, further, that where any person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said action shall testify; and provided, further, that the bringing of an action, to recover for the death of a patient, by the executor of his will, or by the administrator of his estate, or by the surviving spouse of the deceased, or if there be no surviving spouse, by the children personally, or, if minors, by their guardian, shall constitute a consent by such executor, administrator, surviving spouse, or children or guardian, to the testimony of any physician who attended said deceased.

5. A public officer can not be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.

History: Enacted March 11, 1872, founded upon §§ 395-399, Practice
Act; amended March 23, 1893, Stats. and Amdts. 1893, p. 301; by Code
Commission, Act March 8, 1901, Stats. and Amdts. 1900-1, p. 242; Act
held unconstitutional, see History, Kerr's Cyc. C. C., § 4; amended

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