Am. St. Rep. 159, 46 S. E. 76; Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N. W. 140; Hyland v. Sherman, 2 E. D. Smith, 234; Kelly v. Kelly, 2 E. D. Smith, 250; and where a surveyor was employed to take the height of a mill dam, a certificate thereof was not receivable against his employer. He was retained to take dimensions and not to make the certificate: Runk v. Ten Eyck, 24 N. J. L. 756; and the husband's or wife's declarations, disconnected from any act of agency, are not admissible against her or him: Warner v. Warren, 46 N. Y. 228; Raiford v. French, 11 Rich. (S. C.) 367. But where an officer in charge of an execution sent to a constable in another county to which the principal had removed, and an action was brought by the officer upon the delivery bond, admissions made by the constable at the time relative to collecting money upon the bond were competent evidence against the officer: Walker v. Howell, 1 Cold. 238. And an officer who takes a prisoner to a third person at the request of the prosecutors, to obtain the signature of such third person as surety on a note to be given in settlement, is the agent of the prosecutors, and his declarations while so engaged are evidence: Rouse v. Mohr, 29 Ill. App. 321; and where an agent took an indorsement of notes by the debtor to his principal, his declarations in relation thereto prior to the acceptance of the notes by his principal are admissible against the latter, inasmuch as the agency continued until the notes were accepted: Wallace v. Goold, 91 Ill. 15. And where a notary was employed to arrange a mortgage with the mortgagor and his wife, and it was agreed that whatever they and the notary did should be binding, evidence of statements made by such notary to the wife as to the mortgage at the time were admissible against the mortgagee: Krohn v. Anderson, 29 Ind. App. 379, 64 N. E. 621.

Where one directs either a casual or confidential clerk to write a letter for him, such letter is properly admissible against the principal, always assuming the establishment of the direction: Marsh v. Hammond, 11 Allen, 483; Skidmore v. Johnson, 70 N. J. L. 674, 57 Atl. 450. But where a person authorizes another to speak for him, he may be confronted by evidence as to what his representative said within the scope of his authority; and, where the employment is purely mechanical, the master is not chargeable: Huebner v. Erie R. Co., 69 N. J. L. 327, 55 Atl. 273; King v. Atlantic City Gas & Water Co., 70 N. J. L. 679, 58 Atl. 345.

c. Architects and Building Contractors.-Conversations between the contractor and the architect who is put in charge of the work are generally admissible in actions against the owner for the price of the work. The architect is the agent of the owner, and his directions in regard to the manner of doing the work and as to the materials to be used, and in many other respects may become admissible in evidence: Hudspeth v. Allen, 26 Ind. 165; Wright v. Reusens, 60 Hun, 585, 15 N. Y. Supp. 590, 133 N. Y. 298, 31 N. E. 215; State v. King, 64 W. Va. 546, 610, 63 S. E. 468, 495; but the usual rule of first establishing the agency must be followed. If it

appears that the architect was not the agent when the admission was made, it cannot be used: Birch v. Hale, 99 Cal. 299, 33 Pac. 1088. And where the architect, with the owner's assent, placed an agent in charge, the conversations of the contractor with such agent were properly admitted as evidence in an action by the architect against such owner: Turnley v. Baker, 103 Mo. App. 390, 77 S. W. 479.

Although the relation between the owner of a building and the contractor is not one of agency, yet the statute provides that the building shall be liable for materials furnished the contractor, and his receipt for such materials, being part of the res gestae, and being also against his interest, may be offered in evidence against the owner to prove delivery: Treusch v. Shryock, 51 Md. 162.

In an action by a subcontractor against the contractor, and to enforce a mechanic's lien against the property of the owners, declarations of the contractor, made after the materials had been purchased and delivered are admissible against him, though not against the owners, the contractor not being the owner's agent, and the owner may have its effect so limited by instructions: Phillibert v. Schmidt, 57 Mo. 211; Deardorff v. Everhartt, 74 Mo. 37 (overruling Morrison v. Hancock, 40 Mo. 561); Carthage Marble & White Lime Co. v. Baumann, 55 Mo. App. 204; Grace v. Nesbitt, 109 Mo. 9, 18 S. W. 1118.

Time checks given by a contractor to his employés are not conclusive evidence of labor performed against the owner of the subject of a mechanic's lien, but are admissible in evidence as the declarations of the owner's agent in the line of his employment and sufficient to establish, prima facie, the claim to such lien: Forbes v. Willamette Falls Electric Co., 19 Or. 61, 20 Am. St. Rep. 793, 23 Pac. 670.

On scire facias upon a mechanic's lien against the owner of the building and the contractor, the declarations of the contractor as to the materials received and the amount remaining due are evidence admissible for the plaintiff, but such evidence should be subjected to the nicest scrutiny: Dickinson College v. Church, 1 Watts & S. 462. In an action for lumber furnished to build a vessel, the declarations and admissions of the contractor and his agent made after the delivery of all the lumber were inadmissible to help plaintiff's case, for the reason that the contractor was in no sense the agent of the defendant owner, and there was no such relation between them as to make his declarations competent against the latter or his sureties: Happy v. Mosher, 48 N. Y. 313, reversing Happy v. Mosher, 47 Barb. 501.

Where the architect exceeds his powers by ordering the contractor to quit the work if he could not hasten it, and he would pay him for what was done up to that time, such order is inadmissible against the owner in a suit by the contractor for wrongfully terminating the contract, as not being within the scope of the architect's authority: Ahern v. Boyce, 26 Mo. App. 558.

Declarations of the contractor, at the time of the purchase, as to the purpose, etc., for which the owner requires materials are inadmissible to show that they were actually used in the construction of the building: Schulenburg v. Hawley, 6 Mo. App. 34.

Where an agent of the defendant marks a boundary line on growing timber, proof that a third person gave him directions as to certain points on the line is admissible: Douglas Land Co. v. T. W. Thayer Co., 107 Va. 292, 58 S. E. 1101.

d. Brokers and Factors.-The authority of a broker or factor to perform all things usual in the business on which he is employed cannot be limited by any secret order from his principal, and in actions arising out of such transactions, evidence may be given of declarations of the broker concerning that which he is dealing about. Statements as to the validity of a note sold, as to whether a sale and delivery of merchandise at a future time was a gambling transaction or not, entries by loan agents of loan transactions, are all admissible against the principal: Lobdell v. Baker, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 193, 35 Am. Dec. 358; General Convention of Congregational Ministers v. Torkelson, 73 Minn. 401, 76 N. W. 215; Dexter v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 78 N. W. 1111; Cassard v. Hinman, 19 N. Y. Super. Ct. 8. But an unauthorized entry in a factor's account book of a demand and charge by a third person on his principal, when the principal has a special contract with such person for supplying him with wheat, which provides for a forfeiture in case the wheat is not supplied, is not evidence against such principal: McPherson v. Neuffer, 11 Rich. (S. C.) 267. And where in an action for false representations on an exchange of real estate, the issue was whether defendant disclosed that the tenants in possession of the property were allowed rebates from the rent reserved by the leases, a letter written by plaintiff's broker, subsequently to the transaction, and while he was acting for plaintiff in looking after the property exchanged, showing that he, the broker, knew of the rebates, was inadmissible, because not made within the scope of his employment: Burbank v. Hammond, 189 Mass. 189, 75 N. E. 102.

One who has neither actual nor constructive possession, but is anthorized to sell, is a mere broker; and his declarations are not admissible to affect the title of his principal: Pier v. Duff, 63 Pa. 59. e. Carriers and Their Officers and Agents.-The rules applicable to the admissions and declarations of officers and other agents of common carriers are the same as those applying to the agents of other persons and corporations: Alabama & M. R. R. Co. v. Sanford, 36 Ala. 703; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hill, 115 Ala. 334, 22 South. 163; Home Ice Factory v. Howell's Min. Co., 157 Ala. 603, 48 South. 117; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Barger, 52 Ark. 78, 20 Am. St. Rep. 155, 12 S. W. 156; Choctaw, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Rolfe, 76 Ark. 220, 88 S. W. 870; Norwich & W. R. Co. v. Cahill, 18 Conn. 484; Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Lockwood, 33 Fla. 573, 15 South. 327; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wells, 50 Fla. 474, 111 Am. St. Rep. 129, 39 South. 838, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 1072, 7 Ann. Cas. 531; Griffin v.

Montgomery & W. P. R. Co., 26 Ga. 111; Hematite Min. Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 92 Ga. 268, 18 S. E. 24; Taylor v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Ill. 86; Hodgerson v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 160 Ill. 430, 43 N. E. 614; Indianapolis & C. R. Co. v. Jewett, 16 Ind. 273; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 50 Am. St. Rep. 320, 39 N. E. 451; Livingston v. Iowa M. Ry. Co., 35 Iowa, 555; Peden v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 78 Iowa, 131, 42 N. W. 625, 4 L. R. A. 401; Carpenter. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 126 Iowa, 94, 101 N. W. 758; Central Branch Union Pac. R. Co. v. Butman, 22 Kan. 639; St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412, 57 Am. Rep. 176, 11 Pac. 408; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Consolidated Cattle Co., 59 Kan. 111, 52 Pac. 71; McLeod v. Ginther's Admr., 80 Ky. 399; Rowe v. Baltimore etc. R. Co., 82 Md. 493, 33 Atl. 761; Pratt v. Ogdensburg etc. R. Co., 102 Mass. 557; Grinnell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299, 18 Am. Rep. 485; Wellington v. Boston etc. R. R., 158 Mass. 185, 33 N. E. 393; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Nichol, 18 Mich. 170; Doyle v. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 42 Minn. 79, 43 N. W. 787; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. McGowan, 62 Miss. 682, 52 Am. Rep. 205; Wells v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 67 Miss. 24, 6 South. 737; Ryan v. Gilmer, 2 Mont. 517, 25 Am. Rep. 744; Meyer v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 16 Nev. 341; Huebner v. Erie R. Co., 69 N. J. L. 327, 55 Atl. 273; McCotter v. Hooker, 8 N. Y. 497; Chapman v. Erie Ry. Co., 55 N. Y. 579; Nowack v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 433, 82 Am. St. Rep. 691, 60 N. E. 32, 54 L. R. A. 592; Branch v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 88 N. C. 573; Porter v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 97 N. C. 46, 2 S. E. 374; Stockton v. De Muth, 7 Watts (Pa.), 39, 32 Am. Dec. 735; Van Kirk v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 76 Pa. 66, 18 Am. Rep. 404; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Sulphur Spring School Dist., 96 Pa. 65, 42 Am. Rep. 529; Baltimore & Ohio Employés' Relief Assn. v. Post, 122 Pa. 579, 9 Am. St. Rep. 147, 15 Atl. 885, 2 L. R. A. 44; Charleston & S. R. Co. v. Blake, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 634; Lipscomb v. South Bound R. Co., 65 S. C. 148, 43 S. E. 388; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 125, 19 S. W. 455, 17 L. R. A. 643; Houston etc. Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 91 Tex. 551, 45 S. W. 2, 43 L. R. A. 225; Southwestern Telegraph etc. Co. v. Gotcher, 93 Tex. 114, 53 S. W. 686; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Barefoot, 97 Tex. 159, 76 S. W. 914, 64 L. R. A. 491; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Gallahue's Admr., 12 Gratt. 655, 65 Am. Dec. 254; Jammison v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 92 Va. 327, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813, 23 8. E. 758; Coyle v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 11 W. Va. 94; Eastburn v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 34 W. Va. 681, 12 S. E. 819; Milwaukee & M. R. Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388; New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U. S. 637, Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039, 30 L. ed. 1049; Jesup v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 36 Fed. 735; Dubuque etc. R. Co. v. Jesup, 43 Fed. 483; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Parker, 55 Fed. 595, 5 C. C. A. 20, 12 U. S. App. 132; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Belliwith, 83 Fed. 437, 28 C. C. A. 358.

f. Deputy Sheriffs.—In all official acts the deputy may bind the sheriff, and in the regular discharge of official duty the acts of the deputy are the acts of the sheriff. Declarations, therefore, of the

deputy are, with the same limitations as in other cases of agency, admissible in evidence in actions against the sheriff: Savage v. Balch, 8 Me. 27; Tyler v. Ulmer, 12 Mass. 163; Terral v. McRae, 6 Smedes & M. 136; Mott v. Kip, 10 Johns. 478; State v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36; Wheeler v. Hambright, 9 Serg. & R. 390; Lyman v. Lull, 20 Vt. 349. But the admissions of an under-sheriff, or of a deputy revenue collector, in the absence of proof of special authorization, are not admissible to bind his principal: Grimshaw v. Paul, 76 Ill. 164; and a letter written by the deputy to the plaintiff in execution, after the alleged conversion of the goods taken, is not admissible against the sheriff, the writing of such letter not being an official act on the deputy's part: Barker v. Binninger, 14 N. Y. 270.

The old case of Somervell v. Hunt, 3 Har. & McH. 113, purporting to decide that in an action against a sheriff for an escape of a runaway negro, an advertisement in a newspaper that such negro had been apprehended and was in custody, purporting to be made by the sheriff, is not evidence, though the deputy sheriff confessed that he had advertised the negro, is not reliable. In that case it was the Calvert county court which made the decision, and on appeal the final decision was rendered on another point.

g. Employés and Servants.-No branch of agency is so heavily laden with decisions as that relating to employés or servants in general, although the rule by which the admissibility of their evidence is weighed is the same as that regulating other agents. Difficult questions, however, do arise on every term of the original proposition, but the variation of employment keeps adding to an everwidening stream of decisions from which the leading as well as the uncommon decisions must be selected for comparison. In an action for the death of an employé, regular daily verbal reports made by a deceased foreman of the works as to their condition, which was connected with the matters in issue, are admissible in evidence: Williams v. Walton & Whann Co., 9 Houst. 322, 32 Atl. 726.

Letters written by clerks of a firm in the partnership name and on business in which the writers are acting for the firm, and entries in the books in ordinary course, are presumptively the letters and entries of the firm: Anderson v. Pollard, 62 Ga. 46; Bliss v. Estate of Plummer, 103 Mich. 181, 61 N. W. 263; Heywood Chair Mfg. Co. v. Burns, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 570; Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 69 Fed. 798, 16 C. C. A. 425, 32 U. S. App. 554. And statements made by them in the course and as part of their duty are admissible in evidence: Weeks v. Barron, 38 Vt. 420.

Where plaintiff contended that premises held by defendant belonged to a third party, a letter to such party, written by defendant's son, in possession as defendant's agent, on the subject of rent in arrear, was competent to show that defendant recognized the third party as owner: First Nat. Bank v. Bruce (Tex. Civ. App.), 55 S. W. 126; and a certificate of work and labor done, signed by defendant's foreman in the course of his duty, is admissible: Smith v. Kahill, 17 Ill. 67; and a conversation of plaintiff with defendant's