preme court expressly overruled its former decision in that regard, and now holds that a municipal corporation can properly be held liable for injury to a pedestrian by the negligent driving of the city's fire apparatus. Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 9 A.L.R. 131, 126 N. E. 72. The same ruling has been had as to the operation of a fire tug, but that by reason of maritime law. Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 570, 45 L. ed. 314, 324, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212. There is a manifest distinction between services rendered by a city in extinguishing fires, for which, as is well known, no compensation is received by the city, and a situation. arising from negligence in the operation or maintenance of a waterworks system by the city, where water is furnished to private consumers upon contract and for compensation. When engaged in the performance of services in the conduct of a business from which it is receiving particular and specific financial return, the municipality is held accountable for the default or negligence of its employees as though it were a private corporation. State Journal Printing Co. v. Madison, 148 Wis. 396, 403, 134 N. W. 909; Piper v. Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 314, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 239, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1078, 122 N. W. 730; Nemet v. Kenosha, 169 Wis. 379, 383, 172 N. W. 711. It was clearly referring only to its conducting the waterworks system as a revenue producer, and not when within the limited purpose of furnishing fire protection, that this court speaks of it as acting in a proprietary capacity in Eau Claire Dells Improv. Co. v. Eau Claire, 172 Wis. 240, 252, 179 N. W. 2. The clear distinction between such two services and the acting by the municipality in its proprietary capacity in the one, and its exercise of governmental function in the other, is pointed out in Piper v. Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 314, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 239, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1078, 122 N. W. 730, and in Chi cago v. Selz, S. & Co. 202 Ill. 545, 67 N. E. 386, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 23, there cited. Upon the third point above stated, and as urged here by the defendant, it was early held in this state, has been steadily adhered to since, and in accord with the general line of authority elsewhere, that a private corporation under contract with a city to furnish the water supply to such city and its inhabitants is not liable any more than is the city for damages arising from any breach of its contract obligations to furnish sufficient pressure in the water mains for fire protection. The question was squarely presented and fully discussed in Britton v. Green Bay & Ft. H. Waterworks Co. 81 Wis. 48, 29 Am. St. Rep. 856, 51 N. W. 84, where the damages sought to be recovered occurred by reason of the failure of the waterworks company to comply with a provision of its franchise with the city, expressly requiring it to furnish water both for public and private use, and for the putting out of fires, and in that case the distinction between the two kinds of services was pointed out (81 Wis. 53). The question was again fully discussed, and this court strongly urged to change the rule so announced in the Britton Case, in the case of Krom v. Antigo Gas Co. 154 Wis. 528, 140 N. W. 41, 143 N. W. 163. Upon the first decision in the Krom Case it was held that there could be a liability under the treble damage provisions of the public utility law, but upon rehearing that view was withdrawn, and the court then agreed with the opinion exconcurring opinion, in which is pressed by Mr. Justice Timlin in his found a full discussion of this question. So the rule in the Britton Case was expressly reaffirmed, and added weight given to it from the view the court then expressed (154 Wis. 544) as to the tremendous liabilities that would be now imposed upon such water companies which had assumed similar situations in (178 Wis. 340, 190 N. W. 110.) evident reliance upon the rule announced in the Britton Case. If, therefore, the complaint must receive the construction as contended for by defendant,-and there is much plausible support in the language used therein for such contention, then, under the decisions above quoted, there could be no escape Water-breach of contract to furnish power to from the conclusion pump water for fires. that the complaint states no cause of action as against the defendant, and the demurrer should have been, as it was, sustained. The plaintiff, however, contends that the complaint is grounded in tort, and sufficiently shows an intentional, unnecessary, and negligent interference by defendant with the electric current then being furnished to and used by the city of Edgerton in its then-present service in attempting to put out the fire on plaintiff's premises, and that for injuries proximately caused by such negligent, present interference the defendant must be held liable as a tort-feasor-as much so as though it were an unquestioned interloper. And, further, that the allegations in the complaint showing the contractual relationship between the city and the defendant are but explanatory of the situation, and not controlling as to the respective rights and liabilities of the parties here. Under the rule binding us as to liberal constructions of pleadings, if two permissible Pleadingadoption of most constructions of a favorable view. complaint are presented, we are required to adopt that which will support a cause of action, rather than another rather than another which would tend to show no legal ground for action. From the allegations of this complaint as summarized in the statement of facts we can see sufficient to support the conclusion that there is alleged, not merely a breach of defendant's contract with the city of Edgerton, but a breach of the obligation which the defendant, as well as all persons, owed to the plaintiff, as well as to all other residents of the city to whom at any time the city of Edgerton might be in the immediate performance of its governmental function of fire protection, to not interfere with such gratuitous and voluntarily assumed function by the city, and that any breach of such implied duty so resting on the defendant and all third persons by any intentional, unwarranted, or negligent interference with, or caused interruption of, such for intentional service, may be interference considered a tort, extinguishing and for the damages proximately caused thereby the person responsible for the same be held liable. Water-liability with power for fires. We consider, therefore, that the obligations tending to show defendant's intentional, unnecessary interruption of and interference with the service being rendered to plaintiff by the city in extinguishing the fire brings this case squarely within the rule and doctrine stated in the case of Concordia F. Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co. 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 199, where the defendant, while driving piles for a building on its own premises, broke into the main water supply pipes of the city of Kenosha and interrupted its service in fire protection. It follows, therefore, that it must be held that the complaint states a cause of action, and the demurrer thereto should have been overruled. Order reversed. ANNOTATION. Liability of water or power company for interruption of pressure during progress of fire. The weight of authority, though not without dissent, supports the general rule that a private citizen cannot maintain an action, either ex contractu or ex delicto, against a waterworks company to recover damages for losses sustained by him in consequence of its failure to furnish water for extinguishment of fires according to its contract with the municipality. 27 R. C. L. 1426-1429. Although the exception to the rule which is made in the reported case (HIGHWAY TRAILER CO. v. JANESVILLE ELECTRIC Co. ante, 1268) seems reasonable in view of the allegations of the complaint as there construed, showing an intentional, unnecessary, and negligent interference at the very time of the fire, with the TRUSTEES OF JENNIE DEPAUW MEMORIAL METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, Appt., 1. A statute merely imposing a duty upon a public water company to furnish a water supply in the language of the common law, and giving a right of action for failure to do so, does not enlarge its common-law liability for loss of private property by fire, due to failure to furnish an adequate supply. [See note on this question beginning on page 1279.] - liability for failure to extinguish fire. 2. Neither a municipality operating its own waterworks, nor a privately owned water company serving a city and its inhabitants with water for domestic purposes and for the purpose of extinguishing fires, is liable in damages to an individual for a loss from fire occasioned by failure to obtain water from the hydrants to extinguish such fires. [See 27 R. C. L. 1426, 1431; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1553.] chise rights of a corporation supplying a municipality with water and placing the company under the control of the public utilities commission does not impose a liability on it in favor of a taxpayer for loss of his property by fire, through its failure to furnish an adequate water supply, where the only provision for service by the company is that found in its former contractual relations with the municipality. Case when action for tort lies. 5. To render one liable in tort for injuries to another he must have violated some duty owing to such other. [See 26 R. C. L. 757.] - when action for injury lies. 6. No one has a right to damages occasioned by an injury unless there is some person who is legally answerable for having caused such injury. [See 26 R. C. L. 757.] Definition "injury." 7. The word “injury” in a statute giving a right of action to a person APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for total destruction of its church building, alleged to have been caused by the negligent failure of defendant to maintain fire hydrants in condition for use. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion Messrs. Stotsenburg & Weathers, Hottel & Patrick, and Hottel & Mead for appellant. Mr. George H. Voigt, for appellee: A contract between a city and a public utility to furnish fire protection to the citizens creates no common-law liability against the utility. Fitch v. Seymour Water Co. 139 Ind. 214, 47 Am. St. Rep. 258, 37 N. E. 982; Ellis v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. 187 Ala. 552, 65 So. 805, 8 N. C. C. A. 611; Jones House Furnishing Co. v. Arkansaw Water Co. 112 Ark. 425, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 402, 166 S. W. 557; Bessemer Waterworks v. Murphy, 6 Ala. App. 603, 60 So. 533; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co. 226 U. S. 220, 57 L. ed. 195, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1000, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; Hall v. Passaic Water Co. 83 N. J. L. 771, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 750, 85 Atl. 349; Lutz v. Tahlequah Water Co. 29 Okla. 171, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 568, 118 Pac. 128; Collier v. Newport Water, Light, & P. Co. 100 Ark. 47, 139 S. W. 635, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 458; Milford v. Bangor R. & E. Co. 106 Me. 316, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 526, 76 Atl. 696, 20 Ann. Cas. 622; Holloway v. Macon Gas, Light & Water Co. 132 Ga. 390, 64 S. E. 330, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 70, 6 Ga. App. 112, 64 S. E. 574; Brame v. Light, Heat & Water Co. 95 Miss. 26, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 468, 48 So. 728, 20 Ann. Cas. 1293, 1 N. C. C. A. 297; Ancrum v. Camden Water, Light & Ice Co. 82 S. C. 284, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1029, 64 S. E. 151; Cooke v. Paris Mountain Water Co. 82 S. C. 235, 64 S. E. 157; Galena v. Galena Water Co. 132 Ill. App. 332, 82 N. E. 421, affirmed in 229 Ill. 128, 82 N. E. 421; Metz v. Cape Girardeau Waterworks & E. L. Co. 202 Mo. 324, 100 S. W. 651; Thompson v. Springfield Water Co. 215 Pa. 275, 64 Atl. 521, 7 of the court. Ann. Cas. 473; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Topeka Water Co. 132 Fed. 702; Lovejoy v. Bessemer Waterworks Co. 146 Ala. 374, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 429, 41 So. 76, 9 Ann. Cas. 1068; Peck v. Sterling Water Co. 118 Ill. App. 533; Boston Safe-Deposit & T. Co. v. Salem Water Co. 94 Fed. 238; Allen & C. Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Waterworks Co. 113 La. 1091, 68 L.R.A. 650, 104 Am. St. Rep. 525, 37 So. 980, 2 Ann. Cas. 471; Smith v. Great South Bay Water Co. 82 App. Div. 427, 81 N. Y. Supp. 812; Blunk v. Dennison Water Supply Co. 71 Ohio St. 250, 73 N. E. 210, 2 Ann. Cas. 852; Nichol v. Huntington Water Co. 53 W. Va. 348, 44 S. E. 290; Boston Safe-Deposit & T. Co. v. Salem Water Co. 94 Fed. 238; Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. 46 Conn. 24, 33 Am. Rep. 1; Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co. 83 Ga. 219, 20 Am. St. Rep. 313, 9 S. E. 673; Bush v. Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. 4 Idaho, 618, 95 Am. St. Rep. 161, 43 Pac. 69; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Robinson v. Evansville, 87 Ind. 334, 44 Am. Rep. 770; Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330; Summers v. Daviess County, 103 Ind. 262, 53 Am. Rep. 512, 2 N. E. 725; Becker v. Keokuk Waterworks Co. 79 Iowa, 419, 18 Am. St. Rep. 377, 44 N. W. 694; Davis v. Clinton Waterworks Co. 54 Iowa, 59, 37 Am. Rep. 185, 6 N. W. 126; Mott v. Cherryvale Water & Mfg. Co. 48 Kan. 12, 15 L.R.A. 375, 30 Am. St. Rep. 267, 28 Pac. 989; Home v. Presque Isle Water Co. 104 Me. 217, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1021, 71 Atl. 769; Wilkinson v. Light, Heat & Water Co. 78 Miss. 389, 28 So. 877; Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co. 119 Mo. 304, 23 L.R.A. 146, 41 Am. St. Rep. 654, 24 S. W. 784; Houck v. Cape Girardeau Waterworks & E. L. Co. Mo. App. 114 S. W. 1099; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Trenton Water Co. 42 Mo. App. 118; Eaton v. Fairbury Waterworks Co. 37 Neb. 546, 21 L.R.A. 653, 40 Am. St. Rep. 510, 56 N. W. 201; Ferris v. Carson Water Co. 16 Nev. 44, 40 Am. Rep. 485; Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46, 30 L.R.A. 660, 51 Am. St. Rep. 667, 42 N. E. 405; Wainwright v. Queens County Water Co. 78 Hun, 146, 28 N. Y. Supp. 987; Akron Waterworks Co. v. Brownless, 10 Ohio C. C. 620, 5 Ohio C. D. 1;. Beck v. Kittanning Water Co. 8 Sadler (Pa.) 237, 11 Atl. 300; Stone v. Uniontown Water Co. 4 Pa. Dist. R. 431; Foster v. Lookout Water Co. 3 Lea, 42; House v. Houston Waterworks Co. 88 Tex. 233, 28 L.R.A. 532, 31 S. W. 179; Greenville Water Co. v. Beckham, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 118 S. W. 889, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S. W. 709; Britton v. Green Bay & Ft. H. Waterworks Co. 81 Wis. 48, 29 Am. St. Rep. 856, 51 N. W. 84. The word "injury" in § 116 must be construed in its accurate and technical legal sense, and it means to violate the legal right of another, or, what amounts to the same thing, to inflict an actionable wrong. No liability exists under this section that did not exist under the common law. Krom v. Antigo Gas Co. 154 Wis. 528, 140 N. W. 41, 143 N. W. 163; North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2 N. E. 821; Stein v. Lafayette, 6 Ind. App. 414, 33 N. E. 912; 1 C. J. p. 964. Travis, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Appellant sued appellee for damages for the total destruction of its church building and contents, occasioned, as alleged, by the negligent failure of appellee to maintain fire hydrants in condition for use. The complaint alleges that appellee is a private corporation, which owned and operated the waterworks in the city of New Albany by virtue of a franchise and contract, entered into on the 25th day of August, 1904, between appellee and the city, which franchise and contract were to run for a period of twenty-five years. By § 1 of the ordinance which created the franchise and contract referred to, appellee was "empowered to maintain the system of waterworks in and for the city of New Albany, and to supply such city and its citizens with pure and wholesome water." Section 3 of the ordinance provided that the capacity of such waterworks should be such as to supply sufficient water upon demand for the purposes of maintaining a hydraulic pressure of 90 pounds per square inch at a given point during the prevalence of a fire in said city, and at other times a pressure of 70 pounds per square inch. And by § 4 of the ordinance appellee "shall maintain at its own cost and expense 200 fire hydrants at such points along its line of water pipe as the same are now established. . . . And said New Albany Waterworks shall keep said fire hydrants constantly in good order and working condition. For the use of such water from the fire hydrants for extinguishing fire and other public purposes as herein provided, the city of New Albany promises and agrees to pay the said New Albany Waterworks the sum of sixty dollars ($60) per annum for the first 200 of said fire hydrants. . On the 25th day of June, 1917, appellee availed itself of the terms of § 101 of the Public Service Act (Acts 1913, p. 202) by filing with the clerk of the city of New Albany and with the public service commission a written declaration legally adopted and executed, to the effect that it surrendered its franchise, by virtue of the ordinance of said city of New Albany, and received in lieu thereof an indeterminate permit granted by the public service commission, and was operating under said indeterminate permit at the time of the act of negligence here in question. Appellant owned the church building and contents situate in the city of New Albany, which were totally destroyed by fire December 30, 1917, which total destruction was caused, as alleged, because the appellee negligently and carelessly suffered and permitted the fire hy |