These rulings and this instruction are before us for review. We shall assume that the learned trial judge did not mean to be understood as denying the power of the court to order the production of the garments: Graves v. City of Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 35 Am. St. Rep. 561, 54 N. W. 757, 19 L. R. A. 641. Treating the rulings made as an exercise of judicial discretion, we are not impressed that the discretion was abused. The witnesses for defendant were permitted before the trial inspection of the principal articles of apparel claimed to have been injured, and we do not think it is clear that the inspection which the jury might have made, if the garments had been produced in court, would have aided them. Judgment is affirmed. Moore, C. J., and Carpenter, Montgomery and Hooker, JJ., concurred. The Right of a Husband or Father to sue for the loss of baggage belonging to his wife or infant child is discussed in the monographic note to Wood v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 99 Am. St. Rep. 389, 390. HUNT v. BRANCH CIRCUIT JUDGE. EXEMPTION of Life Insurance Money from Claim for Alimony. Under the statute of Michigan creating an exemption in favor of the proceeds of certificates in beneficial associations, the circuit court has no jurisdiction, on a bill for a divorce and alimony, to enjoin the payment of the proceeds of such a certificate to the defendant. (p. 543.) Kinney & Briggs and Palmer & Palmer, for the relator. Lockerby & Cowell, for the respondent. 423 HOOKER, J. The relator was beneficiary in two certificates issued by mutual benefit societies of which his father was a member. Two days after the father's death the relator's wife filed a bill for divorce and alimony, making the societies parties thereto, and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the payment of the benefits to the relator. The relator was brought in by publication, as personal service could not be had upon him, for the rea son that he was absent from this state and in the state of Georgia. He employed attorneys at Coldwater, and they filed an order that "on motion of Kinney & Briggs and Palmer & Palmer, solicitors for said defendant, it is ordered that the appearance of said defendant be, and is hereby, entered specially, and for the purpose of filing a petition to dissolve the injunction heretofore issued in this cause," and for general relief. This was accompanied by 424 a petition, made by counsel upon relator's behalf, for a dissolution of the injunction. Upon service of this petition counsel for the complainant filed a petition for an allowance for expenses and maintenance during the pendency of the suit, and caused notice of the hearing of the same to be served on relator's counsel. The two applications were heard at the same time, the motion to dissolve the injunction being denied, and the other being granted and an allowance made. Relator now asks that the court be compelled by mandamus to (1) dissolve said injunction; (2) vacate the order allowing maintenance, etc. The questions argued are (1) whether the fund was subject to the process of the court; (2) whether there was such a service as to support the action of the court in relation to alimony pendente lite. The first contention rests upon the statute (2 Comp. Laws, sec. 7754), which provides: "(7754) Sec. 15. The money or other benefit, charity, relief or aid to be paid, provided or rendered by any association authorized to do business under this act, shall not be liable to attachment by trustee, garnishee, or other process, and shall not be seized, taken, appropriated or applied by any legal or equitable process, or by operation of law, to pay any debt or liability of a certificate holder, or of any beneficiary named in a certificate, or of any person who may have any right thereunder." In other words, the claim is that this class of property is exempt from interference by a court of equity for this purpose and that such courts have no jurisdiction over it. We are reluctantly forced to the conclusion that this statute must be construed in accordance with the relator's contention, and that the writ should issue as prayed, so far as the injunction is concerned. Upon the other question we must decline to interfere at this stage. If the order for temporary alimony is void for want of jurisdiction, it cannot be enforced. If there is jurisdiction, we should be disinclined to interfere with the discretion of the circuit judge. Counsel cite authorities 125 to support their claim that, by appearing and moving to dissolve the injunction, the defendant appeared generally in the case and conferred jurisdiction, if the court did not already have it: See Coad v. Coad, 41 Wis. 23; 3 Cyc. 504, note 28. We find it unnecessary to pass upon the question, and this portion of the relief prayed for is denied. A writ will issue in accordance with the above opinion, without costs to either party. Moore, C. J., and Carpenter, McAlvay, and Grant, JJ., concurred. A Statute Exempting the Proceeds of all life and accident insurance policies from liability for any debt applies to an endowment or investment policy payable to the insured or his estate and having a present cash value: Flood v. Libbey, 38 Wash. 366, 107 Am. St. Rep. 851. The right to exemption is not lost where the beneficiary in a policy deposits the proceeds thereof in a bank: Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 777, 104 Am. St. Rep. 86. PEOPLE v. WOLVERINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY. [141 Mich. 455, 104 N. W. 725.] OBSTRUCTION OF STREETS.-Title to Land cannot be Tried in a prosecution in a municipal court for obstructing a street. (p. 545.) OBSTRUCTION OF STREETS.—To Oust a Court of Jurisdiction of a prosecution for obstructing a street because the title to land is involved, it is essential that there should be a bona fide contention either as to the existence of the highway or the title of the lands where the obstructions are placed. (p. 545.) DEDICATION OF STREETS-Sufficiency of Acceptance.—If a plat dedicating a street is approved by the board of public works, and is recorded in the office of the register of deeds, and soon thereafter men in the employ of the city plow, scrape and round up the street for public travel, this shows a sufficient acceptance of the dedication. (p. 546.) OBSTRUCTION OF STREET.-Where the Dedication of a Street has been accepted by the city opening and working it, abutting owners who have recognized its public character by petitioning the council for its vacation cannot be heard to contend, when prosecuted for obstructing the street, that the prosecution involves title to land, and thereby oust the municipal court of jurisdiction. (p. OBSTRUCTION OF STREET.—Abutting Owners on Both Sides of a Cul-de-sac used only for their private purposes may build a fence across it without being liable to prosecution in a municipal court under an ordinance forbidding the obstruction of streets. (p. 547.) Keena, Lightner & Oxtoby and Samuel Harris, for the appellants. Timothy E. Tarsney and J. W. Dohany, for the respondent. 456 BLAIR, J. The defendants were convicted on June 24, 1904, in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit, of obstructing Thirteenth street, south of Stanley avenue, an alleged public street in said city, under the provisions of a city ordinance. Sentence having been entered upon such conviction, defendants have brought the judgment and record of this court for review upon writ of certiorari. Defendants in their brief limit the "discussion" to three items, as follows: 1. Respondents in good faith claim. title to the property in question; 2. No actual highway existed at the place in question; 3. The city never accepted as a street the parcel or property in question. It is well settled that the title to lands cannot be tried in proceedings like the present: People v. Stott, 90 Mich. 343, 51 N. W. 509, and cases cited. In order to oust the court of jurisdiction, it is, however, essential that there should be a bona fide contention either as to the existence of the highway or the title of the lands where the alleged obstructions are located. The rule is well stated by Chief Justice Christiancy, in Roberts v. Highway Commrs. of Cottrellville, 25 Mich. 23, as follows: "And whenever the contest shall appear before the jury to be, really and in good faith, a question of the existence of the highway claimed, or a question involving the title to real estate, rather than a question of encroachment upon a highway admitted to exist, or the existence of which is not in good faith seriously contested, or so clearly shown as to admit of no real and bona fide contest, the whole proceeding should be dismissed by the jury as beyond their jurisdiction in such a proceeding. 457 We think that the existence of the highway is so clearly shown in the case at bar as to admit of no real and bona fide contest. It appears conclusively from the evidence that on the fourteenth day of July, 1895, Senator McMillan, having theretofore purchased the property, executed a Am. St. Rep., Vol. 113-35 plat in due form, whereby he dedicated, amongst other things, the streets and alleys shown on said plat to the public. On the eighteenth day of July, 1895, the plat designated "McMillan-Edensor Subdivision of Part of Lots 1 and 2, Lafferty Farm, Private Claim 228," was approved by the board of public works of the city of Detroit. On the nineteenth day of July, 1895, this plat was recorded in liber 19 of Plats, on page 96, in the office of the register of deeds for Wayne county. Thirteenth street, the highway in question here, was one of the streets dedicated by said plat. It further appears, by the undisputed testimony, that soon after the recording of the plat a gang of men in the employ of the board of public works, under the direction of a ward boss, plowed three furrows on each side of Thirteenth street its entire length, and then took a road scraper and scraped it up to the center of the road, rounded up the street, and scraped it up for public travel, and the work was paid for by a pay boss for the city. This opening and working the street by the city constituted a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the street, which thereupon became a public street of the city, subject to its jurisdiction and control, till vacated or lost by nonuser or adverse possession, which is not claimed in this case: City of Mt. Clemens v. Mt. Clemens Sanitarium Co., 127 Mich. 115, 86 N. W. 537. Furthermore, the defendants recognized the public character of the street by their own solemn act. In January, 1903, the defendants presented a petition to the common council asking for the vacation of Thirteenth street south of Stanley avenue, which was referred to the committee on street openings, who reported on March 10th in favor of granting the prayer of the petition upon certain conditions, and a resolution was introduced to that effect. On March 24th the resolution was put on its passage, and 458 failed of securing the necessary three-fourths of the votes of the aldermen-elect, there being eighteen yeas and fifteen nays. In March, 1903, and, we suppose, after the failure of the vacation proceedings, defendants constructed a fence across the street, which is the obstruction complained of. Under such circumstances, we think the recorder's court had jurisdiction of the case. It remains to consider whether Thirteenth street, south of Stanley avenue, was an actual highway in the sense |