But little has been found within the scope of this annotation.

In Booth v. State (1913) 179 Ind. 405, L.R.A.1915B, 420, 100 N. E. 563, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 987, it was held that a provision in a statute for the maintenance of washhouses by coal miners, only upon petition of their employees, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court said: "Appellant insists that the act is invalid for the reason that it is for the benefit of individuals employed in the particular mine, and that its operation is left entirely to the dictation of certain persons. That a certain law may be called into exercise by petition does not violate § 25, article 1, of the Constitution." The section referred to provided: "No law shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as provided in this Constitution." This case was affirmed in (1915) 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. ed. 1011, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, the court stating as to the matter of delegation of legislative power: "With this objection we are not concerned. The supreme

court of the state decided that the law could be called into operation by petition, and in the decision no Federal question is involved."

(The statute involved in Booth v. State was before the court in Hewitt v. State (1908) 171 Ind. 283, 86 N. E. 63, where an affidavit alleging that the defendant was superintendent, but not alleging that he was in charge of the

mine, was held not to satisfy the language of the statute imposing the duty as to wash rooms upon the owner, operator, lessee, superintendent, or other person in charge of every coal mine.)

The Booth Case was approved and followed in Princeton Coal Co. v. Fettinger (1916) 185 Ind. 676, 113 N. E. 236, 114 N. E. 406, a case upon the same statute.

On the other hand, it will be seen that in the reported case (COM. v. BEAVER DAM COAL Co. ante, 920) it is held that making a statute requiring employers to furnish wash rooms for their employees depend upon a vote of a specified percentage of the employees violates a constitutional provision that no law shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the general assembly.

As will appear from the annotation in 15 A.L.R. 1430, on the duty of an employer with respect to the timbering of a mine, under statutes relating specifically to the subject, it is stated, at page 1464, that under certain statutes "the duty to which the employer is subject with regard to the delivery of timbers to the miner does come into existence until the latter has notified the former that the timbers are needed." But the question of the constitutionality of such statutes so far as concerns the delegation of legislative power does not seem to have been discussed. B. B. B.

V.

2. A municipal corporation is liable for all damages proximately caused by its failure to exercise ordinary care to construct and maintain its highways so as to render them reasonably safe for ordinary travel.

[See 13 R. C. L. 310; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 40.]

Negligence necessity of anticipation of consequences.

3. Anticipation of consequences is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular act or omission is actionable negligence, but also whether the injury complained of is proximately caused by such act or omission.

[See 20 R. C. L. 30; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1020; 22 R. C. L. 124.]

liability for consequences which should have been anticipated.

4. One is bound to anticipate those consequences of his acts which, in the ordinary course of human experience, might reasonably be expected to result therefrom, and is legally responsible therefor.

[See 20 R. C. L. 30; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1020; 22 R. C. L. 120 et seq.; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1234.]

- relation of act to person injured. 5. In determining the question of legal responsibility for a particular act or omission, the relation thereto of the injured party or of persons in situations analogous to his is a controlling factor.

[See 13 R. C. L. 421; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 52.]

Highways - liability for extraordi

nary occurrences.

7. The duty to keep roads reasonably safe for ordinary travel excludes liability for those consequences which arise from unusual or extraordinary

Occurrences.

Negligence

-

of driver of automobile - imputation to guest.

8. The negligence of the driver of an automobile is not a defense to an action by a guest to hold the municipality liable for an accident resulting from a defective condition of the highway, where the guest is not in such relation to the driver as to share in the responsibility for his negligence.

[See 2 R. C. L. 1207; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 743; 20 R. C. L. 158; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1039.]

Municipal corporations- liability for uncontrolled automobile plunging over unguarded declivity.

9. A municipal corporation is not liable for injury caused by an automobile plunging over an unguarded declivity along the side of the public highway, where the machine was entirely out of control because of defects in the steering gear or negligence of the driver, since such occurrence is so unusual and extraordinary as within the contemplation of law to be unforeseen.

[See 2 R. C. L. 1204; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 741.] Proximate cause — ger in automobile steering gear.

injury to passenbreaking of

10. The breaking of the steering gear of an automobile traveling on a well-paved and level roadway, which causes it to plunge into a ravine at the side of the road, and not the absence of a barrier along the edge of the ravine, is the proximate cause of injury to the occupants of the car.

[See 13 R. C. L. 454; see also note in 14 A.L.R. 1339.]

The facts are stated in the opinion Messrs. James J. Collins, Allen Charlton, W. S. Bramlett, Carl B. Callaway, and Charles L. Black for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. McCutcheon & Church and W. D. Cardwell for defendants in er

ror.

McClendon, P. J., filed the following opinion:

About 6:30 o'clock P. M. on December 19, 1916, a jitney car in which Mrs. Laura Maxwell and others were passengers, and which was traveling in a south or southwesterly direction on Carlisle street, in the city of Dallas, became unmanageable by reason of some defect in the steering gear, turned to the right across the sidewalk, and plunged into a deep ravine. One of the passengers was killed, and Mrs. Maxwell was seriously injured. This suit was brought by Mrs. Maxwell and her husband against the city to recover compensatory damages for Mrs. Maxwell's injuries; it being alleged that the city was negligent in not providing a barrier to prevent automobiles and other vehicles from falling into the ravine. The case was tried twice. On the first appeal it was remanded for new trial for error in the charge. Tex. Civ. App., 210 S. W. 725. The second trial was to a jury upon special issues; the jury finding,

in addition to the amount of damages, in substance, the following: (1) That the city's failure to have a "sufficient and adequate guard or barrier along the north or northwest line of Carlisle street at the place and time of the accident" was

negligence: (2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of; (3) that the jitney driver was negligent in operating the car; (4) that the steering gear of the car was defective, and the driver could not control or guide it; (5) that such negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the accident; (6) that the city's neg27 A.L.R.-59.

of the court.

ligence, concurrently with that of the driver, was the proximate cause of the accident; and (7) that Mrs. Maxwell did not fully understand or appreciate the dangers incident to vehicular traffic on Carlisle street. Upon this verdict the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. Tex. Civ. App. -, 231 S. W. 429, 20 N. C. C. A. 749.

The accident occurred at the intersection of Carlisle and Vine streets. The south line of the latter forms a right angle with the east and west line of the former, while the east line of Vine street makes a slight angle with Carlisle street, so that in traveling south or southwest on the latter there is a slight curve to the right or west at the west line of Vine street. Vine street, although platted, appears never to have been used as a street, north of Carlisle, and is taken up entirely by a deep ravine. Formerly there was a bridge across this ravine; but some three or four years before the accident the city removed this bridge, placed a cement culvert or storm sewer at the bottom of the ravine, and filled in above it. Carlisle street was 50 feet wide between property lines and had a sidewalk on either side about 5 feet wide, leaving about 40 feet of roadway in the center. This roadway was macadamized, surfaced with gravel, and was in good condition for travel by motor and other vehicles. On the west side of Carlisle street there were concrete curbings and cement

footpaths up to the north and south lines of Vine street, leaving a break of about 50 feet with no curbing or cement walk. A board walk some 2 or 3 feet wide had been constructed to connect the cement walks. A few feet south of the end of the curbing at the north of Vine street was a light or telephone pole, which stood slightly west of the line of the curb

ing extended south. The board walk was west of the pole, and west of the board walk the ground sloped off rapidly, terminating in a 9-foot perpendicular retaining wall. The bottom of the ravine was some 40 or 50 feet lower than the surface of the street. There was some conflict in the evidence as to whether the sidewalk space across which the board walk extended was on a level with or slightly elevated above the gutter or drain adjoining the roadway; some of the witnesses testifying there was no elevation, while others, including Mr. Maxwell, gave an elevation of a few inches. This seems to be borne out by photographs introduced by plaintiff, which also clearly indicate that the ground west of the board walk began to slope at about where the property line would be, leaving about the usual 5 feet of sidewalk space to the curb line. The traveled part of the roadway began a foot or more from the curbing, thus leaving a space of 6 or more feet between the traveled part of the road and the point of danger. No character of guard or barrier had been constructed to prevent those using the street from precipitation down the incline and into the ravine. About 300 feet north of Vine street Carlisle intersects Sneed street. The jitney driver was traveling south on the west side of Carlisle street. He was familiar with the road, and had traveled it many times daily on his regular route for about a month. Mrs. Maxwell and a lady companion boarded the car as passengers at Sneed street. They occupied the rear seat, Mrs. Maxwell being on the left. The driver was on the left side of the front seat, and by his side was another passenger. When the car neared the north line of Vine street, it veered to the right, struck the telephone pole, went around it, crossed the board walk, and plunged down the embankment to the bottom of the ravine. There is no material controversy as to the manner in which the accident happened.

A

car, the steering wheel or steering gear was on the left side, and I was seated in the left side of the front seat, and the boy was seated on the right side by me, in the front seat. That was a five-passenger Ford. Then, besides the boy and I, there was in the car, I found out later, Mrs. Holford and Mrs. Maxwell. My automobile had a top on

it at that time and I had side curtains. The top was up and the curtains half up; the curtains were up to the back seat where the ladies sat.

As to how fast I was running between Sneed street and Vine street just before this accident, I can't tell just how fast I was running, but I know I wasn't running very fast; I don't think I could have been possibly been making over 8 or 10 miles an hour-not over 8 miles or 10. From my experience of a motor bus or jitney I am familiar with the speed of such vehicles. In my opinion between Vine and Sneed streets before this accident occurred I do not think I was going over 8 miles, if that much. When I stopped and the ladies got in, one of the ladies, I don't know which one, one said, 'Let's fasten up these curtains; it is cold.' Well, I didn't think it had been cold enough to put up the curtains, and that is the reason I had them fixed up so they would protect the passengers in the back seat, just the front part coming up; so I reached back-I just reached back that way with my left hand; my right hand, when I reached back with my left hand, was on the steering wheel, and I was sitting just like I am now and reached back that way. I was

sitting just like I am reached back that way. I was setting with my face straight ahead, looking straight ahead on the street. I don't think I ever turned in the seat, but I just reached back and gave the curtains a jerk, and I saw it was not fastened in some way, and the lady said, 'I will fasten this,' and I says, 'All right.' Well, I seen that my car had cut-cut to the right some. I don't know how it was, but it seemed like it wanted to go to the right all the time, and I tried to cut it to the left and couldn't; and about that time I seen the pole, and it hit the pole in some way, I don't know just how it hit the pole, and then it sorter seemed like it was going the other way, it seemed like it sorter turned a little, and all at once it just turned, and I seen where that ditch was, and I grabbed the emergency and tried to stop the car, but couldn't, and we went off then. It seemed like it was all done in a second. I remember the car hitting the pole, and up to that time we were pretty near off. The pole was located right near the curb, it seemed like; it was right at the edge of the ditch like, or the gutter, the street gutter, just a little to the right of that. I stated a while

ago that my machine kept trying to turn to the right. I later found the cause of that. I think my wheels had become toed and caused the axle to tip forward, and the radius knuckle, the left knuckle on the radius rod, I think, broke. At

.

the time I struck this pole I was trying to cut my car to the left, at that time. I was trying to cut the car to the left with the steering wheel. I was trying to turn the steering wheel, using both hands, in an effort to cut the car to the left. That steering gear wouldn't work; it work; it wouldn't cut to the left; my steering gear was loose. After the car struck this pole and went over the sidewalk it went right off into that ditch."

The general rule is that a municipality is charged with the duty

of exercising ordinary care to so construct and maintain its public high- corporationstain its public high

Municipal

highways safe.

ways as to render duty to maintain them reasonably

safe for ordinary travel. A breach of that duty imposes legal liability for all damages which are thereby proximately caused.

Negligence

consequences.

In this state it is now a settled doctrine that anticipation of consequences is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular necessity of act or omission is anticipation of actionably negligent, but also whether the injury complained of is proximately caused by such act or omission. Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 65 Tex. 274, 57 Am. Rep. 602; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Bennett, 110 Tex. 270, 219 S. W. 197; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Behne, Tex. 231 S.. W. 354. This doctrine is the result of an effort by the courts to avoid as far as possible the metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the age-old discussion of causation, and to lay down a rule of general application which will, as nearly as may be done by a general rule, apply a practical test, the test of common experience, to human conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability. Actual anticipation is of course not in any sense the test; but what one should under the circumstances reasonably anticipate as consequences of his conduct. And "when it is found that a man ought to have foreseen in a general way consequences of a certain kind, it will not avail him to say that he could not foresee the precise course or the full extent of the consequences, being of that kind, which in fact have happened." Sir Frederick Pollock in "Liability for Consequences," 38 Law Quarterly Rev. 165 (1922).

Human beings in their common dealings with each other in society. should be required to exercise some