compelling him to go some distance with them, searched him and took his valuables, no resistance being made because prosecutor believed his captors to be officers and that he would be locked up if he resisted, the court said: "It is generally held that whenever the element of force or putting in fear enters into the taking, and is the cause that induces the owner of the property to part with it, the taking is robbery, no matter how slight the act of force or the cause creating the fear may be, nor by what other circumstances the taking may be accompanied. It is enough that the force or the putting in fear employed is sufficient to overcome resistance on the part of the person from whom the property is taken, and is the moving cause inducing him to part unwillingly with his property. It seems to us that there was in the case before us both the elements of force and putting in fear. There was a forcible seizure of the prosecuting witness, his forcible taking to a place where he had no desire to go, a command to keep silent, and a forcible taking against his will of his money from his person. True, these acts were accompanied by the false representations to the effect that the appellants were officers of the law having authority to compel him to accompany them, and to take from him his property, but these representations did not induce the prosecuting witness to part with his money. They were still compelled to take it from him. Nor was the mere false impersonation sufficient to enable them to thus obtain the property of the prosecuting witness. They were compelled to exercise their assumed authority by such threats of violence as to put him in fear. It may be that a man of more intelligence and resolution than the witness exhibited would have seen through the very flimsy pretext the appellants were making, and would have successfully resisted such an attempt as was here successful. But this is beside the question. The law must protect the weak and irresolute as well as those of stronger wills, and it is enough that the person assaulted was intimidated and yielded up his

property because of the force used and threatened, be the same ever so slight."

And in Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293, an oft-quoted case, where a man was induced by threats of shooting, constraint upon his person, and threats to send him to prison for a theft he had committed in the past, to give a bill of sale of a negro girl, and almost all of the property which he owned, in affirming a conviction of robbery, the court said: "Threats to

take one before a magistrate, or to prosecute for any other offense, or accusations of other crimes, although these may have the effect of extorting money or property from a person, do not make the transaction a robbery. If, however, such threats or accusations are accompanied with force, actual or constructive, and the property or money is given up in consequence of this force, the transaction is robbery. Nor is the guilt of the party accused any defense to an act of robbery. If property is extorted by violence, upon a charge of larceny or any other crime, the offense is neither justified or mitigated by his guilt, nor aggravated by his innocence. The law will not permit property or money to be violently taken from a citizen because he happens to be a guilty man. He is liable to the law if guilty, and under the protection of the law, whether innocent or guilty." And in Bussey v. State (1883) 71 Ga. 100, 51 Am. Rep. 256, where defendant, while wearing a star designating the office of town marshal, pretended that he was such officer, and seized prosecutor, to whom another was showing a card trick, and pushed him against a wall and threatened to take him to jail unless he paid him money, thus extorting from him $8, which he said "he paid to keep from going to jail," the court, relying on Long v. State (Ga.) supra, upheld a conviction of robbery. The court said that while the mere arrest with the threat to jail prosecutor did not suffice, alone, to make a case of robbery, yet, accompanied by the ill usage and violence of seizure, pushing, and holding, it did, although the case was a close one.

And robbery by intimidation under the Georgia statute was held in Sweat v. State (1892) 90 Ga. 315, 17 S. E. 273, to have been committed where two men, without a warrant, arrested another, whom they pretended to believe was a fugitive from justice, handcuffed him, took possession of his personal property and took him to the home of one of his captors in another county, where, by operating on his fears, threatening to carry him to prison, and hinting at mob violence, they induced him to give them $50 for permission to depart, he having testified that he complied with the proposition of his captors because he was afraid that they were going to kill him.

And in State v. Balch (1896) 136 Mo. 103, 37 S. W. 808, where the prosecuting witness and a young woman, while sitting at night on the grass in a park, were approached by the defendant who, after drawing a revolver, said that he was a police officer, that the prosecuting witness was under arrest for loitering in the park, and that he would have to pay $10 or go to the police station, to which witness replied that he would go and leave his watch as security, but the defendant refused, and himself took the watch at the point of his gun, it was held that the defendant was guilty of robbery, the watch having been delivered up because of the fear induced by the defendant's gun. And again, in McCormick v. State (1886) 26 Tex. App. 678, 9 S. W. 277, where defendant came up to two men in a city street at night with his hat pulled down and his collar turned up, and, stating that he was an officer of the law, demanded that they hold up their hands or he would arrest them for drunken and disorderly conduct, and one of the men testified that he was very much alarmed and through fear threw up his hands, and the defendant took his money from his pocket, it was held that the offense was robbery. And in Williams v. State (1900)

Tex. Crim. Rep., 55 S. W. 500, where defendant impersonated an officer, and, accusing two men of having counterfeit money, demanded that

they deliver up their money, and used a six-shooter to enforce such demand, the court affirmed a conviction of robbery, stating that, as the defendant used firearms to enforce compliance with his demands, and secured the money by such means, it constituted robbery. And in Pearson v. State (1916) 79 Tex. Crim. Rep. 609, 187 S. W. 336, where defendant, while impersonating the sheriff of the county, purported to arrest bootleggers and took whisky from them at the point of a gun, but released them upon their promise to say nothing, it was held that the offense was robbery.

In People v. Pasqueria (1916) 30 Cal. App. 625, 159 Pac. 173, the taking of property was held to have been accompanied by all the elements constituting the crime of robbery where accused entered a Chinaman's store, and, claiming to be a detective, accused the Chinaman of having lottery tickets in his possession, and stated that he wanted to search his place, and, under the pretense of making a search for lottery tickets, put his hand in the Chinaman's pocket and took therefrom money and a diamond ring, and, putting them in his own pocket, struck the Chinaman and ran out of the store.

And in United States v. Smith (1903) 3 Philippine, 20, where defendant, claiming to be a detective with authority to arrest, threatened to arrest and imprison the prosecuting witnesses unless they paid him a certain amount of money, which they did to secure their release, it was held, citing a Spanish case, that the defendant's offense was robbery by intimidation. And following United States v. Smith (Philippine) supra, it was held in United States v. Flores (1911) 19 Philippine, 178, that a policeman, who, knowing that no crime had been committed, falsely accused one of crime, arrested him, and, by means of threats of imprisonment and personal harm, obtained money from such person, was guilty of the crime of robbery by intimidation. The court added, however, that in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions the crime would probably not be

so denominated. And following United States v. Smith and United States v. Flores (Philippine) supra, it was again held in United States v. Recio (1912) 21 Philippine, 511, that one who obtained money by pretending to be an officer of the law and by threats of arrest and imprisonment is guilty of the crime of robbing by intimidation under the provisions of the Philippine Penal Code.

In Tones v. State (1905) 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. 363, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1024, 122 Am. St. Rep. 759, 88 S. W. 217, 13 Ann. Cas. 455, it was held that officers were guilty of robbery where, after having arrested a person, they forcibly searched him and took valuables with the intention of keeping them. In this case it appeared that the officers used actual force, and it was held immaterial, in view of the force and criminal intent, whether or not the arrest itself was rightful.

In Merriman v. Hundred of Chippenham (1767) 2 East, P. C. (Eng.) 709, where the prosecuting witness, while carting cheeses along a highway, was stopped by defendant, who insisted on seizing them for want of a permit, the real purpose having been, as found by the jury, to defraud the owner, no permit being necessary, and after some dispute they agreed to go before a magistrate, and while they were gone the defendant's confederates carried away the cheeses, the jury returned a verdict of robbery, which the reporter, in a note, says must have been grounded on the consideration that the first seizure of the cart and goods by the aggressor, being by violence and while the owner was present, constituted the offense of robbery.

In Rex v. Gascoigne (1783) 1 Leach, C. L. (Eng.) 280, 2 East, P. C. 709, it was held that a runner at the police office who took money out of the hand and pocket of a prisoner whom he had before handcuffed and was conducting to prison,-under pretense of letting her go home,-and paid therewith for coach hire and liquor which he had himself ordered, was guilty of robbery, the jury having found that all of his acts were done with a felo

nious design to get her money, and this although the party in custody had before offered him the money if he would let her go home, and had repeated the offer after he had taken it.

That where the threat to accuse, arrest, or prosecute is accompanied by force, actual or constructive, the innocence or guilt of the one whose property is taken is immaterial, see also Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293, as quoted supra.

III. Threat to charge unnatural crime.

It is quite generally conceded, although, as stated in the reported case (MONTSDOCA v. STATE, ante, 1291), the rule has been criticized, that the extortion of money or property by threatening to charge one with crimen innominatum has generally been held to constitute an exception to the general rule that threats to arrest or prosecute one for crime do not constitute the intimidation or putting in fear which is essential to the offense of robbery. The following cases either recognize this distinction or expressly hold that it is robbery to extort money from a person by threatening to accuse him of an unnatural crime: Florida.

MONTSDOCA v. STATE (reported herewith) ante, 1291. Georgia.-Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293; Bussey v. State (1883) 71 Ga. 100, 51 Am. Rep. 256.

Illinois. People v. Bodkin (1922) 304 Ill. 124, 136 N. E. 494.

New York.-People v. McDaniels (1839) 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 198. And see People v. Barondess (1891) 61 Hun, 571, 16 N. Y. Supp. 436, as reversed in (1892) 133 N. Y. 649, 31 N. E. 240.

Tennessee.-Britt v. State (1846) 7 Humph. 45.

Virginia.-Houston v. Com. (1890) 87 Va. 257, 12 S. E. 385.

England.-Brown's Case (1763) 2 East, P. C. 715; Rex v. Jones (1776) 1 Leach, C. L. 139, 2 East, P. C. 714; Harrold's Case (1778) 2 East, P. C. 715; Rex v. Donnally (1779) 1 Leach, C. L. 193, 2 East, P. C. 715; Staple's Case (1779) 2 East, P. C. 728; Rex v. Hickman (1783) 1 Leach, C. L. 278, 2 East, P. C. 728; Rex v. Knewland

(1796) 2 Leach, C. L. 721, 2 East, P. C. 732; Rex v. Elmstead (1802) 2 Russell, Crimes, 106, as cited in 4 Mews, Eng. Case Law Dig. col. 1375; Rex v. Egerton (1819) Russ. & R. C. C. 375; Rex v. Gardner (1824) 1 Car. & P. 479; Rex v. Stringer (1842) 2 Moody, C. C. 261, 1 Car. & K. 188, doubting Reg. v. Henry (1840) 2 Moody, C. C. 118. Compare Rex v. Cannon (1809) Russ. & R. C. C. 146.

For instance, in Long v. State (Ga.) supra, in discussing the effect, for purposes of robbery, to be given a threat to destroy one's character by accusations of sodomitical practices, the court said: "Again, threats of a prosecution amount to that violence by construction which constitutes the offense of robbery only in one instance, and that is when the threat is to prosecute for an unnatural crime; and it will be robbery, whether the party is guilty or not. So abominable is the crime, and so destructive is even the accusation of it, of all social right and privilege, that the law considers that the accusation is a coercion which men cannot resist. This seems to be the only case in which a threat to prosecute will supply the place of actual force."

And in regard to the exception thus made, it is said in Britt v. State (Tenn.) supra: "The reasoning on which the single admitted exception is made to rest turns upon the overhelming and withering character of the charge and its damning infamy, so well calculated to unman and subdue the will and alarm the fears of the falsely accused. It is evident that the courts of England felt that even this exception looked extremely anomalous, and they strive, while permitting it to stand, to place it on ground unapproachable by any other case of fear of prosecution, as if determined, hereafter, it should have no associate in the offense of robbery. Our statutes create no change in this respect."

And that no apprehension of personal violence is necessary in such a case was held in Rex v. Hickman (1873) 1 Leach, C. L. (Eng.) 278, 2 East, P. C. 728, where the court said

"that whether the terror arose from real or expected violence to the person, or from a sense of injury to the character, the law made no kind of difference, for to most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation was equally, if not more, terrific than the dread of personal injury;" and "that a threat to accuse a man of having committed the greatest of all crimes was a sufficient force to constitute the crime of robbery by putting in fear." And in Rex v. Donnally (1779) 1 Leach, C. L. (Eng.) 193, 2 East, P. C. 715, the unanimous opinion of a number of judges who considered the case at length was that in case of an accusation of unnatural practices no actual or personal violence was essential to render a taking robbery. (Compare Rex v. Cannon (1809) Russ. & R. C. C. (Eng.) 146, where some of the judges declined fully to accede to the correctness of the holding in the Donnally Case and similar cases.) And the doctrine of the Hickman and Donnally Cases (Eng.) supra, was recognized and followed in Rex v. Egerton (1819) Russ. & R. C. C. (Eng.) 375, where it was held that fear of loss of character was sufficient, though the party had no fear of being taken into custody, or of punishment.

In People v. McDaniels (1839) 1 Park. Crim. Rep. (N. Y.) 198, it was expressly held that if money is obtained through fear produced by a threat to charge with an unnatural crime, it is robbery, although the threat, which was unfounded, and was known to be so by the defendant, was not in direct terms, but was in the nature of an insinuation.

And it has been held that in case of a threat to arrest or to prosecute one for an unnatural crime, the effect is the same whether the person charged is innocent or guilty of the crime. Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293; Rex v. Gardner (1824) 1 Car. & P. (Eng.) 479. And see Reg. v. Cracknell (1866) 10 Cox, C. C. (Eng.) 408, and Reg. v. Richards (1868) 11 Cox, C. C. (Eng.) 43.

But it is not robbery if the prosecuting witness delivers over, pursuant to threats to accuse him of un

natural practices, money, without fear either of violence or injury to his character. It was so held in Rex v. Reane (1794) 2 Leach, C. L. (Eng.) 616, 2 East, P. C. 734.

However, in Rex v. Elmstead (1802) 2 Russell, Crimes, 106, as set out in 4 Mews, Eng. Case Law Dig. col. 1375, it was held that the obtaining of money by calling a man a sodomite, and threatening him, constituted robbery, although the money was parted with by the prosecutor, not so much from fear of losing his character, as from fear of losing his place or position.

IV. Under special statutes.

In State v. Ricks (1914) 108 Miss. 7, L.R.A.1915B, 1140, 66 So. 281, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 244, it was held that sending a letter threatening a trepasser with prosecution unless he compensated the sender for the injury done was not within the operation of a statute (Miss. Code 1906, § 1364) providing that every person who sends a letter threatening to accuse a person of crime shall be guilty of an attempt to rob. This was upon the theory that a threat to charge a debtor with an offense committed in connection with a debt of which the creditor was entitled to demand payment was not within the statute. And for other cases where similar statutes have been discussed, see People v. Griffin (1848) 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 427, and People v. Barondess (1891) 61 Hun, 571, 16 N. Y. Supp. 436.

In Davis v. State (1897) 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 47, 66 Am. St. Rep. 791, 38 S. W. 792, applying a statute providing that "any person, by threatening to do some illegal act,

injurious to the character, person or property of another, shall fraudulently induce the person so threatened to deliver to him any property with intent to appropriate the same," etc., shall be guilty of robbery, it was held that one who obtained money by threatening to accuse, prosecute, and imprison one for unlawfully carrying a gun, cannot be convicted of robbery where the prosecuting witness was as a matter of fact guilty of unlawfully carrying a gun, since in such a case the threat was not to do an "illegal" act as specified by the statute. In Burnsides v. State (1907) 51 Tex. Crim. Rep. 399, 102 S. W. 118, where the same statutory provisions were involved, it was held that one who extorted money from the prosecuting impersonating an officer was guilty of witness by means of an arrest while robbery. Here the fact was that the defendant falsely accused witness of attempting to steal a ride on a railroad train, and the court said that the impersonation of an officer, together with the false charge and the threat to put witness in jail, constituted a "threatening to do an illegal act injurious to the character, person, or property of another;" but added, in reference to testimony on the part of the defendant to the effect that he acted in good faith: "If the arrest was made by appellant in good faith, believing that he had a right to make it, even though he did not have authority to do it, the subsequent taking of money from Martin, on his proposition that he would pay to be released, would not be robbery under this statute." G. J. C.