dent sole responsibility to prepare and submit an executive budget to the Congress, and established a Bureau of the Budget to administer the new budget system. These congressional enactments permitted the Executive to achieve a great concentration of financial and policymaking authority first in the Budget Bureau and more recently in the Office of Management and Budget.

Despite periodic efforts to centralize budget responsibility in Appropriations Committees and to enact an overall legislative budget, budget responsibility remained dispersed throughout the Congress. Both taxing and spending actions were carried on over many months in many different legislative measures. Budget actions never explicitly decided the size of the budget, whether it should be in surplus or deficit, and precisely by what amount. The budget process was, in fact, merely the sum of dozens of isolated and usually unrelated actions, sometimes having the effect of stimulating the economy when restraint was needed, and vice-versa.

Third, the nature and timing of congressional budget actions. About 75 percent of the budget was regarded as "relatively uncontrollable under existing law," and uncontrollables had become the fastest rising part of the total budget. Backdoor spending—that is, spending outside the regular appropriation process-represented more than half of all spending.

Appropriation bills were seldom completed by the beginning of the fiscal year for which funds were to be provided, causing many Federal agencies to operate on continuing resolutions for part, and in some cases, all of the year.

And fourth, the increasing use of impoundments by the Executive, which directly challenged Congress' constitutional power to establish spending priorities.

Acting pursuant to the limited authority granted in the Antideficiency Act, the Executive claimed power not merely to defer or delay spending for various programs, but to determine which programs should be continued and which eliminated altogether. Impoundment actions were vigorously challenged in the courts and within the Congress itself. Although most impoundments were reversed, the lack of a comprehensive and coherent budget process clearly placed the Congress in a weakened position to contest the Executive's action.

THE BACKGROUND OF BUDGET REFORM (PRIOR TO 1974)

Reform of its budget process has been a continuing concern of the Congress since World War II:

In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Congress provided for the adoption of a legislative budget recommended by a joint committee composed of all House and Senate Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Finance Committee members. Yet, in 1947, the Congress was unable to agree on a budget ceiling; in 1948, it adopted a ceiling, but ignored it in later spending decisions; and in 1949, it abandoned the legislative budget altogether.

In 1950, the Congress enacted an Omnibus Appropriations Bill covering all of the regular bills usually acted upon separately. Again, it abandoned the process the following year.

In 1952 and many times again in subsequent years, the Senate passed a bill creating a Joint Committee on the Budget. The House, however, did not take similar action.

In 1972, however, the Congress embarked firmly on the path to meaningful reform. During consideration of legislation to raise the ceiling on the public debt, the President requested authority to hold fiscal year 1973 spending to $250 billion. Although both Houses adopted the requested limit on spending, they were unable to agree on what discretion the President should be given to enforce the ceiling. Consequently, the ceiling was eliminated by the House-Senate conferees.

The 1972 debt limit legislation (Public Law 92-599), however, established a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control and directed it to study "... the procedures which should be adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving congressional control of budget outlay and receipt totals, including procedures for establishing and maintaining an overall view of each year's budgetary outlays which is fully coordinated with an overall view of anticipated revenues for that year."

The Joint Committee issued its final report in April 1973 and legislation was introduced in both Houses to implement its recommendations. After significant modification by both House and Senate committees, including the addition of anti-impoundment procedures originally considered in separate legislation, both Houses overwhelmingly approved the budget reform legislation. Although the House and Senate versions differed significantly in detail, the main thrusts of the Joint Committee recommendations were not at issue. Final action in both Houses was completed in June 1974, and the bill was signed into law July 12, 1974, as Public Law 93-344. The Act contains 10 titles which, for purposes of explanation, can be grouped into four major categories, as follows:

Titles I and II establish Committees on the Budget in both the House and the Senate and a Congressional Budget Office to improve the Congress' informational and analytical resources with respect to the budgetary process;

Titles III and IV establish a timetable and procedures for various phases of the congressional budget process;

Titles V through IX amend the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and 1970 to provide for a new fiscal year, improvements in budget terminology and information to be included in the President's budget submissions, improved program review and evaluation procedures, and effective dates for the various provisions of the Act; and

Title X establishes procedures for congressional review of Presidential impoundment actions. Titles I through IX are known as the Congressional Budget Act and Title X is known as the Impoundment Control Act.

THE BACKGROUND OF BUDGET PROCESS REFORM (1985)

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) made significant changes in the congressional budget process. Conceived as a statutory response to the

burgeoning Federal deficit problem, the measure was first introduced in the Senate by Senator Phil Gramm, along with 24 cosponsors as S. 1702 on September 25, 1985.

That bill served as the basis for an amendment to H.J. Res. 372, Statutory Debt Limit Increase, a bill passed in the House without a separate vote when the House adopted the conference report on the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1986.1 The amendment to the debt limit bill was first offered by Senator Dole on October 3, 1985 and, after several modifications, was incorporated into the debt limit extension as it passed the Senate on October 10, 1985.

House and Senate conferees were initially unable to resolve their differences on the debt limit legislation and, consequently, a conference report was filed in disagreement in the House on November 1, 1985.

After amendments in both Houses, the Senate, on November 7, 1985, agreed to the House request for a further conference. On December 10, 1985, the conference report was filed in the House and on December 11, 1985, both bodies passed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as part of H.J. Res. 372. President Reagan signed the measure into law on December 12, 1985 as Public Law 99-177.

S. 1702 and the initial Senate amendment contained several changes in the congressional budget process, including the institution of a single binding budget resolution, binding subcommittee allocations, required reconciliation, and enforcement of deficit targets in congressional budgetmaking through points of order.

The final product kept many of these changes and further incorporated budget process modifications included in "Congressional Budget Act Amendments of 1984" (H.R. 5247, 98th Congress, 2d Session (1984)).2 That bill was the product of two years' review and deliberation by the House Rules Committee Task Force on the Budget Process. The Task Force was first appointed in March 1982 to identify problems in the budget process and develop practicable solutions.

THE HOUSE AND SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEES

The Act establishes a standing Committee on the Budget in each House. The House Committee is composed of 33 members: 3 five from the Ways and Means Committee; five from the Appropriations Committee; twenty-one from other standing committees of the House; and one member each from the majority and minority leadership.

The composition of the House Budget Committee recognizes the special need to coordinate revenue and expenditure actions by participation of Ways and Means and Appropriations Committee members. However, the entire House membership is drawn into the budget process to assure that all interests and views are represent

'See further discussion in "The Public Debt Limit", infra.

2 For a legislative history of H.R. 5247, see. H. Rept. 1152, Part 1, 98th Congress, 2d Session (1984).

3 Originally 23 under the Act, but increased to 30 beginning with the 97th Congress by amendment to the Standing Rules of the House. Beginning with the 99th Congress reference to the size of the Committee in the Standing Rules of the House was deleted.

4

ed by the making of fiscal decisions. All Budget Committee members are selected by party caucuses, including the Chairman, who is not required to come from the Ways and Means or Appropriations Committee. No member may serve more than 6 years in five successive Congresses, except that an incumbent Chairman having served during three Congresses on the committee and not more than one Congress as Chairman and who is reelected for one additional Congress as Chairman shall not be subject to this limitation. Finally, selection of members and Chairman is made without regard to seniority.

The Senate Budget Committee consists of 22 members,5 selected from the Senate at large in the same manner as other standing committees of the Senate.

The House and Senate Committees are given the following duties by the Act:

(1) To report to their respective Houses the matters required by Titles III and IV of the Act including "concurrent resolutions on the budget" (a term defined in the Act and discussed in greater detail following);

(2) To make continuing studies of the effect on budget outlays of relevant existing and proposed legislation;

(3) To request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expenditures and methods of coordinating tax expenditures with direct budget outlays; and

(4) To review the operations of the Congressional Budget Office.

The House committee's jurisdiction extends to all "concurrent resolutions on the budget," and to all other matters required to be referred to it under Title III of the Act.

Section 306 of the Act gives the Budget Committees exclusive jurisdiction over any bill, resolution, or amendment which deals with any matter covered by a "concurrent resolution on the budget." For example, it would not be in order to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget reported by the Appropriations Committee. One other provision of Title III specifies an additional matter under the jurisdiction of the Budget Committees. Section 310 provides for the reporting by the Budget Committees of reconciliation bills or resolutions involving the actions of two or more committees called for in a budget resolution. This process is discussed in greater detail in a separate section on reconciliation.

It is important to note the distinct nature of the functions of the two Budget Committees. They are created to guide the Congress in the tasks of setting national fiscal policy aggregates; that is, total spending, revenue, and debt levels. No other committee of the Congress performs these tasks, a major defect prior to the establishment of the congressional budget process.

Furthermore, the Budget Committees are not intended to diminish in any way the responsibilities or prerogatives of other committees. They are intended to provide new fiscal policy and priority

Originally 4 years under the Act but changed by amendment to the Standing Rules of the House beginning with the 96th Congress.

5 Originally 15 under the Act, but changed by amendment to the Standing Rules of the Senate, in the 96th Congress (20 Members) and the 97th Congress (22 Members).

setting functions which, properly executed, will enable other committees to perform their tasks with greater focus and effect.

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 imposed additional responsibilities on the Budget Committees. In the Senate, the Budget Committee is responsible for formulating a congressional response to a Presidential sequestration order prior to its final effect. In fulfilling that responsibility, the Committee is empowered to receive the views and estimates of Senate committees and report a resolution which affirms in whole or part a pending Presidential sequestration order. To the extent that a sequestration order is not affirmed, the resolution would set into motion a procedure similar to budget resolution reconciliation in an attempt to formulate a congressional alternative to a sequestration order. In the House, the Budget Committee has jurisdiction over the resolution.

In addition, the membership of the House and Senate Budget Committees would constitute the Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction in the event any of the reporting procedures under the sequestration process are invalidated by the Supreme Court.* The purposes of the Joint Committee are to receive the reports of the Directors of CBO and OMB and to report a joint resolution setting forth the contents of the report of the Directors. Enactment of that joint resolution gives rise to a sequestration order. (For a further discussion of the process, see Attachment "C".)

THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

In addition to the Budget Committees, the Act establishes a Congressional Budget Office.

This office is headed by a Director appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate after receiving recommendations from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The CBO Director, who is required to be appointed without regard to political affiliation, has a four-year term of office and may be removed by either House.

The CBO is given wide-ranging and important responsibilities by the Act. With a specific mandate to assist the House and Senate Budget Committees, it serves as a principal source of information on the budget and on taxing and spending legislation. At the request of any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate, the CBO shall provide these committees with information which will assist them with respect to the budget; appropriation bills; legislation authorizing or providing budget authority or tax expenditures; and information with respect to revenues, receipts, and changing revenue conditions.

In addition, the CBO also assumed the functions of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures, particularly its scorekeeping duties which are an extremely important part of the budget process. Scorekeeping involves the tracking of Congress' nu

*On February 7, 1986, a three judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held the General Accounting Office's role in the reporting procedures unconstitutional on the ground that the Act vests executive power in the Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress. On July 7, 1986, the United States Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling. Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, U.S.

(July 7, 1986) (No. 85-1377).