ber is admitted to the firm, he acquires an interest in the partner-
ship property by operation of law; and such transfer is not within
the statute of frauds. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.
4. PARTNERSHIP, Right of to Renewal of a Lease Though
Changes have Taken Place in the Interests of the Partners.-In
an action by a partnership for the specific performance of a cove-
nant to renew a five-year lease, it is immaterial that at certain times
during the first term of said lease other persons held an interest in
said partnership, where the persons who constituted the partner-
ship at the time of demanding such renewal are the same persons
who were members of the firm at the time of the execution of the
lease. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.
5. PARTNERSHIP, Capacity of to Take Title to Real Estate,
Estoppel to Question.-Where a lessor has accepted the benefits of
a lease made by him to a partnership, he cannot, in an action by
such partnership to enforce the specific performance of a covenant
to renew, plead that the partnership was without capacity to take
the legal title to real estate. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.
1. PERJURY-Judgment of Acquittal in Action Where Com-
mitted. In a prosecution for perjury the judgment of acquittal in
the cause in which the perjury was committed is not admissible to
prove the defendant's innocence. (Kan.) State v. Bevill, 345.
2. PERJURY-Judgment of Acquittal in Action Where Com-
mitted. A party cannot, after securing an acquittal by perjury, suc-
cessfully plead such acquittal in bar of a prosecution for the perjury
so committed. (Kan.) State v. Bevill, 345.
1. PLEADING-What may be Proved Under General Denial.-
Where a complaint alleges the assignment of the contract sued upon,
which is a necessary allegation, a general denial puts the question of
assignment in issue. (Wis.) Johnson v. Nickers, 1046.
2. DEMURRER-Discrepancy Between Summons and Complaint.—
A demurrer to a complaint on the ground that it fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action does not reach discrepancies
between the relief to which the complaint may entitle and the prayer
in the summons. (Minn.) Freeman v. Paulson, 438.
3. PRACTICE Amendment, Striking Out Names of Parties.-
Under the code of Alabama, a plaintiff may strike out the names of
parties to his complaint without working a discontinuance of his
action. (Ala.) Scarbrough v. City Nat. Bank, 71.
4. PLEADING.-A Demurrer Admits Only Such Facts as are suf-
ficiently pleaded. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge K. & L. of
H., 253.
5. PRACTICE-Special Demurrer, When Should be Sustained.-
The petition was subject to special demurrer on the ground that it
did not set forth with sufficient particularity the expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in the support of the child. (Ga.) Brown v. Brown,
229.
6. PLEADING-Defect not Waived by Failure to Demur.-If the
complaint by an assignee of a contract fails to show a valid assign-
ment, and therefore does not state a cause of action, the defect is not.
waived by failure to demur. (Wis.) Johnson v. Nickers, 1046.
POLICE OFFICER.
See Railroads, 4-7.
POOLROOMS.
See Gaming, 1, 2.
PRESCRIPTION.
See Adverse Possession.
AGENCY-Employment of Subagent-Ratification.-A princi-
pal whose agent employs a subagent is liable for the compensation
of such subagent if the employment is authorized and ratified on
the part of the principal by his adopting the acts of the subagent.
(W. Va.) Fisher v. Berwind, 898.
See Brokers; Husband and Wife, 1.
Principal and Agent-Admissions of Agents, accounts, settlement of,
310.
acts or conduct of agents of natural persons, 313, 314.
acts or conduct of officers and other agents of corporations, 316.
after revocation of authority, 337.
after termination of agency, 337, 338.
at former trial, 337.
authority, how provable, 309.
coincident with occurrence, 307, 310, 311, 320.
conditions precedent to reception of as evidence, 309.
contracts, as to terms of, 333.
contracts, breach of, establishing by, 320.
conversation of wife of partner not admissible, 319.
criminal causes, when admissible in, 309.
death of agent, when evidence after, 313.
deed executed without authority, 319.
disconnected from particular matter to prove scienter, 315.
fraudulent transactions, when admissible to prove, 313.
illustrations showing when admissible as evidence, 309-311.
impounding cattle during progress of, 310.
independent evidence, when agency provable by, 314.
indicating malice inadmissible to show motive of principal, 311.
inducement to others, when matter of, 309, 310.
interest clashing with duty, 320.
in trover or trespass, claims, notices, etc., 319.
knowledge of principal, when provable by, 315.
limited to action against principal, when, 309.
letters, drafts, receipts, etc., 311, 318, 323.
made after the event, 335-337.
made before the event, 335.
mechanics' liens, materials received and amount due, 324.
messenger limited to delivery of message, 322.
must be dum fervet opus, 307.
must be within scope of authority, 307, 314, 322.
negligence, proof of by, 315.
negligent performance of authorized acts, 315.
newspapers in libel actions, 321.
of architects, surveyors and builders, 323, 324.
of attorneys under power, 318.
of benefit society as to proof of member's death, 311.
of brokers and factors, 325.
of caretakers, 322.
of carriers and their clerks and officers, 319, 322, 325.
of collecting agents, 322.
Principal and Agent-Admissions of Agents, of committee of an eccle-
siastical society, 320.
of contractors, foremen, etc., 318.
of corporations, 311, 312, 316, 321, 334, 336, 338.
of deputy sheriffs, 326.
of driver and hirer of horses, 319, 321.
of employés and servants, 321, 327.
of hotel proprietors, 311, 314.
of husband and wife, 323.
of interpreters, 330.
of maker or indorser of note, 319, 323.
of masters, pilots or captains of boats, 330.
of members of family against head thereof, 318.
of notaries, 323.
of officers of banks, 331.
of officers of insurance companies, 332.
of one of several partners limited to that one, 310.
of persons in possession of property, 332.
of police officers executing warrant, 319, 323.
of telegraph company as to undelivered telegrams, 311.
of vendors, purchasers, mortgagees and lessors, 318.
of warehouse, shipping and counting-house clerks, 319, 322.
opinion, statement of, 317.
ostensible agent, where he is, 319, 334.
ostensible principal, where he is, 310, 334.
principles controlling, 307.
ratification of unauthorized contract, effect upon admissibility of,
reasons governing admissibility of, 307.
reports to principal, 337.
res gestae, when admissible as, 307, 310, 311.
special or subagent, when acting as, 314, 319, 322.
specially authorized, 323.
spontaneous utterances, 307.
symbols on principal's receipt explanatory of, 310.
third parties, not evidence against, 309.
title of principal, disclaiming or disparaging, 320, 322.
unauthorized, cannot bind principal, 309.
under Civil Code of Georgia, section 3034, 313.
where acting as general agent, 318.
where acting for both parties, 317.
where the authority is special or limited, 322.
witness, when agent competent as must be called, 314.
See Attachments; Corporations, 21; Judgment, 2.
1. PROHIBITION-Nature and Scope of Writ.-Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ, properly issuable only in cases of extreme neces-
sity. If a complete remedy lies by appeal, certiorari, mandamus, or
in any other manner, this writ should be denied. (Miss.) Crittenden
v. Booneville, 518.
2. PROHIBITION-When Should be Granted.-Whenever there
is anything in the nature of the action or proceeding which makes it
apparent that the rights of a party cannot be adequately protected
by any other remedy than prohibition, this writ should be granted.
(Miss.) Crittenden v. Booneville, 518.
3. PROHIBITION-Whether Scope Broadened by Statute.-Sec-
tion 922 of the Mississippi code may be said to broaden the right of
courts to issue writs, including prohibition, and to extend the right
to all cases where necessary to attain the ends of justice. (Miss.)
Crittenden v. Booneville, 518.
4. PROHIBITION to Prevent Enforcement of Poolroom Ordi-
nance. A person who is being prosecuted under a void ordinance
prohibiting the operation of poolrooms or billiard-tables, and who
is being forbidden the use of his property for these purposes while
the prosecutions are conducted. is entitled to a writ of prohibition.
(Miss.) Crittenden v. Booneville, 518.
5. PROHIBITION-When Should be Granted.-Whenever an In-
ferior Court proceeds to act in excess of jurisdiction, and whenever,
as incidental to its action, it involves an infringement of property
rights, or a submission to multitudinous and persecuting prosecutions
in such way as to make its acts oppressive, there is no adequate
remedy by appeal, and it is proper to issue the writ of prohibition;
and this is true, whether the court in which the proceeding is in-
stituted has acted or not, if the effect of the void authority under
which it is assuming to act stands as a vexatious menace to personal
liberty or the destruction of property rights. (Miss.) Crittenden
v. Booneville, 518.
Use of Track as Footpath by Permission.
1. RAILROADS-Use of Track as Footpath by Permission.-
Where a railroad company has permitted its roadbed to obstruct the
natural drainage of water from a street so that it has overflowed and
washed away the sidewalk and thus compelled pedestrians to use the
railroad track instead of the sidewalk as a footpath, and this use of
the track has been so general and long-continued that the company
must have known thereof and acquiesced therein, a person so using it
after alighting from a train will be deemed a licensee rather than a
mere trespasser. (Ark.) Moody v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 75.
Collision with Street-car.
2. RAILROADS Collision with Street-car.-A Complaint in an
Action against a railroad company alleging that the plaintiff was the
conductor in charge of an electric car, that the defendant operated a
steam railway which crossed the electric line, that the plaintiff
stopped his car as it approached the defendant's tracks and looked
thereon for approaching cars, but observing none started his car over
the crossing, and that the defendant then negligently and without
warning ran and kicked a car over the crossing and against the
electric car, is sufficient to show a breach of duty owed to the plain-
tiff. (Ind.) Cleveland, Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
3. RAILROADS Collision with Street-car.-Whether a Street
Railway Conductor who alights from his car and steps upon a steam
railroad crossing to look for approaching cars is negligent, after ob-
serving no trains approaching, in immediately signaling the motor-
man to cross instead of standing on the crossing and looking for any
definite period before giving the signal, is a question for the jury.
(Ind.) Cleveland, Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
Liability for Acts of Special Police Officer.
RAILROAD-Liability for Act of Special Police Officer.-
A special officer, appointed and commissioned by the governor, at
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 131-766
the instance of a railroad company, under the provisions of section
31, chapter 145, Code of 1899, section 4281, Code of 1906, and paid
by such company for his services, is prima facie a public officer for
whose wrongful acts such liability is not liable. (W. Va.) McKain
v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 964.
5. RAILROAD-Liability for Act of Special Police Officer.—
If such an officer is engaged in special service for the company, such
as guarding its property or enforcing obedience to its rules and
regulations, and does a wrongful act for which the injured party
is entitled to damages, and such act was within the scope of such
service or employment, the company is liable as in the case of its
regular employés such as conductors and station masters. (W. Va.)
McKain v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 964.
6. RAILROAD-Liability for Arrest and Prosecution Made by
Police Officer. But the company is not liable for a false arrest, as-
sault and battery and malicious prosecution, not directed nor in-
stigated by it, and founded upon an alleged breach of the peace at
one of its stations, in no way affecting or involving, so far as the
evidence discloses, any of its property, rights or servants, nor
growing out of any transaction between the plaintiff and the com-
pany, although the plaintiff was rightfully in the station, having a
ticket and awaiting the arrival of a train, and the alleged breach
of the peace, arrest and assault and battery occurred on the prem-
ises of the company. (W. Va.) McKain v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co.,
964.
7. RAILROAD-Liability for Arrest and Prosecution Made by
Police Officer.-Evidence disclosing the facts and circumstances above
stated, and nothing more, is insufficient to sustain a verdict against
the railroad company at whose instance the special officer was ap-
pointed and by whom he was paid for his public services, and the
trial court properly set it aside. (W. Va.) McKain v. Baltimore
etc. R. R. Co., 964.
See Carriers; Express Companies; Street Railways; Master and Ser-
See Deeds, 5; Judgment, 9-12; Mortgages, 9; Notice; Vendor and
Vendee, 4.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
REFORMATION OF MORTGAGE, Who may not Maintain Suit
for. If land is erroneously described in a mortgage, and, under a power
of sale contained therein, is sold by the same erroneous description to
the mortgagee, who subsequently sells and conveys the land by a cor-
rect description, there is no such privity between the purchaser and
the mortgagor as entitles the former to maintain against the latter's
grantees a suit to reform the mortgage so as to include the lands in-
tended to be described therein. (Ala.) Jackson v. Lucas, 17.
RELEASE.
See Judgment, 5.
RELEASE OF JOINT WRONGDOER.
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