6284. preffions in more clear author. nians, after having promifed to retire from the territories of the Bestians, claimed a right to remain in the country under pretence that the lands actually occupied by their army did not belong to the Bocotians;-a ridiculous quibble, fince, by giving that sense to the treaty, they reduced it to nothing, or rather to a puerile play. The territories of the Baotians fhould evidently have been conftrued to mean all that was comprised within their former boundaries, without excepting what the enemy had feized during the war. If he who has expreffed himself in an obfcure or equivocal Obfcure ex- manner has spoken elfewhere more clearly on the fame fubject, terpreted he is the best interpreter of his own words. We ought to interby others pret his obfcure or equivocal expreffions in fuch a manner, that they in the fame may agree with thofe clear and unequivocal terms which he has elfewhere ufed, either in the fame deed, or on fome other fimilar occafion. In fact, while we have no proof that a man has changed his mind or manner of thinking, it is prefumed that his thoughts have been the fame on fimilar occafions; fo that if he has anywhere clearly fhewn his intention with refpect to a certain thing, we ought to affix the fame meaning to what he has eltewhere obfcurely faid on the fame fubject. Let us fuppofe, for inftance, that two allies have reciprocally promifed each other, in cafe of neceflity, the affiftance of ten thoufand foot-foldiers who are to be fupported at the expenfe of the party that fends them, and that, by a pofterior treaty, they agree that the number of the auxiliary troops fhall be fifteen thoufand, without mentioning their fupport: the obfcurity or uncertainty which remains in this article of the new treaty, is diffipated by the clear and exprefs ftipulation contained in the former one. As the allies do not give any indication that they have changed their minds with refpect to the fupport of the auxiliary troops, we are not to presume any fuch change; and those fifteen thousand men are to be fupported as the ten thoufand promifed in the first treaty. The fame holds good, and with much stronger reafon, when there is queftion of two articles of the fame treaty,-when, for example, a prince promises to furnith ten thousand men, paid and maintained at his own expenfe, for the defence of the ftates of his ally, and, in another article, only promifes four thousand men, in cafe that ally be engaged in an offenfive war. It frequently happens, that, with a view to conciseness, people exprefs imperfectly, and with fome degree of obfcurity, things which they fuppofe to be fufficiently elucidated by the preceding matter, or which they intend to explain in the sequel: and moreover, words and expreflions have a different force, fometimes even a quite different fignification, according to the occafion, their connection, and their relation to other words. The connection and train of the discourse is therefore another source of interpretation. We must confider the whole difcourfe together, in order perfectly to conceive the fenfe of it, and to give to each expreffion, not fo much the fignification which it may individually ad mit of, as that which it ought to have from the context and fpirit of the difcourfe. Such is the maxim of the Roman law, Incivile eft, nifi totâ lege perspectâ, unâ aliquâ particulá ejus propofilá, judicare, vel relpondere*. tion drawn and rela The very connection and relation of the things in question § 286. helps alfo to discover and establish the true fenfe of a treaty, or Interpretaof any other piece. The interpretation ought to be made in fuch from the a manner, that all the parts may appear confonant to each other, connection that what follows may agree with what preceded,--unless it evi- tion of the dently appear, that, by the fubfequent clauses, the parties intended things to make fome alteration in the preceding ones. For it is to be pre- themselves. fumed that the authors of a deed had an uniform and fteady train of thinking,-that they did not aim at inconfiftencies and contradictions, but rather that they intended to explain one thing by another,—and, in a word, that one and the fame spirit reigns throughout the fame production or the fame treaty. Let us render this more plain by an example. A treaty of alliance declares, that, in cafe one of the allies be attacked, each of the others fhall allift him with a body of ten thoufand foot, paid and fupported; and in another article, it is faid that the ally who is attacked fhall be at liberty to demand the promised affiflance in cavalry rather than in infantry. Here we fee, that, in the first article, the allies have determined the quantum of the fuccour, and its value, -that of ten thousand foot; and, in the latter article, without appearing to intend any variation in the value or number, they leave the nature of the fuccours to the choice of the party who may ftand in need of them. If therefore the ally who is attacked calls upon the others for cavalry, they will give him, according to the established proportion, an equivalent to ten thousand foot. But if it appears that the intention of the latter article was, that the promifed fuccours fhould in certain cafes be augmented,if, for instance, it be faid, that, in cafe one of the allies happen to be attacked by an enemy of confidcrably fuperior firength, and more powerful in cavalry, the fuccours thall be furnished in cavalry, and not in infantry,-it appears that, in this cafe, the promifed affiftance ought to be ten thousand horse. As two articles in one and the fame treaty may bear relation to each other, two different treaties may in like manner have a relative connection; and in this cafe, each ferves to explain the other. For inftance, one of the contracting parties has, in confideration of a certain object, promifed to deliver to the other ten thoufand facks of wheat. By a fubfequent agreement, it is determined, that, inftead of wheat, he fhall give him oats. The quantity of oats is not expreffed; but it is determined by comparing the fecond convention with the firit. If there be no circumftance to prove that it was the intention of the parties, in the fecond agreement, to diminish the value of what was to be delivered, we are to understand a quantity of oats proportioned to the price Digeft. lib. i. tit. iii. De Legibus, leg. 24. of $287. Interpreta tion found ed on the reafon of the deed. of ten thousand facks of wheat: but if it evidently appears, from the circumstances and motives of the second convention, that it was their intention to reduce the value of what was due under the former agreement,-in this cafe, ten thousand facks of oats are to be fubítituted in lieu of the ten thousand facks of wheat. The reafon of the law, or of the treaty,-that is to fay, the motive which led to the making of it, and the object in contemplation at the time,-is the most certain clue to lead us to the difcovery of its true meaning; and great attention should be paid to this circumftance, whenever there is queftion either of explaining an obfcure, ambiguous, indeterminate paffage in a law or treaty, or of applying it to a particular cafe. When once we certainly know the reafon which alone has determined the will of the perfon Speaking, we ought to interpret and apply his words in a manner fuitable to that reafon alone. Otherwife he will be made to speak and act contrary to his intention, and in oppofition to his own views. Purfuant to this rule, a prince, who, on granting his daughter in marriage, has promised to aflift his intended fon-in-law in all his wars, is not bound to give him any assistance if the marriage does not take place. But we ought to be very certain that we know the true and only reafon of the law, the promife, or the treaty. In matters of this nature, it is not allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain conjectures, and to fuppofe reafons and views where there are none certainly known. If the piece in queftion is in itself obfcure, if, in order to discover its meaning, we have no other refource than the investigation of the author's views, or the motives of the deed, we may then have recourfe to conjecture, and, in default of abfolute certainty, adopt, as the true meaning, that which has the greatest degree of probability on its fide. But it is a dangerous abufe, to go, without neceflity, in fearch of motives and uncertain views, in order to wreft, reftrict, or extend the meaning of a deed which is of itself fufficiently clear, and carries no abfurdity on the face of it. Such a procedure is a violation of that incontestable maxim,-that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation (§ 263). Much lefs are we allowed,-when the author of a piece has in the piece itfelf declared his reafons and motives,-to attribute to him fome fecret reafon, which may authorife us in giving an interpretation repugnant to the natural meaning of the expreflions. Even though he fhould have entertained the views which we attribute to him,-yet, if he has concealed them, and announced different ones, it is upon the latter alone that we must build our interpretation, and not upon those which the author has not exprefied: -we affume, as true, against him, what he has fufficiently de$283. clared (§ 266). Where ma ny reafons We ought to be the more circumfpect in this kind of interpretation, as it frequently happens that feveral motives concur to decurred to termine the will of the party who speaks in a law or a promife. determine Perhaps the combined influence of all thofe motives was neceffary the will. in in order to determine his will ;-perhaps each one of them, taken individually, would have been fufficient to produce that effect. In the former cafe, if we are perfectly certain that it was only in confideration of feveral concurrent reafons and motives that the legiflature or the contracting parties confented to the law or the contract, the interpretation and application ought to be made in a manner agreeable to all thofe concurrent reafons, and none of them muft be overlooked. But in the latter cafe, when it is evident that each of the reafons which have concurred in determining the will, was Jufficient to produce that effect, fo that the author of the piece in queftion would, by each of the reafons feparately confidered, have been induced to form the fame determination which he has formed upon all the reafons taken in the aggregate, His words must be fo interpreted and applied, as to make them accord with each of thofe reafons taken individually. Suppofe a prince has promised certain advantages to all foreign proteftants and artifans who will come and fettle in his ftates: if that prince is in no want of fubjects, but of artifans only, and if, on the other hand, it appears that he does not choose to have any other fubjects than proteftants,his promise must be fo interpreted, as to relate only to fuch foreigners as unite thofe two characters, of proteftants and artifans. But if it is evident that this prince wants to people his country, and that, although he would prefer proteftant fubjects to others, he has in particular fo great a want of artifans, that he would gladly receive them, of whatever religion they be,—his words hould be taken in a disjunctive fenfe, fo that it will be fufficient to be either a proteftant or an artifan, in order to enjoy the promised advantages. fufficient To avoid tedious and complex circumlocution, we fhall make $239. ufe of the term, "fufficient reafon for an act of the will," to ex- What conprefs whatever has produced that act,-whatever has determined ftitutes a the will on a particular occafion; whether the will has been de- reafon for termined by a fingle reafon, or by many concurrent reafons. an act of That fufficient reafon, then, will be fometimes found to confift the will. in a combination of many different reafons, fo that, where a fmgle one of thofe reafons is wanting, the fufficient reason no longer exifts and in thofe cafes where we fay that many motives, many reafons, have concurred to determine the will, yet fo as that each in particular would have been alone capable of producing the fame effect,-there will then be many fufficient realons for producing one fingle act of the will. Of this we fee daily inftances, A prince, for example, declares war for three or four injuries received, each of which would have been fufficient to have produced the declaration of war. interpreta The confideration of the reafon of a law or promife not only $200. ferves to explain the obfcure or ambiguous expreffions which oc- Extenfive cur in the piece, but alfo to extend or reftrict its feveral provi- tion foundfions independently of the expreffions, and in conformity to the ed on the intention and views of the legislature or the contracting parties, reafon of rather than to their words. For, according to the remark of the act. Cicero, 291. Frauds Cicero, the language, invented to explain the will, ought not to But we fhould here obferve the fame caution above recom- The rule juft laid down ferves alfo to defeat the pretexts and tending to pitiful evafions of those who endeavour to elude laws or treaties. elude laws Good-faith adheres to the intention; fraud infifts on the terms, when it thinks that they can furnish a cloak for its prevaricamifes. tions. The ifle of Pharos near Alexandria was, with other or pro idlands, tributary to the Rhodians. The latter having fent col- Quid verb's fatis hoc cautum erat? Minime. Que res igitur valuit? + Pufendorf, lio v. cap. xii. § 18. He quotes Ammianus Marcellinus, lib xii. |