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(72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602.)

ble for loss due to their own negligence.

Cases cited by defendant in which a limited liability was printed in a railway ticket which, after purchase and opportunity for examination, was used by a traveler as a basis for checking baggage, gratuitous bailments, and bailments evidenced by checks or receipts requiring specific notation at the time of the bailment of the articles in question or their values, are clearly distinguishable in principle from the case at bar and require no further examination.

It is next contended that this limitation is valid under an order of the Director General of Railroads which was extended up to and including September 20, 1920, by the United States Transportation Act of that year (41 Stat. at L. 456, chap. 91, Comp. Stat. § 100711, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1920, p. 72). The President of the United States took over the railroads under Act Cong. of August 29, 1916, chap. 418 (39 Stat. at L. 645, Comp. Stat. § 1974a), and his proclamation was issued December 28, 1917. The Act of

1920 terminated Federal control on March 1, save as to "regulations and practices on lines" subject to the Interstate Commerce Act (24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104). Section 1 of that act (4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 337, Comp. Stat. § 8563) provides that it shall not apply to the "receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property wholly within one state." If, therefore, the business of defendant was properly taken. over under the act of Congress and the presidential proclamation (which question we find it unnecessary to decide), such Federal control terminated prior to the date when the cause of action herein arose.

In our opinion there was no contract between plaintiff and defendant limiting the bailee's liability for negligence, and no order of the Director General of Railroads is here involved. The supersedeas is accordingly denied, and the judgment affirmed.

Campbell, J., not participating.

Petition for rehearing denied December 4, 1922.

ANNOTATION.

Carrier's liability in respect to baggage checked in parcel room.

1. Introductory, 157.

II. Liability in absence of express limitation, 157.

[No later decisions herein.]

III. Effect of clause or notice limiting liability, 157.

I. Introductory.

This annotation is supplementary to that in 7 A.L.R. at page 1234, and treats those cases only which have arisen since the publication of that note.

II. Liability in absence of express limitation.

No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see annotation in 7 A.L.R. 1234.

III. Effect of clause or notice limiting liability.

(Supplementing annotation in 7 A.L.R. 1235.)

In three of the late cases the courts have held that where one checks an article at the parcel room of a carrier and receives a notice of limitation of liability on the part of the carrier for damage to or loss of the goods, the limitation will be upheld and the bailor restricted, in case of recovery of damages, to that amount.

In Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fuqua (1921) 150 Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926, 21 N. C. C. A. 195, it appeared that the plaintiff checked his suit case at the defendant's parcel room, and on the

payment of 10 10 cents received a check containing a provision that the company "will not be responsible for loss, damage, or detention of articles left in storage for any amount in excess of $25." Following the destruction of the suit case and its contents by fire, which loss could have been prevented by due care, the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $150 for the loss thereof, which, however, was modified by a reduction to $25, the amount specified in the limitation provision. The contract was declared broad enough to limit the carrier's liability on any account. It was said too: "A warehouseman may limit his liability to an agreed value of the article received, where the rate charged is based upon the value of the article. This character of contract does not contravene the principle that one cannot contract for exemption or limitation from liability on account of his own negligence."

And a limitation on a bailee's liability for loss or damage to property checked in a parcel room was upheld by the court in Noyes v. Hines (1920) 220 . App. 409, wherein it appeared that the plaintiff had checked a Gladstone bag with the defendant, whose servant delivered the bag by mistake to another. The check handed to the plaintiff at the time contained on the back thereof a provision limiting the defendant's liability for loss or injury to the property to $25, and a placard above the parcel room carried the same notice. On the question whether this provision of limitation became part of the contract of bailment the court said: "We think the weight of authority is to the effect that when a person accepts a ticket from a bailee in receipt for a parcel deposited with him, he is bound by the terms and conditions of that receipt in so far as he has reasonable notice of the same, and in so far as the same are reasonable. In this case it does not seem to be unreasonable to hold that a person depositing luggage or similar articles temporarily, in the manner as shown by the evidence, and for a consideration of only 10 cents to be paid by him, would expect that there would

be some limitation placed upon the value of the article so deposited. If this were not so then the defendant would have been bound if plaintiff had deposited with his suit case $100,000 worth of diamonds or other articles of similar great value. The condition, therefore, in itself, seems to have been a reasonable one. The notice as to the condition would also seem to have been reasonable. The defendant had a right to assume that the plaintiff could read the English language; had also a right to assume that the plaintiff would take notice that by reason of the very small charge he could not expect an unlimited liability." The defendant was said to have done all that was necessary to put the plaintiff on notice, the plaintiff was held bound by the limitation, and judgment was given accordingly.

In Gibaud v. Great Eastern R. Co. [1921] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 426, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for the loss of a bicycle checked by him at a suburban station of the defendant where the booking office was used as a cloakroom, the bicycle being left near the booking office door at the direction of the clerk when the plaintiff asked whether he should take it into the booking office. The plaintiff was given a ticket containing the following condition: "The company will not be in any way responsible in respect of any article deposited the value whereof exceeds £5 unless at the time of deposit the true value and nature of the article shall have been declared and 1d. per £1 sterling of the declared value be paid for each day or part of a day in addition to the ordinary cloakroom charges. For further conditions and scale of charges see back of this ticket." was urged that the condition of limitation did not apply because the contract of bailment contemplated the keeping of articles in the cloakroom or booking office, and if the article was kept elsewhere there was a breach of the contract. With this, however, the court disagreed, pointing out that the contract did not specify where articles were to be kept, and that, moreover, some of the articles named

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on the ticket were obviously of such a size that they could not be kept in a cloakroom or suburban booking office. The limitation clause was considered reasonable, the opinion of Blackburn, J., in Harris v. Great Western R. Co. (1876) L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 515, 45 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 729, 34 L. T. N. S. 647, 25 Week. Rep. 63, being cited to that effect. And the court refused to take the view that the clause would not protect the defendant because it exempted it from its own negligence. Scrutton, L. J., said: "When I read the clause 'will not be in any way responsible,' and remember that the liability of the company was for negligence, that is to say, they were bound to use reasonable care,-it seems to me that those words are clearly sufficient to protect the company, particularly in a case where it is eminently reasonable that they should be protected-if the man who deposits property of large value has not taken the trouble to pay the company for the excess in value of the property which he is leaving with them."

The opposite view, however, has been taken by the courts in five of the later cases wherein similar clauses limiting the bailee's liability for loss or damage to goods have been held not binding on the bailor.

In Lebkeucher v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1922) — N. J. L. —, 116 Atl. 323, it appeared that the plaintiff deposited with the defendant two parcels, receiving only one on her return, the other parcel having been delivered by mistake to another. On the back of the check given her was a provision limiting the liability of the defendant to the sum of $25. A placard at the parcel room made a similar proclamation. The plaintiff, however, did not have either notice brought to her knowledge, and on this ground was held not to be bound thereby. Said the court: "The bailee must bring home to the bailor notice of the special terms upon which the bailment is accepted in order to limit liability." The case of Healy v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1912) 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y. Supp. 287,

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And a similar conclusion was reached in Brown v. Hines (1923) Mo. App., 249 S. W. 683, wherein it appeared that the plaintiff lost his golf bag and contents when the defendant, with whom he had left it for safe-keeping, delivered it by mistake to another. The limitation of liability on the part of the defendant to $10, printed on the check riven to the plaintiff, was held to be of no effect, as the plaintiff had no knowledge whatever of such limitation. And said the court: "We think that the limitation of liability attempted to be made by the defendant was nonenforceable for the further reason that the bailment was completed at the time the check was issued. Plaintiff had paid, and defendant had received, the charge for keeping the property, and, as plaintiff testified, had also received the golf bag. The check could not in any sense be construed as a contract because it was issued after the contract of bailment was made. Cothren v. Kansas City Laundry Service Co. (1922) Mo. App. —, 242 S. W. 168; 3 R. C. L. 106, 107. It was a mere token showing who was entitled to the possession of the property when called for. There was no showing that plaintiff agreed to the conditions printed upon the check, for the reason that he had checked parcels before at the same check stand and that he saw printed matter, which he did not read, upon the check that he received when he checked the bag in question, as his consent cannot be inferred from these facts." Continuing, it was said: "We do not think that the cases of Terry v. Southern R. Co.

(1908) 81 S. C. 279, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 295, 62 S. E. 249, and Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fuqua (1921) 150 Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926, 21 N. C. C. A. 195, are wellconsidered cases or are in accordance with the great weight of authority in this country upon the subject. The decision in the latter case is based upon the statement: 'A warehouseman may limit his liability to an agreed value of the article received, where the rate charged was based upon the value of the article. This character of contract does not contravene the principle that one cannot contract for exemption or limitation from liability on account of his own negligence.' From the facts stated in the opinion there was no agreement of any kind entered into by the bailor, but merely that a check was issued to the owner of the suit case stating that the warehouseman 'would not be responsible for loss, damage, or detention of articles left in storage for any amount in excess of $25.' This does not show any agreed valuation of the contents of the particular suit case and, of course, no contract that plaintiff should be bound by the $25 limitation of liability. A mere general limitation as to value expressed in printed form intended to be applicable to the property of all persons amounts to no more than an arbitrary preadjustment of damages."

And in the reported case (DENVER UNION TERMINAL R. Co. v. CULLINAN, ante, 154) another court accepted the reasoning of the decision in Healy v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1912) 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y. Supp. 287, affirmed in (1914) 210 N. Y. 646, 105 N. E. 1086, denying the limitation of

liability, at the same time refuting that in the case of Noyes v. Hines (1920) 220 Ill. App. 409. There was a question, said the court, whether the attempted limitation, notice of which was printed on the check delivered to the plaintiff and on a placard above the check-room window, rose to the dignity of a contract. It was held that there was no presumption in favor of a limitation of liability, but that one alleging such limitation should be held to strict proof. And if the defendant contracted as a warehouseman, it was liable for loss to its own negligence. It was the court's conclusion that there was no contract between the parties limiting the defendant's liability for negligence, and no order of the Director General could avail the defendant, since Federal control of the railroads had terminated prior to the time when the plaintiff's cause of action arose.

In Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker (1921) 125 Miss. 260, 87 So. 643, wherein it appeared that the defendant had lost a suit case and its contents belonging to the plaintiff and checked with them for safe-keeping, the court adopted the rule laid down in Healy v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (N. Y.) supra, that a bailor who is not advised of a special contract limiting the liability of the bailee, and printed on the back of a check, given to the bailor for the identification of his baggage, is not deemed to have assented thereto, and consequently is not bound thereby. It does not appear in this case that the defendant was a common carrier but its checking room was located in the waiting room of a railroad station. R. S.

H. O. WILBUR & SONS, Inc., Appt.,

V.

ARTHUR H. LAMBORN et al., Copartners as Lamborn & Company.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court - February 19, 1923.

(276 Pa. 479, 120 Atl. 478.)

Sale designation of carrying vessel right of substitution.

Under a contract to sell sugar to be shipped from foreign port, "names

(276 Pa. 479, 120 Atl. 478.)

of . . . steamers to be declared later," a declaration of a carrying vessel does not, in case it becomes disabled, prevent delivery of sugar of similar kind by another vessel, arriving at destination at a time reasonably near that in which the designated vessel would have arrived but for the interruption, even though the carrying vessel was diverted from its original destination in order to make the delivery.

[See note on this question beginning on page 165.]

APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, for Philadelphia County (Shoemaker, J.), denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for defendants in an action brought to recover the amount of two drafts alleged to have been presented and collected in violation of a contract of sale of sugar between plaintiff and defendants. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Messrs. Clement B. Wood, Francis
B. Bracken, and Morgan, Lewis, &
Bockins, for appellant:

In mercantile contracts every stipulation in the contract is material and important. The nonperformance of any stipulation by the seller entitles the buyer to reject the tender.

Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 29 L. ed. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12; Bowes v. Shand, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 455, 46 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 561, 36 L. T. N. S. 857, 25 Week. Rep. 730; Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213, 29 L. ed. 372, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19; Johnson v. Macdonald, 9 Mees. & W. 600, 152 Eng. Reprint, 253, 12 L. J. Exch. N. S. 99, 6 Jur. 264; Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U. S. 57, 40 L. ed. 616, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Dorrance v. Barber & Co. 262 Fed. 489.

The declaration of the steamer is a material stipulation in the contract, and performance of the stipulation by the seller, in accordance with the terms of the contract, is a condition precedent.

Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co. 256 U. S. 619, 65 L. ed. 1123, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612; Nickoll & Knight v. Ashton, E. & Co. [1901] 2 K. B. 126, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 600, 49 Week. Rep. 513, 84 L. T. N. S. 804, 17 Times L. R. 467, 6 Com. Cas. 151, 9 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 209-C. A.; Dorrance v. Barber, supra; Thornton v. Simpson, 6 Taunt. 556, 128 Eng. Reprint, 1151, 2 Marsh. 267, Holt, N. P. 164; Busk v. Spence, 4 Campb. 329; Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709, 156 Eng. Reprint, 304, 2 C. L. R. 1266, 23 L. J. Exch. N. S. 228; Gilkes V. Leonino, 4 C. B. N. S. 485, 140 Eng. Reprint, 1180, 4 Jur. N. S. 537, 6 Week. Rep. 620; Reuter v. Sala, 48 L. J. C. P. N. S. 492, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 239, 27 A.L.R.-11.

40 L. T. N. S. 476, 27 Week. Rep. 631— C. A.; Steinhardt v. Bingham, 182 N. Y. 326, 75 N. E. 403; Gath v. Lees, 3 Hurlst. & C. 557, 159 Eng. Reprint, 650.

Messrs. Thomas Stokes, George Wharton Pepper, and Van Doren, Conklin, & McNevin, for appellees:

The provision relating to declaration of steamers was not a condition precedent, but was an independent stipulation for the benefit of the sell

er.

Pennsylvania Sugar Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co. 158 C. C. A. 201, 245 Fed. 913; Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213, 29 L. ed. 372, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19; Neill v. Whitworth, 18 C. B. N. S. 435, 144 Eng. Reprint, 513, 34 L. J. C. P. N. S. 155, 11 Jur. N. S. 158, 11 L. T. N. S. 677, 13 Week. Rep. 461; Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U. S. 57, 40 L. ed. 616, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; J. Hungerford Smith Co. v. Lamborn, 200 N. Y. Supp. 292; Matthew Smith Tea, Coffee & Grocery Co. v. Lamborn & Co. 276 Fed. 325.

The substitution of one steamer for another by the seller at any time before delivery, when made for a reasonable cause, is not a breach of the stipulation that names of steamers shall be declared later.

Thornton v. Simpson, 6 Taunt. 556, 128 Eng. Reprint, 1151, 2 Marsh. 267, Holt, N. P. 164; Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 141 N. Y. 414, 36 N. E. 509; Cunningham v. Judson, 100 N. Y. 179, 2 N. E, 915.

There never was an unconditional declaration prior to the declaration of the West Cheswald, and hence there was no alteration of a previous declaration.

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