cult. Neither the vessel herself nor any local authority can be justified in blockading or rendering it unreasonably difficult.48

In the City of Reading," a vessel was anchored outside the regular harbor grounds by a pilot—a fact unknown to her officers, as they were strangers in the port. District Judge McPherson held that the vessel was not negligent for such an anchorage under such circumstances. He does not allude to the act of Congress above referred to, although the accident happened on September 18, 1899, six months after the act went into effect.

SAME-WRECKS

142. The owner of a vessel sunk in collision is not liable for

subsequent damages done by her if he abandons her, but is liable if he exercises any acts of ownership. In the latter case he is required to put a beacon on her at night, and a plain buoy in the day.

The reason why an owner who abandons a vessel is not liable for any further damage is that his misfortune is already great enough, and, if he feels that he cannot afford to save his vessel, the courts will not add to his responsibility. Under the federal statutes the government takes

43 Itasca (D. C.) 117 Fed. 885; Northern Queen (D. C.) 117 Fed. 906; John H. Starin, 122 Fed. 236, 58 C. C. A. 600; Caldy (D. C.) 123 Fed. 802; Id., 153 Fed. 837, 83 C. C. A. 19; Newburgh, 130 Fed. 321, 64 C. C. A. 567; City of Birmingham, 138 Fed. 555, 71 C. C. A. 115; Job H. Jackson (D. C.) 144 Fed. 896; Ann J. Trainer, 152 Fed. 1021, 82 C. C. A. 332; Europe, 190 Fed. 475, 111 C. C. A. 307; Strathleven, 213 Fed. 975, 130 C. C. A. 381.

44 (D. C.) 103 Fed. 696, affirmed City of Dundee, 108 Fed. 679, 47 C. C. A. 581, on another point. As to the effect of local usages or the acts of local officials, see, also, Severn (D. C.) 113 Fed. 578; Charles E. Matthews (D. C.) 132 Fed. 143; Juniata (D. C.) 124 Fed. 861: Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 185 Fed. 261, 107 C. C. A. 367.

charge of abandoned wrecks, and blows them up, or otherwise destroys them; or, if it does not care to do so, sells the wreck after a certain advertisement, and requires the purchaser to remove them as obstructions from the channel.45

The law on this subject of the duty of owners of sunken wrecks may be seen from the cases of the Utopia,** U. S. v. Hall, and Ball v. Berwind.48

If the owner, instead of abandoning his wreck, decides to raise her, he is then responsible for any injury done by her from the failure to take proper precaution.

In fact, this is one case where there may be a liability even for the acts of an independent contractor. As a general rule, when an independent contractor is employed to undertake work which an employer can lawfully let out to contract, he alone, and not the owner, is responsible; but, where the act required is a personal duty, then the owner may be responsible, even for the acts of an independent contractor. To obstruct a navigable channel without giving proper notice is an act unlawful in itself, just as the obstruction of a highway or street would be under similar circumstances; and therefore, when the owner of a vessel is having her raised by an independent contractor, and the contractor omits to put proper lights or buoys upon the wreck, the owner also is liable; and he is liable for any lack of due diligence in raising the wreck.50

§ 142. 45 Act March 3, 1899, §§ 19, 20, 30 Stat. 1154 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 9924, 9925).

46 $ [1893] A. C. 492.

47 63 Fed. 473, 11 C. C. A. 294.

48 (D. C.) 29 Fed. 541.

49 Ante, pp. 211, 213.

50 Snark, [1899] P. 74; Id., [1900] P. 105; Drill Boat No. 4 (D. C.) 233 Fed. 589; Compare Weinman v. De Palma, 232 U. S. 571, 34 Sup. Ct. 370, 58 L. Ed. 733. But the owner, after having secured the services of the Lighthouse Department, is not liable for

THE STAND-BY ACT

143. This act requires colliding steamers to stay by each other regardless of the question of fault, on pain of being presumed negligent if they disregard this duty.

The act of September 4, 1890, provides as follows: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that in every case of collision between two vessels it shall be the duty of the master or person in charge of each vessel, if and so far as he can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, crew, and passengers (if any), to stay by the other vessel until he has ascertained that she has no need of further assistance, and to render to the other vessel, her master, crew, and passengers (if any) such assistance as may be practicable and as may be necessary in order to save them from any danger caused by the collision, and also to give to the master or person in charge of the other vessel the name of his own vessel and her port of registry, or the port or place to which she belongs, and also the name of the ports and places from which and to which she is bound. If he fails so to do, and no reasonable cause for such failure is shown, the collision shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been caused by his wrongful act, neglect or default.

"Sec. 2. That every master or person in charge of a United States vessel who fails, without reasonable cause, to render such assistance or give such information as aforesaid shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars, or imprisonment its acts or omissions. Plymouth, 225 Fed. 483, 140 C. C. A. 1; McCaulley v. Philadelphia, 119 Fed. 580, 56 C. C. A. 100.

HUGHES, ADM. (2DED.)—20

for a term not exceeding two years; and for the above sum the vessel shall be liable and may be seized and proceeded against by process in any District Court of the United States by any person; one-half such sum to be payable to the informer and the other half to the United States." 5′

This is a copy of the earlier English act on the same sub- . ject, and is intended to prevent a ship, even if faultless herself, from leaving the other to her fate, and also to give the information necessary as the basis of any proceeding for damages.

Presumptions against Violator of Act

The act merely raises a presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Hence, if the case is tried on plenary proofs, the act does not do more than shift a nicelybalanced burden of proof. The master may be punished for his inhumanity under the second section, but his innocent owners cannot be mulcted in damages on that account if their vessel was guiltless of contributing to the collision. As Dr. Lushington says in. the Queen of the Orwell: 52 "Now for the penalty, or what may be called the penalty: 'In case he fails so to do, and no reasonable excuse for said failure,' it shall be attended with certain consequences which are enumerated in the enactment. The effect of that, I think, is precisely what has been stated-that, supposing such a state of things to occur, there is thrown upon the party not rendering assistance the burden of proof that the collision was not occasioned by his wrongful act, neglect, or default. It does not go further. Assuming this case to come within the provisions of the statute, the proper question I shall have to put to you is that which I should put if no such statute at all existed: whether this collision was occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of the steamer."

§ 143. 51 26 Stat. 425 (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 7979, 7980).

521 Mar. Law Cas. (O. S.) 300.

A leading American case on the subject is the HERCULES.53

53 80 Fed. 998, 26 C. C. A. 301. See, also, Trader (D. C.) 129 Fed. 462; Luzerne (D. C.) 148 Fed. 133; Id., 157 Fed. 391, 85 C. C. A. 328; Lizzie Crawford (D. C.) 170 Fed. 837. Pitgaveney, [1910] P. 215. In England this presumption of negligence has been repealed by the Maritime Conventions Act 1911, § 4 (2).