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STATUTES.

Title of Act.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Title of Act.-A statute entitled
"An act relating to elections," and providing for the removal of
officers for malfeasance by summary proceedings on complaint of a
private individual, is in violation of a constitutional provision requir
ing each law to embrace but one subject, and matter properly con-
nected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in its title, since
such removals from office have no proper connection with the subject
of elections. (Nev.) Bell v. District Court, 854. .

Validity and Interpretation.

2. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE Resort to Title of Act.-In
construing the language of a code section, resort with propriety may
be had to the title of the act. (Cal.) Estate of Clark, 197.

3. STATUTES.-Neither Bad Grammar nor Bad English will Viti-
ate a Statute if the meaning of the legislature can be clearly dis-
covered. Awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical phrases and sen-
tences may yet convey a definite meaning, and if they do so, the
courts must except it as the meaning of the lawmakers. (Minn.)
State v. Bates, 612.

4. STATUTES, Interpretation in Favor of Validity of.-A stat-
ute must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference. An in-
terpretation which renders a statute null and void cannot be admitted.
It ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have effect,
and not be found vain and nugatory. (Minn.) State v. Bates, 612.

5. STATUTES, Omitting Words for the Purpose of Interpreting.-
The court may, in interpreting a statute, omit a word to render the
statute intelligible, if, as it stands, it is devoid of sensible meaning.
(Minn.) State v. Bates, 612.

6. STATUTES, Rule with Respect to Conflicting Provisions-In-
tent First Expressed, When to Control.-The rule that what appears
last in a statute is the last expression of the legislative will should
not be applied where the provision standing first in the act is more
in harmony with other statutes in pari materia, and especially when
it is in harmony with the unquestionable general purpose of the stat-
ute to be interpreted. (Minn.) State v. Bates, 612.

Repeal by Implication.

7. STATUTES-Repeal by Implication.-As between two conflict-
ing statutes, the one first enacted to take effect after sixty days is
impliedly repealed by the one enacted a day later to take effect
immediately. (Cal.) Ex parte Sohncke, 236.

8. STATUTES-Repeal by Implication.-An unconstitutional stat-
ute does not repeal by implication portions of a former statute incon-
sistent therewith. (Cal.) Ex parte Sohncke, 236.

STREET RAILROADS.

1. STREET RAILWAYS - Negligence, Contributory, When Im-
puted to Person Injured by.-One who alights from a street-car, and
whose view is obstructed by it and who knows that, by waiting a
short time, it will move on and his view become unobstructed, is
guilty of contributory negligence if he at once crosses the other
track, where he is struck by another car which he must have seen
and been able to avoid had he waited until his view became unob-
structed. (Mo.) Hornstein v. United Railways Co., 693.

2. STREET RAILWAYS.-The Duty to Stop, Look and Listen
applies to street as well as to steam railways. (Mo.) Hornstein v.
United Railways Co., 693.

3. STREET RAILWAYS.-The Failure to Sound the Gong or Give
Other Warning, though it constitutes negligence on the part of the
operatives of a street railway, will not entitle a person to recover
for injuries due to a collision, if he was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in not stopping, looking, and listening to ascertain whether
a car was approaching. (Mo.) Hornstein v. United Railways Co.,

693.

Note.

Street Railways, presumption of negligence from accidents on, 1028,
1029.

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1. VESSEL-Situs for Purposes of Taxation.-If a vessel is owned
by residents of different states, and is engaged in commerce on the
high seas, her home port, for purposes of taxation, is that where her
managing owner resides, notwithstanding she has never been in the
waters thereof, nor received permanent registration thereat, but is
temporarily registered in another state whose waters she enters as an
incident of her employment in foreign commerce. (Cal.) Olson v.
San Francisco, 191.

Of Stock of Foreign Corporation.

2.

TAXATION.-Shares of Stock in a Foreign Corporation owning
property within and without the state are, under the Michigan stat-
utes, assessable to a shareholder residing in that state. (Mich.)
Thrall v. Guiney, 528.

3.

TAXATION-Stock in a Foreign Corporation.-A resident of
this state, who owns stock in a foreign corporation, cannot complain
of an assessment in this state on his stock at four-fifths its value,
when one-fifth of the property of the company is situated within
the state and four-fifths thereof is located in other states and there
taxed according to their laws. (Mich.) Thrall v. Guiney, 528.
Of Railroads.

4. RAILROADS-Value for Taxation.-The cash value of a rail-
road for the purpose of taxation must be determined by its net earn-
ings, capitalized at the current rate of interest, taking into con-
sideration any immediate prospect of an increase or decrease in its
earning capacity, and if it appears that its actual cost, which is prima
facie its value, was in excess of the necessary cost, the necessary cost

is the proper standard. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co.,
834.

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5. RAILROADS Taxation-Net Income.-The net income of a
railroad, for the purposes of taxation, is the difference between the
gross receipts and necessary expenses under reasonably economical
and prudent management. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co.,
834.

6. RAILROADS - Earning Capacity for Purposes of Taxation—
Evidence. On the question as to the earning capacity of a railroad
for the purposes of taxation, classifications of items of expense by
the railroad company in its accounts are not evidence in its favor,
except as substantiated by the original entries of the transactions
in its books. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.

7. RAILROADS-Earning Capacity for Purposes of Taxation
Evidence-Waiver of. If, on the question as to the earning capacity
of a railroad for the purposes of taxation, its books of account are
not placed in evidence, and the opposing parties seek to prove a
result from them by the opinion of an expert, and each party objects
to the opinion of the opposing witness, without objection as to the
books themselves, the introduction of the books in evidence is
waived. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.

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8. RAILROADS Earning Capacity for Purposes of Taxation
Expenditures-Presumption.-On the question as to the earning ca-
pacity of a railroad for the purposes of taxation, it is presumed that
charges for things essential to the operation of the road represent
reasonable and economical expenditures. (Nev.) State v. Nevada
Central R. R. Co., 834.

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9. RAILROADS Taxation of Earning Capacity-Evidence. If
on the issue as to the earning capacity of a railroad for the purposes
of taxation, the question whether certain charges of expense are
legitimate, and whether earnings other than those shown should not
have been received is disputed, it is error to permit expert account-
ants who have examined the railroad books to give parol evidence
of their opinion as to what the railroad's net earnings should have
been based on an arbitrary classification and exclusion of debts and
credits. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.

10. RAILROADS Value for Taxation. On the issue as to the
value of a railroad for taxation, evidence of an offer of a certain sum
for the road made to its general manager by persons who had neither
the intention nor the ability to buy for themselves, but who made
such offer on behalf of others who are not shown to have been able
to buy or to have known the value of the property, is not admissible.
(Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.

11. RAILROADS-Value for Taxation.-In estimating the value of
a railroad for the purposes of taxation, taxes actually paid by the
railroad company should be added to its operating expenses and de-
ducted from its gross income. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R.
Co., 834.

12. RAILROADS-Value for Taxation-Indebtedness.-In estimat-
ing the value of a railroad for the purpose of taxation, evidence of
the value of its bonds secured by mortgage, and of the value of bonds
issued by a county to aid in its construction, is admissible to show
the cost of the road. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co.,
834.

13. RAILROADS-Value for Taxation-Cost-Presumption.—The
presumption that a railroad, for the purpose of taxation, is worth its
cost continues until it is shown that it is less by reason of insufficient

earning capacity to pay net current rates of interest on its cost, or
from other causes. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.
14. RAILROADS-Value for Taxation-Evidence. If a witness
has not made computations of a railroad's earning balances for a
number of years, as to which he is asked to testify, and does not
know whether such balances are correct, nor what items they include
his testimony on that point is not admissible. (Nev.) State v.
Nevada Central R. R. Co., 834.

Validity of Tax--Uniformity-Double Taxation.

15. TAXATION.-Presumptions are in Favor of the Validity of
an official tax levy. (Nev.) State v. Nevada Central R. R. Co., $34.

16. TAXATION and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.-The fourteenth amendment to the con-
stitution of the United States imposes limits on the exercise of the
powers of the state, including that of taxation. (Mo.) State v.
Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 661.

17. TAXATION, Uniformity Required in.-The general rule is that
taxes must be uniform and equal, coextensive with the territory to
which the tax applies. (Mo.) State v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 661.

18. TAXATION, Discrimination in Favor of Localities, When For-
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.-An amendment to the constitution of the state au-
thorizing the county courts to levy, at their discretion, a special
amount of taxes for road and bridge purposes, but exempting desig-
nated cities in different counties of the state, makes a discrimina-
tion in favor of those cities and against other portions of the state
not permitted by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States. (Mo.) State v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 661.

19. TAXATION. A Prohibition Against Double Taxation con-
tained in a state constitution applies only to the taxing of property
by that state, and therefore is not violated where stock in a foreign
corporation is assessed by that state to a shareholder therein residing,
while the property of the corporation is taxed in another state where
it is situated. (Mich.) Thrall v. Guiney, 528.

Tax Sale and Deed.

20. TAX SALE-Deed from State-Recitals as Evidence.-When
the state conveys land acquired by it for taxes, the requirement of
section 3898 of the Political Code that the deed to the purchaser
shall recite "the facts necessary to authorize such sale and con-
veyance, which deed shall convey all the interest of the state in and
to such property, and shall be prima facie evidence of all facts
recited therein," does not operate as proof of the execution of a prior
deed whereby the title of the taxpayer has been transferred from him
to the state. (Cal.) County Bank v. Jack, 286.

21. TAX DEEDS Description.-A tax deed describing the land as
"part E. 1, N. E. 4, Sec. 32," is void for insufficiency of descrip-
tion. (Ark.) Dickinson v. Arkansas City Imp. Co., 170.

22. TAX DEEDS-Limitation of Actions.-A tax deed, void for
uncertainty of description of the land intended to be conveyed does
not set the statute of limitations in operation. (Ark.) Dickinson v.
Arkansas City Imp. Co., 170.

23. TAX DEEDS-Sale for Excessive Sum.-The sale of an entire
tract of land for the whole of the taxes assessed, when part of the
taxes thereon have been paid, renders the sale and tax deed void.
(Ark.) Dickinson v. Arkansas City Imp. Co., 170.

In General.

1.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES - Source of Power to
Erect Poles.-In New York the telegraph and, telephone companies
derive the right to erect their poles and string their wires directly
from the state. (N. Y.) Village of Carthage v. Central New York
Tel. etc. Co., 932.

2. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES—Authority of Agent-Presump-
tion. It is presumed that a telegraph agent intrusted with receiving
messages for transmission has authority to bind it by his agreement
as to the time for sending it, even to the extent of disregarding the
regulations as to the hours of opening and closing its office, to which
the message is to be sent. (Ala.) Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mer-
rill, 66.

3. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Limitation of Liability.-A stip-
ulation on a blank on which a telegraph message is written that "the
company will not be liable for damages in any case where the claim
is not presented in writing within sixty days after sending the mes-
sage, "does not bar a right to recover, although the claim was pre-
sented after that time, if the delay was caused by the misleading
statements of the company's agent. (Ark.) Arkansas etc. Ry. Co.
v. Stroude, 130.

4. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Stipulation as to Notice-Ex-
cuse for Noncompliance.-A stipulation in a telegram requiring notice
of a claim for damages to be given within sixty days after sending
the message as a condition precedent to recovery does not require
that the addressee give such notice before he could, with reasonable
diligence, ascertain that the telegraph company had failed to deliver
the message. (Ark.) Arkansas etc. Ry. Co. v. Stroude, 130.

Failure to Deliver Message-Free Delivery Limits.

5. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Failure to Deliver Message.-Ex-
emplary Damages cannot be recovered against a telegraph company for
its failure to deliver a telegram unless the company's employés knew
where the addressee might be found and willfully and wantonly failed
to deliver the message. (Ark.) Arkansas etc. Ry. Co. v. Stroude,

130.

6. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES Failure to Send Message-Dam-
ages-Proximate Cause.-If damages are sustained by reason of the
failure of a telegraph company to send a message notifying the sendee
of the serious illness of his wife, it is error to charge, as matter
of law, that he is entitled to recover damages for mental anguish
and pain suffered by him. That is a question to be determined by the
jury upon consideration of whether such failure was the proximate
cause of the suffering, or whether it would not have followed if the
message had been promptly transmitted and delivered. (Ala.) West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Merrill, 66.

7. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES - Failure to Deliver Message-
Presumption as to Free Delivery Limits.-If a telegraphic message
is handed in for transmission, the presumption is that the sendee
lives within free delivery limits and that the sender takes the risk
of delivery unless he makes arrangements for delivery at a greater
distance. Handing in such a message without explanation casts
duty on the transmitting operator, other than to forward the message
accurately and with proper diligence, and it casts no duty on the
terminal operator other than to copy the message correctly and to

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