The purpose of the rule against accumulations is to prevent the sequestration of the fruits and profits of property. Society is best served by the ready alienation and transfer of property, and objects to the accumulation of large fortunes for the benefit of individuals." It is well established in New York, at present, that gifts for charitable uses are not exempt from the prohibition against accumulations. The leading case in support of this proposition is St. John v. The Andrews Institute for Girls. The facts there presented are similar to those of the principal case. The testator devised a residuary fund to a corporation to be formed during the lives of two persons in being, as soon as practicable after his death. The purpose of the corporation was to be the free education of girls and their support during education. About three years after the testator's death his executor secured the incorporation of the "Andrews Institute for Girls." The next of kin contended that the income on the fund accruing between the testator's death and the incorporation of the institute could not be accumulated for a corporation not in existence. The court held that there was an implied direction for the accumulation of income which was void under the statute, since it was not for the benefit of a minor. Furthermore, since the testator failed to bequeath the income to a person capable of receiving it, it passed to his next of kin.

Little uniformity exists among the various states in this country upon the question of the validity of accumulations for charitable uses. In some of the American jurisdictions, as in New York, the matter is now governed by statute, while in a majority of the states the common law rule prevails. The various American rules, as well as the English view, are given below.9

H. Wolkinson.

Institute for Girls, 191 N. Y. 254, 279 (1908), the court said: "The persons entitled to the next eventual estate are the persons entitled to the estate at the end of the period of accumulation." See also Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303, 376 (1871).

The general policy of our law favors the greatest freedom of alienation of property consistent with the necessities of families, ***." Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508, 515 (1883). Minors are not within the reason of the rule, hence the exception for their benefit. During the period of their minority their "judgment is immature, or their necessities are limited, [and they] do not require and might not be safely entrusted with a large income. In that case the legislature authorized it to be retained and accumulated until their majority, for their benefit." There is an excellent discussion of the origin and history of the rule against accumulations, as well as the reasons behind it, on pp. 116 ff. of Professor Bogert's article, supra, n. 1.

7191 N. Y. 254 (1908)

"In the principal case also, the court found that "The gift of some part of the income to the foundation is not in express terms, but there is a clear gift by implication." (p. 490).

'ENGLAND.-All accumulations for the benefit of charity are void. The charity may put an end to the accumulation which is exclusively for its benefit and make immediate use of the income as soon as it accrues. The same rule is applicable where the legatee is a charity as where the legatee is an individual. This rule is stated in Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] App. Cas. 186, 198. For a comment on this case, see Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90, 97 (1913), where the U. S. Supreme Court rejects the English doctrine. It would follow from the rule prevailing in England that an accumulation for the benefit of a charitable corporation not yet in being when the income accrues is void, and would go to the next of kin. For the general rule against accumulations in England and in Australia, under the Thel

lusson Act, see In Re Stevens, [1923] Vict. L. R. (Australia) 584, 591. For a note on this case, see 37 Har. L. Rev. 637. See also Bogert, Trusts, pp. 236 ff. UNITED STATES:

Alabama.-"No trust of estate for the purpose of accumulation only can have any force or effect for a longer term than io years, unless when for the benefit of a minor *** in which case the trust may extend to the termination of such minority." Code (1907), sec. 3410. It would seem from this statute that where the trust fund devised to a charitable corporation or an individual is not for the purpose of accumulation only, that is, where the accumulation is incidental to the primary purpose of the fund, it will be upheld. Speaking of the above section, the court in Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 379, 390 (1921), said that it limits "trusts for accumulation merely; and under the rule against perpetuities, a bequest of personal property is governed by common law." As to the limits of an accumulation at common law, see infra, Iowa.

Arizona.-Accumulations of the rents and profits of real estate only are restricted. The restrictions are similar to those of New York, except that an accumulation is permitted for the sole benefit of a literary or charitable corporation, to terminate upon the expiration of 21 years from the time that the same shall be directed to commence. Rev. Stat. (1913), sec. 4702.

California.-All directions for accumulation of the income of property are void. Exceptions are made for the benefit of minors, identical with those in New York. Kerr's Code, 2nd Ed., (1920), secs. 723ff. See Estate of Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, 20 (1917).

District of Columbia.-The testator's intent will be given effect where he provides for the accumulation of funds for the benefit of certain individuals. Where it is against public policy to uphold an accumulation, a court may declare it invalid. King v. Shelton, 36 App. D. C. 1 (1910), affirmed, in Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90 (1913). From this case it would seem that, a fortiori, an accumulation for the benefit of a charitable organization will be upheld, where public policy dictated such a course.

Connecticut.-No statute now exists, and the common law rule, limiting "the inalienability of an estate to a life or lives in being at the death of the testator and 21 years afterwards," is now the rule in this state. In the absence of statutes, courts of equity will protect the accumulations of income for charitable uses within reasonable limits. Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. (C.C.A.) 806, 809 (1899). See also, Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125 (1893); Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 279, 281 (1915).

Illinois. Accumulations are restricted to a term no longer than (1) the life of the settlor (2) 21 years from the death of the settlor (3) during the minority of any person living, or in ventre sa mere at the settlor's death. Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1908), ch. 30, sec. 155. The statute is a copy of the English Thellusson Act. See French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 254 (1911).

Indiana.-An accumulation of the interest or income of money, or other personal property, is void, except for the benefit of minors. In this respect, the statute is similar to the N. Y. Statute. Burns' Stat. (1914), vol. 4, sec. 9724. As to an accumulation of the rents and profits of real estate, see Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 654 (1921):-"It was testator's thought, too, as appears from his will, that one-half of the income should accumulate. This may be allowed or stopped, as the exigencies require. Appellees talk of this accumulation as going through the ages until it becomes a public menace. There is no occasion for alarm, for this may be limited by a court of equity, so that it will not be a public menace, and so that it will best subserve the main purpose, charity."

Iowa. "Every disposition of property is void which suspends the absolute power of controlling the same, for a longer period than during the lives of persons then in being, and twenty-one years thereafter." Code (1897), sec. 2901. This statute is declaratory of the common law rule. The same rule is in effect in Connecticut without a statute to this effect, see supra. Iowa may be taken as an example of the majority of the states in this country, where the common law rule prevails, and an accumulation of income for the period of lives in being and 21 years will be sustained. See Professor Bogert's article, supra, n. 1, p. 118. See also Bogert, Trusts, pp. 176ff.

In Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Ia. 92, 107 (1894), the accumulation of a fund to

build a hospital was sustained on the ground that the above statute (former sec. 1920) did not apply to devises for charitable purposes.

Louisiana. There is no statute against accumulations. The following decisions may be noted. In Succession of Kernan, 52 La. Ann. 48, 51 (1899), the court held a "destination of the property and its revenues forever to the maintenance of the charitable institution" to be illegal. See also Female Orphan Society v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n. 119 La. 278, 287 (1907), to the effect that public policy is opposed to the validity of a condition of inalienability in a donation for charitable uses.

Massachusetts. It is within the discretionary power of a court of equity to pass upon the validity of an accumulation for charitable ends. If the court believes that public interests might best be served by sustaining the validity of an accumulation, the gift will be upheld. Where however, the gift, though charitable, involves an accumulation entirely unreasonable, and is not supported by sound public policy, it will be declared invalid. Each case is decided upon its own facts. The leading case is St. Paul's Church v. Att'y. Gen'l., 164 Mass. 188, 204 (1895), where the court said: "*** to authorize equitable interference with the accumulation directed by the testator, the accumulation should be unreasonable, unnecessary and to the public injury." See Amory v. Trustees of Amherst College, 229 Mass. 374, 382 (1918), where an accumulation of income for the use of Amherst College was upheld as a "valid charitable trust." In the absence of statutes, the Massachusetts view, with which Connecticut is in accord, represents the leading American view. See Girard Trust Co. v. Russel, 179 Fed. (C. C. A.)_446, 452 (1910); Bogert, Trusts, pp. 236 ff.; 2 British Rul. Cas. 889 ff.; 5 R. C. L. p. 304; Gardner, Wills (2d ed.), p. 138.

Michigan.-Accumulations are restricted to the minority and for the benefit of infants only in the case of rents and profits of real estate. Com. Laws (1915), secs. 11555 ff. In this respect, the statute affects an accumulation for charity to the same extent as the N. Y. statutes. As to accumulations on personalty for charitable uses, see Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 480 (1889); 5 L. R. A. 858.

Minnesota. An accumulation of the rents and profits of real estate is permitted for the benefit of minors during their minority. Gen'l Stat. (1913), secs. 6687 ff. In this respect, the statute is similar to the statutes of Mich., and N. Y. New York.-Supra, n. 1.

North Dakota. The wording of the California statutes is followed, and are to the same effect as those in New York. Laws of N. D. 1913, vol. 1, secs. 5291 ff. Pennsylvania.-Bequests and devises for literary, scientific, charitable or religious purposes are excepted from the operation of the statute, which is in other respects similar to the Illinois statute. Pa. stat. (1920), sec. 18868, p. 1827. Channon's Estate, 266 Pa. 417 (1920). For a limitation upon this exception in favor of charitable corporations, see 1 Purd. Dig. Pa. (13th Ed.) p. 594. See also Bogert, Trusts, p. 239.

South Dakota.-The wording of the California statutes is followed. See supra, North Dakota Rev. Code (1919), sec. 298 ff.

Wisconsin. The statute prohibits an accumulation of the rents and profits of real estate except for the benefit of minors and "(3) For the sole benefit of a literary or charitable corporation ***"-the exception for a charitable use reads exactly like that of the Arizona statute, supra. Stat. (1921), sec. 2061. "As to accumulations resulting from the income of personal estate, there is no legal objection to such a direction (Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 529);"-Will of Stark, 149 Wis. 631, 655 (1912).

U. S. Supreme Court.-The court will sustain an accumulation, having “as an object the application of a testator's bequest to the support and maintenance of the recipient of his bounty." It rejects the English doctrine that "liability to creditors and freedom of alienation are necessary incidents to the right to enjoy the rents and profits of real estate, or the income from other property.' Public policy alone is the check on an accumulation. Shelton v. King, 229 Ú. S. 90, 97 (1913). It would seem, therefore, that an accumulation for a charitable purpose would be upheld, where the ends of public benefit would be served.

Book Reviews

MILTON WEISS, Editor

Legal Philology. Compiled by Fred C. Mullinix from the Legal Opinions of Henry Lamm. F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, Mo. 1923. PP. 344.

It may be stated on good authority that one William Dodd who published the Beauties of Shakespeare somewhere around 1750, was the first to make the discovery that a book of quotations "digested under proper heads" might have a ready sale. He was subsequently hanged at Tyburn.

Legal Philology-Whatever that may mean-is a collection of quotations from the opinions of Henry Lamm, written while he was a member of the Supreme Court of Missouri. The book is well printed on good paper, but the proof reading was not well done. Under the heading "Epigrams and Excerpts" are about four hundred short quotations running from a line to ten lines in length. The balance of the book is made up of longer selections. And all are gathered under familiar digest heads.

One recalls reading years ago portions of Judge Lamm's earlier opinions occasionally published in some legal periodical. He was then by way of acquiring a reputation as a judicial humorist. Here we have the full harvest of that humorous tendency. Judge Lamm was doubtless a sound lawyer. That he was also a man of wide general reading is evidenced by a literary reference index at the end of the volume containing some hundreds of items. But the quality which has made him known to lawyers is his sense of humor. He is of kin to the whole line of American humorists from Artemus Ward to Will Rogers.

Scattered through these extracts are many bright and wise sayings expressed in the homely Doric, which Americans understand and enjoy. One can endure the literary allusions, often dragged in vi et armis, if one can read that "the pie end of the defendant's business never busted;" or that to act as plaintiff did was "to tighten the spigot and spend at the bunghole;" or that "that which cannot be done in a straight line (as the bee flies), can not be done in a circle (as the fox runs)."

Tastes may differ as to whether an opinion of a court of last resort is the place for humor. There are gleams of it now and then even in the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals. But there is probably less difference of opinion as to the wisdom of segregating it.

Judge Lamm's humor, cropping out unexpectedly from the text of an opinion as it appears in the Missouri reports, has a different and finer savor than it has when concentrated in a single volume. And therein it does not differ from the work of his fellow humorists. In

short, a volume of quotations and extracts, humorous or otherwise, does with many minds end by being tedious. To those whose minds are not of that type the book may be commended.

L. C. C.

Cases on the Conflict of Laws. By Ernest G. Lorenzen. Second Edition. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1924. pp. xxiii, 1096.

Anyone who has used the first edition of Professor Lorenzen's Cases on the Conflict of Laws will take the second edition on faith. During the past fifteen years, the first edition has been tried and proved. During those years, the author has profited by his study and his teaching of this fascinating and unsettled branch of law, and the enrichment of the second edition comes as a result of his experience.

One finds little change in the author's method of presentation. There are minor changes in arrangement, the cases on Capacity, for example, being merged in other chapters, and the material on Foreign Corporations being segregated into a new short chapter under that title. Some cases have been omitted and many more have been added, especially those of recent decision, thus making a net addition of three hundred pages to the book. The additional material is evenly distributed in expanding each of the various chapters by about onethird, except that the chapter on Family Law has been increased from eighty pages in the first edition to over two hundred in the second. An outstanding feature of the new edition is the scholarly development of the foot-notes with reference to Continental and South American Law. Lawyers with international practice will doubtless find assistance in these collections of authorities.

Robert S. Stevens.

Outlines of Evidence. By William Payson Richardson. Third Edition. Published by the Author. Brooklyn Law School. 1923. pp. xxvii, 529.

This book is intended primarily for use by students and lawyers in the state of New York, and designedly emphasizes the law of this jurisdiction. It purports to give only the outlines of the law of evidence as developed in this state, and properly makes no pretense of competition with the more exhaustive treatises. In fact, it does not even lay claim to having exhausted the authorities within its field. It with proper modesty limits its endeavor to a presentation of present conditions and tendencies, subordinating other things to this end. Even in the field of procedure no jurisdiction can be wholly selfsufficient, and any book which limits itself to the law of any single jurisdiction, however important that jurisdiction may happen to be, must be received with grave doubts as to its value. Perhaps the doubt is somewhat less in the field of procedure than elsewhere, but even here the doubt must exist. Even New York has its rules of evi