beyond a reasonable doubt that A did not kill B, you will acquit
him." (Tex. Cr.) Blocker v. State, 772.
5. A DYING DECLARATION is Subject to Impeachment by Any
Competent Testimony which impairs its value. (Miss.) Gambrell v.
State, 549.
6. A DYING DECLARATION may be Discredited by Any Testi-
mony which would be permissible to discredit the testimony of the
declarant if he were in court testifying, (Miss.) Gambrell v.
State, 549.
7. DYING DECLARATION-Impeachment by Showing Disbelief
in God.-A dying declaration may be discredited by showing that the
declarant was a nonbeliever in God; and the testimony offered for
that purpose need not be confined to the time when the declaration
was made, but may relate to a time one year before the death. (Miss.)
Gambrell v. State, 549.
8. DYING DECLARATIONS Voluntary Character of a Question
for Jury. When a woman suffering intense pain and believing that
she will die is told by physicians that they will do nothing for her
unless she reveals the secret of the ailment, which apparently is
an abortion, her statements as to who operated on her have at least
so far the appearance of being involuntary as to raise an issue on
that point which should be submitted to the jury. (Tex. Cr.) Jack-
son v. State, 792.
Voluntary Character of a Question
for Jury.-Where there is an issue in regard to whether a dying dec-
laration was voluntary, the court should submit the matter as an
issue of fact to be determined by the jury, and if the declaration
is found to have been involuntary it should be disregarded. (Tex.
Cr.) Jackson v. State, 792.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Her Liability for Acts of Her Hus-
band as Her Agent. If a husband acting as the agent of his wife
converts goods, and she knows of and approves his act, and con-
ceals her liability as an unconcealed principal, she is liable for such
conversion in an action brought within six years after the plaintiff
obtains knowledge that her husband acted as such agent. (Mass.)
Leslie v. Jaquith, 395.
MARRIED WOMEN, Effect of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions. The effect of the constitution and statutes of Florida
respecting a married woman is not to place her in the position of a
feme sole, but, on the contrary, her common-law status remains, except
to the extent it has been modified by the provisions of such con-
stitution and statutes. (Fla.) Graham v. Tucker, 124.
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Contract and Property Rights.-The
policy of permitting husband and wife to own property and to trans-
act business independently of each other has been expanded in Kan-
sas by legislation until the property rights of married people are as
separate and distinct as if they were unmarried. They transact
business with each other as freely as with other people. (Kan.)
State v. Shaw, 298.
Property Rights-Transfers by Husband.
4. DEED BY HUSBAND in Fraud of Marital Rights of Wife.-
If a man induces his wife to join in a deed of their homestead by
representing that he desires to invest the proceeds in another home,
whereas the conveyance is without consideration and the property is
thereafter reconveyed to him for life with remainder to his children
by a former marriage, the conveyance is in fraud of her homestead
and dower rights and may be canceled. (Ark.) Colegrove v. Cole-
grove, 82.
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Sale of Land.-The Signature of the
Wife as a witness to an executory contract by the husband for the
sale of his real estate, she being in no way referred to in the body
of the contract as a party thereto, does not constitute on her part
a written consent to the sale within the meaning of section 3648,
Revised Laws of 1905. (Minn.) Stromme v. Rieck, 452.
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Sale of Land-Parol Contract by Her.
Evidence held insufficient to show a parol contract for the sale of
the land by the wife. (Minn.) Stromme v. Rieck, 452.
7. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Specific Performance Against Him
Alone. An executory contract for the sale of the husband's real es-
tate other than the homestead, signed by him alone, may be enforced
by the vendee to the extent of the vendor's ability to perform, but
not against the interest of the wife. (Minn.) Stromme v. Rieck, 452.
8. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Contract by Him as Her Agent to
Sell Land. Where a husband, acting as the agent of his wife, en-
ters into an executory contract in her name for the sale of her
land, and she thereafter confirms his act and offers and tenders per-
formance, the vendee cannot refuse performance on his part on the
ground that the contract is void under the statutes because made by
the husband as agent. Keystone Iron Co. v. Logan, 55 Minn. 537,
followed. (Minn.) Stromme v. Rieck, 452.
Liability of Married Woman for Torts.
9. MARRIED WOMAN, Liability of for Tort.-A married woman,
the owner of statutory separate real estate, upon which is located a
swimming-pool and bath-houses, conducted by the husband and wife
as a public resort, is sued jointly with her husband for damages in
tort by a party who was injured while lawfully using said premises,
by his feet slipping and falling on his left leg upon the projecting
points of planks alleged to have been negligently left uneven. Held,
that under the constitution and laws of Florida, under the circum-
stances stated, the married woman is not liable in an action of tort.
(Fla.) Graham v. Tucker, 124.
Liability of Wife for Improvements on Her Land.
10. MARRIED WOMAN, Charging in Equity for Building Im-
provements Made with Her Acquiescence.-Where the husband of a
married woman enters into an agreement with building contractors
for the erection, at an agreed price, of a building upon a lot that is
the separate property of his wife, and the wife has knowledge of
the erection of such building, and does not dissent thereto, but
silently acquiesces in the erection thereof, such separate property
of the wife may be charged in equity and sold for the collection of
the agreed price of such building, if such agreed price is not un-
reasonable. (Fla.) McGill v. Art Stone Const. Co., 1106:
IMPROVEMENTS.
See Ejectment.
INCRIMINATING QUESTIONS.
See Witnesses, 5, 6.
'Am. St. Rep., Vol. 131-74
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
See Master and Servant, 2-6.
INHERITANCE TAX
See Taxation, 12-16.
INJUNCTION.-A Further Suit Involving the Interpretation
of a Will, when there have already been three, should not be en-
joined, if the interpretation presents a difficult question and the
parties are acting in good faith. Some latitude should be allowed
counsel in proceeding on different hypotheses and theories. (Mo.)
Stewart v. Jones, 595.
See Limitation of Actions, 4, 5; Municipal Corporations, 7.
INNKEEPER AND GUEST, Relation of, When not Shown to
have been so Established as to Render the Former Liable to the
Latter. Where an innkeeper provided a lot and stable in which his
guests were permitted to keep their horses without charge, but it was
customary to charge for feed for horses if furnished by the innkeeper,
it was not sufficient evidence of the relation of innkeeper and guest
that one drove into the lot, unhitched his mule from his buggy, and
placed the mule in a stable pointed out by a boy in charge of the lot
and stables, and then left the premises without entering the inn or
having any agreement with the innkeeper or his authorized agent that
he would be a guest, or that the innkeeper should furnish any feed
for the mule, or doing anything further toward becoming a guest,
though the owner stated to the boy that he would return and would
himself feed his mule at dinner-time, and though he testified that he
intended to take dinner at the inn with another person who accom-
panied him, and who dined there, but did not do so because before
the dinner hour he learned of injury to the mule. (Ga.) Brewer v.
Caswell, 216.
Innkeepers, admissions of agents of, 311, 314.
INSTRUCTIONS.
See Trial, 5-13.
1. INDEMNITY INSURANCE-Liability for Costs of Defend-
ing Action for Damages.-Though a policy agreeing to indemnify the
assured for his loss for any common-law or statutory liability for
damages on account of bodily injuries suffered by any person while
in an elevator belonging to the assured provides that if suit is
brought against him he must forward the process to the insurer,
which will at its own cost defend the action or settle the same, un-
less it elects to pay the indemnity provided for in the policy, yet, if
the latter fails to defend and the insured defends with success, he
cannot recover of the insurer the amount expended in such defense.
(Mass.) Nesson v. United States Casualty Co., 390.
1a. FIRE INSURANCE-Delivery and Acceptance of Policy.Where an insurance company mails to an insured a renewal fire policy which he returns, refusing to accept it, and the company then leaves the policy with a mortgage clause attached with the mortgagee's agents, who place it with the mortgage papers, where it remains, and subsequently the company presents a bill for the premiums to these agents, who, requesting time to communicate with the owner, then write to him stating that if he does not pay the premium they will, and charge the amount to him, and the owner does not answer the letter, but writes his agent directing him to pay the premium at once, but tender of payment is delayed until after the destruction of the property by fire, when it is refused, the policy does not become effective so as to bind the company. (Ind.) New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 245.
2. FIRE INSURANCE—Acceptance of Policy.-The Mere Receiving of a Policy by a person proposed to be insured, for the purpose of determining whether he will accept it, is not sufficient to conclude the contract. (Ind.) New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 245.
3. FIRE INSURANCE—Acceptance-Delivery to Mortgagee. Where a policy on mortgaged premises which the mortgagor has refused to accept is delivered to the mortgagee, who does not pay or agree to pay the premium, the policy does not become effective by reason of a clause therein that the mortgagee should pay the premium on demand if the mortgagor fails to do so. (Ind.) New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 245.
4. FIRE INSURANCE.-A Memorandum of the Receipt of an Insurance Policy, made by a clerk of the agents of the mortgagee, the clerk having no authority in the premises, is not admissible in evidence in an action on the policy. (Ind.) New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 245.
5. FIRE INSURANCE-Agent of Insured-Delegation of Authority. An agent having discretionary authority to procure fire insurance for his principal cannot delegate this authority to another. (Ind.) New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 245.
Loss-Proof and Arbitration.
6. INSURANCE-Proof of Loss, Failure to Make-Bankruptcy. If a policy insuring goods against loss by fire requires that in case of loss or damage a statement in writing, signed and sworn to by the assured, shall be forthwith rendered to the insurer, and upon the destruction of such goods, the assured abandons his property and absconds, and twenty days later an involuntary petition in bankruptcy is filed against him, thirty-one days later the adjudication takes place, and thirteen days afterward the trustee is appointed, the right of the bankrupt had terminated through his failure to furnish such proofs of loss. (Mass.) Bennett v. Aetna Ins. Co., 414.
7. INSURANCE, LOSS, Necessary for Fixing Amount of by Arbitration.-Covenants in fire insurance policies for appraisal by arbitrators of the amount of the loss are valid and binding upon the parties; and when such policies further provide that the sum for which the insurer is liable shall not become payable until sixty days after an award by such arbitrators has been received by the insurer, when an appraisal has been required, or that no suit upon the policy shall be sustainable until after full compliance by the insured with all of such requirements, then such arbitration and award are conditions precedent to the right of the insured to an action upon such policy, where the insurer has demanded such arbitration and award. (Fla.) Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 1098.
8. LIFE INSURANCE—Execution of Policy-Seal and Signa-
tures. Where a benefit certificate calls for the seal of the sub-
ordinate lodge and the counter-signatures of the protector and secre-
tary, it is not completely executed where it is impressed with the
seal but not countersigned by these officers. (Ind.) Caywood v.
Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H., 253.
9. LIFE INSURANCE-Insufficient Execution. The Mere Pos-
session of a benefit certificate which does not bear the signatures of
the officers of the subordinate lodge does not show a waiver of the
signatures. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H., 253.
10. LIFE INSURANCE-When not Forfeited for Default in Pre-
miums.-A life insurance policy cannot be forfeited for the nonpay-
ment of a premium or assessment when the company has in its posses-
sion dividends declared under the policy which it has the right to apply
to such payment. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H.,
253.
11. LIFE INSURANCE—Application of Funds to Payment of As-
sessment.-A mere allegation in an action on a benefit certificate that
the insurer owed the insured two dollars for services rendered does
not show any right or duty on the part of the insurer to apply the
same to the payment of an assessment; and an allegation that it
was the right or duty of the insurer to apply this amount to the pay-
ment of the assessment is insufficient, as being the mere conclusion
of the pleader and not a statement of the facts from which the right
or duty arises. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H.,
12. LIFE INSURANCE—Application of Funds to Payment of As-
sessment. An allegation in an action on a benefit certificate that
the insurer refused to apply a certain amount to the payment of an
assessment involves the assumption that the insurer had been directed
or requested to so apply such money, a fact which should be alleged.
(Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H., 253.
Time Limited for Suit on Policy.
13. FIRE INSURANCE—Time Within Which Suit must be Brought
on Policy. Though a fire insurance policy provide that suit must
be brought on it within twelve months from the fire, yet as it also
provides that no suit shall be brought before sixty days after
proof of loss, the twelve months does not begin until the end of
the sixty days. (W. Va.) Hogl v. Aachen Ins. Co., 972.
14. LIFE INSURANCE—Time Limit for Action on Policy.-A
provision in an insurance policy limiting the time in which suit may
be brought thereon to a period less than that fixed by the statute of
limitations is binding unless it contravenes a statute. (Ind.) Cay-
wood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H., 253.
15. LIFE INSURANCE—Time Limit for Action on Policy.-In
Indiana a provision in a policy of a foreign insurance company limit-
ing the time within which suit can be brought thereon to less than
three years is void, but to entitle a beneficiary to the benefit of this
rule he must allege and prove facts which will bring the policy sued
on within its provisions. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. &
L. of H., 253.
16. LIFE INSURANCE—A Stipulation Limiting the Time Within
Which an Action may be brought on an insurance policy or certifi-
cate, being for the benefit of the company, may be waived by it.
(Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H., 253.
Assignment of Life Insurance.
17. INSURANCE, Right to Assign.-A life insurance policy pay.
able to the estate of the assured may be assigned without the consent
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