6174 between ties and equal alli ances. to make a public mockery of them. Men in power more openly facrifice honour and honefty to prefent advantage: but, fortunately for mankind, it often happens that fuch feeming advantage proves fatal to them; and even between fovereigns, candour and rectitude are found to be the fafeft policy. All the fubtilties, all the tergiverfations of a famous minifter, on the occafion of a treaty in which Spain was deeply interested, turned at length to his own confufion, and to the detriment of his mafter; while England, by her good faith and generofity to her allies, gained immenfe credit, and rofe to the highest pitch of influence and refpectability. When people speak of equal treaties, they have commonly in Difference their minds a double idea of equality, viz. equality in the enequal trea-gagements, and equality in the dignity of the contracting parIt becomes therefore neceffary to remove all ambiguity; and for that purpose, we may make a diftinction between equal treaties and equal alliances. Equal treaties are thofe in which there is an equality in the promifes made, as we have above exexplained (§ 172); and equal alliances, thofe in which equal treats with equal, making no difference in the dignity of the contracting partics, or, at leaft, admitting no too glaring fuperiority, but merely a pre-eminence of honour and rank. Thus kings treat with the emperor on a footing of equality, though they do not hesitate to allow him precedency; thus great republics treat with kings on the fame footing, notwithstanding the pre-eminence which the former now-a days yield to the latter. Thus all true fovereigns ought to treat with the most powerful monarch, fince they are as really fovereigns, and as independent as himself. (See $ 37 of this Book.) § 175. Unequal treaties and un equal alli ances. Unequal treaties are thofe in which the allies do not recipro cally promife to each other the fame things, or things equiva lent; and an alliance is unequal when it makes a difference in the dignity of the contracting parties. It is true, that moft commonly an unequal treaty will be at the fame time an unequal alliance; as great potentates are feldom accustomed to give cr to promife more than is given or promifed to them, unlefs fuch conceffions be fully compenfated in the article of honour and glory; and, on the other hand, a weak ftate does not submit to burthenfeme conditions without being obliged alfo to acknowledge the fuperiority of her ally. Thofe unequal treaties that are at the fame time unequal alliances, are divided into two claffes,-the first confifting of thofe where the inequality prevails on the fide of the more confiderable power-the fecond comprehending treaties where the inequality is on the fide of the inferir power. Treaties of the former clafs, without attributing to the more powerful of the contracting parties any right over the weaker, fimply allow him a fuperiority of honours and refpect. We have treated of this in Book I. § 5. Frequently a great monarch, withing to engage a weaker ftate in his intereft, offers her advantageous advantageous conditions, promifes her gratuitous fuccours, or greater than he ftipulates for himself: but at the fame time he claims a fuperiority of dignity, and requires respect from his ally. It is this laft particular which renders the alliance unequal: and to this circumftance we must attentively advert; for with alliances of this nature we are not to confound thofe in which the parties treat on a footing of equality, though the more powerful of the allies, for particular reafons, gives more than he receives, promifes his affiftance gratis, without requiring gratuitous affiftance in his turn, or promifes more confiderable fuccours, or even the affiftance of all his forces :-here the alliance is equal, but the treaty is unequal, unlefs indeed we may be allowed to fay, that, as the party who makes the greater conceffions has a greater interest in concluding the treaty, this confideration restores the equality. Thus, at a time when France found herself embarraffed in a momentous war with the houfe of Auftria, and the cardinal de Richelieu wished to humble that formidable power, he, like an able minister, concluded a treaty with Guftavus Adolphus, in which all the advantage appeared to be on the fide of Sweden. From a bare confideration of the ftipulations of that treaty, it would have been pronounced an unequal one; but the advantages which France derived from it, amply compenfated for that inequality. The alliance of France with the Swifs, if we regard the ftipulations alone, is an unequal treaty; but the valour of the Swifs troops has long fince counterbalanced that inequality; and the difference in the interefts and wants of the parties ferves ftill further to preferve the equilibrium. France, often involved in bloody wars, has received effential fervices from the Swifs: the Helvetic body, void of ambition, and untainted with the fpirit of conqueft, may live in peace with the whole world; they have nothing to fear, fince they have feelingly convinced the ambitious, that the love of liberty gives the nation fufficient ftrength to defend her frontiers. This alliance may at certain times have appeared unequal:-our forefathers paid little attention to ceremony:-but in reality, and especially fince the abfolute independence of the Swifs is acknowledged by the empire itself, the alliance is certainly equal, although the Helvetic body do not hesitate to yield to the king of France all that pre-eminence which the eftablished ufage of modern Europe attributes to crowned heads, and efpecially to great monarchs. * Treaties in which the inequality prevails on the fide of the inferior power, that is to fay, thofe which impofe on the weaker party more extenfive obligations or greater burthens, or bind him down to oppreffive and difagreeable conditions,-thefe unequal treaties, I fay, are always at the fame time unequal alliances; for the weaker party never fubmits to burthenfome conditions, without being obliged alfo to acknowledge the fuperiority of his ally. Thefe conditions are commonly impofed by the conqueror, or dictated by neceffity, which obliges a weak ftate to feek The author was a native of Switzerland. the e powerful; and by her own inferiority. of alliance is a difpaat the fame time that it Sometimes alío, the o promise the fame fucecomes neceflary that the this point, by engagements ..d often even fubject her, this kind are all thofe treaengages not to make war rful ally, to have the fame am,-to fupport and refpect ...n certain places,-not to trade countries, to deliver up her others, as was the cafe of the their Roman conquerors,—— ver of troops, &c. ebdivided into two kinds; they they do not. We have lightly I. and XVI. are and unimpaired when none of sterred to the fuperior ally, or renxr, dependent on his will. But the any of its rights are ceded to an em be merely rendered dependent on example, the treaty does not impair ...er itate only promifes not to attack he confent of her ally. By fuch an vetts herself of her right, nor fubjects er's will; fhe only confents to a reeally and thus the incurs no greater an is incurred by promifes of every kind. ery day ftipulated in alliances that are either of the contracting parties engages any one whatfoever without the conat ally who on his fide does not make the mer contracts an unequal alliance with dicv; for he deprives himself of one of the es of the fovereign power, or renders the ent on another's will. The Carthaginians that terminated the fecond Punic war, prowar on any state without the confent of the ake thenceforward, and for that reason, confion the Romans. forced to fubmit to the will of a fuperior fully renounce her former treaties, if the the is obliged to enter into an alliance requires ne then lofes a part of her fovereignty, her anthe ground together with the power that had This is a necellity that cannot be imputed ܂ ܢ ܂ to her as a crime and fince the would have a right to place herfelf in a state of absolute subjection, and to renounce her own fovereign, if the found fuch measures neceflary for her preferva tion, by a much stronger reafon, she has a right, under the fame neceffity, to abandon her allies. But a generous people will exhauft every refource before they will fubmit to terms fo fevere and fo humiliating. to avoid as much as In general, as every nation ought to be jealous of her glory, $177. careful of maintaining her dignity, and preserving her indepen- We ought dence, nothing short of the last extremity, or motives the most weighty and fubftantial, ought ever to induce a people to con- poflible tract an unequal alliance. This obfervation is particularly making un meant to apply to treaties where the inequality prevails on the equal allifide of the weaker ally, and still more particularly to those unequal alliances that degrade the fovereignty. Men of courage and fpirit will accept fuch treaties from no other hands but those of imperious neceflity. ances. ties of na liances. Notwithstanding every argument which felfifh policy may § 178. fuggeft to the contrary, we must either pronounce fovereigns to Mutual dube abfolutely emancipated from all fubjection to the law of na- tions with ture, or agree that it is not lawful for them, without juft reasons, respect to to compel weaker ftates to facrifice their dignity, much lefs their unequal alliberty, by unequal alliances. Nations owe to each other the fame affiftance, the fame respect, the fame friendship, as individuals living in a state of nature. Far from seeking to humble a weaker neighbour, and to defpoil her of her most valuable advantages, they will refpect and maintain her dignity and her liberty, if they are infpired by virtue more than by pride,-if they are actuated by principles of honour more than by the meaner views of fordid intereft,-nay, if they have but fufficient difcernment to diftinguish their real interefts. Nothing more firmly fecures the power of a great monarch than his attention and respect to all other sovereigns. The more cautious he is to avoid offending his weaker brethren,—the greater esteem he teftifies for them,-the more will they revere him in turn: they feel an affection for a power whofe fuperiority over them is difplayed only by the conferring of favours: they cling to fuch a monarch as their prop and fupport; and he becomes the arbiter of nations. Had his demeanour been ftamped with arrogance, he would have been the object of their jealousy and fear, and might perhaps have one day funk under their united efforts. But as the weaker party ought, in his neceflity, to accept with gratitude the affiftance of the more powerful, and not to refufe 179. him fuch honours and refpect as are flattering to the perfon who In alliances receives them, without degrading him by whom they are `ren- inequality dered,-fo, on the other hand, nothing is more conformable to is on the the law of nature, than a generous grant of afliftance from the side of the more powerful ftate, unaccompanied by any demand of a return, erful party. or, at leaft, of an equivalent. And in this inftance alfo, there exits an infeparable connection between intereft and duty. Sound where the more pow 8 157. fhould be able to allege ftrong and substantial reasons, and, in particular, to prove that his minifter has deviated from his inftructions. A treaty is valid if there be no defect in the manner in which Validity of it has been concluded: and for this purpofe nothing more can treaties. be required, than a fufficient power in the contracting parties, and their mutual confent fufficiently declared. § 158. An injury cannot then render a treaty invalid. He who enInjury does not render ters into engagements ought carefully to weigh every thing bethem void. fore he concludes them; he may do what he pleases with his own property, forego his rights, and renounce his advantages, as he thinks proper; the acceptor is not obliged to inquire into his motives, and to estimate their due weight. If we might recede from a treaty because we found ourfelves injured by it, there would be no ftability in the contracts of nations. Civil laws may fet bounds to injury, and determine what degree of it fhall be capable of invalidating a contract. But fovereigns are fubject to no fuperior judge. How fhall they be able to prove the injury to each other's fatisfaction? Who fhall determine the degree of it fufficient to invalidate a treaty? The peace and happinefs of nations manifeftly require that their treaties should not depend on fo vague and dangerous a plea of invalidity. $ 159. Duty of nations in this refpect. $160. *ricaties A fovereign nevertheless is in confcience bound to pay a regard to equity, and to obferve it as much as poffible, in all his treaties. And if it happens that a treaty which he has concluded with upright intentions, and without perceiving any unfairness in it, fhould eventually prove difadvantageous to an ally, nothing can be more honourable, more praifeworthy, more conformable to the reciprocal duties of nations, than to relax the terms of fuch treaty as far as he can do it confiftently with his duty to himself, and without expofing himfelf to danger, or incurring a confiderable lofs. Though a fimple injury, or fome disadvantage in a treaty, be Nullity of not fufficient to invalidate it, the cafe is not the fame with those inconveniences that would lead to the ruin of the nation. Since, ious in the formation of every treaty, the contracting parties must be ftate. vefted with fufficient powers for the purpofe, a treaty pernici in are ous to the ftate is null, and not at all obligatory, as no conductor of a nation has the power to enter into engagements to do fuch things as are capable of deftroying the ftate, for whofe fafety the government is intrufted to him. The nation itself, being neceffarily obliged to perform every thing required for its prefervation and fafety (Book I. § 16, &c.), cannot enter into engagements contrary to its indifpenfable obligations. In the year 1506, the ftates-general of the kingdom of France, affembled at Tours, engaged Louis XII. to break the treaty he had concluded with the emperor Maximilian, and the archduke Philip, his fon, because that treaty was pernicious to the kingdom. They alfo decided, that neither the treaty, nor the oath that had accompanied it, could be binding on the king, who had no right to alienate |