BATTLE-GROUND OF CERRO GORDO. 583 above it; and, after it enters the pass, to those of No. 4, which bear directly down upon it; also to those of the height of Cerro Gordo,-opposite which, you observe that battery No. 5 entirely closes the road, and its guns point directly down the pass.--From No. 4 to No. 5 is a continued breastwork on the side of the rising hill, within pistol range of the pass below.-Turn again to this picture of the batteries, and you observe part of No. 3, on the right; and, over the top of the hill upon which that is placed, under the letter X, there placed, and looking down on the road in the pass, is the position of No. 4. The hill of Cerro Gordo you observe rising above, in the distance. Observing the position of the battery No. 4, on the plan, (page 586), and from this picture described, in imagination proceed there in a direct line, crossing the ravine,-leaving battery No. 3 to your right. On arriving at No. 4, you have the picture, shown in the frontispiece before you, which was also taken after the battle: -the pass below you; the hills of Cerro Gordo and Telegrafo, in front; Cerro Gordo being to the left. Telegrafo is the hill on which the fighting of the 17th took place; and Cerro Gordo rises high, the key of the whole position. A body of our troops are placed going through the pass, toward the head, or the farther extremity, at which is battery No. 5, shown on the plan;-the guns of this bear directly along the pass, as above mentioned. Now, reader, from your last position (battery No. 4) imagine yourself across the pass, and on the summit of Cerro Gordo, and then you look down on, and have a direct view of the whole ground, and, with the aid of the plan first mentioned, can gain a clear idea of the field of operations.-In the first place, facing to the south-east, below you is the pass, and the hill beyond it, rising from battery No. 5, and continually ascending, until it ends at batteries No. 1, 2 and 3. Still farther on, in the same direction, you look far over the mountainous hills, which are between you and Plan del Rio. To the south, you see over this hill of batteries, and observe that on its southern side it is abruptly terminated by the terrible chasm or ravine before mentioned. 584 BATTLE-GROUND OF CERRO GORDO. Over the ravine, you observe but distant mountains, thrown together in nature's wildest style. Looking down from your high elevation to the west, you observe the plain, bounded by the same ravine, which, at battery No. 5, comes nearly to the road at the base of the mountain, and this road follows up the bank of the ravine to where is marked Santa Anna's headquarters;—there the road branches off, and loses itself in other hills. Now look to the north.-At the base of the mountain is another ravine, apparently impassable;-beyond that, the rugged mountains are piled upon one another far as the eye can reach. Now look to the east, still consulting the plan. Below you is the hill of Telegrafo;-it stretches long and high. Between it and the hill of batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, the road runs up. Over this hill of Telegrafo, surrounded as it is by tremendous chasms, your vision extends far off to the eastward;-rugged hills succeed to others still lower, until, thirty miles in the distance, you observe the more level and faint outlines of the lower lands of the sea coast. The view all around you is of the wildest of nature's work, and you wonder at the exceeding strength of this place. You see that no force can approach by the south, for the terrible ravine forbids.-You think it utterly hopeless to endeavor to come around to the north, for the ravines appear impassable.-You perceive no way to come, save directly up the road from the south-east along the pass; but if that was attempted, you perceive, from the plan, that they would be exposed to a flank fire from fort No. 2, as they crossed the valley below, and then would be annihilated as they came up the pass, by the lofty batteries, Nos. 3 and 4, and the direct fire of No. 5, added to that of No. 6, on the summit of the hill of Cerro Gordo. You can perceive no opportunity for a force ever to be able to come so near as to attack any of the works, save the batteries on the extreme south,-Nos. 1 and 2,-which may be approached by a difficult path through the chapparal on the rocky hills, marked as Gen. Pillow's route. Well, reader, so it appears, and so Santa Anna and his DESERTION OF DRAGOON. 585 officers thought; and into that part of the line, consequently, he had placed the best troops and strongest collection of artillery; their opinion was made certain by a German,—one of our regular dragoons,-who, confident, from their position, that they must gain the victory, deserted from our troops on the night of the 17th, and passed over to them, informing them that they were to be attacked on the next morning, and that the principal effort was to be made against those batteries, Nos. 1 and 2. On this information, Gen. La Vega, who commanded on the height of Cerro Gordo, changed places with Gen. Vasquez in command of the batteries on the hill; and every preparation was made to receive the attack. But this deserter was wrong in his idea: the main assault was not to be made there, but at the eminence of Cerro Gordo itself, in the face of all the natural difficulties that surrounded it; and his tale, therefore, and its effect in change of the Mexican movements, in strengthening these batteries, and waiting there for the main attack, was in the highest degree subservient to the glory of the American arms: for Gen. Scott, although commanding an assault to be made against these batteries, yet had from the first intended to direct his main movements to the right; and so confident was he of his plans securing the victory, notwithstanding the immense advantage of position and numerical force of the enemy, added to their overpowering number of artillery, that his orders were only directed to that end, and nothing is said in them of the possibility of defeat; but the troops are directed as to the manner of pursuit of the routed foe.* GEN. SCOTT'S ORDERS PREVIOUS TO THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO. General Orders, No. 111. The enemy's whole line of entrenchments and batteries will be attacked in front and at the same time turned, early in the day to-morrow, probably before ten o'clock,' A. M. The second (Twiggs") division of regulars is already advanced within easy turning distance towards the enemy's left. That division has instructions to move forward before daylight to-morrow, and take up position across the National Road in the enemy's rear, so as to cut off a retreat towards Jalapa. It may be reinforced to-day, if unexpectedly attacked in force, by regiments-one or two taken from Shields' brigade 586 GEN. TWIGGS' MOVEMENTS. Gen. Twiggs had already opened a road around, with infinite labor, and, after a hard fight on the 17th, taken possession of the hill of Telegrafo, driving off the enemy with great loss; and, on this evening, he was reinforced by Gen. Shields' brigade of volunteers, consisting of the third Illinois infantry, Col. Foreman, the fourth do., Col. Baker, and the New York regiment, Col. Burnett. Gen. Twiggs' division slept on their arms, on the ground. GEN. SCOTT'S ORDERS PREVIOUS TO THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO. of volunteers. If not, the two volunteer regiments will march for that purpose at daylight to-morrow morning, under Brig. Gen. Shields, who will report to Brig. Gen. Twiggs on getting up with him, or the general-in-chief, if he be in advance. The remaining regiment of that volunteer brigade will receive instructions in the course of this day. The first division of regulars (Worth's) will follow the movement against the enemy's left at sunrise to-morrow morning. As already arranged, Brig. Gen. Pillow's brigade will march at six o'clock to-morrow morning along the route he has carefully reconnoitred, and stand ready as soon as he hears the report of arms on our right, or sooner, if circumstances should favor him, to pierce the enemy's line of batteries at such point-the nearer the river the betteras he may select. Once in the rear of that line, he will turn to the right or left, or both, and attack the batteries in reverse, or if abandoned, he will pursue the enemy with vigor until further orders. Wall's field battery and the cavalry will be left in reserve on the National Road, a little out of view and range of the enemy's batteries. They will take up that position at nine o'clock in the morning. The enemy's batteries being carried or abandoned, all our divisions and corps will pursue with vigor. This pursuit may be continued many miles, until stopped by darkness or fortified positions, towards Jalapa. Consequently, the body of the army will not return to this encampment, but be followed to-morrow afternoon, or early the next morning, by the baggage trains of the several corps. For this purpose, the feebler officers and men of each corps will be left to guard its camp and effects, and to load up the latter in the wagons of the corps. A commander of the present encampment will be designated in the course of this day. As soon as it shall be known that the enemy's works have been carried, or that the general pursuit has been commenced, one wagon for each regiment, and one for the cavalry, will follow the movement, to receive, under the directions of medical officers, the wounded and disabled, who will be brought back to this place for treatment in general hospital. The Surgeon General will organise this important service, and designate that ho pital, as well as the medical officers to be left at it. Every man who marches out to attack or pursue the enemy, will take the usual allowance of ammunition, and subsistence for at least two days. By command of Major General SCOTT : H. L. SCOTT, A. A. A. General. |