purpose of limiting the powers of special sessions, of final action upon the amendment by the people themselves.

In connection with matters of ordinary legislation, the courts have been called upon most frequently-39 merely to compare the subjectmatter of particular statutes with that embraced within the governor's proclamation or message. In the following cases, the subject-matter of the enactment in question was clearly within the scope of the governor's program, and it was so held:

McKee v. English10 (Ark., 1921). Governor: Ratification special or local improvement districts. Statute: Validation of road improvement districts.

Road Imp. Dist. v. Sale" (Ark., 1922). Governor: Establishment of special or local road improvement districts. Statute: Put old district number 2 into new district number 16. Held, germane. While a mere abolition of an existing district would have been bad, this was a necessary incident to and directly concerned with the creation of the new one.

Carroll v. Wright (Ga., 1908). Governor: To raise revenue and appropriate funds for care of convicts. Statute: Imposed liquor license fees, proceeds to convict care.

Ross v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.43 (Ill., 1875). Governor: To amend charters of railroad companies. Statute: Amended charter granted by special act year before to particular railroad, although substantially a revision of previous act.

State v. Romero44 (La., 1909). Governor: Consolidation and abolition existing offices, in order to reduce expenses. Statute: Made parish superintendent schools, treasurer parish school funds, to serve without pay, vice parish treasurer who had been paid.

State v. Rawlings45 (Mo., 1911). Governor: Enactment of effective local option laws for counties, cities, and towns.

39It was at first doubted, in Arkansas and Texas, whether the matter of compliance between the statute and proclamation or message was judicially cognizable. It was thought that the conclusiveness of the signed and enrolled bill prevented an inquiry into this matter as it did into compliance with certain procedural requirements. These courts quickly saw, however, that the limitations were not procedural but substantive. See McKee v. English, 147 Ark. 449, 228 S. W. 43 (1921); Jones v. State, supra, n. 25; Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 591, 3 S. W. 109 (1886); Ball v. Presidio Co., 27 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 702 (1894); Manor Casino v. State, 34 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 769 (1896); State v. Larkin, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 253, 90 S. W. 912 (1905); Stockard v. Reid, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 121 S. W. 1144 (1909); Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. App. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405 (1910); Ex parte Davis, 82 Tex. Crim. App. 168, 215 S. W. 341 (1919).

Statute: Strengthened existing local option laws with reference to storing, keeping, and delivery of liquor in local option territory.

Fleming v. Wengler46 (Mo., 1916). Governor: To suppress race track gambling. Statute: Made stakeholding for bettors a crime.

State v. Clancy47 (Mont., 1904). Governor: Disqualification of judges for bias or prejudice, suitable provision for trials in event judge thus disqualified. Statute: Disqualified judges on filing of affidavit of prejudice, and provided no change venue if a qualified judge called in and acted within thirty days.

Sweeney v. Butte48 (Mont., 1922). Governor: Obviation of conditions whereby city of Butte forced to pay $100,000 to discharged and suspended policemen, for which no service rendered. Statute: Six months statute of limitations applicable to actions by discharged or suspended policemen for salary. No action for salary except for service actually rendered. State v. Dishman49 (Mont., 1922). Governor: Harmonizing state prohibition act with Volstead Act. Statute: Same.

Riley v. State0 (Okla., 1914). Governor: Abolition or elimination state, county, and local offices, in interest of efficiency and economy. Statute: Secretary of senate made ex-officio secretary state election board, and latter office abolished. Pittsburg's Petition51 (Pa., 1907). Governor: To enable cities in close proximity, including the intervening land, or contiguous cities in same county, to be united. Statute: Authorized uniting any two cities and intervening land, whether contiguous or in close proximity. Cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny united, apparently not contiguous, but in same county.

Hyde v. State52 (Tenn., 1915). Governor: Regulation of intrastate trade and sale of opium or coca leaves or preparations thereof. Statute: prohibited sale or distribution these substances.

Brown v. State53 (Tex., ment of judicial districts. district.

1893). Governor: Reapportion-
Statute: Created a new judicial

Stockard v. Reid54 (Tex., laws simplifying procedure in civil and criminal trials. Statute: Changed procedure in contests of local option elections, such contests being triable in a civil proceeding.

1909). Governor: Enactment of

46269 Mo. 366, 190 S. W. 875.

4730 Mont. 193, 76 Pac. 10; s. c., 30 Mont. 529, 77 Pac. 312.

48208 Pac. 943.

4964 Mont. 530, 210 Pac. 604.

5043 Okla. 65, 141 Pac. 264.

1217 Pa. St. 227, 66 Atl. 348, 120 A. S. R. 845; affirmed, Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151.

52131 Tenn. 208, 174 S. W. 1127.

5832 Tex. Crim. App. 119, 22 S. W. 596.

457 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 121 S. W. 1144.

!

1

Long v. State55 (Tex., 1910). Governor: Enactment of laws simplifying procedure in civil and criminal courts, and amending laws relating to court procedure. Statute: Extended length

court terms.

Howard v. State56 (Tex., 1915). Governor: Creation of additional district criminal court for Dallas County. Statute: Defined the jurisdiction of the new court.

In each of the following cases, the subject-matter of the enactment was equally clearly outside of the governor's program, and it was so held:

McClintock v. City of Phoenix57 (Ariz., 1922). Governor: Validation of bonds issued in connection with street special assessments. Statute: Validated city bond issue for armory for use local unit state militia.

Jones v. State58 (Ga., 1921). Governor: To amend automobile license tax. Statute: Made speeding in excess thirty miles an hour, and driving while intoxicated, crime.

St. Louis v. Withaus59 (Mo., 1887). City charter confined powers city assembly when convened by mayor in special session to objects specially stated in proclamation. Mayor: Appropriations, dramshops, meatshop licenses. Ordinance: Regulation of driving on certain newly paved streets.

State v. Edwards6o (Mo., 1922). Governor: To amend certain section statutes then authorizing districting cities of 300,000 population for constables and justices of peace, so as to permit districting of cities of 600,000 for justices of peace alone. Statute: Repealed original section, so as to leave cities of 300,000 without provision for districts for either constables or justices of peace, and substituted new section authorizing districting cities of 600,000 for both constables and justices of peace.

Stocke v. Edwards1 (Mo., 1922). Governor: To make assessors in cities of 500,000 population elective state officers. Statute: Did so, and, in addition, fixed term office, authorized appointment deputies and employees, specified salaries, directed methods assessment, and created a board of equalization.

Fayette County v. County Commrs.62 (Pa. Dist. Ct.) Governor: To fix amount to be spent on county bridges annually,

6558 Tex. Crim. App. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405.

5677 Tex. Crim. App. 185, 178 S. W. 506.

5724 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611.

58151 Ga. 502, 107 S. E. 765. See also McDonald v. State, 152 Ga. 223, 109 S. E. 656 (1921); Howard v. State, 151 Ga. 845, 108 S. E. 513 (1921); Bibb County v. Williams, 152 Ga. 489, 110 S. E. 275 (1922).

5990 Mo. 646, 3 S. W. 395.

60241 S. W. 945, 951.

61295 Mo. 402, 244 S. W. 802.

18 Pa. Dist. Ct. 217, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 477. See also, in re French Creek Bridge Co., 21 Pa. Dist. Ct. 484, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 477.

and to enact safety regulations for bridges. Statute: Provided plan for advertising for sealed bids for repair and construction contracts relating to county bridges.

State v. Woolen63 (Tenn., 1913). Governor: To make appropriation for maintenance state's institutions, offices, and departments. Statute: Appropriated $25,000 to private corporation organized for development of half-million dollar exposition of natural resources of state.

Columbia, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Hughes (Tenn., 1915). Governor: A road law for Maury County, and amendment of act creating a turnpike commission for that county. Statute: Regulated operation and condition turnpike roads in that county. Could not be amendment mentioned by governor for no original act creating turnpike commission Maury County. Not a road law, for that term refers to general county system public roads.

Manor Casino v. State (Tex., 1896). Governor: No mention of subject of statute, namely, permitting injunctive relief against violation revenue and penal laws.

In several cases, however, the problem of construction proved more difficult:

Jones v. State66 (Ark., 1922). Governor: Establishment of local road, bridge, school, and levee districts, and the amendment of existing local laws for the same. Statute: Required annual reports from commissioners of all road, drainage, and improvement districts which had issued bonds. Held, only amendment of local legislation creating districts contemplated. This statute not an amendatory act, but a new and general act. Dissent: The special improvement district acts of the preceding session had all omitted this report provision, a clause already in the general act. The statute in question was intended as a blanket correction of this defect in these special laws, and was thus within the governor's call.

Mitchell v. Turnpike Co.67 (Tenn., 1842). Governor: Reception and investment of federal aid for education and internal improvements. Statute: Authorized commissioners of any turnpike road to resurvey route and change it when in interests of company. A prior statute incorporating defendant had fixed the route. Held, valid. State owned onethird interest in all turnpike companies.

State v. Shores68 (W. Va., 1888). Governor: To protect the public treasury against unnecessary expenditures by a regulation of the costs, charges, and proceedings in criminal cases.

63128 Tenn. 456, 161 S. W. 1006, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 465.

64131 Tenn. 267, 174 S. W. 1108.

6534 S. W. 769.

66154 Ark. 288, 242 S. W. 377.

673 Humph. 456, 22 Tenn. 444.

6831 W. Va. 491, 7 S. E. 413, 13 A. S. R. 875.

Statute: Gave state power to strike off any two members of any jury, in addition to challenges for cause. Held, valid. Will operate to save money by preventing the hanging of juries by jurymen friendly to defendant.

The Mitchell and Shores cases seem to go rather far. The mere fact that the state owned a one-third interest in the turnpike companies hardly makes the alteration of their routes germane to the subject of investment of federal aid funds. And the relation between allowing the state peremptory challenges and the elimination of unnecessary expense, while possible, is rather remote. Instead, the statute seems more directly to even up the strategic positions of prosecution and defense. Assuming the absence of local constitutional restrictions upon the amendment of local laws by general act, the dissent in the Jones case seems to take the better view.

So much for the cases which have involved mainly the comparison of the statute and the proclamation or message. There remain to be noticed those which have in addition dealt with the extent to which the governor may go in submitting relatively broad and indefinite topics for legislative action, and the extent to which he may restrict the subject-matter by specification of detail:

Davidson v. Moorman69 (Tenn., 1870). Governor (in 1861): Legislation relating to the military and political interests of the state. Statute: Extended time for exercise of equity of redemption in connection with mortgages of land. Held, not within the governor's program.

Wells v. Mo. Pac. Ry.,70 (Mo., 1892). Governor: Referred to previous message at beginning regular biennial session, which in turn called for legislation enforcing the railroad article of the constitution. That article demanded legislation to prevent abuses, discrimination, and extortion in railroad rates, and legislation fixing maximum charges. Statute: Required frogs at switch intersections to be blocked, and abolished defense contributory negligence in cases arising out of unblocked frogs. Held, not within the governor's program.

Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Wolfe" (Neb., 1901). Governor: The revision or amendment of the general incorporation law. This law had much to do with railroad corporations. Statute: Made common carriers insurers of the personal safety of passengers. Not an amendment or revision, but a new law. Held, valid. Statute had effect of amendment.

Duffy v. Cooke12 (Pa., 1913) Governor: To provide for the

692 Heisk. 575, 49 Tenn. 500.

70110 Mo. 286, 19 S. W. 530, 15 L. R. A. 847.

7161 Nebr. 502, 86 N. W. 441; affirmed, 187 U. S. 638, 23 Sup. Ct. 847, 47 L. Ed. 344.

72239 Pa. St. 427, 86 Atl. 1076, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 550.