from the effects of a fudden tranfport or a violent passion, and is fupportable to the reft of the nation,- the refpect we ought to pay to the tranquillity of the ftate is fuch, and the refpect due to sovereign majefty fo powerful, that we are flrictly obliged to feek every other means of prefervation, rather than to put his perfon in danger. Every one knows the example fet by David: he fled, -he kept himfelf concealed, to fecure himself from Saul's fury.and more than once fpared the life of his perfecutor. When the reafon of Charles VI. of France was fuddenly difordered by a fatal accident, he in his fury killed feveral of those who furrounded him: none of them thought of fecuring his own life at the expenfe of that of the king; they only endeavoured to disarm and fecure him. They did their duty like men of honour and faithful fubjects, in expofing their lives, to fave that of this unfortunate monarch: fuch a facrifice is due to the state and to fovereign majesty: furious from the derangement of his faculties, Charles was not guilty; he might recover his health, and again become a good king. What has been faid is fufficient for the intention of this work: the reader may fee these questions treated more at large in many books that are well known. We fhall conclude this fubject with an important obfervation. A fovereign is undoubtedly allowed to employ minifters to eafe him in the painful offices of govern ment; but he ought never to furrender his authority to them. When a nation chufes a conductor, it is not with a view that he fhould deliver up his charge into other hands. Minifters ought only to be inftruments in the hands of the prince; he ought constantly to direct them, and continually endeavour to know whether they act according to his intentions. If the imbecillity of age, or any infirmity, render him incapable of governing, a regent ought to be nominated, according to the laws of the itate: but when once the fovereign is capable of holding the reins, let him infift on being served, but never fuffer himself to be superfeded. The laft kings of France of the first race furrendered the government and authority to the mayors of the palace: thus becoming mere phantoms, they justly loft the title and honours of a dignity of which they had abandoned the functions. The nation has every thing to gain in crowning an all-powerful minifter; for he will improve that foil as his own inheritance, which he plundered whilft he only reaped precarious, advantages from it. CHA P. V. Of States Elective, Succeffive or Hereditary, and of thofe called WE have feen in the preceding chapter, that it originally be longs to a nation to confer the fupreme authority, and to chuse the person by whom it is to be governed. If it confers the fovereignty on him for his own perfon only, referving to itfelf C 4 the $ 55. Of minif ters. $56. Of elective ftates. $ 57. Whether elective kings are real fovereigns. $58. Of fucceffive and ftates. The origin of the right the right of chufing a fucceffor after the fovereign's death, the ftate is elective. As foon as the prince is elected according to the laws, he enters into the poffeffion of all the prerogatives which those laws annex to his dignity. It has been debated, whether elective kings and princes are real fovereigns. But he who lays any ftrefs on this circumstance must have only a very confufed idea of fovereignty. The manner in which a prince obtains his dignity has nothing to do with determining its nature. We must confider, firft, whether the nation itself forms an independent fociety (fee chap. I.), and fecondly, what is the extent of the power it has intrufted to the prince. Whenever the chief of an independent ftate really represents his nation, he ought to be confidered as a true fovereign ($40), even though his authority should be limited in several refpects. When a nation would avoid the troubles which feldom fail to accompany the election of a fovereign, it makes its choice for a hereditary long fucceffion of years, by establishing the right of fucceffion, or by rendering the crown hereditary in a family, according to the order and rules that appear most agreeable to that nation. The name of an Hereditary State or Kingdom is given to that where the fucceffor is appointed by the fame law that regulates the fucceffions of individuals. The Succeffive Kingdom is that where a perfon fucceeds according to a particular fundamental law of the ftate. Thus the lineal fucceffion, and of males alone, is eftablished in France. of fucceffion. right. $59. The right of fucceffion is not always the primitive establishOther ori- ment of a nation; it may have been introduced by the conceffion gins of this of another fovereign, and even by ufurpation. But when it is fupported by long poffeffion, the people are confidered as confenting to it; and this tacit confent renders it lawful, though the fource be vicious. It refts then on the foundation we have already pointed out,-a foundation that alone is lawful and incapable of being fhaken, and to which we must ever revert. $ 60. Other fources which fill amount to the fame thing. $ 6r. A nation The fame right, according to Grotius and the generality of writers, may be derived from other fources, as conqueft, or the right of a proprietor, who, being mafter of a country, fhould invite inhabitants to fettle there, and give them lands, on condition of their acknowledging him and his heirs for their fovereigns. But as it is abfurd to fuppofe that a fociety of men can place themselves in fubjection otherwife than with a view to their own fafety and welfare, and ftill more that they can bind their pofterity on any other footing, it ultimately amounts to the fame thing; and it must ftill be faid that the fucceffion is established by the exprefs will or the tacit confent of the nation, for the welfare and fafety of the state. It thus remains an undeniable truth, that in all cafes the fucceffion is established or received only with a view to the public welfare may change and the general fafety. If it happened then that the order the fuccef- established in this refpect became deftructive to the state, the fion. nation would certainly have a right to change it by a new law. Salus the order of Salus populi fuprema lex,-the fafety of the people is the fupreme law; and this law is agreeable to the strictest justice,-the people having united in fociety only with a view to their fafety and greater advantage *. This pretended proprietory right attributed to princes is a chimera produced by an abufe which its fupporters would fain make of the laws refpecting private inheritances. The state neither is nor can be a patrimony, fince the end of patrimony is the advantage of the poffeffor, whereas the prince is established only for the advantage of the ftate + The confequence is evident: if the nation plainly perceives that the heir of her prince would be a pernicious fovereign, fhe has a right to exclude him. The authors whom we oppofe, grant this right to a defpotic prince, while they refuse it to nations. This is because they confider fuch a prince as a real proprietor of the empire, and will not acknowledge that the care of their own fafety, and the right to govern themselves, ftill effentially belong to the fociety, although they have intrufted them, even without any express referve, to a monarch and his heirs. In their opinion, the kingdom is the inheritance of the prince, in the fame manner as his field and his flocks,-a maxim injurious to human nature, and which they would not have dared to advance in an enlightened age, if it had not the support of an authority which too often proves ftronger than reafon and justice. A nation may, for the fame reason, oblige one branch who removes to another country, to renounce all claim to the crown, as a daughter who marries a foreign prince. These renunciations, required or approved by the state, are perfectly valid, fince they are equivalent to a law that fuch perfons and their pofterity fhould be excluded from the throne. Thus the laws of England have for ever rejected every Roman Catholic. "Thus a law of "Ruffia, made at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, most * Nimirum, quod publicæ falutis caufa et communi confenfu ftatutum eft, eadem multitudinis voluntate, rebus exigentibus, immutari quid obftat? MARIANA, ibid. c. iv. + When Philip II. refigned the Netherlands to his daughter Ifabella Clara Eugenia, it was faid (according to the testimony of Grotius) that it was ferting a dangerous precedent, for a prince to treat free citizens as his property, and barter them away like domestic flaves; - that, among barbarians indeed, the extraordinary practice fometimes obtained, of transferring governments by will or donation, because those people were incapable of difcerning the difference between a prince and a master ;but that thofe whom fuperior knowledge enabled to diftinguish between what is lawful and what is not, could plainly perceive that the adminiftration of a state is the property of the people (thence ufually denominated res-publica);-and that as, in every period of the world, there have been nations who governed themselves by popular aflemblies or by a fenate, there have been others who intrufted the general management of their concerns to princes. For it is not to be imagined it was added that legitimate fovereignties have originated from any other fource than the confent of the people, who gave themfe ves all up to a fingle perfon, or (for the Lake of avoiding the tumults and difcord of elections) to a whole family: and thofe to whom they thus committed them elves, were induced by the prospect of honourable pre-eminence alone to accept a dignity by which they were bound to promote the general welfare of their fellow citizens in preference to their own private advantage. GROTIUS. Hift. of the Disturbances in the Netherlands. Book II. « wifely $62. Of renun ciations. 1 powerful republic owes its birth. The tyranny exercised by Philip II. in the Netherlands excited thofe provinces to rife: feven of them, clofely confederated, bravely maintained their liberties, under the conduct of the heroes of the houfe of Orange and Spain, after feveral vain and ruinous efforts, acknowledged them fovereign and independent states. If the authority of the prince is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws, the prince, on exceeding the bounds prefcribed him, commands without any right, and even without a juft title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may refift his unjust attempts. As foon as a prince attacks the conftitution of the ftate, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him: the people become free by the act of the fovereign, and can no longer view him but as an ufurper who would load them with oppreflion. This truth is acknowledged by every fenfible writer, whofe pen is not enflaved by fear, or fold for hire. But fome celebrated authors maintain, that if the prince is invested with the fupreme command in a full and abfolute manner, nobody has a right to refift him, much less to curb him, and that nought remains for the nation but to suffer and obey with patience. This is founded upon the fuppofition that fuch a fovereign is not accountable to any perion for the manner in which he governs, and that if the nation might controul his actions and refift him, where it thinks them unjuft, his authority would no longer be abfolute; which would be contrary to this hypothefis. They fay that an abfolute fovereign completely poffeffes all the political authority of the fociety, which nobody can oppofe,- that, if he abufes it, he does ill indeed, and wounds his confcience, but that his commands are not the less obligatory, as being founded on a lawful right to command,— that the nation, by giving him abfolute authority, has reserved no fhare of it to itself, and has fubmitted to his difcretion, &c. We might be content with anfwering, that in this light there is not any fovereign who is completely and fully abfolute. But in order to remove all thefe vain fubtleties, let us remember the effential end of civil fociety. Is it not to labour in concert for the common happiness of all? Was it not with this view that every citizen divefted himself of his rights, and refigned his liberty? Could the fociety make fuch ufe of its authority, as irrevocably to furrender itself and all its members to the difcretion of a cruel tyrant? No, certainly, fince it would no longer poffefs any right itfelf, if it were difpofed to opprefs a part of the citizens. When therefore it confers the fupreme and abfolute government, without an exprefs referve, it is neceflarily with the tacit referve that the fovereign fhall ufe it for the fafety of the people, and not for their ruin. If he becomes the scourge of the itate, he degrades himself; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself; and if he has carried his tyranny to the utmost height, why should even the life of fo cruel and perfidious an enemy be fpared? Who fhal prefume to blame the conduct of the Roman fenate, that declared Nero an enemy to his country? But But it is of the utmost importance to obferve, that this judgment can only be paffed by the nation, or by a body which represents it, and that the nation itself can not make any attempt on the perfon of the fovereign, except in cafes of extreme neceflity, and when the prince, by violating the laws, and threatening the fafety of his people, puts himself in a state of war against them. It is the perfon of the fovereign, not that of an unnatural tyrant and a public enemy, that the interest of the nation declares facred and inviolable. We feldom fee fuch monfters as Nero. In the more common cafes, when a prince violates the fundamental laws, when he attacks the liberties and privileges of his fubjects, or (if he be abfolute) when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifeftly tends to the ruin of the nation, it may refift him, pafs fentence on him, and withdraw from his obedience: but though this may be done, ftill his perfon fhould be fpared, and that for the welfare of the ftate *. It is above a century * Diffimulandum cenfeo quatenus falus publica patiatur, privatimque corruptis toribus princeps contingat: alioquin fi rempublicam in periculum vocat, fi patriæ religionis contemptor exiftit, neque medicinam ullam recipit, abdicandum judico, alium fubftituendum; quod in Hifpania non femel fuiffe factum fcimus: quafi fera irritata, omnium telis peti debet, cum, hun anitate abdicata, tyrannum induit. Sic Petro rege ob immanitatem dejecto publice, Henricus ejus frater, quamvis ex impari matre, regnum obtinuit. Sic Henrico hujus abnepote ob ignaviam prawlque mores abdicato procerum fuffragis, primum Alfonfus ejus frater, recte an fecas, non difputo, fed tamen in tenera ætate rex eft proclamatus: deinde defuncto A.fonfo, Elifabetha ejus foror, Henrico invito, rerum fummam ad fe traxit, regio tentum nomine abftinens dum ille vixit. Mariana, de Rege et Regis Inftitut. Lib. I. c. iii. To this authority furnished by Spain, join that of Scotland, proved by the letter of the barons to the pope, dated April 6, 1320, requesting him to prevail on the king of England to efift from his enterprises against Scotland. After having fpoken of the evils they had fuffered from him, they add-A quibus malis innumeris, ipfo juvante qui poft vulnera m detur et fanat, liberati fumus per fereniflium princip m regem et dominum noftium, dominum Robertum, qui pro populo et bæreditate fuis de manibus inimicorum liberandis, quafi alter Maccabæus aut Jofue, labores et rædis, inedias et pericula, lato fuftinuit animo. Quem etiam divina difpofitio, et (juxta leges et confuetudines noftras, quas ufque ad mortem fuftinere volumus) juris fucceffio, et debitus noftrorum confenfus et affenfus noftrum fecerunt principem atque regem: cui, tanquam illi per quem falus in populo facta eft, pro nottra libertate tuenda, tam jure quam meritis tenemur, et volumus in omnibus adhærere. Quem, fi ab inceptis defiftet, regi Anglorum aut Anglis nos aut regnum acft um volens fubjicere, tanquam inimicum noftrum et fui noltrique juris fubverforem, ftatim expellere nitemur, et alium regem noftrum, qui ad defenfionem Dotram fufficiet, faciemus: quia, quamdiu centum viri remai.ferint, nunquam Anglorum dominio aliquatenus volumus fubjugari. Non enim propter gloriam, divitias, aut horores pugnamus, fed p:opter libertatem folummodo, quam nemo bonus nifi fimul cum vita amittit. "In the year 1581 (fays Grotius, Aun. book III.) the confederated provinces of the Netherlands,-after having for nine years continued to wage war against Philip the Second without ceafing to acknowledge him as their fovereign,—at length folemnly deprived him of the authority he had poffeffed over their country, because he had violated their laws and privileges." The author afterwards obferves that "France, Spain herfelf, England, Sweden, Denmark, furnish instances of kings depofed by their people, fo that there are at prefent few fovereigns in Europe whole right to the crown refts on any other foundation than the right which the people p flefs of divefting their fovereign of his power when he makes an ill use of it Pursuant to this idea, the United Provinces, in their juftificatory letters on that fubject, addreffed to the princes of the Empire and the king of Denmark,after Ca |