each group to work out their own controversies at some later time and as they arise. The great controversy thus far existing has been between the two groups of states rather than between member-states of the same group. While it would have been desirable to have had the Compact provide for a complete division among the states, the attempt would have been futile and would have imperilled the solution of the existing controversy, which happened to be a controversy between the two groups.

The Compact does not deal with the question of whether it is for the State or for the Federal Government to dispose of appropriation rights in respect to the now unused waters of the river system. The paramount purpose of the Compact was to divide the use of the water between the two groups of states. Whatever the relative powers of the Federal and State Governments may be as to the authority to dispose of appropriation rights to appropriators and to determine the conditions upon which those rights may be initiated or possessed, that power is not affected in the least. To have attempted to deal with that question would have jeopardized the main issue which led to the formation of the Compact and which was, how the water should be divided between the two groups, and not whether it is from the Federal Government or from the State that, within the groups, the use must be procured. Again, there is nothing in the Compact which interferes in any way with the internal water law of any particular state. Indeed, such interference is disclaimed in Article 4 (paragraph c) above set forth. The Compact affects the relations among the states in respect to the use of water only as between the upper group on the one hand and the lower group on the other, with one exception. That exception consists in the fact that the system of dominant uses created by the Compact applies even as between any two states of the same group as well as between the two groups. So too, the Compact is silent on the question of whether development shall be by public or by private capital.

SUFFICIENCY OF WATER

The average annual flow of the river system as measured at Yuma, Arizona, has already been given-20,500,000 acre feet. The highest authority upon the sufficiency of the water of the system to meet the agricultural needs of the seven states is Mr. Arthur P. Davis, former Chief Director of the Reclamation Service. According to Mr. Davis there probably is water enough in the river system to supply the irrigation needs of all seven of the states concerned. There would

not be enough for irrigation in the upper group if the power uses in the lower group were to require all of the now unused flow.

At the Santa Fé Conference of the representatives of the different States and of the Federal Government, resulting in the negotiation of the Compact in November, 1922, Mr. Davis stated that up to that time the upper states were using 2,400,000 acre feet of water to water 1,500,000 acres of land; the lower states 2,360,000 acre feet of water to water 513,000 acres; that Mexico was using 950,000 acre feet to water 190,000 acres; that, in other words, up to that time only 5,710,000 acre feet were being used by all of the states and Mexico combined, and that the total area being irrigated was 2,203,000 acres.

At the time of the conference Mr. Davis also made predictions as to what the future holds in store. His estimate of the ultimate quantity of water and of the ultimate area of land to be watered from the river system, inclusive of the water then being used and of the land then being irrigated, was as follows: 6,150,000 acre feet for the upper states on 4,000,000 acres of land; 5,100,000 acre feet for the lower states on 1,267,000 acres of land; 3,500,000 acre feet for Mexico on 800,000 acres of land—a total of 14,750,000 acre feet by all of the states and Mexico combined to water a total of 6,067,000 acres of land.

Some of the engineers of the different states estimate the feasible irrigable area of their respective states as greater than that stated by Mr. Davis, and the quantity of water to be used in irrigation as therefore likely to be correspondingly greater than that estimated by him. But, after making reasonable allowances for these claims of the different states, it would seem that the water of the river system will probably be sufficient to take care of any and all lands which it would be financially feasible to reach, since it is to be noted that while the average annual flow is 20,500,000 acre feet, the estimate of Mr. Davis of the total ultimately to be used is only 14,750,000 acre feet, leaving a margin or factor of safety of over 5,000,000 acre feet.

RATIFICATION AND ARIZONA

All the states, save Arizona, ratified the Compact at their 1923 sessions and the Compact itself will be found set forth in the ratifying acts. Undoubtedly ratification or approval by the Congress will follow immediately upon ratification by Arizona. In Arizona the Compact has its friends and its opponents, the former probably outnumbering the latter, but for the moment being handicapped by the fact that the present Governor is numbered among the opponents although his predecessor in office was one of its stanch friends. The objections

raised by the opponents in Arizona are numerous indeed. To state them and to answer them would require much detail and much space. Suffice it to say that the Arizona opponents can scarcely face the nation with any hope of winning the support of public opinion, in view of the ratification by the four states of the upper group and by California and Nevada, which, with Arizona, constitute the three states of the lower group. It is not likely that Arizona will be able to secure for herself any further reclamation projects or any federal power licenses for electric projects until she first ratifies the Compact. The sympathies of the Congress and of Federal administrative officials are likely to be with the six states which have shown a willingness to divide the waters of the river system in such manner that no one of their number may have a substantial monopoly, but rather that all of them may have their future economic development guaranteed by a fair distribution in the use of the river system which by nature constitutes a common source of supply.

At the 1923 session of the Arizona Legislature various reservations to the Compact were proposed in the House and also in the Senate. The two bodies could not agree upon what the reservations should be, and adjourned without action. It is believed by the friends of the Compact, both within Arizona and outside, that as the result of the approaching state election of November the friends of the Compact will be returned to office in sufficient number to make possible the ratification of the Compact by that state and without reservations. It was well enough to talk of "reservations" in the days of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That Covenant set up an Assembly, a Council, a Court; in other words, established a common machinery, participation in which by any nation making reservations would be construed as an implied contract on the part of all nations, to the effect that the nation entering with reservations would be considered as having the consent of the other nations to the reservations made. The Colorado River Compact, however, sets up no organization, tribunal, or common machinery of any kind, and, therefore, affords no basis from which, upon the theory of implied contract, the reservations attempted to be made by any particular ratifying state could be said to receive the consent of the other states. The effect of reservations, whether by a State or by the Congress, might very well be regarded as invalidating the entire Compact.

The Colorado River Compact in point of number of signatory states and of importance of subject matter is probably the greatest interstate document negotiated since the days of the adoption of the Federal

Constitution. Its ultimate ratification will break the deadlock that now rests upon the river system and permit development to go gradually ahead throughout all seven of the interested states, and by providing the necessary economic and legal basis will open the way for a civilization in the Southwest which otherwise and in large degree could not exist.

MERTON L. FERSON

How are simple contract obligations created? What is their essential basis? They are induced by acts. The essential qualities of the particular acts which are potent to induce such obligations may best be disclosed by the aid of illustrations.

Suppose X offers to trade his horse for Y's cow. X's offer is an act. It may consist of speaking or writing words; or it may consist of making some other kind of signs. The act symbolizes X's will: first, to transfer his horse to Y; and, second, to require as a condition1 that he receive title to the cow. Y, in case he accepts, symbolizes, by suitable act, his will: first, to transfer his cow to X; and, second, to require as a condition that he receive title to the horse. The law recognizes these acts and predicates from them two transfers; one of the horse from X to Y and one of the cow from Y to X.

The analysis would be similar if X, having Y's cow in his possession, offers to buy her for $100 on thirty days credit. X's offer is an act symbolizing his will: first, to come under an obligation binding him to pay $100 in thirty days; and, second, to require as a condition that he presently receive title to the cow. Again, suppose Y accepts. His acceptance cannot be anything other than an act symbolizing his will: first, that title to the cow pass presently to X; and second, that he requires as a condition a claim against X to be paid $100 in thirty days. It should be noted that X's act symbolizing his willingness to come under the obligation is of essentially the same character as his act in the preceding illustration where he signified his willingness to transfer the title to his horse. He has merely used a different set of words or other signs. The result is different. In this latter case, X comes under obligation in exchange for receiving the title to the cow; Y exchanges the title to the cow for a contract right against X. One title is transferred, and one obligation is created.

Another illustration: suppose X offers to buy Y's cow on credit and for future delivery of title and possession. X's offer is an act symbolizing his will: first, to come under an obligation to pay Y a stated amount; and second, to require as a condition that Y come †Professor of Law, University of Missouri.

"The very existence of a contract may be made by the parties to depend upon a contingency, i.e., the happening of the contingency may be necessary before there can be any contract***." Costigan, The Performance of Contracts, p. I. This is the sort of conditions referred to above.