we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiment or observations without us, our knowlege goes not beyond particulars.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Maxims.

There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science; and, because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate. But if those, who would persuade us that there are innate principles, had considered, separately, the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate: since, if the ideas, which made up those truths, were not, it was impossible that the propositions, made up of them, should be innate, or our knowlege of them be born with us. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then, they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is certainly (if there be any such) an innate principle. But the names impossibility and identity stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understanding. They are so far from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe, on examination, it will be found that many grown men want them.

It may be worth while likewise to inquire into the reason of the evidence of these maxims, and examine how far they influence our other knowlege. Know

lege being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other ideas, there our knowlege is self-evident: which being so, not only maxims, but an infinite number of other propositions partake equally with them in this self-evidence. For, In respect of identity and diversity, we may have as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas. It is the first act of the mind, to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly, one from another; so that all affirmations, or negations concerning them, are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty; and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood: that is, as soon as we have in our minds the ideas clear and distinct, which the terms in the proposition stand for. Thus, A circle is a circle, Blue is not red, are as selfevident propositions, as those general ones, What is is, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; nor can the consideration of these axioms add any thing to the evidence, or certainty of our knowlege of them.

As to the agreement or disagreement of coexistence, the mind has an immediate perception of this but in very few. And therefore, in this sort we have very little intuitive knowlege; though, in some few propositions we have. Two bodies cannot be in the same place, I think is a self-evident proposition; the idea of fitting a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body.

As to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality, as Equals taken from equals, the remainder

will be equal, &c. which, however received for axioms, yet I think have not a clearer self-evidence than these, that One and one are equal to two: that If from the five fingers of one hand you take two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness than those mathematical axioms.

As to real existence, since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a first Being; we have not so much as a demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowlege, concerning the real existence of other beings.

In the next place, let us consider what influence these maxims have on the other parts of our knowlege. The rules established in the schools, that all reasonings are ex præcognitis et præconcessis, seem to lay the foundation of all other knowlege in these maxims, and to suppose them to be præcognita ; whereby I think is meant two things: 1. that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind; 2. that on them the other parts of our knowlege depend.

1. That these axioms are not the truths first known to the mind, is evident from experience for who knows not that a child perceives that a stranger is not its mother, long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. And how many truths are there about numbers, which the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general maxims? Of this the reason is plain; for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in words one of another; and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas not to be

the same, it must necessarily follow, that such selfevident truths must be first known, which consist of ideas that are first in the mind; and the ideas first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things; from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished, and so knowlege got about them; and next to them the less general or specific, which are next to particular ones.

For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect on them, we shall find, that general ideas carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowlege; to both which it is naturally very much inclined.

2. From what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowlege: for if there be a great many other truths, as self-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible that they should be the principles from which we deduce all other truths. Thus, that One and two are equal to three, is as evident, and easier known, than that the Whole is equal to all its parts. Nor after the knowlege of this maxim, do we know that One and two are equal to three, better, or more certainly than we did before; for if there be any odds in these ideas, the ideas of whole, and parts, are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the

mind, than those of one, two, and three. Either, therefore, all knowlege does not depend on certain præcognita, or general maxims, called principles; or else, such as these, (that one and one are two, that two and two are four, &c.) and a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if we add all the selfevident propositions that may be made about all our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the knowlege of at different ages; and a great many of those innate principles they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view early or later, they are all known by their native evidence, and receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much less the more particular from the more general; or the more simple from the more compounded: the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended.

These general maxims, then, are only of use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths; or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowlege. Several general maxims are no more than bare verbal propositions; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names, one to another; as, The whole is equal to all its parts,-what real truth does it teach us more, than what the signification of the word totum, or whole, does of itself import?

But yet, mathematicians do not without reason place this, and some other such, amongst their maxims; that their scholars having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions made in such general terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular cases: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this,