ing them home to the knowledge of the master, or by showing them to
be of such nature, character, and frequency that the master, in the
exercise of due care, must have had them brought to his notice.
(Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

16. MASTER AND SERVANT.-Specific Acts of Incompetency of
Fellow-servants cannot be shown to prove that such servants were neg-
ligent in doing, or omitting to do, the act complained of. (Ala.)
First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

17. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servants-Proximate
Cause. The incompetency of a servant, in all cases, in order to charge
the master with negligence, must be the proximate cause of the injury.
The mere fact that the servant was incompetent and the master had
knowledge thereof is of no importance, unless therein is found the
cause of the injury or a cause contributory thereto, without which it
might not have happened. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

18. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servants.-Negli-
gence such as unfits a person for service or renders it negligent in a
master to retain him in the employment, must be habitual, rather
than occasional, or of such a character as to render it imprudent to
retain him in the service. A single exceptional act will not prove a
servant incapable or negligent. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chandler,
39.

19. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servants-Waiver of
Negligence of Master.-If the injured servant knew of the incompe-
tency of his offending fellow-servant as well as his master knew of it,
and, notwithstanding such knowledge, continued in the employment
without objection, he thereby waived the negligence of the master in
retaining in his employ such incompetent servant. (Ala.) First Nat.
Bank v. Chandler, 39.

20. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servant-Negligence
of Master. If it is sought to recover for injury to a servant caused
by the alleged incompetency of a fellow-servant, it is not necessary
that the complaint in charging negligence should state the quo modo,
or negative the fact that plaintiff knew of such incompetency before
going into the place of danger where the injury was received.
First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

(Ala.)

21. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servant-Negligence
of Master.-If a complaint for injury to a servant charges the master
at common law in failing to inform himself of the incompetency of
a fellow-servant of plaintiff, it is not necessary in such complaint to
lay such failure to some person intrusted by the master with manage-
ment and superintendence. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.
22. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence of Fellow-servant.—If
a servant is injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant in the
operation of an elevator while the injured servant was at work in
the shaft, the fact that the latter stated that he had only a small
amount of work to do and that he would be through with it in a few
moments did not justify the elevator operator in causing the elevator
to descend the shaft without first ascertaining that the shaft was
clear. Especially when such statement was not made to him or to
anyone authorized to act upon it. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chand-
ler, 39.

23.

MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servant-Evidence.-
Proof of the fact that a servant disobeyed his master's instructions is
competent on the issue of the servant's incompetency. (Ala.) First
Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 113-72

24. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servant. If it is
sought to recover for injury to a servant caused by the alleged in-
competency of a fellow-servant, an answer alleging that the injured
servant had knowledge of his fellow-servant's ability to do his work
is insufficient to charge the injured servant with knowledge of the
incompetency of such fellow-servant. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v.
Chandler, 39.

25. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetent Servant.-An instrue-
tion that if an injury to a servant was caused by the slipping of the
brake of an elevator, he cannot recover, is properly refused when the
jury is entitled to find that the slipping of such brake was caused by
the incompetency of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff. (Ala.) First
Nat. Bank v. Chandler, 39.

Warning Trainmen of Danger.

26. RAILROADS-Duty to Warn Trainmen of Dangers in Roadbed.
Trainmen do not assume the risk of defective track conditions and
have a right to assume that the track is safe, and the duty to warn
them of defects in the roadbed rests upon the company. (Ala.)
Western Ry. v. Russell, 24.

Actions by Servant for Injuries.

27. MASTER AND SERVANT-Sufficiency of Complaint.-A com-
plaint for injury to a servant caused by his being struck by defend-
ant's railroad engine, failing to charge that the person whose negli-
gence is complained of was in charge of such engine, does not state a
good cause of action. (Ala.) Tennessee Coal etc. R. R. Co. v. Bridges,
35.

28. MASTER AND SERVANT-Sufficiency of Complaint.-A com-
plaint alleging that an injury to a servant resulted from the wanton,
reckless or intentional act of a fellow-servant, but not alleging that
the master was guilty of negligence in the selection of such servant,
in the orders given him, or otherwise, does not state a good cause of
action. (Ala.) Tennessee Coal etc. R. R. Co. v. Bridges, 35.

29. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to Servant-Sufficiency of
Complaint.-A complaint against a railroad company for the death
of its engineer due to defects in the roadbed, alleging the negligent
failure of the company to maintain its tracks in proper condition, and
that a culvert was defectively constructed in being too small to carry
off the water during heavy rains, and that the material of which it
was constructed had become weak from Lecay, is sufficient as against
demurrer. (Ala.) Western Ry. v. Russell, 24.

30. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to Servant.-If an em-
ployé is injured by the operation of an elevator below the first floor
of a building, while he was in the elevator shaft in the basement,
a request to charge concerning the running of such elevator to the
first floor is properly refused. (Ala.) First Nat. Bank v. Chandler,
39.

Liability of Master for Acts of Servant.

31. MASTER AND SERVANT—Negligence.-A master is liable
to third persons for the negligent conduct of his servant, while acting
within the line of his duty and in obedience to his master's author-
ity, independently of whether there is any liability of the servant to
his master. (III.) Star Brewery Co. v. Hauck, 420.

32.

MASTER AND SERVANT-Liability of Saloon-keeper for As-
sault by Bar-keeper.-A saloon-keeper is not liable for an assault

on one of his patrons committed by his bar-keeper not in the scope
of his employment. (Ark.) Anderson & Co. v. Diaz, 180.

See Constitutional Law, 14-23.

MECHANICS' LIENS.

1. MECHANICS' LIENS are Governed by the Law existing at
the time the work is done and the liens are filed. (Cal.) Higgins v.
Charlotta Gold Min. Co., 344.

2. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Unrecorded Contract.-A contract for
plastering which does not expressly state the aggregate cost of the
work, but which nevertheless clearly calls for an expenditure of over
one thousand dollars, is, if not recorded, void under section 1183 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and the materials will be deemed fur-
nished at the "personal instance of the owner,' so that a lien there-
for may be had against the building. (Cal.) Smith v. Bradbury, 189.
3. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Unrecorded Contract. If a contract for
more than one thousand dollars is void because not recorded, payment
by the owner to the contractor is no defense to a claim of lien by
employés. (Cal.) Berentz v. Belmont Oil Min. Co., 308.

4. MECHANIC'S LIEN on Leased Mining Claim.-In the fore-
closure of a mechanic's lien on a leased mining claim, a default judg-
ment against the owner is erroneous, if the complaint does not allege
the lessee's authority to develop the mine, nor the lessor's knowledge
of the work, and the mine is charged with a lien for a larger amount
than the demand stated in the summons, which in this particular does
not correspond with the prayer in the complaint. (Cal.) Berentz v.
Belmont Oil Min. Co., 308.

5. MECHANIC'S LIEN on Oil Lands.-A Tract of Land in pro-
cess of development as an oil mine is a mining claim within the mean-
ing of the mechanic's lien law. (Cal.) Berentz v. Belmont Oil Min.
Co., 308.

6. MECHANIC'S LIEN on Oil Lands.-When Labor or Material is
expended in developing an oil claim, a mechanic's lien attaches
thereto. If it is the claim of a single locator to twenty acres, the
lien covers the twenty acres; if it is a consolidated claim of several
locators, worked as a whole, the lien covers the entire consolidated
claim. (Cal.) Berentz v. Belmont Oil Min. Co., 308.

7. MECHANIC'S LIENS on Leased Mining Claim.-Where a lease
of mining property provides that the lessees shall work and develop
the mine and pay the lessor a percentage of the net profits, the lessees
are, under section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarded as
the agents of the lessor, and both his and their interests are subject
to liens for work done in developing the mine and extracting ore,
(Cal.) Higgins v. Charlotta Gold Min. Co., 344.

MINES AND MINERALS.

1. MINING CLAIM-Error in Date of Location.-The date of the
location of a mining claim as fixed by the locator upon his notice does
not absolutely control in case the claim is also located by another.
The conflicting rights of the parties are governed by the fact of the
prior location, of which the written date of the notice is, at the most,
only evidence. An error, if any, in the date must give way to the
proved fact. (Cal.) Webb v. Carlon, 305.

2. MINING CLAIM-Error in Date of Location.-Where a notice
of location is placed on a mining claim, and the boundaries are marked,

one who makes a subsequent location of the property cannot be misled by the erroneous date of the notice nor heard to say that he has been injured by the error. (Cal.) Webb v. Carlon, 305.

3. MINES AND MINERALS.-A mining right may be separated from the surface, the surface being held by one person and the mining right by another. (Ohio St.) Gill v. Fletcher, 962.

4. MINES AND MINERALS.-The Severance of a Mine and the Surface of Lands may be Accomplished by a conveyance of the mines and minerals, or by a conveyance of the land with a reservation or exception of the mines and minerals. (Ohio St.) Gill v. Fletcher, 962.

5. MINES AND MINERALS, Exception of, What Amounts to.— A conveyance of a tract of land providing that the grantor reserves to himself one-half of the plaster or the proceeds thereof which may hereafter be found on such land," "to have and to hold the same, the one-half of the plaster as above designated only excepted," does not amount to a mere reservation of the grantor terminating with his life, but is an exception whereby the grantor retains to himself the fee simple in one-half of the plaster. (Ohio St.) Gill v. Fletcher,

962.

See Adverse Possession, 6-8; Mechanics' Liens.

MONOPOLIES.

MONOPOLIES.—A Combination Between Corporations engaged in carrying freight and passengers by steamer between points in different states, whereby the net earnings are pooled and divided in certain proportions, and whereby a monopoly in the traffic is created, is unlawful and invalid under the Sherman act. (Mich.) White Star Line v. Star Line of Steamers, 551.

Foreclosure.

MORTGAGES.

1. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Parties-Wife of MortgagorEffect of Decree.-If a mortgagor's wife is made a party to a proceeding to foreclose his mortgage, and subsequently acquires such interest as her husband had in the land, she is bound by the foreclosure decree. (Ill.) Gouwens v. Gouwens, 395.

2. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Res Judicata.-Parties defendant to a foreclosure suit who claim liens may set up their claims by answer and make proof of the facts upon which they claim their liens, but unless there is a surplus after satisfying the mortgage debt, there is nothing to litigate between the defendants, and hence no adjudication which can become res judicata as between the mortgagor and such defendants as to the validity of their liens. (Ill.) Gouwens v. Gouwens, 395.

3.

MORTGAGES-Defenses.-By a Foreclosure by Advertisement, the owner of the equity of redemption may be deprived of a defense which he could successfully interpose had an action been brought to foreclose the mortgage. (N. Y.) House v. Carr, 936.

4.

MORTGAGES-Enjoining Sale Under Power After Bar of Limitations. A court of equity will not, on the ground that the statute of limitations has run against a mortgage, restrain a sale under the power of sale contained in the mortgage, where it is not shown that the bond and mortgage have been in fact paid. (N. Y.) House v. Carr, 936.

Redemption.

5. REDEMPTION Under Supposed Lien, When Premature.—If by statute a party is entitled to redeem from foreclosure sale only

by giving notice of his intention when he has a lien on the premises, a notice given of an intention to redeem under the lien of a judg ment is entirely ineffective if the judgment is not docketed until some hours afterward. (Minn.) Brady v. Gilman, 622.

6. REDEMPTION, Validity of, When May be Questioned.Though the amount paid for redemption is all that can be lawfully exacted, the validity of the redemption can be objected to where its effect is to subrogate the redemptioner to the rights of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and to thereby transmit an absolute title to the premises unless further redemption is made within the time specified by law. (Minn.) Brady v. Gilman, 622.

Forged Satisfaction.

7. MORTGAGES-Forged Satisfaction-Estoppel of Testamentary Trustees. Where one of three testamentary trustees, holding a mortgage for the benefit of their trust, executed a satisfaction of the mortgage, purporting to be signed by himself and his cotrustees, but the signature of one of whom was forged and the other obtained by fraud, the fact that his cotrustees had surrendered to him full control of the trust estate and had failed, upon discovery of his dishonesty, to compel him to make restitution, and had failed to notify the mortgagor, and had obtained releases from their adult cestuis que trustent, does not estop them from enforcing, as trustees, the demands of the estate which they represent, even though it might be sufficient as an estoppel against them individually. (N. Y.) Vohmann v. Michel, 921.

See Chattel Mortgages; Executors and Administrators, 7-9; Limitation of Actions, 4.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Delegation of Power by State. While it is competent for the state to delegate its sovereign power to cities and villages in regard to the construction, management and control of these companies, such surrender of sovereignty cannot be implied, but must rest on express legislation containing a clear and unqualified grant of power. (N. Y.) Village of Carthage v. Central New York Tel. etc. Co., 932.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Liability of for Injuries Due to Ultra Vires Acts.-A municipal corporation is not liable for negligence in the doing of an ultra vires act. (Va.) Donable v. Town of Harrisonburg, 1056.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Compelling the Placing of Telephone Wires Underground.-Under the transportation corporation law granting such corporations the right to construct and maintain telephone lines upon, over, or under any public roads, streets and highways, and the village law conferring upon the boards of trustees of villages the power to regulate, the erection of telegraph, telephone or electric light poles, and the stringing of wires on those poles, the right of a telephone company to erect poles and string wires is derived from the state, but the village authorities may regulate their erection; that is to say, the location of the poles and the streets to be occupied. Hence a village has no power to compel a telephone conduits. (N. Y.) Village of Carthage v. Central New York Tel.

etc. Co., 932.

4. A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION is Restricted to Its Corporate Limits, as a general rule, in the exercise of its powers. (Va.) Donable v. Town of Harrisonburg, 1056.