lation of a tions that live together in a ftate of nature, and acknowledge no fuperior upon earth, to maintain order and peace in their fociety. Nations, therefore, and their conductors, ought inviolably to obferve their promifes and their treaties. This great truth, though too often neglected in practice, is generally acknowledged by all nations: the reproach of perfidy is efteemed by fovereigns a moft atrocious affront; yet he who does not obferve a treaty, is certainly perfidious, fince he violates his faith. On the contrary, nothing adds fo great a glory to a prince, and to the nation he governs, as the reputation of an inviolable fidelity in the performance of promifes. By fuch honourable conduct, as much or even more than by her valour, the Swifs nation has rendered herfelf refpectable throughout Europe, and is defervedly courted by the greatest monarchs, who intruft their perfonal fafety to a body-guard of her citizens. The parliament of England has more than once thanked the king for his fidelity and zeal in fuccouring the aliies of his crown. This national magnanimity is the fource of immortal glory; it prefents a firm bafis on which nations may build their confidence; and thus it becomes an unfailing fource of power and fplendor. As the engagements of a treaty impofe on the one hand a perThe viola fect obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. The treaty is an breach of a treaty is therefore a violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have contracted; and this is an act of injustice against him. act of in juftice. $ 165. Treaties cannot be trary to thofe already exitting. A fovereign already bound by a treaty, cannot enter into others contrary to the firft. The things, refpecting which he has enmade, con- tered into engagements, are no longer at his difpofal. If it hap pens that a pofterior treaty be found, in any particular point, to clafh with one of more ancient date, the new treaty is null and void with respect to that point, inafmuch as it tends to difpofe of a thing that is no longer in the power of him who appears to difpofe of it. (We are here to be understood as fpeaking of treaties made with different powers.) If the prior treaty is kept fecret, it would be an act of confummate perfidy to conclude a contrary one, which may be rendered void whenever occafion ferves. Nay, even to enter into engagements, which, from the eventual turn of affairs, may chance at a future day to militare against the fecret treaty, and from that very circumflance to prove ineffeQual and nugatory, is by no means juftifiable, unless we have the ability to make ample compenfation to our new ally: otherwife it would be practising a deception on him, to promile him a thing without informing him that cafes may poffibly occur, which will not allow us to fubftantiate our promife. The ally thus decrived is undoubtedly at liberty to renounce the treaty; but if he chufes rather to adhere to it, it will hold good Mahommed warmly recommended to his disciples the obfervance of treaties. Ockly's Hiftory of the Saracens, vol. i. with refpect to all the articles that do not clafh with the prior treaty. with the There is nothing to prevent a fovereign from entering into en- $166. gagements of the fame nature with two or more nations, if he How trea ties may be be able to fulfil thofe feveral engagements to his different allies concluded at the fame time. For inftance, a commercial treaty with one with feve nation does not deprive us of the liberty of afterwards contract- ral nations ing fimilar engagements with other ftates, unless we have, in the fame view. former treaty, bound ourselves by a promife not to grant the fame advantages to any other nation. We may in the fame manner promife to aflift two different allies with troops, if we are able to furnish them, or if there is no probability that both will have occafion for them at the fame time. anc en ntitled to ence. If nevertheless the contrary happens, the more ancient ally is § 167. entitled to a preference: for the engagement was pure and abfo- The more ally late with refpect to him; whereas we could not contract with the more recent ally, without a refervation of the rights of the a preferformer Such refervation is founded in juftice, and is tacitly understood, even if not exprefsly made. The juftice of the caufe is another ground of preference be- $ 163. tween two allies. We ought even to refufe afliftance to the one whofe caufe is unjuft, whether he be at war with one of our allies, or with another state: to aflift him on fuch an occafion, war. would in the event be the fame thing as if we had contracted an alliance for an unjust purpose; which we are not allowed to do (§ 161). No one can be validly engaged to fupport injuf tice. We owe no affiftance in an unjust General di vifion of 1. Thofe by the law Grotius divides treaties into two general claffes,-first, thofe $169. which turn merely on things to which the parties were already bound by the law of nature, fecondly, thofe by which they enter into fur-treaties. ther engagements*. By the former we acquire a perfect right to things to which we before had only an imperfect right, fo that that relate we may thenceforward demand as our due what before we to things could only requeft as an office of humanity. Such treaties be- already cue came very neceflary between the nations of antiquity, who, as of nature. we have already obferved, did not think themfelves bound to any duty towards people who were not in the number of their allies. They are ufeful even between the moft polifhed nations, in order the better to fecure the fuccours they may expect, to determine the measure and degree of thofe fuccours, and to fhew on what they have to depend,—to regulate what cannot in general be determined by the law of nature, and thus to obviate all difficulties, by providing against the various interpretations of that aw. Finally, as no nation poffeffes inexhauftible means of afliftance, it is prudent to fecure to ourselves a peculiar right to that af fiftance which cannot be granted to all the world. To this first clafs belong all fimple treaties of peace and friendhip, when the engagements which we thereby contract, make no * De Jure Blli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. xv. § 5. $170. Collifion of thefe treaties with the duties we owe to ⚫ ourselves. $171. which we addition to thofe duties that men owe to each other as brethren, and as members of the human fociety: fuch are those treaties that permit commerce, paffage, &c. If the affiftance and offices that are due by virtue of fuch a treaty, fhould on any occafion prove incompatible with the duties a nation owes to herself, or with what the fovereign owes to his own nation, the cafe is tacitly and neceffarily excepted in the treaty. For neither the nation nor the fovereign could enter into an engagement to neglect the care of their own fafety or the fafety of the ftate, in order to contribute to that of their ally. If the fovereign, in order to preserve his own nation, has occafion for the things he has promifed in the treaty, if, for inftance, he has engaged to furnish corn, and in a time of dearth he has scarcely fufficient for the fubfiftence of his fubjects, he ought without hesitation to give a preference to his own nation: for it is only fo far as he has it in his power to give affiftance to a foreign nation, that he naturally owes fuch affistance; and it was upon that footing alone that he could promife it in a treaty. Now it is not in his power to deprive his own nation of the means of fubfiftence in order to affift an other nation at their expenfe. Neceffity here forms an exception, and he does not violate the treaty, because he cannot fulfil it. The treaties by which we fimply engage not to do any evil to Treaties in an ally, to abftain, with refpect to him, from all harm, offence, barely pro- and injury, are not neceffary, and produce no new right, fince mife to do every individual already pofleffes a perfect natural right to be no injury exempt from harm, injury, and real offence. Such treaties, however, become very ufeful, and accidentally neceffary, among thofe barbarous nations who think they have a right to act as they please towards foreigners. They are not wholly useless with nations lefs favage, who, without fo far divefting themselves of humanity, entertain a much lefs powerful fenfe of a natural. obligation, than of one which they have themfelves contracted by folemn engagements: and would to God that this manner of thinking were entirely confined to barbarians! We fee too frequent effects of it among thofe who boaft of a perfection much fuperior to the law of nature. But the imputation of perfidy is prejudicial to the rulers of nations, and thus becomes formidable even to those who are little folicitous to merit the appellation of virtuous men, and who feel no fcruple in filencing the reproaches of confcience. § 172. Treaties concerning things that are not na Treaties by which we contract engagements that were not impofed on us by the law of nature, are either equal or unequal. Equal treaties are thofe in which the contracting parties promife the fame things, or things that are equivalent, or, finally, turally due. things that are equitably proportioned, fo that the condition of the parties is equal. Such is, for example, a defenfive alliance, in which the parties reciprocally ftipulate for the fame fuccours. Such is an offenfive alliance, in which it is agreed that each of Equal treaties. the the allies fhall furnish the fame number of veffels, the fame Equal treaties may be fubdivided into as many fpecies as there are of different tranfactions between fovereigns. Thus they treat of the conditions of commerce, of their mutual defence, of affociations in war, of reciprocally granting each other a paffage, or refufing it to the enemies of their ally; they engage not to build fortreffes in certain places, &c. But it would be needlefs to enter into thefe particulars: generals are fuflicient, and are easily applied to particular cafes. of preferv Nations being no lefs obliged than individuals to pay a regard $173. to equity, they ought, as much as poffible, to preferve equality Obligation in their treaties. When, therefore, the parties are able recipro- inequality cally to afford each other equal advantages, the law of nature in treaties. requires that their treaties fhould be equal, unless there exift fome particular reafon for deviating from that equality, fuch, for inftance, as gratitude for a former benefit,-the hope of gaining the inviolable attachment of a nation,-some private motive which renders one of the contracting parties particularly anxious to have the treaty concluded, &c. Nay, viewing the tranfaction in its proper point of light, the confideration of that particular reafon reftores to the treaty that equality which feems to be destroyed by the difference of the things pro mifed. I fee thofe pretended great politicians fmile, who employ all their fubtilty in circumventing those with whom they treat, and in fo managing the conditions of the treaty, that all the advantage fhall accrue to their mafters. Far from blushing at a conduct fo contrary to equity, to rectitude, and natural honesty, they glory in it, and think themfelves entitled to the appellation of able negotiators. How long fhall we continue to fee men in public characters take a pride in practices that would difgrace a private individual? The private man, if he is void of confcience, laughs alfo at the rules of morality and justice; but he laughs in fecret: it would be dangerous and prejudicial to him & 174. between ties and equal alli ances. to make a public mockery of them. Men in power more openly facrifice honour and honefty to prefent advantage: but, fortunately for mankind, it often happens that such seeming advantage proves fatal to them; and even between fovereigns, candour and rectitude are found to be the fafeft policy. All the fubtilties, all the tergiverfations of a famous minifter, on the occafion of a treaty in which Spain was deeply interested, turned at length to his own confufion, and to the detriment of his ma fter; while England, by her good faith and generofity to her allies, gained immenfe credit, and rofe to the highest pitch of influence and refpectability. When people fpeak of equal treaties, they have commonly in Difference their minds a double idea of equality, viz. equality in the enequal trea-gagements, and equality in the dignity of the contracting parties. It becomes therefore neceffary to remove all ambiguity; and for that purpofe, we may make a diftinction between equal treaties and equal alliances. Equal treaties are those in which there is an equality in the promises made, as we have above exexplained (172); and equal alliances, thofe in which equal treats with equal, making no difference in the dignity of the contracting parties, or, at leaft, admitting no too glaring fuperiority, but merely a pre-eminence of honour and rank. Thus kings treat with the emperor on a footing of equality, though they do not hesitate to allow him precedency; thus great repub lics treat with kings on the fame footing, notwithstanding the pre-eminence which the former now-a days yield to the latter. Thus all true fovereigns ought to treat with the most powerful monarch, fince they are as really fovereigns, and as independent as himfelf. (See $ 37 of this Book.) § 175. Unequal treaties and un equal alli ances. Unequal treaties are thofe in which the allies do not recipro cally promife to each other the fame things, or things equiva lent; and an alliance is unequal when it makes a difference in the dignity of the contracting parties. It is true, that most commonly an unequal treaty will be at the fame time an unequal alliance; as great potentates are feldom accuftomed to give cr to promife more than is given or promifed to them, unless such conceffions be fully compenfated in the article of honour and glory; and, on the other hand, a weak ftate does not fubmit to burthenfome conditions without being obliged alfo to acknowledge the fuperiority of her ally. Thofe unequal treaties that are at the fame time unequal alliances, are divided into two claffes,-the first confifting of thofe where the inequality prevails on the fide of the more confiderable power, the fecond comprehending treaties where the inequality is on the fide of the inferior power. Treaties of the former clafs, without attributing to the more powerful of the contracting parties any right over the weaker, fimply allow him a fuperiority of honours and refpect. We have treated of this in Book I. § 5. Frequently a great monarch, withing to engage a weaker ftate in his intereft, offers her advantageous |