other starboarded, under the belief that this would bring the vessels parallel, and at least ease the blow. He did not reverse, as required by rule 23 as then worded. It was contended for him that he was justified under the special circumstances, but the House of Lords held that the stop and back rule governed, and that this rule could not be invoked to excuse noncompliance with the stop and back rule.

In the Benares,1o a vessel saw a green light a little on her port bow. When they came close together, she saw the port side, but no red light where it should have been. She thereupon starboarded, and went full speed ahead, instead of backing and reversing. The court held that it was an exceptional case, governed by the general prudential rule, and that she had done right; and that a departure is justified when it is "the one chance still left of avoiding danger which otherwise was inevitable." 17

The American courts have been equally reluctant to admit exceptions. In the Clara Davidson,18 the court said: "But I do not find myself at liberty to ignore the inquiry whether a statutory rule of navigation was violated by the schooner. Those rules are the law of laws in cases of collision. They admit of no option or choice. No navigator is at liberty to set up his discretion against them. If these rules were subject to the caprice or election of masters and pilots, they would be not only useless, but worse than useless. These rules are imperative. They yield to necessity, indeed, but only to actual and obvious necessity. It is not stating the principle too strongly to say that nothing but imperious necessity, or some overpowering vis major, will excuse a sail vessel in changing her course when in the presence of a steamer in motion; that is, obeying the duty resting upon it or keeping out of the way. If the statutory rules of navigation were only optionally binding, we should

169 P. D. 16. See, also, Allan & Flora, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 860. 17 See, also, Mourne, [1901] P. 68; Test, 5 Notes of Cases, 276. 18 (D. C.) 24 Fed. 763.

J

be launched upon an unbounded sea of inquiry in every collision case, without rudder or compass, and be at the mercy of all the fogs and mists that would be made to envelop the plainest case, not only from conflicting evidence as to the facts, but from the hopelessly conflicting speculations and hypotheses of witnesses and experts as to what ought to or might have been done before, during, and after the event. The statutory regulations that have been wisely and charitably devised for the governance of mariners furnish an admirable chart by which the courts may disentangle themselves from conflicting testimony and speculation, and arrive at just conclusions in collision cases."

In the BREAKWATER,10 where, in a crossing case, the privileged vessel kept her course and speed, and was attacked because she did not reverse, the court said: "Where rules of this description are adopted for the guidance of seamen who are unlearned in the law, and unaccustomed to nice distinctions, exceptions should be admitted with great caution, and only when imperatively required by the special circumstances mentioned in rule 24, which may exist in any particular case, rendering a departure from them necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. The moment the observance or nonobservance of a rule becomes a matter of doubt or discretion, there is manifest danger, for the judgment of one pilot may lead him to observe the rule, while that of the other may lead him to disregard it. The theory of the claimant that a vessel at rest has no right to start from her wharf in sight of an approaching vessel, and thereby impose upon the latter the obligation to avoid her, is manifestly untenable, and would impose a wholly unnecessary burden upon the navigation of a great port like that of New York. In the particular case, too, the signals exchanged between the steamers indicated clearly that the Breakwater accepted the situation and the obligation

19 155 U. S. 252, 15 Sup. Ct. 99, 39 L. Ed. 139.

imposed upon her by the starboard-hand rule, and was bound to take prompt measures to discharge herself of such obligation."

In the Non Pareille,20 the court said: "There is no such thing as a right of way to run into unnecessary collision. The rules of navigation are for the purpose of avoiding collision, not to justify either vessel incurring a collision unnecessarily. The supreme duty is to keep out of collision. The duties of each vessel are defined with reference to that object, and, in the presence of immediate danger, both, under rule 24, are bound to give way, and to depart from the usual rule, when adherence to that rule would inevitably bring on collision, which a departure from the rules would plainly avoid."

It is plain, therefore, that he who disregards the regular rules, and appeals to this one, shoulders a heavy burden. He is like the whist player who fails to return his partner's trump lead. He may be able to justify it, but explanations are in order.21

As vessels maneuvering around slips are not on regular courses, their navigation is usually governed by this rule.22 Collisions due to extinguishing the lights of vessels under governmental orders during war come under this rule."

20 (D. C.) 33 Fed. 524. See, also, Hercules, 51 Fed. 452; Mauch Chunk, 154 Fed. 182, 83 C. C. A. 276; John I. Clark (D. C.) 199 Fed. 981.

21 Jakobsen v. Springer, 87 Fed. 948, 31 C. C. A. 315; Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, 20 Sup. Ct. 595, 44 L. Ed. 751; Concordia, L. R. 1 A. & E. 93.

22 Transfer No. 17, 254 Fed. 673, 166 C. C. A. 171; M. Moran, 254 Fed. 766, 166 C. C. A. 212. .

23 Algol, [1918] P. 7; Hydra, [1918] P. 78.

>

SOUND SIGNALS

138. A steamer must indicate to other vessels in sight the course taken by her, by giving sound signals.

Article 28 prescribes these, but they have been explained in a previous connection, and need not be repeated.

THE GENERAL PRECAUTION RULE

› 139. Proper precautions, other than those required by the rules, are not to be neglected.

Article 29 provides that nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen or by the special circumstances of the case.

This rule is intended as a supplement for the other rules, not as a substitute for them. It covers many cases not expressly included in the other rules.

SAME-LOOKOUTS

140. The law is rigid in requiring a competent lookout, charged with that sole duty.

A common instance is the necessity of a lookout. Both the English and American courts have said as emphatically as language can express it that vessels must have a competent lookout stationed where he can best see, and that he must be detailed to that sole duty. Neither the master nor helmsman, if engaged in their regular duties, can act as such, for they have troubles enough of their own. A good English illustration is the Glannibanta.24

§ 140. 241 P. D. 283.

In Clyde Nav. Co. v. Barclay,25 the steamer, which was on her trial trip, was in charge of a pilot, but an officer also was on the bridge, and there was another man, not properly qualified, on the lookout. The House of Lords held this sufficient, and that the bridge was the proper place for the lookout under the circumstances.

The decisions of the American courts have been numerous and emphatic. In the MANHASSET,20 the leading cases on the subject were reviewed, and the difference between the duties of the master and lookout clearly put. In that case a ferryboat crossing Norfolk harbor on a stormy night was condemned for having no one on duty except the master at the wheel.

In fact, circumstances may arise where more than one lookout is necessary. Large steamers have been held in fault for not having two, if it appears that objects were not seen as soon as possible.27

Under some, circumstances-as where a vessel is backing, or another vessel is overtaking-there should be a lookout astern as well as forward.28

This rule as to lookouts must not be carried to a reductio ad absurdum. If the approaching vessels see each other an ample distance apart to take all proper steps, then the object of having a lookout is accomplished, and the absence of a man specially detailed and stationed is a fault not contributory, and therefore immaterial.20

25 1 A. C. 790.

26 (D. C.) 34 Fed. 408. See, also, J. G. Gilchrist (D. C.) 173 Fed. 666; Id., 183 Fed. 105, 105 C. C. A. 397; Wilbert L. Smith (D. C.) 217 Fed. 981; Union S. S. Co. v. Latz, 223 Fed. 402, 138 C. C. A. 638.

27 BELGENLAND, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152; Oregon, 158 U. S. 186, 15 Sup. Ct. 804, 39 L. Ed. 943.

28 Nevada, 106 U. S. 154, 1 Sup. Ct. 234, 27 L. Ed. 149; Sarmatian

(C. C.) 2 Fed. 911; Bernicia (D. C.) 122 Fed. 886.

29 Farragut, 10 Wall. 338, 19 L. Ed. 946; Blue Jacket, 144 U. S.