as in the eighteenth century, in terms of a building built by men to satisfy human desires and continually repaired, restored, rebuilt, and added to in order to meet expanding or changing desires or even changing fashions." And in the last chapter he insists on "an interpretation in terms of activity," an interpretation leading us to think of legal institutions not merely as things that are, but as things that were made at some time and place and are made now by those who believe in them and will them and are largely what the latter believe them and will them to be. Yet the interpretation must be "in terms of conditioned activity, conditioned by the capacities, the characters, and the prejudices of those who plan and make, by the materials with which they must work *** and by the special purposes for which they must work." These passages breathe the spirit of the eighteenth century's faith in reform, which the historical school did so much to undermine. It is, however, not the analogy of the law to the engineer's materials which Professor Pound has in mind, but the fact that the engineer does something, brings things to pass, and "is judged by the adequacy of his work to the purposes for which it is done, not by its conformity to some ideal form of a traditional plan." Analogies have done much harm in history, and the engineering analogy, if consistently carried out, would lead to a purely mechanical conception of society, to the conception of a society composed of abstract units, human atoms, the kind, for example, that figure in the system of that great mechanist Hobbes. And Professor Pound seems to come close to such a view: the task of the legal order, according to him, is one of satisfying human demands, of securing interests or satisfying claims or demands with the least friction and the least of waste, whereby the means of satisfaction may be made to go as far as possible, there being not enough to go around. Have we not here our eighteenth-century units, simply stripped of their natural rights and endowed with claims and wants which are to be satisfied as far as possible, through compromise and adjustment, in order that the group may carry on? Have we not here what Hegel once called "das menschliche Tierreich," the human animal kingdom?

But there is another phase of the engineering analogy which must not be forgotten and upon which Professor Pound would lay chief stress. His engineer is a social engineer. And this social engineer must be equipped with a wider knowledge than the eighteenth century possessed: he must study the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines, and the means of making legal rules effective; he must study sociology, juridical method, sociological legal history, and the importance of reasonable and just solutions of individual cases. The social idea has already been realizing itself in legal history; Professor Pound shows in detail that there has been a recognition, on the part of the courts, of the social interests, of the claims and demands involved in the existence of society (p. 160). Yes, he declares that it would be as easy to write legal history in terms of a continually wider and broader recognition and securing of social interests as to write it as a record of the unfolding of individual

freedom, as was the fashion in the nineteenth century. In emphasizing the social interest he is therefore in tune with the development of the law. For many years the word "social" has been a talisman to conjure with. And yet it is not a new thing, this social interest. Justice is a social virtue, and the law has for ages had to do with the administration of justice. But what seems beneficence,-another social virtue, to one age may become the justice of another. To a slave-owner the freeing of slaves appeared as an act of benevolence. What "social interest" will come to mean to the coming generations it is hard to forecast. To many to-day the real social engineer would be a "socialist" engineer. The meaning of the term "social" will depend upon one's ideal of society, upon one's conception of what society ought to be; in other words, upon one's social philosophy. A scientific sociology may form the starting-point for such aphilosophy; it can tell us what happens but never what ought to happen. What we miss in Professor Pound's book is a satisfactory social philosophy in this sense; without it a social jurisprudence would seem to be incomplete. To be sure, the social jurisprudence "works"-to use a pragmatist term-but is that not because it carries in its bosom, and applies, principles and ideals which have been developed in the history of the law, conceptions of what a human society ought to be? Frank Thilly.

Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence. By Sir Paul Vinogradoff Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford. Volume Two, The Jurisprudence of the Greek City. Oxford University Press, New York City. 1922. pp. x, 316.

1920.

The first volume of Professor Vinogradoff's Outlines appeared in This thoroughly readable work, characterized as it was by wide knowledge, painstaking research, and profound scholarship, filled a need in the field of jurisprudence, not only for the technical student but also for lawyers generally. Needless to say, the second volume is enriched by that same scholarship, research, and discrimination which characterized the first. A study of the science of Law in the Greek City State, that earliest development of democratic government, is particularly interesting at the present time when so much attention is being directed to the development of democratic institutions, as well as to their successes and shortcomings.

Professor Vinogradoff has in the main confined this discussion to the jurisprudence of the Greek City of the fourth and fifth centuries, the classical period, representing the highest development of Greek genius. Nor has he been content to present a reproduction of the teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus and the other Greek writers on political science and jurisprudence. About two-thirds of the present volume is taken up with a discussion of the general jurisprudence of the Greek City, the theory and sources of the law, the outlines of the legal system, the structure and composition of the city, the relation of the citizen to the city, the constitution, and international or intercity law. The author's complete mastery of the Greek language and writings has enabled him to present Greek juridical

theory from the viewpoint of the Greek writers, in addition to a modern scholarly and critical survey. From the necessities of the case most of the illustrative material is taken from Athens and the Attic writers, but the work is in no sense confined to a discussion of Athenian jurisprudence.

The last one hundred pages of the volume are devoted to a more detailed and technical presentation of rules of the law of crime and tort, property and possession, conventions and transactions including sale and methods of conveyancing. But throughout the work the object of the author is to treat of the science of law in Greece, and not to give us a text-book of Greek laws. The modern student of political science, familiar with the American division of government into the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, and the theory that each department should operate as a check upon the others, will be interested to note that there was no corresponding clear-cut division of governmental functions in the Greek City, but in an attempt to furnish a means of keeping public officials within proper bounds, a remarkable system of repressive actions by citizens against officials was developed, as well as drastic provisions for examination upon appointment and a stringent audit upon laying down their offices. One who proposed a measure to the people was liable to criminal indictment for "deceit of the people” (ypаøǹ åπáτNS TOÛ dhμov), if the proposal was adopted by the people and was not a success. Students of criminal law will be interested to note that the prosecution of criminals was almost exclusively in the hands of the particular citizen or citizens injured by the crime, the Greeks having no official corresponding to our prosecuting attorney, and the injured party had the choice between an action in the nature of tort (dikn) to recover damages or a penalty, and a penal action instituted by an accusation in writing (Ypapń). But in case the prosecutor chose the more drastic ypaon, he was in turn subject to a criminal action for malicious prosecution if he failed to make good his indictment.

In the field of contract it may be noted that there are no indications of the doctrine of consideration. Conventions in Greece in the classical period were formed by simple consent. Nor did any elements of archaic formalism remain in this period. As a matter of convenience in proof, the presence of witnesses, the preparation of a writing and registration were desirable, and the Greeks developed a doctrine analogous to our parol evidence rule in the formal literal contract (ovyypaøn), but even in the absence of all of these, a party to a convention could claim an equitable remedy. The Greeks seem to have regarded the substance rather than the form.

Reference to the great wealth of illustrative material contained in the text might be prolonged indefinitely, but its full value and interest can best be appreciated after a first hand acquaintance. All who read the present work will anticipate with interest the early publication of the third volume of the series which is to be devoted to Medieval Jurisprudence.

H. E. W.

A Treatise on the American Law of Administration. By J. G. Woerner. Third Edition, by William F. Woerner. & Co., Boston, Mass. 1923. Three Volumes.

2121.

Little, Brown pp. cclxxxxiv,

The first and second editions of Judge Woerner's Treatise presented to the profession a unified and comprehensive treatment of the law of administration as developed under the American statutes and precedents. The author treated probate law as a system based on reason and order rather than a mass of widely divergent interpretations of statutes and conflicts in the application of legal principles in the courts of the various jurisdictions. The clear and discriminating discussion of the text was supplemented by full citations to carefully selected authorities. Judge Woerner's work may fairly be said to have served as a guide to the profession, and to have exerted a considerable influence upon the development of this branch of the law.

But the lapse of nearly twenty-five years since the publication of the second edition has made it absolutely necessary that a third edition be prepared if the work was to continue to occupy a place in the first rank of law books. The present edition was prepared by the son of the original author, who was eminently qualified for the task by reason of the fact that he aided Judge Woerner in the preparation of the original work and was co-editor of the second edition. It is particularly fitting that this revision should have been undertaken by one fully conversant with the history of the work from the beginning, and in sympathy with the objects and methods of approach of the original author.

In recent years it has become increasingly important to the lawyer to understand the principles and development of the law of administration in other jurisdictions than his own. Because of modern business development and the fact that many individuals have property interests in distant localities, few estates of any importance can be settled by reference to the law of the decedent's domicile alone. The administrator must frequently be advised as to the law of several jurisdictions on matters of taxation, devolution of title, and management of estates. Obviously no general text can be wholly free from error as to recent statutory changes, and the present work is no exception in this respect, but this factor should not detract from its usefulness.

In accordance with the plan of the original treatise, the editor has not been content to state with encyclopedic fullness the holding of a multitude of authorities, without regard to their soundness, but rather he has given a discriminating discussion of the principles of probate law, illustrated by copious statutory citations and references to carefully chosen leading cases from all jursidictions. The work has been brought down to date and may fairly be said to present an accurate and complete treatment of the modern law of administration in the American jurisdictions.

H. E. W.

Law of Corporations in New York. 2nd Edition. Alden I. Rosbrook. Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y. 1923. pp. clx, 1707.

The law of corporations in our American jurisdictions abounds in conflicting decisions, and the various state corporation acts, while not varying with regard to fundamental conceptions, exhibit a perplexing diversity of requirements as to formalities and details. Assuredly, such a condition of any branch of the law is most unfortunate, but so long as it continues the practitioner finds that a text-book on the corporation law of his particular state is an invaluable office tool.

Rosbrook on New York Corporations is a text-book of New York law and not merely an annotated collection of the New York statutes relating to corporations and corporate practices. In the first edition the author performed a useful service by lassoing the far-flung sections that dealt with a particular phase of corporate procedure and coralling them into his compact treatment of that subject. Wisely enough the revisers of 1923 have collected many of these widely scattered sections, and have placed them in proper relation to each other in the new Stock Corporation law.

The recent revision has resulted in many substantial changes in the law. The author calls attention to these alterations and discusses them with relation to the pre-existing sections and decisions thereunder. Since this is a text-book of corporation law and not a collection of annotated statutes, it naturally includes a treatment of innumerable topics upon which the corporation statutes are silent, e. g., promoters' liability, de facto corporations, ultra vires acts, and corporate liability for torts and crimes.

In order to make the volume more complete there is contained in an appendix a reprinting of the Business Corporations Law, General Corporation Law, Membership Corporations Law, Stock Corporation Law of 1923, and the Federal Revenue Act of 1921, together with a collection of 1,000 forms, more than twice the number contained in the first edition, and these have been prepared or revised to meet the changes effected by the Stock Corporation Law of 1923.

It is a serviceable volume for the local practitioner.

R. S. S.