terms. An owner of shares of stock in a foreign corporation was assessed the value of his shares. It appeared that the property of the corporation was situated and was taxed outside the state. The assessment of the shares was sustained. In each of these cases there was, in fact, double taxation of property, if the shares of stock are considered as mere evidence of the interest of the holder of them in the property of the corporation. In only one of the cases was there such double taxation in this state. It is plain that the constitutional rule can apply only to the taxing of property by this state, and this being so, judicial interference with the 397 subject can go no further than to see that as to taxes levied by and within the state the rule is observed.

Has the legislature exempted these shares of stock from taxation? It is said that the facts make a case to be governed by the provisions of clause 5, above quoted, and that proper construction would be expressed by the formula that shares of stock in foreign corporations shall be subject to taxation, except when the property is actually and permanently invested in business in another state. We are of opinion that this contention must be held to be disposed of against relator by the decision in Bacon v. Board of State Tax Commrs., 126 Mich. 22, 86 Am. St. Rep. 524, 85 N. W. 307, 60 L. R. A. 321.

It is said, also, that there is no statutory provision for taxing the stock of a foreign corporation after deducting the value of its property within this state. Undoubtedly this is true, and it is also true, as pointed out, that if assessors are to adopt the method pursued in this case, in assessing citizens of this state who own shares of stock in foreign corporations having some property within the state, difficulties will arise in fixing values of such shares for the purposes of assessment. In the case before us there has been an assessment of the shares of relator, which he consents is a proper one if they are held to be assessable. We are of opinion that such shares were taxable, and, whatever difficulties may arise in other cases, that he cannot complain of the particular assessment made. There are many difficulties in the assessment of property under laws designed and framed, so far as general enactments can be framed, to insure recognition and operation of constitutional requirements. Courts must meet and deal with such matters

as they arise. We are not here required to say more than that we find no reason to interfere with the assessment complained about.

It will be of little benefit to enter upon a discussion of the contention of relator that the particular assessment violates rights secured to him by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. It is in testing the legislation by the constitution of our own 398 state that we have experienced difficulty. In the particular case, relator has the benefit of a construction of the law to which we are committed, and which affects him no differently than it does any other citizen of the state owning property of the same class.

The court rightly refused the writ, and the judgment is affirmed.

McAlvay, Blair, Montgomery and Hooker, JJ., concurred.

The Constitutionality of Statutes Providing that Shares of Stock in all corporations, whether owned by residents or nonresidents, shall be liable to taxation, and that stock held by nonresident stockholders is situated for the purposes of taxation at the place where the principal office of the corporation for the transaction of business is located, is upheld in Corry v. Mayor of Baltimore, 96 Md. 310, 103 Am. St. Rep. 364, and see the cases cited in the cross-reference note thereto. In the recent case of People v. Reardon, 184 N. Y. 431, 112 Am. St. Rep. 628, a statute imposing a tax on sales of corporate stock is held valid.

WITHEY v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILROAD COMPANY. [141 Mich. 412, 104 N. W. 773.]

CARRIER-Liability to Parent for Child's Baggage.-A father, paying full fare for himself, traveling with a child of such tender years that by custom no fare is demanded for its transportation, may recover upon the contract of carriage for the loss of articles bought and used for the child and packed and carried with the father's baggage. (pp. 535, 536.)

CARRIER-Liability to Husband for Wife's Baggage.-Where a husband buys railway tickets for himself and wife, and has their baggage checked thereon, he can recover on the contract of carriage for the loss of her jewels which were not furnished her by himself. (p. 537.)

EVIDENCE-Opinions as to Value of Injured Baggage.—In an action against a railroad company for injury to wearing apparel car

ried as baggage, opinion evidence is admissible to show how much the articles depreciated in value by reason of the injury to them. (p. 539.)

TRIAL-Inspection by Jury of Injured Chattels.-The refusal of a court to require the production of articles of baggage claimed to have been injured through the negligence of a carrier is not an abuse of discretion, if the defendant's witnesses have had an opportunity to inspect them, and it is not clear that the jury would be aided by an examination of them. (pp. 541, 542.)

Frederick W. Stevens and Charles McPherson, for the appellant.

Crane & Norris, for the appellee.

413 OSTRANDER, J. On Saturday, December 26, 1903, plaintiff, his wife, and their twenty-one months old child were passengers on defendant's road from Monroe, where they had passed Christmas with relatives, to Grand Rapids, their home. As baggage they had on the same train two trunks. These trunks contained various articles of dress and of the toilet, some intended solely for the use of the infant. They contained, also, some articles of jewelry used by and intended for use by the wife, which had been given her by others than her husband, which she took to Monroe with her on her visit, and some gifts made to plaintiff and his wife and to the child at Monroe.

Plaintiff purchased at Monroe two full fare tickets to Grand Rapids, no ticket for the infant, checked the trunks, and received the checks issued for them. At East Paris, 414 near Grand Rapids, the train in question was in collision with an eastbound passenger train. On the following Monday the baggage was delivered at plaintiff's place of residence, and later, at defendant's freight depot, plaintiff's wife picked out from a quantity of goods certain articles which had been in the trunks. As delivered, the trunks, which were broken, contained a portion only of their original contents, and also articles, some of them greasy, not belonging to plaintiff or his wife, coal and pieces of earth or mud. The contents of the trunks were mussed, and some of them stained and greased and spotted with mud. In January, 1904, a claim, which reads: "I herewith present my claim for damages sustained by Mrs. Withey and myself in your wreck of December 26, amounting to three hundred and eighty-six dollars and twenty-five cents”—

with a list of articles and figures, was presented to defendant, and later plaintiff began this suit.

The action is assumpsit. Liability of defendant is predicated upon the contract of carriage, the nonperformance of the contract by defendant, and the injury of the baggage. No contention was made in the court below respecting the negligence of the defendant and resulting liability to pay plaintiff the damages he sustained.

The case comes here upon twenty-five assignments of error, which may be grouped, and which counsel for defendant has grouped and discussed, under four propositions. Stating these propositions as they are understood, and in the order in which they will be discussed, they are: 1. That plaintiff was not entitled to recover (as he did) for destruction of and damages to articles intended for the sole use of the infant; 2. That he was not entitled to recover (as he did) for loss of and damages to the articles of jewelry belonging to his wife; 3. That the court improperly admitted opinion evidence as to the amount or sum of the damage to particular articles; and 4. That the court should have required, upon defendant's application, production of the damaged articles, so far as they could be produced, for exhibition to the jury.

415 1. It is contended that, because no fare was paid for the infant-because it was carried free-the defendant "was a gratuitous bailee as to the baby, and the transportation as baggage of articles intended solely for its use was a mere incident to that gratuity," and the case of Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Weir, 37 Mich. 111, 26 Am. Rep. 499, is relied upon to sustain the contention. In that case the form of action was, as it is here, assumpsit. The plaintiff, on a passage from Detroit to Saginaw upon defendant's road, lost, as he claimed, his trunk, containing personal effects. It appeared that both plaintiff and his trunk were being carried, not for hire, but gratuitously. It was held that, in the absence of a contract for carriage, damages for loss of the baggage could not be recovered in assumpsit. The rule in the case cited does not control the present case. Even if it can be said that the child was carried free, a point which we do not consider, it by no means follows that the articles in question, the child's wearing apparel, were carried free. The clothing of the infant was the property of the father, and was in the trunks of

the father, with whom the defendant had made a contract of carriage, both of his person and his baggage.

While it is asserted on the part of defendant that it had the right to charge for the carriage of the infant, it is not claimed that under its rules and practice it does charge anything for the carriage of infants of the age of plaintiff's child. Nor do we base our determination at all upon the fact, which appears in the record, that the infant occupied for hire a seat in the parlor-car during the trip. What we hold, and what we think the correct rule of law, is that a father, paying full fare, for himself, traveling with an infant child of such tender years that by custom no fare is demanded for its carriage, may recover upon the contract for carriage for the loss or injury of articles bought and used for the child, which articles are a part of, and packed and carried with, his baggage, and upon the ground that such articles are the property of the parent, 416 in his possession, and properly a part of his proper baggage: Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 21; Burke v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 451, 19 Am. Rep. 618; Wheeler v. St. Joseph etc. R. R. Co., 31 Kan. 640, 3 Pac. 297; Smith v. Abair, 87 Mich. 62, 49 N. W. 509.

2. We have before us no question concerning the right of the husband (plaintiff) to recover for injuries to the ordinary wearing apparel of his wife. The contention relates entirely to articles of jewelry, lost or injured, which were not given or furnished by her husband. It is defendant's position that, these being the separate and sole property of the wife, the husband, under the circumstances shown, could not recover for their loss or injury. In his charge the court said to the jury:

"Some question has been raised by defendant's counsel to the effect that the articles contained in this trunk which had been previously given to the plaintiff's wife by others, and which were taken by her to Monroe on this trip as a part of her wardrobe, ought not to be included in your consideration. These articles are the cameo pin, set in pearls, the silk liberty scarf, the set of gold beads, the emerald wreath set in pearls, and perhaps some other articles.

"But after some consideration (although not without considerable hesitation), I have concluded, under the circumstances admitted in this case, to submit that question