value and that the word "property" includes franchises, regards fran-
chises as partaking of a dual character, the one as property subject
to transfer and alienation and the other as the mere right to be or
exist as a corporation. The former part of the franchise must be
taxed as other property; the latter may be subjected to a license tax.
(Utah) Blackrock Copper M. & M. Co. v. Tingey, 850.
11. TAXATION-Franchise or License Tax on Corporations.-An
annual tax imposed on corporations, graduated according to the amount
of capital stock, is in the nature of a license tax on the privilege of
being and existing as a corporation. It can be said to be a franchise
tax in a very limited sense merely. The statute imposing the tax is
valid, and does not impugn the constitutional rule that franchises are
property, and that property must be assessed in proportion to its
value. (Utah) Blackrock Copper M. & M. Co. v. Tingey, 850.
Inheritance Taxes.
12. INHERITANCE TAX.-The Thing that is Taxed Under a Stat-
ute imposing a legacy duty is the transfer by bequest by the testa-
tor to his legatee; it is the singular succession of the legatee, not
the universal succession of the executors. (N. J. L.) Neilson v.
Russell, 673.
13. INHERITANCE TAX.-There Should be a Deduction of Debts
in making the appraisement for the purposes of a legacy tax. (N.
J. L.) Neilson v. Russell, 673.
14. INHERITANCE TAX.-It is the Legacy that is Taxed, not
the Estate, under the New Jersey statute of May 15, 1894. (N. J.
L.) Neilson v. Russell, 673.
15._LEGACY.-The Title to a Legacy is not Complete and Per-
fect Until the Executor has assented, and he should not assent until
the creditors are satisfied. This assent must of necessity be the
assent of the executor at the domicile. (N. J. L.) Neilson v. Rus-
sell, 673.
16. INHERITANCE TAX-Corporate Stock Held by Nonresident.
Stock in a New Jersey corporation belonging to a testator domiciled
in England is not subject to the inheritance tax imposed by the act
of May 15, 1894: Gen. Stats., p. 3339. (N. J. L.) Neilson v. Russell,
17. TAX SALE.-A Co-owner in Indivision may Redeem the share
of his co-owner from a tax sale, but is under no obligation to do so.
(La.) Duson v. Roos, 375.
TAX SALE-Redemption by Co-owner.-Where the Purchaser
at a Tax Sale conveys the land to one of the co-owners after the
period of redemption has expired, for two hundred and fifty dollars,
when the amount required to redeem is twenty-six dollars, this does
not show the transaction to be a mere redemption by the cotenant.
(La.) Duson v. Roos, 375.
19. TAX SALE-Renunciation by Cotenant.-Where a Tenant in
Common gives his agent authority to accept from a purchaser at a
tax sale a renunciation in favor of the estate to an undivided one-
half thereof, but the agent takes upon himself to buy the entire
property from the purchaser, which act his principal ratifies, the
transaction does not constitute a mere renunciation. (La.) Duson
v. Roos, 375.
20. TAX SALE-Acquisition of Title by Cotenant from Purchaser.
The rule that a tenant in common who purchases the property at a
tax sale does not acquire the title of his co-owners, applies where
the purchase is from the purchaser at such sale, and this although
the purchasing cotenant was not in possession during the time when
the tax should have been paid, and did not at any time occupy any
special relation toward it or toward his co-owners such as could give
rise to a trust, nor owe any greater duty to pay the tax than did
they. (La.) Duson v. Roos, 375.
21. TAX SALE Acquisition of Title by Cotenant from Purchaser.
It is optional with his co-owners to take advantage or not of the
rule that title acquired by one cotenant from the purchaser at a tax
sale inures to the benefit of all. (La.) Duson v. Roos, 375.
22. TAX SALE Acquisition of Title by Cotenant-Remedy of Co-
owners. Where a tenant in common purchases the property from the
purchaser at a tax sale, his co-owners may require him to make them
title in the proportion of their former co-ownership; but this right is
not founded on any codal provision, but on mere equitable considera-
tions. (La.) Duson v. Roos, 375.
23. TAX SALE-Purchase by Cotenant-Laches of Co-owners.-
Cotenants who desire to avail themselves of the title acquired by
their co-owners at a tax sale cannot sleep upon their right and await
developments to see whether the property will grow in value, and
then exercise the right according to the event. They may lose their
right by laches; he who seeks equity must do equity. (La.) Duson
v. Roos, 375.
See Drainage; Ejectment, 2; Landlord and Tenant, 2.
Taxation, easement of corporations may be taxed as real estate, 866.
See Franchises of Corporations.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
1. TELEPHONE CORPORATION, Who may not Recover for In-
juries Due to Rotten Condition of Poles.-Where one erects alongside
a public road telephone poles on which telephone wires are placed,
and a person climbs one of such poles by permission of the owner to
remove the wire for the purpose of removing a building for another
across such road, and the pole, because of its "rotten condition,"
breaks and injures such person, the owner of such poles is not liable
in damages to the injured party because the poles were erected along
the roadside "without authority or right and contrary to law," and
such pole was knowingly allowed to stand in a "rotten condition."
The acts of alleged negligence were not acts of negligence relatively
to the party injured while climbing the pole for the purposes stated.
(Ga.) Morris v. Rounsaville, 207.
TELEGRAPH COMPANY-Right to Establish Office Hours.-
A telegraph company may establish reasonable office hours for the
transmission and delivery of telegrams, and the reasonableness thereof
is a question for the court and not for the jury. (Ark.) Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Gillis, 115.
3. TELEGRAPH COMPANY - Failure to Deliver Message
Promptly. Where a telegram received after 7 o'clock in the evening
was not delivered until the next morning, and in an action for damages
caused by the delay the evidence on the question whether the tele-
gram was received during the hours established by the company for
receiving and delivering messages is conflicting so that reasonable
minds may draw different conclusions, the court errs in declaring, as
a matter of law, that under the facts it became the duty of the
company to deliver the message on the day of its receipt. (Ark.)
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gillis, 115.
Telegraph and Telephone Corporations, taxation of the franchises of,
admissions of agents of, 311.
TENANT IN COMMON.
See Taxation, 17-23.
THREATS.
See Homicide, 3.
TIDE LANDS.
See Navigable Waters, 5-9.
1. TIMBER.-A Sale of Standing Timber Conveys an Interest in
Real Property. (Miss.) Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 540.
2. TIMBER.-The Owner of Land may Make a Valid Deed in Fee
Simple, independently of the soil itself, to the timber growing
thereon. (Miss.) Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 540.
3. TIMBER-Equitable Relief from Improvident Conveyance.-
Where the owner of land conveys by warranty deed the timber
standing thereon, he is not entitled to have the deed canceled because
improvidently made, in that it does not limit the time for remov-
ing the timber, the land being useless so long as the timber remains
thereon and the purchaser having failed to remove it within a rea-
sonable time. (Miss.) Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 540.
4. SALE OF TIMBER Statute of Frauds.—A contract requiring
the owner of standing timber to convert it into logs and deliver them
to the purchaser at a designated place is a contract for the sale of
logs, personal property, and not a contract for the sale of standing
timber which must be in writing. (Miss.) Turner v. Planters' Lum-
ber Co., 552.
Limitation on Right to Use Property.
1. TORTS-Limitation on Use of Property. The principle that a
man may use his own property according to his own needs and de-
sires, while true in the abstract, is subject to many limitations in
the concrete. Men cannot always, in civilized society, be allowed to
use their own property as their interests or desires may dictate with-
out reference to the fact that they have neighbors whose rights are
as sacred as their own. The existence and well-being of society re-
quire that each and every person shall conduct himself consistently
with the fact that he is a social and reasonable person. (Minn.)
Tuttle v. Buck, 446.
Malicious Competition in Business.
2. TORTS- Malicious Competition in Business.-A complaint
which states, in substance, that the defendant, a banker and man
of wealth and influence in the community, maliciously established a
barber-shop, employed a barber to carry on the business, and used
his personal influence to attract customers from the plaintiff's barber-
shop, not for the purpose of serving any legitimate purpose of his
own, but for the sole purpose of maliciously injuring the plaintiff,
whereby the plaintiff's business was ruined, states a cause of action.
(Minn.) Tuttle v. Buck, 446.
Joint and Several Liability-Release.
3. TORTS Joint and Several Liability of Wrongdoers.-When
more persons than one unite in the commission of a wrong, each is
responsible for the acts of all and for the whole damage; and where
separate and independent acts of negligence by different persons
concur in causing a single injury, courts will not undertake to appor-
tion the damage in such cases among the wrongdoers. The injured
party has, at his election, his remedy against all or any number.
(Ind.) Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
4. TORTS Satisfaction from One Joint Wrongdoer.-Where an
injured person looks for reparation to one of the persons jointly and
severally liable for the wrong, and accepts satisfaction from and
releases him, he thereby discharges the others from liability. (Ind.)
Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
TORTS-Release of or Satisfaction from One Joint Wrong-
doer. There is a distinction between a "satisfaction" and a "re-
lease" as applied to joint wrongdoers. A naked promise by the in-
jured person not to sue, an action against a part only of the joint
tort-feasors and a forgiveness of the others, or a formal release
unsupported by a consideration, will in neither case operate as a
discharge of those not favored; but a satisfaction, supported by con-
sideration, received by the injured person from one of the wrongdoers
discharges all of them. (Ind.) Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss,
258.
6. TORTS-Release of One Apparently Liable.-A Satisfaction
Received from one apparently liable jointly with others for a wrong
discharges all of them, although he was in fact not liable. (Ind.)
Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
7. TORTS-Estoppel to Deny Release of Wrongdoer.-One who
receives a satisfaction from a joint wrongdoer and retains the con-
sideration will not be heard to say that he had no claim against him
or that the consideration was inadequate. (Ind.) Cleveland etc. Ry.
Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
8. TORTS Consideration for Release.-A Contract for Re-employ-
ment constitutes a sufficient consideration for a release of the em-
ployer from liability for personal injuries received by the employé.
(Ind.) Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 258.
See Municipal Corporations, 5-7; Timber.
1. TRIAL-Taking Case from Jury.-The court should never per-
mit a case to go to the jury if satisfied that under all the evidence a
verdict for the plaintiff should not be allowed to stand. (Mo.)
Fulton v. Freeland, 576.
2. JURY TRIAL-Comment of Counsel on a Claim of Privilege
by a Party. If, on the trial of a proceeding to set aside an adop-
tion, the defendant objects to the testimony of an attorney on the
ground that it discloses a privileged communication, the attorney or
his adversary has a right to comment before the jury on the claim
of privilege thus made and the consequent exclusion of testimony.
(Mass.) Phillips v. Chase, 406.
3. JURY TRIAL-Interfering with the Argument.-Where a par-
ticular line of argument is improper and is objected to, it is disere-
tionary with the trial judge to direct counsel to cease to pursue
such argument, or to permit him to proceed, and then by instrue-
tions protect the rights of the parties. (Mass.) Commonwealth v.
People's Express Co., 416.
4. JURY TRIAL-Comment on Failure to Produce Evidence.—
Where incriminatory evidence has been introduced by the prosecu
tion, and explanations consistent with his innocence could be pro-
duced by the defendant through witnesses other than himself, more
likely to be known to him than to the representatives of the gov
ernment, and he does not call such witnesses, his failure so to do is
fair matter of comment before the jury. (Mass.) Commonwealth v.
People's Express Co., 416.
5. TRIAL. It is not Error to Refuse a Correct Instruction when
its substance is embodied in the charge as given. (Wis.) Jirachek
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. etc. Co., 1070.
TRIAL.-Instructions not Applicable to the Evidence are prop-
erly refused. (Wis.) Jirachek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. etc. Co., 1070.
7. TRIAL.-The Omission is not Prejudicial to Instruct the Jury
in a personal injury case that the burden is on the plaintiff to show
his damages, if the court fully and explicitly charges the jury to
allow only such damages as are proved by the evidence to a reason-
able certainty to have been sustained as a natural and probable con-
sequence of the injury. (Wis.) Jirachek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry.
etc. Co., 1070.
8. TRIAL. An Instruction is Properly Refused that the Jury are
not Bound to find the existence of any fact inherently improbable,
although there is testimony from the mouths of witnesses tending to
prove the fact. (Wis.) Jirachek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. etc. Co.,
1070.
9. JURY TRIAL-Refusing Instruction for Want of Evidence.-
A court does not err in refusing to instruct the jury in the theory
of the case which there is no evidence to support. (Ga.) Mallet
v. Watkins, 226.
JURY TRIAL-Instructions Asked for and Founded on Gen-
eral Presumption of Innocence, When Properly Refused. If the de-
fendant is prosecuted on a charge of transporting liquors where he
does not carry on a general express business, he is not entitled to
an instruction based on a presumption that he has carried on a gen-
eral express business. He is only presumed to be innocent until
his guilt is proved, but not innocent for any particular reason.
(Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.
11. JURY TRIAL-Instructions, Considering and Construing as a
Whole. In construing instructions upon any given proposition, all
instructions bearing upon the same should be construed together as
a whole. (Neb.) Morris v. Miller, 636.
12. INSTRUCTIONS-When may be Refused.-It does not Neces-
sarily follow that because an instruction states the law fully and
correctly upon one issue, the jury should therefore find generally for
the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be; and the court may
refuse an instruction for no other reason than because it directs the
jury to determine the case upon the one request. (Utah) Herndon
v. Salt Lake City, 827.
13. JURY TRIAL-Conflicting Instructions.-Where of two in-
structions one is substantially correct as far as it goes, but is im-
pliedly contradicted by the other on the same subject, the appel-
|