quently, this part contains many of the most interesting and humorous incidents related in the biographies of the principal English and American lawyers of the last hundred years. The second part consists of a collection of famous cross-examinations. The crossexamination of Guiteau in his trial for the murder of President Garfield has been omitted. Four new cross-examinations have been added. In the course of all these, Mr. Wellman aids the student by indicating the purpose of the examiner and the method which he was employing. The work certainly contains many valuable suggestions, especially for the young and inexperienced advocate. If occasionally advice seems contradictory, it merely confirms the belief that cross-examination really is an art, and that it is as important to recognize the proper time to break the rules as it is to know the rules. The attractive way in which nearly a score of portraits of famous trial lawyers have been incorporated not only increases the delightfulness of the book, but also tends to strengthen Mr. Wellman's statement that "personal magnetism is, perhaps, the most important of all the attributes of a good trial lawyer.' Eight Great American Lawyers. By Horace H. Hagan. Harlow Eight Great American Lawyers is a readable and entertaining book containing sketches of the lives of Luther Martin, William Pinckney, William Wirt, Thomas Addis Emmet, Seargent Prentiss, Rufus Choate, Judah P. Benjamin, and William M. Evarts. The author's purpose has been to collect in one volume the biographies of eight lawyers of national importance, showing the foundations of their success and their connection with public affairs. The limited space allotted to each precluded lengthy treatment, yet the prominent facts in the lives of each are narrated. The pleasure of reading the book is marred by unnecessarily frequent typographical errors. The style of the author tends to be ornate, as may be determined from the following excerpt: "In the days of giants he [Wirt] ranked with the mightiest sons of Anak. He who eagerly threw down the gage of battle to Pinckney and Webster and sustained with dignity and honor the shock of the ensuing conflict, need not fear that carping criticism may filch his well deserved honors." Books Received Prize Cases Decided in the United States Supreme Court. Prepared under the Supervision of James Brown Scott. Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York City. 1923. Three Volumes. pp. xc, 2183. Handbook of Common Law Pleading. By Benjamin J. Shipman. Third Edition, by Henry Winthrop Ballantine. Hornbook Series. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1923. pp. xvii, 644. Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence. By James W. Eaton. Second Edition, by Archibald H. Throckmorton. Hornbook Series. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1923. pp. xv, 711. Illustrative Cases on Equity Jurisprudence. By Archibald H. Throckmorton. Hornbook Case Series. Second Edition. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1923. pp. x, 611. Outlines of Review of the Fundamental Principles of the Law. By William Lawrence Clark. American Law Book Co., New York City. 1923. pp. xcii, 364. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. By John R. Commons. Macmillan Co., New York City. 1924. pp. x, 394. The American Judge. By Andrew Alexander Bruce. Macmillan Co., New York City. 1924. pp. 218. Legal Philology. By Fred C. Mullinix. F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, Mo. 1923. pp. 344. The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases. By Burr W. Jones. Third Edition, by William Carey Jones. Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, Cal. 1924. pp. xxvi, 1661. 369 W. F. HUMPHREY Book---Catalogue---Magazine PRINTING THE COMPLETE PLANT Special attention given to technical and scientific works. BINDING RULING BLANK BOOKS The Quarterly Depends on Its Subscribers HAVE YOU Paid Your Subscription? If not mail your check today to The Cornell Law Quarterly BOARDMAN HALL There is, as there always has been, a substantial volume of complaint of the courts as the institution through which our law is administered. Very frequently the source or character of these complaints is such as to make them unworthy of serious consideration. Sometimes they are the expression of those who at heart resent any ordinary orderly regulation or conduct such as is afforded by the Sometimes they are the unintelligent and mere parrotlike repetition of some criticism for which no reason or justification whatever could be given. At other times they are the prejudiced and unfair reaction of a disappointed litigant or of some class which has been disappointed by the failure to survive constitutional tests of legislation intended to secure special advantages or to put into operation well meant but illusory industrial or social welfare measures And sometimes these criticisms are the expressions of those who are opposed to and would wreck some of the fundamental features of our administration of the law. But when we eliminate all of these we are compelled to recognize that there are not infrequent complaints and criticisms by those who are fair-minded and staunch supporters of the courts and who are both intelligent and conservative in their criticisms. I should think that of the criticisms made by these latter persons, the ones most frequently heard are of delays and technicalities in the administration of the law, of its too narrow interpretation wherefrom results injustice, and of the application of too exacting constitutional tests to legislation intended to meet the changing needs of civilization and better to secure the equities of human relations. At the present time we are witnessing an acknowledgment of the defects which exist in the administration of the law and an attempt to *Address delivered before the Association of the Bar of New York City, March 27, 1924. †Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals. eliminate them. It seems to me that no one who attended the conference of lawyers, teachers, and judges held in Washington in February, 1923, and again last February, or who has followed the proceedings of the organization there perfected, can have any doubt that the most conspicuous, systematic, and scientific attempt ever made in this country to relieve the administration of law from technicalities, inconsistencies, and narrowness is now in course of progress. And there is another movement abroad in this country at the present time which has some kinship with the things which I am mentioning. This movement is not concerned with the administration of private law, but it is the expression of an insistent and widespread demand of earnest and thoughtful men and women in this country that the jurisdiction and usefulness of legal and equitable principles shall be extended to a new field, and that some form of permanent judicial tribunal to which we are a party shall be established, which shall be devoted to the consideration and decision of international questions and disputes, and no matter what obstacles may be thrown in the way of this movement by hostile legislators and critics, I feel perfectly sure that in the end, unless Civilization fails and breaks down, some such tribunal will be established and accepted by this country, and that it will become as unthought of and abhorrent to decide ordinary international controversies by the horrors of war instead of by peaceful and just decisions as it now would be regarded to determine private differences by the bludgeon and the duel instead of by judicial proceedings. Considering these things, I have thought that the most interesting question which I could discuss in this address before members of the Bar who pass the final and most searching judgment upon the work of our courts, would be the one of progressiveness in the administration of the law in this State as evidenced by the decisions of the Court of Appeals during recent years. I shall simply attempt in a perfectly impersonal way to review some of the decisions of the Court for your consideration and for the purpose of determining whether in the administration of the law our Court of Last Resort has been turned in the right direction and how far it has proceeded. I shall not, of course, discuss procedural reforms and relief secured by statutory enactment, for obviously the credit for those belongs to the legislature, guided and moved by the Bar, rather than to the courts. Neither shall I spend any time in demonstrating the disposition of courts to disregard technical errors in the administration of the law, such as the trial of cases. Independent of any statutory provisions intended to promote that result, this policy |