and such is probably the case. The superior breeding of the English horses renders them more unsteady than the half cart-horse of the Frenchman. Let any one observe the steady charge of a squadron of yeomanry; one half of the horses were but a few days before in the plough, yet they keep their line, and halt in as good order as a squadron of dragoons, whose horses have been trained to this work alone. The account was closed at Corunna. The war was commenced de novo by augmenting the small force at Lisbon, which army was placed under the command of Sir A. Wellesley, who landed at Lisbon in April 1809. That officer had been wisely chosen, on account of the talent he had shown in the short campaign of the preceding year. Pity that the same principle of selection had not been adopted with regard to Lord Paget. The cavalry of Sir Arthur's army appears to have amounted to about fifteen hundred swords, under command of Lieut.-Gen. Payne. The whole force was put in motion on Sir Arthur's arrival, and moved towards the north, to dislodge Soult, whose headquarters were at Oporto, where he was surrounded by most part of his army. The French cavalry was greatly superior to ours in point of numbers, and the light horse, under the distinguished Franceschi, was actively employed against the Portuguese insurgents, or patriots. On the 4th of May, a post of the French was attacked, and 4000 men dislodged from a strong position at Grijon; on the retreat of the enemy, two British squadrons charged and secured many prisoners. On the following day, the brilliant passage of the Douro was effected. Without entering into the detail of this most interesting operation, we shall merely notice that part of it which afforded an opportunity of employing cavalry. Brig.-Gen. Murray was ordered to cross the river five miles above Oporto, at Barca d'Avintas, with a view to intercept the retreat of the French along the right bank, and also to prevent their crossing over to the province of Beira. This force came too late for the first of these objects, as the enemy had for the most part passed on, and when it came did nothing. We beg to cite the following passage from Colonel Napier's admirable work: "Major-Gen. Charles Stewart, and Major Hervey, 14th Light Dragoons, impatient of this inactivity, charged with two squadrons, rode over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road, to gain an open space beyond; Laborde was unhorsed, and Foy badly wounded. On the English side, Major Hervey lost an arm, and his gallant horsemen receiving no support from Gen. Murray were obliged to fight their way back with loss." It is difficult to imagine any thing more satisfactory the attack. The small force of cavalry, unsupported. the ground it had gained, far less could it sec always a difficult task for cavalry. It is no tinuous account of the war, this is not o sary, it has been done, and is doing ov been greatly underrated; while it is some pledge of our candour that we believe we are unknown, even by name, to any officer who served with the 23rd Light Dragoons at the battle of Talavera. The French cavalry force on that occasion amounted to seven thousand swords, under the command of a highly distinguished officer, Latour Maubourg. A division of dragoons under Milhaud, was employed to keep the Spaniards in check, another division was in reserve, the remainder was divided among the different columns formed for the attack on the British position. A valley, which in accounts of the battle is usually called "the Great Valley," passed in front of the left and centre of the British line. On the 28th of July, two divisions of French infantry were marched up this valley, threatening the left of the position so much as to induce Sir Arthur to send an order for the cavalry to charge: the order was transmitted to Gen. Anson, commanding a brigade composed of the 23rd Light Dragoons, and 1st German Hussars. The ground was very unfavourable for cavalry movements; and had the Colonel of the 23rd been consulted as to the expediency of the measure, he would probably have explained the obstacles which were most manifest. Colonel Seymour received a simple order, and he at once obeyed it, leading his regiment to almost certain destruction, over ground nearly impassable to a single horseman ; many fell in the descent into the valley, Colonel Seymour among the number. The remainder were rapidly formed by Major Ponsonby, and gallantly charged the French infantry, who threw themselves into squares to resist the 23rd. The original attack of the French, which had occasioned the greatest alarm, was paralyzed, and the attempt was not renewed, even after the destruction of the 23rd, which proceeded to charge a regiment of chasseurs, upset them, and was only repulsed by a brigade of fresh dragoons sent to the relief of their comrades, and who charged and nearly destroyed this gallant regiment. We shall now quote from three very high authorities: first, from "Victoires et Conquêtes" (resumés), which after giving an account of the repulse of the division La Jusse, continues: "Les divisions Villatte et Rufin reçurent ordres de se diriger la première dans le vallon, et la seconde par la chaine de montagnes de la Castille, et de chercher à faire une trouée. Ces divisions étoient suivies par la cavalerie, qui devait saisir le moment favorable pour déboucher dans la plaine sur les derrières de l'ennemi.' division was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir A. Wellesley ordered Anson's brigade to charge the head of the column. 6 "This brigade coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but in a few moments came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance; the French throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire, and Colonel Arenchild commanding the Hussars, whom forty years' experience had made master of his art, promptly reined up, exclaiming, I will not kill my young men!' The English blood was hotter. The 23rd rode wildly down the hollow,-men and horses fell over each other in dreadful confusion; the survivors mounted the opposite bank by twos and threes. Colonel Seymour was wounded; but Major Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallying all who came up, passed through Rufin's and Villatte's division, and reckless of the musketry from each side, fell with inexpressible violence on the chasseurs in the rear; the combat was fierce but short. Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers and Westphalian light horse to the support of Villatte; these fresh troops coming up, when the 23rd was already overmatched, entirely broke them, and they retired leaving nearly half their numbers." We have next to refer to Colonel Jones, whose book, though only an outline of the war, is highly esteemed for its accuracy and clearness; after mentioning the charge of the 23rd, Colonel Jones adds, "The regiment was almost entirely destroyed, notwithstanding which, the enemy was so astonished at the boldness of the attempt, that the columns halted, and the division of Spaniards under Bassecourt, detached for that purpose, holding the light troops in check-this imposing movement, which threatened the destruction of the army, produced no result whatever.” Such is the cursory view of this gallant charge as it is given by three very high authorities. Colonel Jones alone has given an opinion pretty generally held in the army, viz. that this charge not only checked Villatte's movement, which of itself was a service of vital importance, by giving Sir Arthur time to manœuvre his forces; but farther, as far as could be judged, prevented a renewal of the attack in that quarter, which was not repeated. We think Colonel Napier has given short measure of praise to the 23rd; indeed, justice demanded a more laudatory detail of the case. He again alludes to it in his " Observations." "The whole of Villatte's and half of Rufin's divisions were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment." We are convinced that the writer of the "History of the Peninsular War" wishes to deal fairly with all, and faithfully to record the events of the war; while writing the above we were informed that this part of his work had been already attacked, and we sympathize with the gallant Colonel on the many attacks he will receive from wounded pride during the progress of his labours, and which may be some small offset against the satisfaction which he will experience in the enjoyment of his well-earned fame. We have read accounts of this charge by several authors, in most of which exceptions are taken against the 23rd; one we remember is, that the cavalry had not reconnoitred their front, another, that they had no reserve; but these and many other objections are very idle specimens of the easy art of finding fault. It is not the province of an officer of cavalry in position to reconnoitre his front; at least, it is the especial duty of the staff or engineer officer who takes up the ground, to point out any peculiar features in the probable line of action; and this is evident, when we consider that a corps, and especially one of cavalry, is frequently moved up and ordered to take part in a battle, when no time can be allowed for reconnoissance, and where the best hopes of success would be lost by a moment's delay. Had the Greys reconnoitred the ground when they made that gallant and decisive charge against D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo ? It is well known that they were ignorant as to what they were charging, yet Ponsonby's brigade by their charge also contributed greatly to the security of the position. The position at Talavera was, at least, equally threatened by two French corps, yet the charge which paralyzed the attack has been judged ill-advised and rash. The 23rd had no share in the motives which led to the order to charge, they received the order and obeyed it; Seymour aud Ponsonby did their duty, and did it well; these officers had no desire to "kill their young men," but relying on the Commander-in-Chief as to the expediency of his orders, they allowed no obstacles to impede them. We truly think that the 23rd may challenge the world to produce an instance of greater effect produced on a well-disciplined enemy by so small a body of men. The only parallel which occurs to us is the charge of the Polish Lancers at Somosierra, which Napoleon probably ordered under a chivalrous excitement, risking most unfairly the brave lancers, who would have been destroyed had a single Spanish regiment kept their ground; and this dangerous measure was adopted most gratuitously, when there were large corps of infantry at hand. We hear nothing in the French accounts of ill-advised attacks. The Emperor did not consider such language likely to edify the chivalry of his dragoons; he covered them with glory. We pursued another course, and the above and another instance of unjust censure had a very bad effect on the spirit of the British cavalry. We do not believe that Napoleon would have thanked Arenchild for the fruits of his forty years' experience; that officer probably did what he considered his duty, and he had many other opportunities of evincing his valour and skill. We would be among the last to derogate from the merit of that gallant veteran; but on this occasion, we must give undivided praise to Ponsonby and his people, who gave a different interpretation to the order. We have little hope of reclaiming any slanderer of the British cavalry, who, it appears, are generally accused of charging too much or too little.* In the arrangements of the army, it unfortunately happened that the 23rd was soon afterwards sent home. * The French cavalry, although so vastly superior in number, appear to have taken no active share in the battle. U. S. JOURN. No. 30. MAY, 1831. YACHT CLUBS AND REGATTAS. THE History of Naval Architecture has not, since the commencement of our commercial greatness, manifested so many decisive proofs of masterly research as it has within the last half-century. It has been allowed to occupy that distinguished place which it has so long and justly deserved, as a science of the utmost possible importance to a maritime people,-while its principles have been studied and professed by men well known in the naval circles for their scientific acquirements and their recondite learning. Within this limited period, not only have the most valuable improvements been effected in the construction, speed, and general equipment of our naval force, but men, who from early life have been attaining, in actual service, a practical knowledge of their profession, have been encouraged to communicate to their country the result of their experience. The situation of England, the unparalleled glory of her victories, the success and the extent of her commerce, all tend to prove that the pride and the honour, the welfare and the prosperity of the nation, depend materially on the practical efficiency of her navy. We have been led into these remarks on considering the progress and prospects of the Yacht Clubs, and as the time is not far distant when the squadrons of these little navies will be preparing for their annual expeditions, and for the great festivals connected with them, we propose to devote a few pages to a brief inquiry into the actual merits and utility of these institutions. There are, we believe, few seamen of judgment and experience who have not admired the beautiful vessels of the " Experimental Squadron," and no one, we imagine, will say that those built subsequently on the plans of different officers, as well as those now constructing in the public yards under their superintendence, do not at the same time confer honour on the service to which they belong, and hold out a cheering prospect of future and incalculable benefit. We sincerely trust, that the different naval administrations will readily encourage every such developement of talent, that they will afford our heroes every possible opportunity of ascertaining in the dock-yards the comparative value and utility of any improvement that may suggest itself to their observation, and that they will promote the ends of science by honouring these manifestations of research with their immediate support and patronage. - But while this laudable spirit of amendment has been sensibly spreading in the public service, the zealous superintendents of the private yards have evidently kept pace with the progress of improvements. To effect this object, the Yacht Clubs have afforded them abundant opportunities of acquiring knowledge, and of applying the results of their practice to the advancement of a great public cause; for the improvement of naval architecture is unquestionably a public cause of the utmost magnitude, and we know no measure so calculated to promote the enlightened views of the scientific members of our navy as the establishment of Yacht Clubs. On these grounds, especially, do we advocate their general encouragement. There are, we are convinced, few seamen who are not familiar with the splendid models of many vessels of the Royal Yacht Club, and every succeeding year brings us fresh proofs of some important advantage gained either in |
