together, we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas.

Power being the source of action, the substances wherein powers are, are called causes; and the simple ideas introduced into any subject by exerting power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new idea is produced is called in the subject exerting power, action; but in the subject wherein the change is produced, passion; which efficacy in intellectual agents we can only conceive to be modes of thinking; in corporeal agents, modifications of motion. Whatever sort of action besides these produces any effect, is as remote from my thoughts as the idea of colors from a blind man and, therefore, many words which seem to express an action, signify nothing but barely the effect. When a countryman says the cold freezes the water, the word 'freezing,' though seeming to import some action, yet signifies nothing but the effect.

I need not remark, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, yet other simple ideas are not excluded; nor need I enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled with names to them. All that is here requisite, is to show what ideas are called mixed modes; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions of simple ideas; which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas of Substances.

The mind being furnished with simple ideas, conveyed by the senses or by reflection, takes notice that numbers of these simple ideas go constantly together, which being presumed to belong to one thing, are united by one name, and inadvertently considered as one simple idea: because, not imagining how these, simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we suppose

some substratum wherein they subsist, which we call substance.1

This section, which was intended to show how distinct species of substances came to be looked on as simple ideas, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of substance in general, and hath been reprehended in these words:- But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas? No; but it is by a complication of many simple ideas together; because, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence they do result; which, therefore, we call substance. And this is all that is to be said for the being of substance, that we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum. Is that custom grounded on true reason or not? If not, then accidents or modes must subsist of themselves; and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them: for figures, colors, &c. would do well enough of themselves but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to.'.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author answers Herein your lordship charges me with two faults: 1. that I make the general idea of substance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together; 2. as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

'As to the first of these, I say, in more places than one, that general ideas are all made by abstraction, therefore I could not mean that that of substance was made any other way. That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance is manifest from the title of the chapter. In the words quoted, I do not observe that any deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstraction; but speaking of the ideas of distinct substances, I say that they are combinations of simple ideas, looked on as one idea, called by one name of substance though made up of modes, from the custom of supposing a substratum wherein that combination subsists. That my notion of substance in general is different from this, is evident from the following words, where I say, The idea of substance in general is a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas

in us.

The other thing laid to my charge, is as if I took the being of substance to be doubtful. To which I answer, that it is of the idea, not of the being of substance that I there speak; and having said that man is a substance, I cannot doubt the being of substance till I doubt my own being. I also say, that sensation convinces us that there are solid substances, and reflection that there are thinking ones. So that the being of substance is not shaken by what I have said, even should the idea of it: nor would it, if I should say we had no idea of it at all; for many things have a being, of which we have no ideas.

So that if any one will examine his notion of pure substance, he will find that he has no idea of it but a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are called accidents. Should any one be asked, what is that wherein color or weight inheres, he would say, the solid and extended parts; and if asked in what solidity and extension inhere, he would be in no better case than the Indian who said that the world was supported by an elephant, and the elephant by a tortoise, and the tortoise by he knew not what. Thus here, as in all cases where we use words without distinct ideas, we talk like children, who being questioned what such a thing is that they know not, answer, Something. The idea then to which we give the name of substance being but the unknown support of qualities, which we imagine cannot subsist without something to support them, we call that support, substantia, standing under, or upholding.1

A relative idea of substance being made, we come

The being of substance being safe, let us see whether the idea be not so too. I have said, that we cannot conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities should subsist alone, and therefore we suppose them to be supported by some common subject, which we denote by the name of substance: which I think is a true reason, because it is the same which your lordship grounds the supposition of a substratum on, in this very page.'

1 From this paragraph has been raised an objection, as if our author had discarded substance out of the world. To which he replies, "This is an accusation that I do not readily know what to plead to. If your lordship means that I deny that there is such a thing as substance, your lordship will acquit me, when you look again into this chapter, where I say, When we think of any sort of corporeal substance, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have be but a collection of ideas of sensible qualities, which we find united in the thing so called, yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, we suppose them supported by some common subject, which we denote by the name of substance, though we have no distinct idea of the thing we suppose or support.

This, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that sub

to have ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting combinations of simple ideas which exist toge

stance is supposed always something, though we know not what it is. Our idea of body, I say, is an extended solid substance; and our idea of soul, a substance that thinks: so long, therefore, as there is body or spirit in the world, I have done nothing towards discarding substance out of the world. Nay, as long as there is any sensible quality left, substance cannot be discarded.

If your lordship means that I have almost discarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a substratum, a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us, &c. I should be glad to be convinced that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that would show me a clearer idea of substance, would do me a kindness. The logicians, who call it ens per se subsistens et substans accidentibus, do but call it a something, they know not what, and may be reckoned with the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world.

'But supposing, that I or these logicians should own that we have but an obscure idea of substance, it would be too hard to charge us with discarding substance out of the world. What 'almost discarding,' and reasonable part' signify, I do not clearly comprehend: but let them signify what they will, (for I dare say your lordship meant something by them) would you not think yourself hardly dealt with, if, acknowleging you had but an imperfect idea of God, you should be accused of having almost discarded God out of the reasonable world? I suppose by * almost discarding out of the reasonable world,' your lordship means something that is blameable; but he, I think, deserves no blame, who acknowleges having an imperfect idea. If it be inferred, that he excludes those things out of being, or out of rational discourse; the first will not hold, for being depends not on our ideas; the latter is no fault, for it is certain, that where we have obscure ideas, we cannot discourse so clearly as if we had distinct ideas.'

To other objections, as to the repetition of the story of the Indian philosopher, and the talking like children, our author replies: This repetition, I confess, is a fault in exact writing; but I have excused it in my preface, saying, I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my Essay go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers' and there farther add, "That I did not publish my Essay for such great masters of knowlege as your lordship; but fitted it to men of my own size, to whom repetitions might sometimes be useful.'

'My saying, that when we talk of substance we talk like children, your lordship seems mightily to lay to heart in these words: If this be the truth of the case, we must still talk like children,

ther, and are supposed to flow from the unknown essence of that substance. Thus we have ideas of man, gold, water, &c. of which substances we have no other clear idea, than of certain simple ideas existing together. The ordinary qualities of iron make the complex idea of that substance, which a smith knows better than a philosopher, who has no other idea of the

cannot

and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we come at a rational idea of substance, we can have no principle of certainty to go on in this debate.' If your lordship has a distincter idea of substance than mine, you are not concerned in what I have there said: but those whose idea of substance is like mine, must with me talk like children, when they talk of something they know not what.'

Farther, the bishop asks, whether there be no difference between the being of a thing and its subsistence by itself? To which our author answers, 'Yes. But how will that prove that, on my principles, we can come to no certainty that there is any such thing as substance? You seem by this question to conclude, that the idea of a thing that subsists by itself is a clear idea of substance. But I ask, Is the idea of the manner of subsistence of a thing, the idea of the thing itself? If not, we may have a distinct idea of the manner, and a confused one of the thing.

For example, I tell your lordship, that I know a thing which cannot subsist without support, and I know another thing that does subsist without a support. Can you, by having clear ideas of having support and not having support, say that you have a clear idea of the thing which has, and of that which has not, a support? To show a blind man that he has no distinct idea of scarlet, I tell him that his notion that it is a being does not prove that he has a distinct idea of it. He replies, that he knows more than that, v. g. he knows that it subsists in another thing; and, there is no difference, says he, in your lordship's words, between the bare being of a thing, and its subsistence in another. Yes, 1 say to him, a great deal; but for all that, you have no such clear idea of scarlet as I have, who see and know it, and have another kind of idea of it, besides that of inherence.

Your lordship has the idea of subsisting by itself, and you therefore conclude, that you have a distinct idea of the thing that subsists by itself. This is, as if a man should say, he has an idea of a cedar of Lebanon, that it is a tree that needs not a prop; which idea, when he comes to examine it, is but the general one of a tree. Just so is the idea of substance, which is confounded with the general idea of something. But suppose that subsisting by itself gives us a clear idea of substance, how does that prove, that, on my principles, we can come to no certainty that there is any such thing as substance in the world?'