action; as a solid substance, by motion, alters the sensible ideas of another substance. Yet this motion is but a passion, if received from some external agent; so that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion. So in thinking, a power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking: but this is but a passive power. But to be able to bring into view ideas at one's own choice, and to compare which one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may preserve us from some mistakes which grammars and the frame of languages may lead us into; since verbs called active do not always signify action, v. g. I see the moon, or I feel the heat of the sun, though expressed by a verb active, signifies not any action, but the reception of ideas wherein I am barely passive. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove from the sun-beams, I am active, because, by a power within myself, I put myself into that motion.

And thus I have given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived and made up: which may all be reduced to these primary ones, viz. extension, solidity, mobility, which by our senses we receive from body; perceptivity, or the power of thinking; motivity, or the power of moving; which by reflection we receive from our minds. I use these words to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal; to which, if we add existence, duration, number, which belong both to the one and the other, we have perhaps all the original ideas on which the rest depend: for by these may be explained colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and all other ideas. But my present purpose being only to inquire into the knowlege the mind has of things by the ideas and appearances which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the mind comes by that knowlege, rather than into their causes, I shall not set my

self to inquire into the peculiar constitution of bodies, whereby they produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities; it sufficing to observe, that gold or saffron has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow; snow and milk, the idea of white; which we can only have by our sight, without examining the figure or motion of the particles which cause in us that particular sensation; though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds, we cannot conceive any thing else to be in any object whereby it produces different ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

CHAPTER XXII.

Of mixed Modes.

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Having treated of simple modes, and given instances of some of the most considerable of them, we are now to consider those we call mixed modes; such are the complex ideas we mark by the names obligation,' drunkenness,' a lie,' &c. which, consisting of combinations of simple ideas, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from simple modes: these mixed modes being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not marks of real beings, but independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

That the mind, in receiving its simple ideas, is wholly passive, experience shows us; but if we consider the ideas we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these combinations: for being once furnished with simple ideas, it can make a variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence these ideas are called notions, as having their origin more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things; though I do not deny but several of them

might be taken from observation : for the man who first framed the idea of hypocrisy might have taken it from the observation of one who made show of good qualities he had not, or have framed the idea without such pattern for several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the establishment of society, must have been in the minds of men before they existed any where else; and many names for those ideas were in use before the combinations they stood for existed.

Indeed, now that language abounds with words standing for such combinations, a usual way of getting these ideas is by explication of the terms: for consisting of a combination of simple ideas, they may be represented to the mind of him who understands the words of the simple ideas, though the combination were never really presented to his senses. Thus a man may have an idea of sacrilege or murder, without ever seeing either of them committed.

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Every mixed mode consisting of many simple ideas, may be inquired how such a multitude comes to make one idea, since the combination does not always exist in nature. I answer, it has its unity from the mind combining the simple ideas, and considering them as one complex one consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union is the one name given to the combination: for men seldom consider

any number of simple ideas to make one complex one, but such collections as there are names for. Thus a man's killing his father is called parricide; but the killing an old man, having no particular name, is not taken for a complex idea, nor a distinct species of action from killing another man.

If we inquire what causes men to make some combinations of ideas into mixed modes, and neglect others equally apt to be so combined, we shall find the reason to be the end of language, which being to communicate thoughts with all despatch, men make Locke.

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such collections as they have frequent use for, leaving others which they seldom have occasion to mention ; choosing rather, when they need, to enumerate the particular ideas, than to burden their memories with names that they seldom use.

Thus it comes to pass that in every language there are words which cannot be rendered by any one single word in another: for the customs of one nation make several combinations of ideas necessary to one, which another people never have occasion to use. Thus dorpakioμòs among the Greeks, and proscriptio among the Romans, stood for complex ideas, which were not in the minds of other people; and, therefore, in other countries there were no names for them.

Hence we see why languages constantly change: because change of customs, bringing new combinations of ideas, new names are annexed to them, and they become new species of complex modes. How much time is thereby saved may be seen by any one who will enumerate the ideas that reprieve' or appeal' stand for; and, instead of the names, use a periphrasis to make any one understand their meaning.

Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat of words, yet I have taken thus much notice here of mixed modes, which being transient combinations of simple ideas, exist only in the mind by their names: for if we should inquire whether the idea of a triumph or apotheosis exists, it is evident that neither could exist at once in the things themselves, being actions that require time for their performance. And as to the mind, where they are supposed to lodge, they have but an uncertain existence there, and so we annex them to the names that excite the ideas in us.

There are three ways whereby we get complex ideas: 1. by experience and observation. Thus by seeing two men wrestle, we get the idea of wrestling;

2. by invention. So he that invented printing had the idea of it in his mind before it existed; 3. which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see, and thus setting before the mind all the ideas which are the constituent parts of them: for having stored our minds with simple ideas and their names, we can represent to another any complex idea, so that it contains no simple ideas but what he knows and has the name for. Thus the mixed mode, 'lie,' is made of these simple ideas: 1. articulate sounds; 2. certain ideas in the mind of the speaker; 3. those words the signs of those ideas; 4. the signs put together otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I need go no farther in the analysis to show that this complex idea is made up of simple ideas. The same may be done with all our complex ideas, which may be resolved into simple ideas, which are the elements of all the knowlege we have.

It is worth observing which of all our simple ideas have had most mixed modes made out of them; and those have been three; thinking and motion, which comprehend all action; and power, from whence those actions are conceived to flow: for action, being the great business of mankind, and the matter about which laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, and have names assigned them, without which laws could but ill be made; nor could communication be had amongst men, without complex ideas and names to them. Therefore men have settled names and ideas of modes of actions according to their causes, means, objects, time, &c. and also of their powers fitted for those actions, v. g. Boldness is the power to speak or act without fear. When any power has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, it is called habit.' To conclude, let us examine any modes of action, of the mind or of the body, or of both