"I do hereby promise Mrs. Catharine Lowe that I will not marry any person besides herself. If I do, I agree to pay her £1000, within three months after I shall marry anybody else." The Court of Queen's Bench held this contract void, remarking, "that it was not a promise to marry her, but not to marry any one else, and yet she was under no obligation to marry him.”

This case was affirmed in error; see Wilm. 364.' So where a lady gave a bond conditioned not to marry, the Court of Chancery ordered it to be delivered up; Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215.

On the subject of Marriage I may further mention, that a deed tending to the future separation of husband and wife is void on grounds of public policy; Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath, 9 B. & C. 200,2 17 E. C. L. R., although a deed providing a fund for her support on the occasion of an immediate separation is not so; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547,3 9 E. C. L. R. The distinction between the two cases is obvious. The deed, in the former case, contemplates and facilitates that which the law considers an evil, namely, the sepa ration of husband and wife; in the latter case, the evil is inevitable, and the effect of the deed is but to save the wife from destitution.

Almost the converse of these cases of deeds of separation are what are called

Marriage brocage contracts, that is, where a man has agreed, in consideration of money, to *bring [*132] about a marriage. These are all void as against public policy, the law considering that unions so brought about are unlikely to be happy ones. This class of cases is founded upon Hall v. Potter, 3 Levinz, 411, in

This reference is to "Wilmot's Notes of Opinions and Judgments." Durant v. Titley, 7 Price, 577; Jones v. Waite, 7 Scott, 317; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 1 Jacob, 126, S. C. in House of Lords, 1 Dow & Clark, 519; Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige, 601.

3 St. John v. St. John, 11 Vesey, 534.

which Thomas Thinne gave an obligation of 10007. to Mrs. Potter, conditioned to pay her 5007. within three months after he should be married to Lady Oyle, "a widow," the reporter says, "of great fortune and honour, for she was the daughter and heir of Jocelyn Percy, Earl of Northumberland." The Master of the Rolls decreed this bond to be void; the Lord Keeper reversed the decree; whereupon there was an appeal to the House of Peers, and, upon hearing the cause there, all the Lords but three or four, were of opinion that all such contracts are of dangerous consequences, and ought not to be allowed; and they reversed the decree of dismissal made by the Lord Keeper, and decreed the obligation to be void.

Another, and an extensive class of cases is that in which the contract has a tendency to obstruct the course of public justice. The time, however, will not permit me to enter upon that this evening.

1 Hall v. Potter (which is also reported in 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 89, and 3 P. Wms. 76, and Shower's Parl. Cas. 76) has been followed by a numerous class of cases; Cole v. Gibson, 1 Vesey, 503; Roberts v. Roberts, 3 P. Wms. 74, see Mr. Cox's note; Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392; Duke of Hamilton v. Lord Mahon, Id. 652; Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, and Lord Redesdale, when Chancellor of Ireland, declared void a bond given to the obligee as a remuneration for having assisted the elopement of the obligor without the consent of the wife's friends, though the bond was given voluntarily after the marriage, and without any previous agreement therefor; Williamson v. Gihon, 2 Sch. & Sef. 362. The civil law, however, it is well known, in its approval and encouragement of the institution of marriage, allowed the proxeneto, or match-makers, to stipulate, within limits, for a reward for promoting marriages; Code, Lib. 5, tit. 1,

1. 6.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS-FRAUD-USURY-GAMING AND HORSERACING-WAGERS.

As a considerable time has intervened since the last lecture, and as it is quite necessary in order to the thorough understanding of a subject, particularly so complex a one as the present, to bear the arrangement of its parts clearly in mind, I shall commence this lecture by recapitulating the topics which I have already discussed, and pointing out how much of the subject remains to be considered.

I stated in the first lecture the general division of Contracts into Contracts of Record, by specialty, and Simple Contracts. I then enumerated the differences by which these classes of contract are distinguished from one another, and the peculiarities of each of them. I then touched on the practical distinction which exists between a simple contract by mere words and one reduced to writing, and the further distinction between those cases in which the adoption of a writing is optional, and those in which its adoption is rendered necessary by the provisions of some Act of Parliament, and particularly of the Statute of Frauds, in the cases to which it applies. I then proceeded to ex[*134] plain the nature of the consideration which the law requires in order to support a simple contract, and to touch on the distinction which exists between executed and executory considerations. Then, leaving the separate consideration of simple contracts, and turning to those points which apply to all contracts whatever, I arrived, in the last lecture, at the effect of illegality upon the contract. the contract. I pointed out the princi

ple upon which illegality, tainting either the consideration or the promise, is held to vitiate every description of contract, and I then stated to you the subdivision of illegal contracts into two classes; 1st, those which are so at common law; 2dly, those which are rendered so by the provision of some statute. With regard to the former of these two classes, namely, contracts illegal at common law, I explained that a contract illegal at common law is so on one of three grounds: 1st, that it violates the rules of morality; 2dly, that it is opposed to public policy; or, 3dly, that it is tainted by fraud.

I exemplified the first of these three classes by the case of Forres v. Jones, 4 Esp., in which the printseller was not permitted to recover on a contract for the sale of libellous publications; and I adduced several instances of the second class of contracts illegal at common law, those which are so because opposed to public policy, in cases, namely, where the contract is in general restraint of trade, or creates a re[*135] straint of trade which, though not general, is unreasonable in its extent, as being larger than the protection of the person who imposes it requires. Contracts in general restraint of marriage, contracts tending to facilitate the future separation of husband and wife, and contracts to bring about marriage for a reward, or as they are called, for Brocage of Marriage. There is another remarkable instance of contracts falling under this class, namely, of illegality created by the rules of common law, which it will be right to specify before proceeding to the next branch of the subject. It consists of contracts, void, because having a tendency to obstruct the administration of justice. Such was the very contract in Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341; the case which first established that the

person who has executed a deed is not estopped from showing, by way of defence, that it was so executed for an illegal consideration, although he would not have been allowed to defend himself on the ground that there was no consideration for it at all. In that case, five persons were indicted for perjury, and it was agreed that Collins, who was their friend, should buy off the prosecutor's evidence by giving him a note for 3507., in consideration of which he undertook not to appear at the Assizes. And it was further agreed that, in order to indemnify Collins against the consequences of his being *called upon to pay the [*136] note, Blantern should give Collins his bond conditioned for the payment of 3507., the same sum for which the note was made. In an action brought upon the bond the Court of Common Pleas held that it was void, and that a plea showing the consideration on which it was given was a good answer to the action. (a) There is a late case of Unwin v. Leader, 1

(a) Agreements to indemnify persons against the consequences of illegal acts fall within this category. (Shackel v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 634, 29 E. C. L. R.) So also do all promises which are made to obtain release from duress of person on illegal arrest, or under compulsion of colourable legal process, whereby it is made the instru

1 Mitchell v. Vance, 5 Monroe, 529; unless the illegal act is already done, in which case, the agreement to indemnify is no encouragement to do future harm; Haskett v. Tilley, 11 Modern, 93; Kneeland v. Rogers, 2 Hall (N. Y.), 587. Thus a bond given to a sheriff to indemnify him against a voluntary escape which had happened is valid, though if given in anticipation of such an escape it would fall within the general rule; Given v. Driggs, 1 Caines, 450; Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johnson, 381; and these cases, it will be perceived, are analogous in principle to those which, while holding to be invalid bonds executed in consideration of a future separation between husband and wife, yet enforce such instruments where the separation is to be immediate, or has already taken place.