powerful republic owes its birth. The tyranny exercised by Philip II. in the Netherlands excited thofe provinces to rife: feven of them, closely confederated, bravely maintained their liberties, under the conduct of the heroes of the houfe of Orange; and Spain, after feveral vain and ruinous efforts, acknowledged them fovereign and independent ftates. If the authority of the , prince is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws, the prince, on exceeding the bounds prefcribed him, commands without any right, and even without a juft title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may refift his unjust attempts. As foon as a prince attacks the conftitution of the ftate, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him: the people become free by the act of the fovereign, and can no longer view him but as an ufurper who would load them with oppreflion. This truth is acknowledged by every fenfible writer, whofe pen is not enflaved by fear, or fold for hire. But fome celebrated authors maintain, that if the prince is invefted with the fupreme command in a full and abfolute manner, nobody has a right to refift him, much less to curb him, and that nought remains for the nation but to fuffer and obey with patience. This is founded upon the fuppofition that fuch a fovereign is not accountable to any perion for the manner in which he governs, and that if the nation might controul his actions and refift him, where it thinks them unjuft, his authority would no longer be abfolute; which would be contrary to this hypothefis. They fay that an abfolute fovereign completely poffeffes all the political authority of the fociety, which nobody can oppose,-that, if he abufes it, he does ill indeed, and wounds his confcience, but that his commands are not the lefs obligatory, as being founded on a lawful right to command,— that the nation, by giving him abfolute authority, has referved no fhare of it to itself, and has fubmitted to his difcretion, &c. We might be content with anfwering, that in this light there is not any fovereign who is completely and fully abfolute. But in order to remove all thefe vain fubtleties, let us remember the effential end of civil fociety. Is it not to labour in concert for the common happiness of all? Was it not with this view that every citizen divefted himself of his rights, and refigned his liberty? Could the fociety make fuch ufe of its authority, as irrevocably to furrender itself and all its members to the difcretion of a cruel tyrant? No, certainly, fince it would no longer poffefs any right itfelf, if it were difpofed to opprefs a part of the citizens. When therefore it confers the fupreme and abfolute government, without an exprefs referve, it is neceflarily with the tacit referve that the fovereign fhall ufe it for the fafety of the people, and not for their ruin. If he becomes the fcourge of the itate, he degrades himself; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself; and if he has carried his tyranny to the utmost height, why fhould even the lie of fo cruel and perfidious an enemy be fpared? Who fhal prefume to blame the conduct of the Roman fenate, that declared Nero an enemy to his country?

But

But it is of the utmost importance to obferve, that this judgment can only be paffed by the nation, or by a body which reprefents it, and that the nation itself can not make any attempt on the perfon of the fovereign, except in cafes of extreme neceflity, and when the prince, by violating the laws, and threatening the fafety of his people, puts himself in a state of war against them. It is the perfon of the fovereign, not that of an unnatural tyrant and a public enemy, that the intereft of the nation declares facred and inviolable. We feldom fee fuch monfters as Nero. In the more common cafes, when a prince violates the fundamental laws, when he attacks the liberties and privileges of his fubjects, or (if he be abfolute) when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifeftly tends to the ruin of the nation, it may refift him, pafs fenténce on him, and withdraw from his obedience: but though this may be done, ftill his perfon fhould be fpared, and that for the welfare of the state*. It is above

a century

* Diffimulandum cenfeo quatenus falus publica patiatur, privatimque corruptis moribus princeps contingat: alioquin fi rempublicam in periculum vocat, fi patria religionis contemptor exiftit, neque medicinam ullam recipit, abdicandum judico, alium fubftituendum; quod in Hifpania non femel fuiffe factum fcimus: quali fera irritata, omnium telis peti debet, cum, hun anitate abdicata, tyrannum induit. Sic Petro rege ob immanitatem dejecto publice, Henricus ejus frater, quamvis ex ipari matre, regnum obtinuit. Sic Henrico hujus abnepote ob ignaviam pravolque mores abdicato procerum fuffragiis, primum Alfonfus ejus frater, recte an fecus, non difputo, fed tamen in tenera ætate rex eft proclamatus: deinde defuncto Alfonfo, Elifabetha ejus foror, Henrico invito, rerum fummam ad fe traxit, regio tantum nomine abftinens dum ille vixit. Mariana, de Rege et Regis Inftitut. Lib. I. c. iii.

To this authority furnished by Spain, join that of Scotland, proved by the letter of the barons to the pope, dated April 6, 1320, requesting him to prevail on the king of England to refift from his enterprifes against Scotland. After having fpoken of the evils they had fuffered from him, they add-A quibus malis innumeris, ipfo juvante qui poft vulnera m detur et fanat, liberati fumus per fereniffium princip m regem et dominum noftrum, dominum Robertum, qui pro populo et hæreditate fuis de manibus inimicorum liberandis, quafi alter Maccabæus aut Jofue, labores et tædis, inedias et pericula, lato fuftinuit animo. Quem etiam divina difpofitio, et (juxta leges et confuetudines noftras, quas ufque ad mortem fuftinere volumus) juris fucceffio, et debitus noftrorum confenfus et affenfus noftrum fecerunt principem atque regem: cui, tanquam ill: per quem falus in populo facta eft, pro noftra libertate tuenda, tam jure quam meritis tenemur, et volumus in omnibus adherere. Quem, fi ab inceptis defiftet, regi Anglorum aut Anglis nos aut regnum reft um volens fubjicere, tanquam inimicum noirum et fui noltrique juris fubverforem, ftatim expellere nitemur, et alium regem noftrum, qui ad defenfionem Bottram fufficiet, faciemus: quia, quamdiu centum viri remai.ferint, nunquam Anglorum dominio aliquatenus volumus fubjugari. Non enim propter gloriam, divitias, aut horores pugnamus, fed propter libertatem folummodo, quam nemo bonus nifi fimul cum vita amttit.

"In the year 1581 (fays Grotius, Ann. book III.) the confederated provinces of the Netherlands,-after having for nine years continued to wage war against Philip the Second without ceafing to acknowledge him as their fovereign,—at length folemnly deprived him of the authority he had poffeffed over their country, because be had violated their laws and privileges." The author afterwards obferves that France, Spain herself, England, Sweden, Denmark, furnish instances of kings depofed by their people, fo that there are at prefent few fovereigns in Europe whole right to the crown refts on any other foundation than the right which the people pics of divesting their fovereign of his power when he makes an ill use of it" Pursuant to this idea, the United Provinces, in their juftificatory letters on that fubje&, addressed to the princes of the Empire and the king of Denmark,--

C 2

after

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a century fince the English took up arms against their king, and obliged him to defcend from the throne. A fet of able enter. prifing men, fpurred on by ambition, took advantage of the terrible ferment, caufed by fanaticifm and party fpirit; and Great Britain fuffered her fovereign to die unworthily on a fcaffold. The nation coming to itfelf discovered its former blindness. If, to this day, it ftill annually makes a folemn atonement, it is not only, from the opinion that the unfortunate Charles I. did not deserve fo cruel a fate, but, doubtlefs, from a conviction that the very fafety of the state requires the perfon of the fovereign to be held facred and inviolable, and that the whole nation ought to render this maxim venerable, by paying refpect to it when the care of its own prefervation will permit.

One word more on the diftinction that is endeavoured to be made here in favour of an abfolute fovereign. Whoever has well weighed the force of the indifputable principles we have establithed, will be convinced, that, when it is neceflary to refift a prince who has become a tyrant, the right of the people is still the fame, whether that prince was made abfolute by the laws, or was not; because that right is derived from what is the object of all political fociety, -the fafety of the nation, which is the fupreme law. But if the diftinction of which we are treating, is of no moment with respect to the right, it can be of none in practice, with refpect to expediency. As it is very difficult to oppose an abfolute prince, and it cannot be done without railing great difturbances in the ftate, and the moft violent and dangerous commotions, it ought to be attempted only in cafes of extremity, when the public mifery is raised to fuch a height, that the people may fay with Tacitus, miferam pacem vel bello bene mutari,

that it is better to expose themfelves to a civil war, than to endure them. But if the prince's authority be limited,-if it in fome refpects depends on a fenate or a parliament that reprefents the nation, there are means of refifting and curbing him, without expofing the ftate to violent fhocks. When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, there can be no reafon for waiting until it becomes extreme.

But however limited a prince's authority may be, he is comArbitration monly very jealous of it; it feldom happens that he patiently fuffers refiftance, and peaceably submits to the judgment of his people. Can he want fupport, while he is the diftributer of

the king and his fubjects.

after having enumerated the oppreffive acts of the king of Spain,-added-" Then, by a mode which has been often enough adopted even by thofe nations that now live under kingly government, we wrested the fovereignty from him whofe actions were all contrary to the duty of a prince." Ibid.

* Populi pat oni non pauciora neque minora præfidia habent. Certe a republica unde ortum habet regia poteftas, rebus exigentibus, regens in jus vocari potest, et, fi fanitatem refpuat, principatu fpoliari; neque ita in principem jura potestatis tranftulit, ut non fibi majorem refervârit poteftatem. Ibid. cap. VI.

Ett tamen falutaris cogitatio, ut fit principibus perfuafum, fi rempublicam opprefferint, fi vitiis et fœditate intolerandi erunt, ea fe conditione vivere, ut non jure tantum, fed cum laude et gloria, perimi poflint. Ibid.

favours?

favours? We fee too many base and ambitious fouls, for whom the ftate of a rich and decorated flave has more charms than that of a modeft and virtuous citizen. It is therefore always difficult for a nation to refift a prince and pronounce fentence on his conduct, without expofing the state to dangerous troubles, and to fhocks capable of overturning it. This has fometimes occafioned a compromife between the prince and the fubjects, to fubmit to the decifion of a friendly power all the difputes that might arife between them. Thus the kings of Denmark, by folemn treaties, formerly referred to thofe of Sweden the differences that might arife between them and their fenate and this the kings of Sweden have alfo done with regard to thofe of Denmark. The princes and states of Weft Friefland, and the burgeffes of Embden, have in the fame manner conftituted the republic of the United Provinces the judge of their differences. The princes and the city of Neufchatel eftablished, in 1405, the canton of Berne perpetual judge and arbitrator of their difputes. Thus alfo, according to the spirit of the Helvetic confederacy, the entire body takes cognisance of the disturbances that arife in any of the confederated itates, though each of them is truly fovereign and independent.

can

§ 53.

As foon as a nation acknowledges a prince for its lawful fovereign, all the citizens owe him a faithful obedience. He The obedineither govern the ftate, nor perform what the nation expects ence which from him, if he be not punctually obeyed. Subjects then have owe to a fubjects no right, in doubtful cafes, to examine the wifdom or juftice of fovereign. their fovereign's commands; this examination belongs to the prince: his fubjects ought to fuppofe (if there be a poflibility of fuppofing it) that all his orders are juft and falutary: he alone is accountable for the evil that may refult from them.

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Nevertheless this ought not to be entirely a blind obedience. No engagement can oblige or even authorise a man to violate the In what law of nature. Ail authors who have any regard to confcience cafes they may refif or decency, agree that no one ought to obey fuch commands as him. are evidently contrary to that facred law. Thofe governors of places who bravely refufed to execute the barbarous orders of Charles IX. on the memorable day of St. Bartholom.ew have been univerfally praifed; and the court did not dare to punish them, at leaft openly. "Sire," faid the brave Orte, governor of Bayonne, in his letter, "I have communicated your majesty's "command to your faithful inhabitants and warriors in the gar"rifon and I have found there only good citizens and brave "foldiers; but not a fingle executioner: wherefore both they "and I most humbly entreat your majefty to be pleafed to " employ our hands and our lives in things that are poffible, "however hazardous they may be; and we will exert ourselves "to the last drop of our blood in the execution of them*."

The count de Tende, Charny, and others, replied to those who brought them the orders of the court, "that they had too great "a refpect for the king, to believe that fuch barbarous orders "came from him."

It is more difficult to determine in what cases a subject may not only refuse to obey, but even refist a sovereign, and oppose his violence by force. When a fovereign does injury to any one, he acts without any real authority; but we ought not thence to conclude haftily that the fubject may refift him. The nature of fovereignty, and the welfare of the ftate, will not permit citizens to oppofe a prince whenever his commands appear to them unjuft or prejudicial. This would be falling back into the ftate of nature, and rendering government impoffible. A fubject ought patiently to fuffer from the prince, doubtful wrongs, and wrongs that are fupportable,-the former, because whoever has fubmitted to the decifion of a judge, is no longer capable of deciding his own pretenfions; and as to those that are fupportable, they ought to be facrificed to the peace and safety of the ftate, on account of the great advantages obtained by living in fociety. It is prefumed, as matter of course, that every citizen has tacitly engaged to obferve this moderation; because, without it, fociety could not exist. But when the injuries are manifest and atrocious, when a prince, without any apparent reafon, attempts to deprive us of life, or of thofe things, the lofs of which would render life irkfome,-who can difpute our right to refift him? Self-prefervation is not only a natural right, but an obligation impofed by nature, and no man can entirely and abfolutely renounce it. And though he might give it up, can he be confidered as having done it by his political engagements, fince he entered into fociety only to establish his own safety upon a more folid basis? The welfare of fociety does not require fuch a facrifice; and, as Barbeyrac well obferves in his notes on Grotius, "If the public intereft requires, that thofe who obey should "fuffer fome inconvenience, it is no lefs for the public intereft "that thofe who command, fhould be afraid of driving their "patience to the utmost extremity*." The prince who violates all laws, who no longer obferves any measures,-and who would in his tranfports of fury take away the life of an innocent. perfon,-divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be confidered in any other light than that of an unjust and outra geous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend themselves. The perfon of the fovereign is facred and inviolable: but he who, after having loft all the sentiments of a fovereign, divests himself even of the appearances and exterior conduct of a monarch, degrades himself: he no longer retains the facred character of a fovereign, and cannot retain the preroga tives attached to that exalted rank. However, if this prince is not a monster,-if he is furious only against us in particular, and

* De Jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. I. cap iv. § 11. not. 2.

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