In many respects the law of wills in other jurisdictions follows closely the New York Statute of Wills. In fact the strong tendency of almost all American jurisdictions is to harmonize in general essentials. Various states of the southwest have been influenced by the law of continental Europe in favor of holographic wills and other peculiar rules and modes of testamentary disposition with which the pure Anglo-Saxon stock was unfamiliar, but in other sections the New York system has been one of the well recognized models. In respect of many points in the law of wills the New York authorities are more numerous than those of all other jurisdictions combined. The present work should prove valuable to investigators in other jurisdictions because of its full treatment of essentials, and its detailed consideration of those principles of New York law which have been adopted elsewhere. The author has treated fully those phases of the subject which from their complexity most frequently occasion difficulty. These matters are illustrated by complete citations to authority and discussion of all the important cases. Two hundred and forty-seven sections are devoted to Responsibility and Volition of Deceased; seventy-nine sections, to Interpretation and Construction; fifty-six sections, to Validity of Testamentary Provisions. Throughout the work matters of evidence, burden of proof, presumptions, and the weight and importance of various facts and circumstances have received careful treatment. Fundamental principles upon which the authorities are substantially agreed, and which do not involve intricate sets of facts, have been stated clearly with citations to leading cases. Especially with regard to the more recent cases, an interpretation of which has not become fixed in the minds of the profession, the fact that the author has not relied upon the syllabi, but has resorted to the full opinions and searched out the underlying principles, often omitted or erroneously stated in the syllabi, should prove of great value. A blind dependence on head notes serves but to perpetuate errors of the reporter and to render valueless the opinions of our courts by obscuring their true meaning. Another feature of this work which should not pass unnoticed is the fact that the work will be kept up to date by annual supplements of statutory changes and new decisions. A pocket has been provided at the back of each volume for these supplements. This device, with which the profession is already familiar, will serve to prolong the life and usefulness of the work. H. E. W. A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law. By John Henry Wigmore. Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass. 1923. Second Edition. Five Volumes. pp. ccxvii, 5324. The first edition of this work was an enormous task. It represented fine judgment, painstaking care and a prodigious amount of effort. The complete success of that edition leaves little to be said about the second, which will not be anticipated by the reader before the statement reaches his eye. Typographically the new work is most satisfactory. The print is clear, the paper good, and even the extended notes are read without the feeling that little by little one is exchanging eyes for information. The addition of new tables and diagrams, the arrangement of citations under state headings, together with the other changes mentioned in the preface, all contribute to make the new edition more easily usable. The author, as was to be expected, continues the terminology adopted in the first edition. It must, however, be confessed that there are those, the writer among them, who after some eighteen years still find these terms rather awkward, despite their claim of greater accuracy. There are those who still speak of "real evidence" in preference to "autoptic proference" and who use the word "precautionary" rather than "prophylactic" in connection with a certain group of rules. This is perhaps a matter of taste, and no mere question of personal preference can obscure the true value of this great work. It stands in a class which it has created for itself. It is, unquestionably, the preeminent work on the law of Evidence in America, if not in the English-speaking world. It is a really wonderful combination of philosophy, principle and precedent. The author has done well the task which he set for himself. In the preface to the first edition he said: "The rules of Evidence, as recorded in our law, may be said to be essentially rational. The reason may not always be a good one, in point of policy. But there is always a reason. If we are to save the law for a living future, if it is to remain manageable amidst the spawning mass of rulings and statutes which tend increasingly to clog its simplicity, we must rescue these reasonings from forgetfulness. A main attempt, therefore, in the following pages and in the preparation for them, has been to search out and to emphasize the accepted reasons for each rule. *** For the law of Evidence, the oblivion of the originals would have the worst consequences. But with these gleanings of the best passages, collated and preserved in form for convenient access, it may be hoped that the reasons of the law will not be buried from daily understanding and that the life of the rules will not be lost." To one even slightly familiar with the making of a worth-while text, the "bewildering mass of precedents" in the field of Evidence makes the writing of a comprehensive discussion and detailed criticism of all the rules in all their variations almost like playing simultaneous chess against an unlimited number of opponents. The practically perfect accuracy, and exceptional judgment of the great law writer have made his success well nigh unqualified. It is indeed rarely that he, as he does in section 2506, declines to offer a practical solution for, or at least a theoretical discussion of, even the most complicated and "knotty question." One characteristic must necessarily strike the reader who attempts to make extended use of the work. This is the fact that it has practically no high spots and no valleys. It proceeds evenly upon a sustained high level. There are no soft spots. While it is volumi nous, one feels that it is so because volume was unavoidable. There is no feeling that the writer was working for a page rate, but on the contrary there is a feeling that nothing appears which would not by its absence mar and weaken the discussion. One scarcely gets beyond the threshold of the first volume before he encounters the moving ideal which inspires the whole treatise. One has but to read sections 4a to 8, inclusive, to find the key to the entire discussion. These sections deal with "the history, shortcomings and future of rules of evidence." The reader has but to open the volumes at random to encounter a careful and constructive discussion of this type, such, for example, as that in section 2070 on the admissability of uncorroborated criminal confessions. The reason for this sustained uniformity of quality, if one is desired, seems to be found in the fact that Dean Wigmore has written himself into the books which he presents. The result is a sort of picture of himself, who has ever been preeminently a philosopher and a reformer and a success as both. This new sharpening of an already keen tool of the craft should be welcomed by the legal profession; judges, lawyers and teachers alike. The slothful attorney may still complain over being asked to absorb the history and philosophy, which for him are bitter, albeit beneficial, medicine. He may, in his search merely for the latest pronouncement of some court, declare a strong preference for a work which is more in the nature of an encyclopaedia or digest, and may omit the curative treatment which he needs most. But there is no one so fatuous as to believe that the law of Evidence has reached a static condition of near-perfection, or is beyond the need of reform, and least of all this great law writer, who points the way to effective development and growth. For, if we are to have reform, it, obviously, should spring from a careful consideration of the history, purposes, reasons, and even the emotions which lie behind the rules we seek to change. It was to furnish just these things that the original work was planned. Nineteen years of results testify to its effectiveness, and they are only the beginning of a long period of usefulness. In the list of books absolutely essential to a good law library, "Wigmore on Evidence" must stand very nearly at the head. No other work quite takes its place. L. P. W. Books Received Prize Cases Decided in the United States Supreme Court. Prepared under the Supervision of James Scott Brown. Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York City. 1923. Three Volumes. pp. xc, 2183. A Treatise on the American Law of Administration. By J. G. Woerner. Handbook of Common-Law Pleading. By Benjamin J. Shipman. 1923. West By Archibald H. Second Edition. pp. x, 611. Longmans, Green & Co., Interpretations of Legal History. By Roscoe Pound. Macmillan. Co., New York City. 1923. pp. xiv, 171. Two questions will be discussed in this and the following pages. In the first place, does the Statute of Frauds prevent the formation of a valid partnership by oral agreement to deal in lands or to create interests in lands? In the second place, if the Statute of Frauds does not impair the validity of such agreements, then what are the limits to this exception to the general rule? The Statute of Frauds provides in substance that no estate or interest in lands shall be created by parol; that no action shall be brought upon any contract involving the sale of land or any interest in or concerning land unless such contract is in writing or there is a written memorandum thereof; that no trust in lands shall be declared unless it shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the declarant. The Statute of Frauds itself makes no exceptions in favor of partnership agreements, nor is there any doubt that the statute applies to equitable interests in lands. Likewise it needs no citations to prove that the statute applies to agreements of partnership to continue for more than one year.2 Prior to the year 1800 there seems to have been no holding, English or American, to the effect that an oral agreement to form a partnership to deal in land or concerning an interest in land was not within the Statute of Frauds unless the case presented facts constituting a resulting or constructive trust.3 †Professor of Law, and Librarian, Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, Ohio. 1Hughes v. Moore, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 176, 192 (1812); Browne, Statute of Frauds (4th ed.), sec. 229 and cases cited; 23 Cent. Dig., Frauds, St. of, sec. 84; 9 Dec. Dig., Frauds, St. of, sec. 56. 2Browne, Statute of Frauds (4th ed.), sec. 272; 23 Cent. Dig., Frauds, St. of, sec. 66; 9 Dec. Dig., Frauds, St. of, sec. 44 (2). 'Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1, 20 (1820): “If you merely employ a man by parol *** to buy an estate for you, although he buy it accordingly, yet if he hold himself out as the real purchaser, and no part of the purchase |