the loan of money. Every conceivable means was used to evade the statute. Sometimes a transfer of stock, sometimes commission on a discount, sometimes a substitution of one contract for another, or several concurrent contracts were resorted to, but the effort of the court was in every case to strip off the external covering of form, and get at the intent and real import of the transaction, and if that were tainted with usury, the contract was held void; see Wright v. Wright, 3 B. & C. 272, 10 E. C. L. R.; Chippindale v. Thurston, M. & M. 411, 22 E. C. L. R.; Meago v. Summons, M. & M. 121; Carstairs v. Stein, 4 M. & S. 192. (a) I cite these cases, because, as I will *presently show you, they are still important, though the law is since altered.

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Now such being the law as constituted by the statute

(a) A recent example of this occurred in the case of Belcher v. Vardon, 14 Law Jour. C. C. 427. A. being entitled to a lease of building ground for seventy years, and having borrowed money of B. agreed to assign the leases of the houses built on it to B., who was to underlet them to A. again at rents equivalent to 8 per cent. on the money advanced. Knight Bruce, V. C., held, however, that this was an usurious contract, within the large language of the statute of Anne, and that the transactions were void, as shifts and devices to evade the usury laws. And if the extra money be paid as a premium for the renewal of a loan at legal interest, it is equally usurious; (Wood v. Grimwood, 10 B. & Cr. 689, 21 E. C. L. R.) All sales made to colour usurious transactions are void; Hargreaves v. Hutchinson, 2 Ad. & Ell. 12, 29 E. C. L. R.; see, also, Wright v. Wheeler, 1 Camp. 165, n.; Doe d. Grimes v. Gooch, 3 B. & Ald. 664, 5 E. C. L. R.

The whole law of usury will be found fully discussed in the Earl of Chesterfield v. Jansen, 1 Wilson, 286, since which case Ld. Abinger said, in Downes v. Green, 12 M. & W. 490, that there is none "in which anything new is to be found." [The case is much better and more fully reported in 2 Vesey, 125; and see the notes to it in 1 White & Tudor's Eq. Cases, 378; see, also, Mr. Perkins's note to the 8th edition of Chitty on Contracts, p. 611.]

of Anne, the first relaxation was by stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, 183. c. 98; that was the act renewing the Charter of the Bank of England; and it enacted, among other things in sec. 7, that bills of exchange and promissory notes, payable at or within three months after date, or not having more than three months to run, should be exempted from the usury law. And I suppose that this enactment was found beneficial, for, by a subsequent act of 1 Vict. c. 80, the three months were ex- 13 tended to twelve months. And by a still later act of

2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, it was enacted, "That no bill or notes not having more than twelve months to run,

nor any contract for the loan or forbearance of [*156] more than 107. sterling, shall be void by reason of the usury laws; provided that the act shall not extend to the loan or forbearance of money on the security of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments or any estate or interest therein." This act was only to continue in force till January 1, 1842; but by stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 83, it was continued to January 1, 1843; and, by 4 and 5 Vict. c. 54, to January 1, 1844.(a)

Now you will observe that none of these acts repeal the statute of Anne. They only exempt from its operation the cases provided for by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37.(b)

(a) The 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, has been annually extended, and by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 102, it has been again extended until the 1st of January, 1851.

(b) It has been expressly so held in Thibault q. t. v. Gibson, 12 M. & W. 88. It follows that in pleading it is sufficient to declare in all remaining cases of usury on the statute of Anne, and it is for the defendant to plead that the case is within one of the subsequent statutes exempting it from the old law. Lord Abinger, C. B., thus stated the rule of pleading in all actions for the recovery of penalties where there are exemptions. "In all cases where proceedings are taken against a party for the recovery of a penalty under a statute, if there be any exemption in the clause which gives the penalty, ex

And that statute does not apply to loans of [*157] money under 107., nor cases of loans on the security of real property, mortgages, for instances, which are therefore still governed by the statute of Anne, and will be void if more than 5 per cent. be directly or indirectly reserved by way of interest. You will now see why I thought it proper to cite cases on the construction of the statute of Anne. If you wish to inquire further regarding that act, see notes to Ferrall v. Shaen, 1 Wms. Saund. 294.(a)1

empting certain cases from its operation, the declaration or information must show that the particular case is not within the exception. But where it comes by way of proviso in a subsequent part of the act, it is not necessary to notice it in the declaration or information, but it is matter which the defendant must allege as a ground of defence. The same rule applies with increased force and efficacy to the case where penalties are given by one statute, and particular cases are, by a subsequent statute, exempted from its operation."

(a) The proviso at the end of section 1, that "nothing herein contained shall extend to the loan or forbearance of money upon security of any lands, &c., or any estate or interest therein," has been held to apply to all collateral securities and equitable mortgages, whether of freehold or leasehold property; Hodgkinson v. Wyatt, 4 Q. B. 749, 45 E. C. L. R. But this must be taken with some limitation, for it was decided in the previous month by the Court of Exchequer, that where a promissory note was given and discounted bona fide, a mortgage of land given as a collateral security to protect it is equally valid; Doe d. Haughton v. King, 11 M. & W. 33. The distinction between these cases, if any, seems to be that, according to the latter, the jury must find that "the real object of the parties was the discounting of the note, and that being legal, it rendered the security by mortgage also legal." [See the recent case of Nixon v. Phillips, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 531.]

In the former cases the deposit of the deed was named in the bond, and might, perhaps, be deemed part of the primary, rather than as the secondary security.

And it has been held that where a deposit of such deeds is made

'And see Clack v. Sainsbury, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 408; and Nixon v. Phillips, Id. 531.

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*The next example to which I shall advert arises on the acts against gaming. These are exceedingly complex and troublesome; but it is absolutely necessary to direct your attention to them, for questions upon them are continually occurring in practice.

The first act is that of 16 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 3, which enacts that if any one shall play at any pastime or game, by gaming or betting upon those who [*159] game, and shall lose more than the sum of 1007. on credit, he shall not be bound to pay, and any contract to do so shall be void.

The 9th Anne, c. 14 (the principal enactment), merely as an inducement to forbear suing upon bills of exchange protected by the recent statutes, and bearing more than 57. per cent. interest, such deposit does not withdraw the bills from the operation of those statutes, and they remain valid; Bell v. Coleman, 5 Jur. 974.

Previously to the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, and under the 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 80, there was nothing to render it less legal to protect such a payment by security on land than in any other way. In fact, in all cases, the courts look to the substance of the agreement and the real intent of the parties; Beete v. Bidgood, 6 B. & Cr. 458, 14 E. C. L. R.

The new statutes have materially reduced the difficulties upon which the cases used to turn. It is enough to state generally, that, as before, it is still necessary that the original agreement must have been usurious to be avoided for usury: no subsequent reservation of usurious interest suffices. There must also be an actual receipt of the interest to render the offence penal, though the contract is void without it; Wood v. Grimwood, 10 B. & Cr. 679, 21 E. C. L. R.

Where a pawnbroker advanced a sum exceeding 107., at more than 5 per cent. interest, on a pledge of goods, without making an entry delivering a duplicate, in compliance with stat. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 99, s. 6, it was held that the transaction was legal, inasmuch as that statute allows pawnbrokers 20 per cent., and does not apply to loans of more than 107., and that such loans are within the protection under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37; Pennell v. Attenborough, 4 Q. B. 868, 45 E. C. L. R.; and see Turquand v. Mosedon, 7 M. & W. 504.

provides in sect. 1, that all securities for money or any other valuable thing won by gaming or playing at cards, dice-tables, bowls, or other game whatever, or by betting on those who game, or for money lent for such gaming or betting, or lent to gamesters at the place where they are playing, shall be void.

And the second section enacts, that any person who shall at a sitting lose the sum or value of 107. may recover it back again within three months; and if he do not, any other person may, together with treble the value, half for himself, and half for the poor of the parish.

Now you will observe, that under these two acts securities for money lost at gaming, or by betting on gamesters, or for money lent to them to game with, are illegal.

And you will further observe that, even if no security be given, but the loser pay in cash, still, if the sum lost amount to 107., it may be recovered back again.

You may consult, on the construction of these acts, Sigell v. Jebb, 3 Stark. 1, 14 E. C. L. R.; Brogden v. Marriott, 3 Bingh. N. C. 88, 32 E. C. L. R.; and M'Kennill v. Robinson, 3 M. & Welsb. 134.

Now a horse-race is a game within the meaning of these acts of Parliament, as you will find laid *down in Goodburn v. Marley, Str. 1159, Blax

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ton v. Pye, 2 Wilson, 309, and Brogden v. Marriott, 3 Bingh. N. C. 88, 32 E. C. L. R.; and therefore if the law rested upon these statutes, all losses above 107. on any such race would be recoverable back by the loser, and would put the winner in danger of the penalties of the statute of Anne, and securities for the payment of any such losses would be void. But it was thought that horse-racing, confined